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ABSTRACT 
Following the Aramco arbitration in 1963, Saudi Arabia’s approach to international 
arbitration resulted in a reputation for being an arbitration unfriendly country. This 
was addressed to some extent by the Arbitration Law of 1983. However, arbitration 
under the 1983 law remained dependent on the approval of the national courts. With 
too much scope for judicial intervention, the legal framework undermined the final 
and binding nature of the award, constrained party autonomy and created inefficient 
delays. In 2012, a new Law of Arbitration was passed to replace the 1983 law with a 
legal framework intending to meet the needs of international commercial parties. The 
question addressed by this thesis is whether the Arbitration Law of 2012 (SAL 2012) 
succeeds in creating a legal framework that is consistent with the three core principles 
that provide the foundations for modern international commercial arbitration. These 
core principles of party autonomy, procedural justice and cost-effectiveness were 
used as normative tools for assessing the provisions of the SAL 2012, which were 
based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. Relying on those principles, the SAL 2012 
was subjected to a comparative legal analysis, using the Model Law and the 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 as comparators. Although hampered by a lack of 
available case law involving the SAL 2012, the analysis concluded that the SAL 2012 
is a very significant development, providing a legal framework that facilitates 
arbitration, encourages a pro-arbitration culture and achieves a balance between the 
three core principles that should meet the needs of international commercial parties. 
Despite this, the law could be further reformed to make Saudi Arabia even more 
attractive as a location for arbitration. While acknowledging that future reform should 
be guided by empirical research on arbitration in Saudi Arabia, proposals were made 
for the further development of a pro-arbitration legal framework. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
International commercial arbitration (ICA) in Saudi Arabia has travelled a rocky road. 
The intention of its government, however, is to make Saudi Arabia more 
commercially attractive as a centre for international arbitration. A crucial part of this 
process is the Saudi Arbitration Law (SAL) of 2012. Based on the Model Law and 
enacted ‘to create a legal framework for arbitration that is more in tune with 
international standards’,1  the SAL 2012 replaces the heavily criticised SAL 1983. 
Since it was enacted with the aim of modernising the approach to arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia, the problem to be addressed is whether the provisions of the SAL 2012 are 
consistent with the modern culture of ICA.  
 
1.2 Research Question 
Based on that problem, the research question is: By comparison with the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) and the 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (Scottish Act), how consistent is the SAL 2012 with 
the core principles underlying modern ICA?  
 
1.3 ICA and Saudi Arabia: the Rationale for the Research 
1.3.1 Terminological issues 
In this section, the basic terminology used in this thesis will be set out. The nature of 
arbitration is considered in the subsequent section and will not be explicated here. 
Following the Model Law approach, an arbitration is commercial if it arises from any 
'relationship[s] of a commercial nature, whether contractual or not'.2 While commerce 
                                                 
1 Faris Nesheiwat and Ali Al-Khasawneh, ‘The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia’ (2015) 13 Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 443, 444-445. 
2 This approach is explained in n 2 of Article 1 of the Model Law, but is not a formal part of that 
article. 
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is not defined by the Model Law, an ordinary definition is applicable and refers to: 
'activities that relate to the buying and selling of goods and services'.3  
 
The term international is used to distinguish those arbitrations that have a 
transnational or cross-border component from wholly domestic or national 
arbitrations.4 Under article 1(3) of the Model Law, an arbitration is considered to be 
international if: the parties conduct business in different countries; the place of 
arbitration is in a different country to where the parties conduct their business; where 
any commercial dealings are conducted in a different country; where the 'subject-
matter of the dispute is most closely connected to a different country'; or where 'the 
parties have agreed that the subject matter of the arbitration agreement relates to more 
than one country'. The consequence of this is that, for example, an arbitration 
conducted in Saudi Arabia between two Saudi firms will be international if the dispute 
relates to the overseas transportation and sale of oil. 
 
A further distinction is that between a domestic (or national) arbitration and a foreign 
arbitration award. Here the terms domestic and foreign refer to the seat of arbitration. 
An award will be foreign in Saudi Arabia if the seat of the arbitration is in Geneva. If 
the seat is in Riyadh, then the award will be domestic even if some, or all, of the 
proceedings took place in Geneva. The Model Law prefers to distinguish between 
"international" and "non-international" rather than between "foreign" and "domestic" 
awards.5 That distinction, however, remains important because of the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 
(NY Convention), which explicitly applies to the recognition and enforcement of 
                                                 
3 Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Online 2015) <http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/commerce> accessed 30 November 2017. 
4 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides QC, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter 
on International Arbitration Practice (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015)1.19ff. 
5 UNCITRAL, 'Explanatory Notes to the Model Law', in UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration 1985: With amendments as adopted in 2006 (UN 2008), para 50. 
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foreign arbitration awards. Under the NY Convention, foreign arbitration awards are 
defined under article 1 as those:  
made in the territory of a State other than the State where 
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought ... it shall 
also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in 
the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought. 
 
A final point of terminology is to note that the phrase “judicial review”, which is 
widely used in the arbitration literature and community,6 will also be used in this 
thesis. In the context of arbitration, judicial review refers to the review made by 
judges of a national court when an award, or arbitrator, is challenged. This should be 
distinguished from the other use of the term to specifically refer to the mechanism 
provided by administrative law for challenging a decision of a public body.7 The 
distinction is clear from the context. 
 
1.3.2 The nature of arbitration and its underlying principles  
Arbitration is a type of dispute resolution allowing the parties to resolve a 
disagreement before the private forum of the arbitration tribunal. It provides an 
alternative to litigation and the public forum of the national courts.8 The 'idea of 
arbitration', as Paulsson explains, 'is that of binding resolution of disputes accepted 
with serenity by those who bear its consequences because of their special trust in 
                                                 
6 Quintette Coal Ltd v Nippon Steel Corp [1991] 1 WWR 219; [1990] BCJ No 2241, [32] (BC Court 
of Appeal, Canada); Lord Hacking, ‘The “Stated Case” Abolished: The United Kingdom Arbitration 
Act of 1979’ (1980) 12 International Lawyer 95; Karon A Sasser, 'Freedom to Contract for 
Expanded Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements' (2000) 31 Cumberland Law Review 337; 
Richard Garnett, Keith Steele, ‘In search of an appropriate standard for reasons in arbitral awards’ 
(2007)  10 International Arbitration Review 111, 112, 114; Gary Born, International Commercial 
Arbitration (Kluwer, 2009), p.2645-2648; Nick Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, 
Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration Practice (6th edn, Oxford 
University Press 2015), 10.66-10.88. 
7 David Feldman, ‘Error of Law and Flawed Administrative Acts’ (2014) 73 Cambridge Law 
Journal 275. 
8 Steven C Bennet, Arbitration: Essential Concepts (ALM Publishing 2002), 4. 
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chosen decision-makers'.9 It possesses a number of ideal features that reflect the 
nature of arbitration and may be attractive to international commercial parties.10 The 
process is flexible and defers to the parties over certain key decisions, such as the 
choice of forum, choice of law and the choice of arbitrators. Furthermore, the 
proceedings are private and the awards binding and enforceable.11 Finally, the process 
should be efficient and cost-effective.12 Thus, the ideal of the arbitration process is 
dispute resolution through a neutral,13 private forum allowing a fair hearing, resulting 
in an enforceable award and implemented with sufficient flexibility to allow the 
parties to meaningfully shape the procedure according to their needs.14 
 
Gaillard and Savage suggest that: 'arbitration should be defined by reference to two 
constituent elements which commentators and the courts almost unanimously 
recognize'.15 These two elements are the arbitrator’s 'judicial' task of resolving the 
dispute between the parties and the contractual 'source' of the arbitrator's role and 
authority. While the purpose of arbitration is reflected in the first of these two 
elements, it is the second element that grounds the fundamental principle of party 
autonomy. As Gaillard and Savage explain: 
party autonomy is found at every stage of the arbitral process and 
... is perhaps the most fundamental difference between international 
                                                 
9 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2013), 1. 
10 Gary Born, ‘Recent Developments in International Arbitration’ (2016) 5 Indian Journal of 
Arbitration Law 1. 
11 Christian Buhring-Uhle, 'A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in International Business 
Disputes' in Christopher R Drahozal and Richard W Naimark (eds) Towards a Science of 
International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2005) 25, 31. 
12 Steven C Bennet, Arbitration: Essential Concepts (ALM Publishing 2002), 6-8. 
13 Christian Buhring-Uhle, 'A Survey on Arbitration and Settlement in International Business 
Disputes' in Christopher R Drahozal and Richard W Naimark (eds) Towards a Science of 
International Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2005) 25, 31. 
14 Margaret L Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012), 1. 
15 Emmanuelle Gaillard and John Savage (eds) Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 1999), 11. 
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commercial arbitration and the courts. Indeed, it will generally be 
when parties make effective use of their entitlement to tailor their 
own arbitration proceedings to their needs that international 
arbitration will provide cheaper and more satisfactory justice than 
any national court system.16  
This reflects a conception of party autonomy in its wider sense, rather than the 
narrower conception of party autonomy, which refers simply to the contracting 
parties' right to select the law applicable to their contract and any dispute that arises 
from it.17 For the purposes of this thesis, party autonomy will be used in its wider 
sense. 
 
Etymologically, autonomy derives from the Greek for self-rule and may be used in 
the context of either nation states or individual persons to express the moral claim to 
a right of self-determination.18 In realising this self-determination, autonomy requires 
the opportunity to choose between acceptable options.19 Within the social context of 
a legal jurisdiction, those choices are both facilitated and restricted by the legal 
framework that regulates the behaviour of those who act within the boundaries of that 
jurisdiction. Within that framework, the law of contract allows individual parties to 
formally alter their reciprocal rights and obligations by agreement. This provides 
individuals with the choice that grounds the principle of party autonomy, which 'is 
one of the most important foundations of contract'.20 Where a dispute arises between 
the parties, that same principle allows the parties to choose whether to resolve the 
                                                 
16 Emmanuelle Gaillard and John Savage (eds) Fouchard Gaillard Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer 1999), 1. 
17 Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, 'The Role of Party Autonomy in International Arbitration' (1997) 52 
Dispute Resolution Journal 24, 25. 
18 Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination (1995) 105 Ethics 352; Richard H Fallon, 'Two 
Senses of Autonomy' (1994) 46 Stanford Law Review 875, 878; Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, 
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (2nd edn, University 
of Pennsylvania Press 2011), 27ff. 
19 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press 1988), 204-205.  
20 Hanoch Dagan, 'Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory' (2013) 76 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 19. 
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dispute through litigation or arbitration. While litigation is the forum for dispute 
resolution provided by the state, arbitration is, as noted above, grounded in an 
extension of the contractual agreement between the parties. Although enabled and 
facilitated by the state, the private, contractual basis of arbitration brings with it the 
principle of party autonomy, which allows the parties the 'freedom to design the 
arbitration procedure according to their needs'.21 Indeed, the arbitration tribunal only 
gains its jurisdictional authority by virtue of the parties' agreement,22 which makes it 
'bound to follow the instructions of the parties' if it is not to exceed its authority.23 
Thus, '[p]arty autonomy is the ultimate power' allowing the parties the choice over 
key elements of the arbitration process.24 
 
The contractual basis of commercial arbitration,25 which grounds the fundamental 
principle of party autonomy, can only function within the legal frameworks 
established by the individual nation states.26 Arbitration does not take place in a legal 
void, but must be enabled and facilitated by national laws that support the private 
contractual arrangements, enforcing the outcome and providing, through its courts, a 
means for dealing with any failures of the arbitration process.27 Because of this 
dependence on their patronage, it is natural that nation states will seek to preserve 
their interests through the legal rules that determine the procedural options open to 
the parties. As will be discussed further in chapter four, the state has an interest in 
ensuring that procedural justice is both done and seen to be done. This state-based 
                                                 
21 Hong-Lin Yu, 'How far can party autonomy be stretched in setting the grounds for the refusal of 
arbitral awards' (2011) 14 International Arbitration Law Review 156. 
22 See further, chapter two. 
23 Giuditta Cordero-Moss, 'Limits to Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration (2014) 
Issue 1 Oslo law Review 47, 49. 
24 Julian DM Lew, Loukas Mistelis and Stefan Michael Kroll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003), 3. 
25 Jean E Faure, 'The Arbitration Alternative: Its Time Has Come' (1985) 46 Montana Law Review 1. 
26 For discussion, see section 2.2. 
27 Giuditta Cordero-Moss, 'Limits to Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration (2014) 
Issue 1 Oslo law Review 47, 49-51. 
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interest, which is reflected in the characterisation of arbitration as "quasi-judicial",28 
coincides with the interest of the parties in ensuring that disputes are resolved justly.29 
While it is arguable that the principle of party autonomy simply requires the dispute 
to be resolved to the satisfaction of the parties, it is unlikely that this will be achieved 
unless the parties perceive the arbitration process as just or fair.30 Indeed, in one 
survey, fairness and justice were ranked as the most important characteristic of 
arbitration.31 Thus, party autonomy and procedural justice must coexist as the 
fundamental principles governing the arbitration process.  
 
Before considering the third principle that governs the arbitration process, it is first 
worth noting that the relationship between party autonomy and procedural justice is 
not a simple balance, offsetting the demands of one principle against the other.32 
Rather, the demands of the two principles are intertwined, which means that 
procedural justice is not simply a constraint on party autonomy, but also an expression 
of it. The connection between the two principles is reflected in the private interest in 
justice. In understanding the relationship, a distinction should be made between three 
senses in which autonomy may be used. First, autonomy may be used in the context 
of an autonomous dispute resolution system, independent of any national legal 
system.33 The second sense is the use of the term in the context of party autonomy, 
                                                 
28 Wesley A Sturges, 'Arbitration - What Is It?' (1960) 35 New York University Law Review 1031, 
1046-1047. 
29 Austin I Pullé, 'Securing Natural Justice in Arbitration Proceedings' (2012) 20 Asia Pacific Law 
Review 63, 65. 
30 John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates 1975); Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite, 'Procedural Justice and Regulatory 
Compliance' (1996) 20 Law and Human Behavior 83; Tom R Tyler, 'Procedural Justice' in Austin 
Sarat (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004) 435; For a 
full discussion, see chapter four. 
31 Richard W Naimark and Stephanie E Keer, 'What do parties really want from international 
commercial arbitration?' (2002) 57 Dispute Resolution Journal 78, 80. 
32 Hiro Naragaki, ‘Constructions of Arbitration’s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency and Justice’ 
[2016] 1 Journal of Dispute Resolution 141, 152-155. 
33 Julian DM Lew, 'Achieving the Dream, Autonomous Arbitration' (2006) 22 Arbitration 
International 179; Jonathan Mance, ‘Arbitration: a Law unto itself?’ (2016) 32 Arbitration 
International 223. 
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which was discussed above as deriving from the contractual nature of arbitration. 
Also lying behind the concept of party autonomy is the autonomy of the individual, 
and it is this relationship between party autonomy and individual autonomy that 
connects party autonomy and procedural justice. 
 
It is arguable that individual autonomy requires an element of rationality, ensuring 
that an individual’s acts and decisions are consistent with his or her goals. This is 
modelled in a distinction between first and second order desires.34 In the context of 
the individual party to an arbitration dispute, the first order desire may be 
characterised as the desire for a favourable outcome. If reflected upon, however, it 
would be rational for the individual to modify that first order desire to create the 
second order desire for a fair or just outcome. The rationality of this is revealed by 
considering this process of reflection from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.35 
Behind the veil, individuals are denied any clues that may allow predictions regarding 
the outcome and are completely ignorant of whether the decision will go for or against 
them. This prevents any temptation to equate justice with a personally favourable 
outcome. The veil would not prevent the first order desire from forming, but since the 
individual cannot predict a personally favourable outcome it makes rational sense to 
modify that desire and instead want at least a fair and just process for resolving the 
dispute. Although the desire for, and hence the individual's interest in, a just process 
flows from individual autonomy, it nevertheless connects justice and party autonomy 
through the arbitration agreement and the contractual relationship between the parties. 
Both are the consequence of an expression of individual autonomy, which carries 
with it the individual's interest in a just process and outcome. This is reflected in the 
empirical evidence of what parties want from arbitration (see chapter four).  
 
                                                 
34 Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 1988), 20; 
Harry Frankfurt, 'Freedom of the will and the concept of a person', in Robert Kane (ed) Free Will 
(Blackwell Publishers 2002) 127. 
35 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (The Belknap Press 1999), 118. 
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Turning now to the third principle, which is cost-effectiveness. This encompasses the 
values of effectiveness and efficiency, which makes pragmatic common sense and 
needs little by way of justification. It would be pointless to have an ineffective process 
of arbitration and it is irrational to use a process that costs more than necessary. This 
does not mean that arbitration must necessarily cost less than litigation if it is to be a 
rational choice, since the advantages provided by a just system that respects party 
autonomy may outweigh the disadvantage of cost. It does mean, however, that in 
providing a framework for arbitration, the law should facilitate both the effectiveness 
of the process and its efficiency. This is reflected in the 2015 International Arbitration 
Survey,36 which highlighted the importance of effectiveness by ranking enforceability 
of awards as the most valuable characteristic of arbitration. By contrast, and 
emphasising a concern with efficiency, the cost of the process was ranked as its worst 
characteristic, with a lack of speed also highlighted as an undesirable feature. 
 
The importance of party autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness is, for example, 
embodied by the general principles contained in s.1 of both the English and Scottish 
Acts.37 The Scottish Act will be considered later, as part of the substantive 
comparative analysis. For present purposes, consider the example of the English Act. 
This states that its substantive provisions are based on, and should be interpreted in 
accordance with, the general principles, which highlight a ‘fair resolution of disputes 
… without any unnecessary delay or expense’ and the freedom of the parties to 
determine the arbitration procedure, which is ‘subject only to such safeguards as are 
necessary in the public interest’.38 
 
                                                 
36 School of International Arbitration Queen Mary University of London, 2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration (2015), 6-7. 
37 This statute is relied on here for three reasons. First, to avoid pre-empting the comparative analysis 
that follows in the subsequent chapters. Second, England is one of the major providers of arbitration 
and English law is a popular choice of lex arbitri. Third, since the Scottish Act relied on the English 
Act, and its application in practice, the English Act is indirectly connected to the comparative 
analysis. 
38 English Act, s 1. 
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A key aspect of these general principles, in the example of the English Act, is that 
they must be balanced against each other, with a priority given to party autonomy. 
That priority is consistent with the private, contractual basis of arbitration.  As 
discussed, it does not, however, mean that party autonomy should be unconstrained.39 
Although a ‘fundamental value’,40 party autonomy is not the sole governing principle 
of arbitration, but must be balanced against both justice and cost-effectiveness. Party 
autonomy may, therefore, be restricted to safeguard the public interest, which - as 
discussed above - includes the state's interest in ensuring that justice is both done and 
seen to be done. As discussed in chapter four, this allows the courts to intervene only 
where an impropriety has, or will, result in a substantive injustice. A fair and just 
outcome is, in turn, prioritised over efficiency. As Fellas comments: ‘[a]n arbitrator 
could quickly decide a case by flipping a coin, but that would be capricious. Thus, 
speed cannot come at the cost of fairness and justice’.41 Nevertheless, efficiency, as 
a component of cost-effectiveness, is acknowledged as important. Thus, as the 
English Act illustrates, there is a weighted, three-way balance between party 
autonomy, justice, and cost-effectiveness. These three principles form a ‘magic 
triangle’,42 central to “best practice” in ICA.43 As discussed below, these principles, 
and the balance between them, provide a useful way of assessing a legal framework 
established to support, facilitate and regulate arbitration. 
                                                 
39 Mia Louise Livingstone, 'Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Popular 
Fallacy or Proven Fact?' (2008) 25 Journal of International Arbitration 529. 
40 Leon Trakman and Hugh Montgomery, ‘The “Judicialization” of International Commercial 
Arbitration: Pitfall or Virtue?’ (2107) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 405, 409. 
41 John Fellas, 'A Fair and Efficient International Arbitration Process' (2004) 59 Dispute Resolution 
Journal 78, 80. 
42 Fabricio Fortese and Lotta Hemmi, ‘Procedural Fairness and Efficiency in International 
Arbitration’ (2015) 3 Groningen Journal of International Law 110, 122. 
43 Leon Trakman and Hugh Montgomery, ‘The “Judicialization” of International Commercial 
Arbitration: Pitfall or Virtue?’ (2107) 30 Leiden Journal of International Law 405, 423. 
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1.3.3 A brief modern history of ICA in Saudi Arabia 
Redfern observes that international arbitration is globally recognised: 'as the fairest 
and most effective method of resolving disputes between states, individuals, and 
corporations in almost all aspects of international investment, trade, and commerce'.44 
He ascribes this first, to the neutrality of the arbitration forum, a condition relevant to 
a just outcome, and second, to the enforceability of the award, which reflects the need 
for an effective process.45 Menon, however, identifies four major issues with ICA. 
These are: judicialisation of the process, with associated costs and delays; a lack of 
ethical standards; unpredictability in enforcement; and unpredictability in the 
decisions of arbitration tribunals.46 Of these issues, it is the problem of enforcement, 
compounded by the judicial interventionism of the national courts, that is most 
relevant to the characterisation of Saudi Arabia as an ICA unfriendly country. 
 
The hostility to international arbitration in Saudi Arabia developed in the third quarter 
of the twentieth century. The initial phase, which followed World War II, prioritised 
Western principles of law over the domestic law of Islamic countries and ‘stemmed 
principally from disputes arising out of long-term oil concessions concluded in 
circumstances of, or akin to, colonial tutelage'.47 It is exemplified by the 1963 Aramco 
arbitration against the Saudi government and its reaction to the outcome.48 The case 
                                                 
44 Alan Redfern, 'The Changing World of International Arbitration' in David D Caron, Stephan W 
Schill, Abby Cohen Smutny and Epaminontas E Triantafilou (eds) Practising Virtue: Inside 
International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2015) 45, 46. 
45 Alan Redfern, 'The Changing World of International Arbitration' in David D Caron, Stephan W 
Schill, Abby Cohen Smutny and Epaminontas E Triantafilou (eds) Practising Virtue: Inside 
International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2015) 45, 46-47. 
46 Sundaresh Menon, 'The Transnational Protection of Private Rights' in David D Caron, Stephan W 
Schill, Abby Cohen Smutny and Epaminontas E Triantafilou (eds) Practising Virtue: Inside 
International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2015) 17, 25-27. 
47 Charles N Brower and Jeremy K Sharpe, 'International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The 
Third Phase' (2003) 97 The American Journal of International Law 643, 643-644. 
48 Charles N Brower and Jeremy K Sharpe, 'International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The 
Third Phase' (2003) 97 The American Journal of International Law 643, 644; Whitney Hampton, 
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concerned Aramco’s freedom over the transportation of oil to destinations outside of 
Saudi Arabia and whether the Saudi government could impose a legal obligation to 
use Satco tankers.49 Following similar cases,50 the tribunal held that while Saudi 
Arabian law was applicable, it should be interpreted according to, and supplemented 
by, general principles of law, commercial custom and 'notions of pure 
jurisprudence'.51 This approach resulted in an award in favour of Aramco.52 
 
The Saudi government accepted, and complied with, the decision. It was, however, 
dissatisfied with the outcome and subsequently prohibited any government agency 
from participating in arbitration without the approval of the Council of Ministers.53 
Consequently, the Saudi government 'abstained from international arbitration for 
decades afterwards'.54 This consequence was characteristic of the second phase of 
increasing hostility to international arbitration, which reflected the view that 
international arbitration favoured Western companies.55 This phase lasted from the 
1970s to the early 1980s and witnessed a reluctance to participate in international 
                                                 
'Foreigners Beware?: Exploring the Tension Between Saudi Arabian and Western International 
Commercial Arbitration Practices' (2011) Journal of Dispute Resolution 431, 437. 
49 Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) (1963) 27 ILR 117; Stephen M 
Schwebel, 'The kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Aramco arbitrate the Onassis agreement' (2010) 3 
Journal of World Energy Law & Business 245. 
50 See: Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd v Sheikh of Abu Dhabi (1951) 18 ILR 144; The 
Ruler of Qatar v International Marine Oil Company Ltd (1957) 20 ILR 534. Both discussed in: VD 
Degan, Sources of International Law (Kluwer 1997), 120-121. See also: Mark Wakim, 'Public Policy 
Concerns Regarding Enforcement of Foreign International Arbitral Awards in the Middle East' 
(2008) 21 New York International Law Review 1, 18-19. 
51 Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) (1963) 27 ILR 117, 157, 166-169. 
52 Saudi Arabia v Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) (1963) 27 ILR 117, 204. 
53 Implemented initially through a 1963 Council of Ministers Resolution (No 58), but subsequently 
incorporated, through article 3, into the Arbitration Law of 1983: George Sayen, 'Arbitration, 
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arbitration.56 Along with the dominance of conservative traditionalism,57 this 
experience meant that it was not until the third phase, triggered by the increasing 
importance of international commerce and characterised by a reversal of the hostility 
to arbitration, that the Saudi government was motivated to introduce the SAL 1983. 
 
The SAL 1983,58 and associated Implementation Rules,59 established an explicit legal 
framework for all arbitration, both domestic and ICA, in Saudi Arabia. Importantly, 
article 7 of the Implementing Rules allowed an arbitration clause to be formally 
recognised, which overcame the previous refusal of Sharia courts to recognise 
arbitration clauses as valid contracts because they related to a possible dispute in the 
future and so were considered gharar (uncertain or speculative).60 Furthermore, it 
allowed parties to appoint their own arbitrators, established certain time limits to 
facilitate an efficient process,61 and provided for a process of enforcement.62 Initially 
enforcement of foreign awards was guaranteed only for signatories to the Convention 
of the Arab League on the Enforcement of Judgments 1952.63 Enforcement of awards 
from non-signatory countries could, however, be enforced on a discretionary 
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reciprocal basis.64 This enforcement was formally extended to other foreign awards 
in 1994, when Saudi Arabia became a party to the NY Convention.65 
 
Although the legislation and accession to the NY Convention were clear signs of a 
more arbitration friendly approach,66 significant issues remained. These included: the 
Sharia prohibition of interest (riba) and speculative (gharar) contracts, which 
allowed Saudi courts to refuse enforcement of foreign awards on public policy 
grounds;67 the obligation to conduct the arbitration in Arabic;68 the gender and 
religious restrictions imposed on the appointment of arbitrators, which like the 
language restrictions impacted on party autonomy;69 some ambiguity in drafting, 
creating 'opportunities for a party to delay proceedings';70 the excessive involvement 
of Saudi courts, which reviewed all arbitration awards to ensure Sharia compliance 
before they became binding;71 and the possibility of having to restart the arbitration 
process following the review.72 Furthermore, even before arbitration could begin, 
under articles 6 and 7 of the Rules, approval had to be sought from the competent 
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authority,73 which for commercial disputes was the Board of Grievances. As Turck 
noted: ‘[w]hereas in most countries one of the reasons to select arbitration is to avoid 
court procedures and delays, Saudi arbitration is directly linked with the commercial 
committees and courts’.74 
 
This approach under the SAL 1983 established a procedure that necessarily prolonged 
the process through the involvement of the competent authority. Given that the trend 
in modern arbitration is to limit the involvement of the courts, allowing arbitration to 
proceed as autonomously as possible, the approach under the SAL 1983 was 
unfortunate. The initial check of the arbitration instrument by the competent authority 
did allow problems with legal formalities to be resolved prior to arbitration.75 That 
benefit was, however, outweighed by the negative impact of such a requirement on 
the duration of the arbitration process, the perception of arbitration in Saudi Arabia 
and, importantly for ICA, party autonomy and the desire to avoid the involvement of 
the national courts.76 As Rawach and El-Rayes suggest, an initial check on the 
arbitration instrument could just as easily be carried out by an arbitration institution, 
which would be more consistent with the purpose of arbitration as an alternative to 
litigation.77  
 
As noted at the start of this section, one of the major issues with the SAL1983, was 
the excessive involvement of the courts throughout the arbitration process. This 
included the obligation to seek initial approval prior to the commencement of 
arbitration, and the need for the competent authority to confirm the award, under 
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article 20, before it became final and effective. In addition, the SAL 1983 was 
criticised regarding the scope of the courts' jurisdiction where one of the parties 
objected to an award. Under articles 18 and 19, the competent authority was afforded 
the power to hear the dispute and determine whether the award should be confirmed, 
or the objection upheld. They did not, however, specify any limits on the scope of the 
court's authority, which meant that a review of the merits of the arbitration decision 
was not excluded and the national courts became courts of appeal for disgruntled 
parties.78 This created an issue for arbitration in Saudi Arabia, which was unable to 
produce an award that could be considered final and binding. Any award was subject 
to a merits review by the Board of Grievances, which could result in the award being 
vacated or even reversed.79 
 
A final issue was that of enforcement,80 which for foreign awards was considered 'the 
exception rather than the rule'.81 The SAL 1983 was silent on the procedure for 
enforcement of a foreign award. Furthermore, despite acceding to the NY Convention 
in 1994,82 the enforcement of foreign awards has been characterised as 'notoriously 
difficult', because they were 'subjected to a de novo review' of the merits of the award 
under Saudi law.83 Additionally, awards would not be enforced if they were contrary 
to public policy,84 which is derived from the Sharia, the public interest and public 
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morality.85 In particular, the enforcement of foreign awards was problematic, because 
foreign arbitrators were unlikely to have been fully cognisant of the scope of Saudi 
public policy and how it might impact on enforcement of an award.86  
 
1.3.4 The need for change and the way forward 
Although the SAL 1983 was a significant forward step for arbitration in Saudi Arabia, 
the wealth of opinion that developed over the years following its enactment was that 
further reform was foreseeably necessary to improve the process of arbitration and 
the enforcement of the award.87 The impetus for reform was driven by the unfriendly 
legal framework as discussed above. The called-for reform has been implemented by 
the SAL 2012, the Enforcement Law 2012 and the Implementation Regulations of the 
Arbitration Law (IRSAL) 2017. The question is how well these laws reflect the needs 
of international commerce by providing a legal framework that achieves an 
appropriate balance between the principles of party autonomy, justice and cost-
effectiveness.  
 
While not devaluing the importance of justice and cost-effectiveness, the trend in 
modern arbitration has been to maximise party autonomy.88 Based on the earlier 
discussion of the three core principles, however, any progressive reform must 
enhance party autonomy within a just and cost-effective process. To be consistent 
with modern arbitration culture, the legal framework should ringfence the 
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jurisdictional authority of the arbitration tribunal ensuring that the courts play a 
supportive role that facilitates a just and effective arbitration process.89 This legal 
framework, however, must account for the Islamic nature of the country. 
 
In developing a modern arbitration culture that will attract ICA to Saudi Arabia, the 
pervasive nature of Sharia must be appreciated.  It governs all aspects of Islamic 
life,90 including law, politics and commerce.91 As article 1 of the country's Basic Law 
of Governance of 1992 states: ‘The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab 
Islamic state. Its religion is Islam and its constitution is the Holy Qur'an and the 
prophet's (peace be upon him) Sunnah’. Building on this, article 7 states that: ‘The 
authority of the regime is derived from the Holy Qur'an and the prophet's Sunnah 
which rule over this and all other state laws’. And, under article 23 the state has the 
obligation to 'protect the Islamic creed and ... apply Islamic Sharia'. The point of 
noting the relevance of Sharia is not to suggest that Saudi law could never be 
considered arbitration friendly from the perspective of the international arbitration 
community. Rather, it is to highlight the necessary relevance of Sharia, which 'is not 
an obstacle to international commercial arbitration',92 but must be accounted for by 
any law within the kingdom.93 
 
While the relevance of the Sharia is important, the deficiencies of the SAL 1983 had 
more to do with the Saudi government's experience of international arbitration than 
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with the constraints of Sharia law per se.94 The procedural requirements of Islamic 
law are consistent with Western notions of natural justice and,95 as Baamir has noted: 
'[the] Hanbali corpus of [Sharia] law is in fact more flexible than Saudi law'.96 
Although the SAL 1983 was a significant advance for Saudi Arabia, it fell short of 
the expectations of the international arbitration community, primarily because of the 
extensive supervisory powers it afforded to the competent authority.97 This may have 
afforded the Saudi government the reassurance that it remained in control of 
arbitration in the country, but it was out of kilter with the approach to arbitration in 
other countries. By the time the SAL 2012 was enacted, new legislation and further 
modernisation of the arbitration culture and process in Saudi Arabia was long 
overdue. In particular, there was a need to reduce the role of the courts, facilitate party 
autonomy, enhance enforcement and ensure that arbitration is both effective and 
efficient without compromising justice. 
 
1.3.5 Socio-cultural context 
While the focus of this thesis is on the legal implementation of the three core 
normative principles underpinning ICA, it is worth briefly explaining the socio-
cultural context of Saudi Arabia.98 The aim is to provide a backdrop  for the normative 
and doctrinal analysis that follows in the main body of the thesis. This should provide 
insights that help to explain some of the differences between the legal regulation of 
arbitration in Saudi Arabia, a comparatively new state established in 1932, when 
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compared to Scotland and the Model Law jurisdictions. The socio-cultural context is 
also important to understanding the proposals for possible reforms to the SAL 2012. 
It is particularly relevant to the possibility and limitations of using legal transplants, 
which refers to the ‘borrowing’ of legal rules,99 to improve the legal regulation of 
arbitration in Saudi Arabia.100 
 
The historical context of modern arbitration in Saudi was explained in the previous 
section. As part of this discussion, the relevance of Sharia was noted. In this section, 
the relevance of Sharia will be elaborated, particularly in relation to commercial 
activity and arbitration. This will be considered against the background of the political 
aspirations for Saudi Arabia as a significant nation in the world of international 
commerce. This discussion begins with some comments regarding Saudi Arabia’s 
socio-economic context and its vision for the future.  
 
In their 2004 analysis, Wilson observes that Saudi Arabia benefited from a robust 
economy, which in 2001 was the ‘largest economy in the Middle East’, and an 
‘increasingly educated’ population.101 He further notes that Saudi Arabia, an oil rich 
and dependent country, has long pursued the policy of economic modernisation 
through diversification, while preserving social stability and traditional Islamic and 
social values.102 In this regard, he observes that Saudi Arabia’s adherence to 
Wahhabism, a conservative form of Islam that ‘adhere[s] to the teachings of the 
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Hanbali [school of jurisprudence]’,103 has not been a barrier to ‘reconcil[ing] modern 
financial and commercial practice with the demands’ of the Holy Qur’an.104  
 
As part of its economic development, Saudi has moved to a market economy and 
sought investment from foreign companies,105 which raises the possibility of 
international commercial disputes and the need for an attractive dispute resolution 
system. The Saudi Arabian government has attempted to address this need through 
the establishment of the Saudi Centre for Commercial Arbitration and the 
modernisation of the legal regulation of arbitration,106 which forms the focus of this 
research. This modernisation, which has popular support,107 is part of a wider process 
that involves the ongoing development of ‘a dualistic legal system’ that allows ‘a 
separate Western-based commercial law system to function within the Islamic law 
umbrella’,108 reducing the impact of the conservative Wahhabist approach to the 
development of Sharia law.109  This modernisation has been achieved by 
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supplementing Sharia law (fiqh), filling any legal regulatory gaps with legal rules 
established through secular, administrative legislation.110 
 
Within this dual, or hybrid, system, Sharia law, which derives its authority from the 
divine revelation of Allah’s will,111 is dominant to the secular legislation enacted by 
the government to facilitate modernisation. As noted above, this means that any 
legislation must be consistent with Sharia, which imposes certain restrictions on any 
legal regulation of arbitration. The most relevant are the Sharia prohibitions of 
interest (riba); uncertain or speculative transactions (gharar); and certain forbidden 
(haram) goods and services such as pork, alcohol, pornography, gambling. Beyond 
these well-established restrictions, and particularly given the liberal attitude of the 
Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence to freedom of contract,112 the legal regulation 
of commercial arbitration should not be affected by Sharia. Furthermore, the duality 
of the legal system in Saudi is also evidenced in the court system, which relies on 
dedicated Sharia courts for issues of Sharia law, while using secular courts, or 
committees, to hear disputes governed by legislative rules of law.113 This approach 
reinforces the distinction between disputes that engage Sharia law and those governed 
by legislation. 
 
Sharia law, or fiqh, is part of the wider Sharia, which provides a normative guide for 
all areas of life.114 The aim for any devout Muslim following the Sharia is to be 
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rewarded in the hereafter with a place in the ‘Gardens of perpetuity’.115 This is 
achieved through the development of an Islamic personality,116 characterised by the 
virtues of, inter alia, justice (‘adl) balance (mizan), moderation (la israf), honesty, 
truthfulness and fairness.117 Under Sharia, unless something is forbidden (haram), 
then it is permissible (halal), although something may be considered permissible and 
desirable (tayyib), such as hard work, or undesirable, such as hoarding money. 
Furthermore, Sharia imposes moral obligations (fard) such as honesty, being just and 
respecting others.118 Given that ‘everything of interest to human beings that does not 
cause harm is permissible,119 nothing in this ethical system should prevent the 
adoption of a suitable legal framework for the regulation of modern ICA.120 However, 
the emphasis in Islam on the importance of justice may support a framework that 
prioritises justice over the other core principles of party autonomy and cost-
effectiveness. Furthermore, the weight given to justice may receive support from the 
Islamic conception of autonomy, which, unlike the more individualistic liberal 
conception, imposes moral and social constraints on self-determination (see further 
3.2.2). 
 
Before ending this section with the vision for Saudi Arabia’s future, and its relevance 
to ICA, it is first worth highlighting the issue of women in Saudi Arabia. Although 
the status of women in Saudi Arabia is an on-going debate,121 and the social and 
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political activism of the ‘Saudi Woman’s Spring’ is still in its early stages,122 their 
opportunities for education and employment have been increasing since the end of 
the twentieth century.123 Saudi women have yet to achieve full participation in 
society, but they have now established a space within ‘the public sphere’ and political 
arena,124 providing an opportunity for them to challenge their marginalised role in 
Saudi society.125 In business, women still have to overcome cultural barriers, 
including family resistance, gender stereotypes and a regulatory system that favours 
men,126 such as the need for female entrepreneurs to use a male ‘legal intermediary’ 
in all public business transactions.127 However, with the increased opportunities for 
education, employment and entrepreneurship, the country is changing towards a more 
inclusive society with greater social, economic, and political opportunity for 
women.128 As will be discussed further in chapter three,129 as part of this ongoing 
process, Saudi women can practice as lawyers and are now also training and 
practicing as arbitrators.130 
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Turning now to Saudi Arabia’s future, it should be noted that Saudi utilises a process 
of centralised economic planning that has previously been expressed and 
implemented through successive five-year plans from 1970 onwards.131 Although all 
the plans were concerned with diversification,132 earlier plans focused on 
infrastructure and education, while the seventh (2000-2005) and eighth (2005-2010) 
plans focused on economic growth in the private sector as a route to economic 
diversification.133 More recently, in 2016, the ‘Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Salman unveiled Vision 2030’, which is aimed at reinforcing the ‘political and 
societal development’ of Saudi Arabia as ‘an investment powerhouse’, with relaxed 
restrictions on foreign ownership and investment.134 For the Deputy Crown Prince, 
the 2030 vision rests on three key pillars, two of which are relevant to the context of 
ICA within Saudi Arabia. The first of these is the development of Saudi Arabia as a 
‘global investment powerhouse’. The second is to develop Saudi as ‘an epicentre of 
trade’, utilising its geographical advantage as a ‘hub connecting … Asia, Europe and 
Africa'.135 Underlying the 2030 vision are three core themes: a vibrant society driven 
by Islamic principles; a thriving economy that allows the development of a larger 
private sector, with a reduced role for the government; and the ambition to develop 
and efficient, transparent system of accountable and responsible governance.136  
 
One of the key aspirational goals is to move from its current position as the world’s 
19th largest economy to a position in the top 15 economies.137 Specifically, Saudi 
Arabia aims to create an attractive commercial environment, with vibrant ‘economic 
cities’ and a transformed King Abdullah Financial District with ‘competitive 
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regulations and procedures’, to encourage foreign investment and business.138 The 
vision is ambitious and may only be partially achieved,139 however, for present 
purposes, its importance lies in the emphasis on economic liberalisation,140 
development and the openness to international engagement. Although arbitration is 
not explicitly mentioned as part of the vision, the need for arbitration services 
accompanies the development of international commerce and the enlargement of the 
private sector. In this regard, it may be noted that the National Transformation 
Program, which has been devised to help implement the Vision 2030 goals, includes 
the intention to launch three branches of the Saudi Centre for Commercial 
Arbitration.141 This suggests that a growth in arbitration is envisaged. Such growth 
should be supported by a legal framework that facilitates the delivery of competitive 
arbitration services in line with the core principles of modern ICA. Furthermore, as 
Saudi Arabia continues in its development as a modern, competitive and 
commercially attractive country, so economic competitiveness and the normalising 
pressures of globalisation (already evident in the reliance on the Model Law as the 
basis for the SAL 2012) will result in the modernisation of the environment that 
provides the context for arbitration.142 This, in turn, should alter expectations and 
facilitate further reform of the legal framework for ICA. This may be enabled by the 
increasingly influential and assertive Consultative Council, whose members include 
accomplished businessmen, and which has the authority to make proposals for 
reforming the law.143 As noted above, however, any such reform must remain 
consistent with the tenets of Islam and the Sharia. 
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1.4 Research Methodology and Methods 
Although a distinction is not always made between “method” and “methodology”, for 
the purposes of this thesis the terms will be used to distinguish between two elements 
of the research process. After reviewing the literature, Mackenzie and Knipe 
concluded that: 
methodology is the overall approach to research linked to the 
[research] paradigm or theoretical framework while the method 
refers to systematic modes or tools used for collection and analysis 
of data.144 
Methodology is concerned with generalised forms of systematically organised 
activity that is made credible by its connection to a rich history of social practice.145 
This highlights the theoretical basis of the research activity, grounded in a reliance on 
approaches that have been accepted as reasonable by the research community. Such 
a relationship, between the researcher’s activity and accepted methodologies, allows 
confidence in the outcome of the research. Based on this understanding, the research 
method will be used to refer to the mechanics of data identification and retrieval, 
while the research methodology will refer to the theory underlying the approach to 
analysing and using the data. 
 
1.4.1 Methodology 
 
In deciding on an appropriate methodology, it is important to appreciate that the 
nature of the research question determines the type of argument required to support a 
convincing answer. The type of argument, in turn, affects the type of data required to 
support the claim or proposition being defended. This connection between the 
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research question, the argument and the data determine whether the chosen 
methodology is appropriate.146 
 
The research question is:  
By comparison with the Model Law and the Scottish Act 2010, how 
consistent is the SAL 2012 with the core principles underlying 
modern ICA? 
That question may be broken down into its constituent issues and these determine the 
relevant methodologies utilised to answer the research question. The starting point is 
a normative analysis of arbitration to identify and understand the implications of the 
core principles that underlie modern ICA. These principles provide the tools that 
allow the SAL 2012 to be normatively assessed. That assessment is conducted within 
the framework of a comparative legal analysis using the Model Law and the Scottish 
Act as comparators. That comparison requires a doctrinal analysis of the Model Law, 
the Scottish Act and the SAL 2012. This doctrinal analysis may then be used as the 
basis for the comparative normative analysis that determines how well the SAL 2012 
implements the core principles governing modern ICA. Thus, the research 
methodology involves doctrinal, normative, and comparative elements. 
 
1.4.1.1 The doctrinal element 
Doctrinal, or black letter, legal research involves a systematic and critical 
interpretative analysis of primary and secondary sources of law to determine, as 
precisely and coherently as possible,147 ‘what the law is in a particular area'.148 This 
requires the researcher to identify and explicate the legal rules and principles, and 
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their relationships within the legal framework. It is a qualitative analysis of the law 
on its own terms, assessing the extent, comprehensiveness and coherence of the legal 
framework,149 using reasoned argument to justify the researcher’s interpretation of the 
meaning of the legal norms.150 It is an inevitable component of any comparative legal 
research, as the law of different jurisdictions cannot be compared without knowing 
and understanding the law in each of the relevant jurisdictions. Given the comparative 
nature of the research, the aim of the doctrinal analysis in this thesis is, therefore, to 
provide a critically descriptive account of the Model Law and the law governing ICA 
in both Scotland and Saudi Arabia.  
 
In this thesis, the doctrinal analysis focused primarily on the SAL 2012, with the 
Model Law and the Scottish Act used as comparators (see 1.4.1.3). Although the 
analysis applied the same doctrinal methodology to each of these, it should be noted 
that the different contexts of the SAL 2012, the Model Law and the Scottish Act 
necessarily impacted on the individual analyses. To begin with, while the SAL 2012 
and the Scottish Acts are pieces of legislation that form part of the national law of 
Saudi Arabia and Scotland respectively, the Model Law is not itself law, but a 
document adopted by the UNCITRAL with the goal of harmonising and improving 
national law. While the Model Law may nevertheless be analysed in isolation, to gain 
a deeper understanding of its provisions, it is necessary to rely on the case law from 
countries that have implemented the Model Law to a greater or lesser extent and 
remaining more or less faithful to its provisions. This means that the doctrinal analysis 
must consider cases from a range of “Model Law countries” and must take into 
account that the implementation of the Model Law varies from country to country.151 
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As such, care was required to ensure that the Model Law cases relied on in the analysis 
were based on national legislative provisions that remained sufficiently faithful to the 
original Model Law articles on which they are based. 
 
A second contextual distinction that impacts on the doctrinal analysis lies in the 
different legal traditions of the two national jurisdictions of Scotland and Saudi 
Arabia. Scots law is classified as a mixed or hybrid system, relying on both the civil, 
or Roman, and the common, or English, legal traditions.152 Saudi Arabia is also a 
mixed legal system, but rather than being a common/civil law hybrid, the two 
elements of the Saudi legal system are Sharia-based law (fiqh) and modern legislative 
law (siyasa) that follows the civil law tradition and is influenced by the French and 
Egyptian systems.153 This legislative element, while involving the Shura Council and 
the Council of Ministers, which proposes and reviews draft laws,154 ultimately relies 
on the authority of the King. Under the rule of law inherent to Sharia,155 the doctrine 
of siyasa allows the King to legitimately authorise Sharia-permissible legislation to 
secure the public good and fill the gaps left by the rules of fiqh, which has been 
essential to the governance of modern commercial activity, including arbitration.156 
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The significance of this distinction is twofold. First, while both are hybrid systems 
that involve a civil/Roman law element, Scots Law relies centrally on the doctrine of 
precedent, while the law in Saudi Arabia does not.157 This makes case law of far 
greater significance in Scotland, where it is an authoritative source of law, than in 
Saudi Arabia where the decisions in individual cases are not authoritative. Second, 
the priority of Sharia, as the ultimate authority for legitimacy in law-making, means 
that the legal rules implemented through legislation must be consistent with Sharia. 
This does not mean that they need to be based on, or derived directly from, the 
authoritative texts of the Hanbali school, which is the school of Islamic jurisprudence 
followed in Saudi Arabia.158 It does, however, mean that the siyasa rules should be 
consistent with the spirit of Sharia and are limited to provisions not already 
determined by fiqh. Furthermore, unlike Scotland where legislation overrides any 
previous conflicting common law, the siyasa rules are subordinate to, and overruled 
by, any conflicting rules of fiqh.159 
 
As a consequence of these distinctions, the doctrinal analysis, while relying on the 
same method of critical interpretation, inevitably varies according to the context as 
discussed above. Thus, the analysis of the Model Law engages with both the Model 
Law itself and with case law from several Model Law jurisdictions. These cases are 
not assessed in any comparative sense, but are used to gain a better understanding of 
the Model Law provisions and how they might be interpreted and implemented in 
national law. The analysis of the Scottish Act also relies on any relevant case law to 
aid the interpretation of the provisions of the Act. The analysis of the SAL 2012, 
however, is almost entirely focused on the statute itself, with limited reliance on case 
law. That analysis must necessarily also account for the interaction between the 
legislation and Sharia. As noted above, the aim of the doctrinal analysis was to 
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provide an understanding of the  frameworks of legal rules established by each of 
these three instruments. That understanding was then subject to the comparative 
normative analysis presented in this thesis. 
 
1.4.1.2 The normative element 
As noted above, the question of whether the legal rules set down in the SAL 2012 are 
justified by the core principles of modern ICA is essentially a normative question. 
Normative questions can only be fully addressed through a normative analysis.160 
While a doctrinal analysis engages with what the law is, a normative analysis engages 
with what the law should be, relating legal norms to moral and other social norms.161 
For the purposes of this thesis, it builds on the doctrinal analyses by allowing the SAL 
2012 to be critiqued by reference to the ideals of the normative principles underlying 
the ‘standards of conduct’ expected by the modern ICA community.162 The aim is to 
identify and explicate the gap between what the law is, as a framework of norms 
prescribing the permitted or required ‘standards of conduct’, and what it should be. 
This, in turn, provides scope for proposing reforms to narrow the gap. 
 
The normative approach adopted in this thesis accepts the objective nature of law as 
'a matter of social fact'.163 It relies on a positivist understanding of law. This makes a 
clear distinction between law and morality, and holds that the validity of the law is 
determined by the formal law-making requirements rather than its content.164 It does 
not, however, preclude a normative analysis of the content and allows for the 
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argument that the law’s content should be changed to be more consistent with the 
normative demands of the regulated subject matter. While normative argument relies 
on a subjective perspective, it is constrained by the objective requirements that the 
argument is logical, coherent, consistent and supported by the best available 
evidence.165 The point is to persuade the reader that any normative claims have 
strength and should be accepted.  
 
1.4.1.3 The comparative element 
While the normative analysis allows an assessment of the SAL 2012 judged against 
the ideal, a comparative approach grounds that analysis in the reality of law in 
practice. It involves a ‘dialectic’ exchange between two or more legal systems to 
generate a better understanding of the relevant law and provide knowledge that may 
be a valuable resource for reform of the law.166 In this thesis, that exchange was 
between the SAL 2012, the Model Law and the Scottish Act (see 1.5). While the 
Model Law is not itself part of a legal system and only becomes law when formally 
adopted, it has been widely adopted for national domestic arbitration law.167 It was 
introduced with the aim of providing a uniform or harmonised approach to ICA and 
‘reflects a worldwide consensus on the principles and many of the important issues 
of international arbitration practice’.168 As such, it provides a useful benchmark that 
is independent of any of the contextual concerns inherent to a national law. 
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The practicalities of this comparative analysis involve a micro-level  assessment that 
engages with ‘concrete legal concepts [and] rules’,169 and aims to identify, from a 
normative perspective, the similarities and differences between the SAL 2012, the 
Model Law and the Scottish Act. The goal of the comparison is directed by the 
research question,170 facilitated by the main and subsidiary hypothesis as explicated 
below in section 1.7. The aim behind the research question is to determine how well 
the SAL 2012 implements the core principles of modern ICA, and subsequently to 
propose reforms that may improve the legal framework. The role of the comparative 
analysis is to compare and contrast the way in which the legal frameworks established 
by the Model Law and the Scottish Act implement the three core principles with the 
approach taken in the SAL 2012 and accompanying laws. For this thesis, then, the 
core principles of ICA formed the primary tertium comparationis,171 or starting point 
of comparison. Furthermore, given the recent history of arbitration in Saudi Arabia, 
the relationship between arbitration and the courts provided an additional point of 
comparison.  
 
The approach adopted involved four analytical stages.172 The first stage was to set out 
a theoretical understanding of the application of the core principles to an idealised 
theoretical legal framework for arbitration. This was done by dividing the task into 
particular elements of the arbitration process, based on the way in which those 
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elements are regulated by the Model Law. The theoretical understanding of the core 
principles was explored in the context of each relevant element. This theoretical 
analysis was then used to inform an initial analysis of the SAL 2012, the Model Law 
and the Scottish Act, which examined both how they implement the three core 
principles of party autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness and how they limit the 
involvement of the national courts. 
 
This preparatory stage of the analysis provided sufficient contextualised knowledge 
of the three legal frameworks to allow their subsequent comparison.173 The Model 
Law was first compared to the approach taken by the Scottish Act and the Scottish 
Arbitration Rules (SAR), set down in Schedule 1 of the Act, with the aim of 
identifying the strengths and weaknesses of both legal frameworks. The final stage of 
the comparison used those analyses as the basis for a comparative assessment of the 
SAL 2012, focusing on the way in which the legal rules may further the goals of 
arbitration with the aim of identifying the better solution.174 The comparative analysis 
allowed the main and subsidiary hypotheses to be tested, with the consequential 
identification of areas of the SAL 2012 that might be improved. It also provided 
insights into reforms that were subsequently proposed, including the transplantation 
of modified legal rules drawn from the Model Law and the Scottish Act.   
 
In carrying out this comparison, it was necessary to be aware of, and account for, the 
differing socio-legal contexts of the main jurisdiction with those used as 
comparators.175 This is important both for the initial comparison and for any proposals 
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that seek to utilise legal rules transplanted from one of the comparators. As discussed 
in sections 1.3.5 and 1.4.1.1, the main contextually relevant difference relates to the 
central importance of Sharia in Saudi Arabia. Unlike the law in Scotland, where 
legislation is secular and supplemented by a precedent-based system of case law, 
legislation in Saudi Arabia plays a secondary, supplementary role to Sharia law. It 
must be consistent with Sharia, and its role is to fill the gaps in the regulatory 
framework established by fiqh. Thus, any criticism of Saudi law, based on a 
comparative analysis with non-Islamic jurisdictions, must consider the constraints 
imposed by the Sharia and fiqh. The relevance of Sharia, however, should not be 
overstated, particularly since the dual legal system in Saudi Arabia means that cases 
involving legislation are decided by secular, rather than Sharia, courts. 
 
As explained above, Saudi Arabia is seeking to develop as a competitive, 
international commercial force. Modernisation in Saudi Arabia is facilitated by the 
dualistic legal system that uses legislation as a tool for implementing progressive and 
internationally competitive economic and commercial policies. This provides an 
opportunity for a comparative analysis with other commercially attractive arbitration 
legal frameworks, such as that found in Scotland and the Model Law. Indeed, the 
openness of Saudi Arabia to learn from and utilise external approaches is evidenced 
by its reliance on the Model Law in drafting the SAL 2012. While any legal 
transplants may need to be modified to account for the different socio-cultural 
context,176 the government’s intention to develop an internationally attractive 
commercial environment requires ‘legal adaptability’ and creates a ‘social need’ to 
be open to the culture of international commerce and ICA.177 This does not negate the 
relevance of Islam and Sharia, but it does allow an analytical focus on the norms of 
modern ICA. Thus, beyond the commercial prohibitions imposed by the Sharia and 
in the context of a dual legal system, there are few obstacles to a direct comparison 
and the use of modified legal transplantations to reform the legal framework 
regulating ICA in Saudi Arabia. The relevance of Sharia, and any other cultural issues 
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(such as the role of women, the societal and commercial expectations of 
confidentiality,178 and any differences in the understanding of concepts such as 
autonomy and justice) are considered at the relevant points of the comparative 
analysis. 
 
It should finally be noted that, while it is not formally included in the comparative 
analysis, the argument presented in this thesis also engages occasionally with the 
English Act and associated jurisprudence. As a non-Model Law country, the use of 
English legislation and case law provides a valuable counterpoint to the approach of 
the Model Law, serving to illustrate and clarify certain arguments and points made in 
this thesis. Furthermore, English Law is relied on as a tool for predicting, in the 
absence of a sufficient body of Scottish case law, how an issue might be decided by 
the Scottish courts. 
 
1.4.2 Methods 
The research method was to apply the methodologies outlined above to allow a 
critical, interpretative analysis of text-based information. That information included 
both primary and secondary sources. The main primary sources were legislation and 
case law. Arabic primary sources used included case law and the Holy Qur’an, 
although quotes from the Qur’an were taken from an English translation. The main 
secondary sources were: peer reviewed articles; working or research papers; books, 
or book chapters; government publications; and newspapers. The sources referred to 
in the thesis are all published in English. Arabic sources were considered, but all of 
the commentaries on arbitration law were published in English, as were other relevant 
academic commentaries. The relevant information was identified by a structured 
search of electronic databases. The keywords used as part of the systematic search 
strategy were guided by the issue being researched, but included combinations of 
terms, such as: arbitration; commercial arbitration; ICA; arbitration award; arbitration 
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tribunal; party autonomy; natural justice; procedural justice; enforcement; 
jurisdiction; competence-competence; Model Law; Saudi Arabia; and Scotland. 
 
1.5 Choice of Jurisdictions 
As apparent from the research question, the research focuses on the two jurisdictions 
of Saudi Arabia and Scotland, with the Model Law providing a common point of 
comparison. The aim behind the research question is to examine the SAL 2012. Given 
the criticisms of the previous approach to arbitration in Saudi Arabia, and the 
relatively recently intent to change that approach, it is important to critically examine 
the law enacted to achieve that change. As a leading member of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), and a world leading producer and exporter of oil,179 Saudi Arabia is 
a commercially important country in the Middle East. This commercial importance, 
alongside its recent history of maintaining an hostile environment for arbitration and 
the enactment of new laws as part of a move to generate a more positive environment 
for arbitration, provides the motivation and justification for the primary focus on 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
In choosing the comparators for the analysis of the SAL 2012, the following factors 
were considered. First, the pragmatic factors were language and access to the 
materials and knowledge that allow for a more nuanced comparative analysis.180 
These factors favour the use of comparators for which a wide range of materials are 
accessible in either English or Arabic. Second, the restrictions of PhD study, which 
impose limits on the time available for research and the word count for the written 
thesis. This makes it reasonable to use a limited number of comparators in order to 
allow for greater depth of analysis. To facilitate this, it was decided to restrict the 
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analysis to Saudi Arabi and two comparators.181 It should, however, be noted that the 
use of the Model Law (see below) as a comparator opened up a range of jurisdictions 
where the Model Law has been differently implemented. Third, it was important for 
the comparators to be respected as paradigmatic exemplars of an appropriate legal 
framework for regulating ICA. Fourth, the more contemporaneous the comparator the 
better since more recent regulation will have had the benefit of being informed by 
both the most contemporary debates and the experience gained from the operation of 
previously implemented frameworks. Fifth, an element of innovation in the legal 
framework was considered valuable, providing a reason to select the innovative 
jurisdiction over a more conservative approach that brings nothing new to the 
analysis. Sixth, the two comparators should be sufficiently different to justify 
including both frameworks. Seventh, the final factor is the nature of the relationship 
between the SAL 2012 and the comparators.182  
 
Scotland was chosen as a comparator for both positive and negative reasons. The 
positive reasons, which are grounded in the factors set out above, are those that make 
the Scottish legal framework useful to the comparative analysis of the SAL 2012. The 
negative reasons are those that explain why the legal frameworks of other 
jurisdictions are less useful. The positive reasons will be set out first, in the following 
paragraph. The negative reasons will be discussed subsequently. 
 
First, like the SAL 2012 in Saudi Arabia, the Scottish Act and the SAR were  
relatively recent enactments and motivated by the same goal of  making the country 
a more attractive environment for ICA. Second, departing from the Model Law, the 
Scottish Act was drafted with the intention of providing a single, comprehensive set 
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of rules 'in line with generally accepted international standards and ... practice'.183  To 
achieve this, it drew on the key principles expressed by the Model Law and by the 
English Arbitration Act 1996 (English Act).184 Although not beyond criticism, by 
developing on both the Model Law and the English Act, the Scottish Act is an 
exemplar of modern commercial arbitration law,185 which justifies its selection as a 
point of comparison for the SAL 2012. Third, through the creation of a unique 
arbitration framework combining the main statutory provisions with the 
comprehensive Scottish Arbitration Rules (SAR) of schedule 1, the Scottish approach 
is innovative.186 This innovative approach provides the opportunity to engage not just 
with the legal rules but also with the legal framework itself. Alongside the framework, 
the Scottish approach also contains other innovations, such as the role of the 
arbitration appointments referee, that make it attractive as a comparator for the Saudi 
legal framework given Saudi Arabia’s commercial ambitions. Fourth, from a 
pragmatic perspective, using the Scottish Act for comparison does not create any 
difficulties with language or access to sources of information. 
 
Because the Model Law is used as a comparator (see below), it is better to look 
beyond the Model Law countries for the other comparator. Given the pragmatic 
limitations of language and access to materials, ruling out France and Sweden for 
example, the most obvious choices are Scotland, England or the US. The US was 
rejected as an option because its law is reliant on the Federal Arbitration Act 1925, 
which provides for only a minimal framework and is a comparatively ancient piece 
                                                 
183 Scottish Parliament, Arbitration (Scotland) Bill Policy Memorandum (2009), para 57 
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/16034.aspx> accessed 30 November 
2017. 
184 Scottish Parliament, Arbitration (Scotland) Bill Policy Memorandum (2009), paras 57 
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/16034.aspx> accessed 30 November 
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185 David Wilson, 'The Resurgence of Scotland as a Force in International Arbitration: The 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010' (2010) 27 Journal of International Arbitration 679; Roy L Martin 
and Steven P Walker, 'A New Scottish Export - Scottish International Arbitration' (2012) 18 The 
Columbia Journal of European Law Online 3.  
186 Hew R Dundas. ‘The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010: A Great Collaborative Success and an 
Innovative Model for Other Jurisdictions To follow’ (2016) 5 Indian Journal of Arbitration Law 81. 
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of legislation that has been supplemented ad hoc by a complicated wealth of judge 
made law. Indeed, Carbonneau goes so far as to state that, ‘there can be little doubt 
that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is in need of overhaul’.187 Such a 
condemnation suggests that US law would be an unsuitable comparator for the 
purposes of this thesis. Furthermore, at the start of this thesis, work was underway on 
the Third Restatement of The US Law of International Commercial Arbitration.188 
Given that this immense and ‘challenging’ project was still ongoing it seemed an 
inappropriate time to use US law as a comparator for this thesis when other, far more 
modern legislative frameworks were available. As such, the choice was essentially 
between Scotland and England. Scotland was preferred because the legislation is 
more recent and, as explained above, more innovative than the English Act. The 
benefit of the Scottish Act, then, is the added value that comes from the innovative 
elements that were implemented to build on the experience of the English Act and the 
Model Law. The main disadvantage of using Scotland is that, as a small jurisdiction, 
and given the relatively recent enactment of the Scottish Act, the case law is limited. 
However, where the Scottish Act is modelled on the English Act then English case 
law may be used to understand how the rule would be applied.189  . 
 
The Model Law provides an ideal common point of comparison since it is considered, 
to a greater or lesser extent, by both the SAL 2012 and the Scottish Act. Furthermore, 
by its very nature, the Model Law represents a legal framework that is acceptable to 
the international community of the United Nations.190 With its revision in 2006, the 
Model Law provides a legal framework that reflects the nature and principles of 
modern ICA. Finally, legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted by 111 
                                                 
187 Thomas E Carbonneau, Toward a New Federal Law on Arbitration (Oxford University Press 
2014), 4. 
188 Catherine A Rogers, Ank Santens and Suyash G Paliwal, ‘The US Law of International 
Commercial Arbitration Restated’ (2014) 21 Dispute Resolution Magazine 8. 
189 Arbitration Application (No.3 of 2011) [2011] CSOH 164, [8]. 
190 UN General Assembly, Resolution on the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (1985) A/RES/40/72. 
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jurisdictions within 80 states.191 This provides a wealth of experience and case law 
that allows a deeper understanding of its principles and provisions. Given the limited 
case law in Scotland, and the lack of accessible cases in Saudi Arabia, the cases from 
Model Law jurisdictions should provide useful guidance on how the SAL 2012 could, 
or should, be applied to support and facilitate the arbitration of disputes. 
 
1.6 Originality 
The concept of originality is vague, difficult to define and subject to diverse 
understandings in the context of PhD theses.192 While the requirement for originality 
seems to demand a substantive or ‘significant’ contribution to the body of knowledge 
within the relevant field, this need only be a small ‘incremental’ step,193 rather than  
a ground breaking advance.194 Phillips and Pugh note that there are at least 15 ways 
in which a thesis may satisfy the requirement for originality.195 Of these, the most 
relevant for this thesis may be synthesised into an understanding of originality 
expressed as: the use of different methodologies to analyse the still relatively new law 
of arbitration in Saudi Arabia to generate an original understanding of the SAL 2012 
that allows new proposals to be made for further reforms to the law. In the following 
discussion, it will be explained how the present research satisfies the requirement for 
originality. 
                                                 
191 UNCITRAL, Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), 
with amendments as adopted in 2006 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html> 
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Although still a relatively new statute, the SAL 2012has been analysed and discussed 
in several short articles,196 and has been the subject of some recent PhDs, and a 
book,197 which mainly focused on general descriptive and doctrinal analyses and the 
issue of recognition and enforcement of awards.198 The research presented here builds 
on those existing commentaries to provide an in-depth understanding of the strengths 
and weaknesses of its provisions. Although the SAL 2012 has previously been 
compared to both the Model Law,199 and the Scottish Act,200 the present research 
differs from those analyses by assessing the law through the normative lens 
comprised of the core principles of modern ICA. Accepting there is nothing 
particularly original in the use of doctrinal, normative and comparative 
methodologies, the particular combination of the three methodologies distinguish the 
                                                 
196 See, eg: Salah Al Hejailan, 'The New Saudi Arbitration Act: A Comprehensive and Article-by 
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analysis of the SAL 2012 in this thesis from any of the previous analyses of that 
statute, or indeed the legal regulation of arbitration in Saudi Arabia more generally.  
 
It is through this combination of methodologies that the current research provides an 
original perspective on the legal regulation of arbitration in Saudi Arabia. Rather than 
focusing solely on doctrinal issues, or on the issues of party autonomy or procedural 
justice as independent concerns, the research presented here recognises the 
interdependence of the three core principles of modern ICA,201 and uses that 
understanding to facilitate an original analysis of the legal regulation of Saudi Arabia. 
This original understanding of the interaction, particularly between party autonomy 
and procedural justice, is explained further in the following paragraphs (see also 
1.3.2).  
 
The three core principles that provide the foundations for a balanced arbitration 
framework and ground the current analysis are: procedural justice; party autonomy; 
and cost-effectiveness. As a somewhat trite starting point, arbitration must be capable 
of effectively resolving disputes if it is to provide a meaningful alternative to 
litigation. While the effectiveness of arbitration may be characterised as its ability to 
produce an enforceable award, this does not distinguish it from litigation as a 
mechanism for dispute resolution. Rather, the distinction lies in the respect given to 
party autonomy, embodied in choice and flexibility. This respect should not, however, 
provide an unfettered discretion to parties, since that risks undermining procedural 
justice. 
 
An unjust arbitration process is unlikely to be acceptable to the parties and an 
inflexible process that fails to respect party autonomy by restricting the parties’ choice 
over key aspects of the proceedings gives commercial actors little or no reason to 
select arbitration over litigation. Thus, even beyond the ability of the arbitration to 
                                                 
201 Hiro Naragaki, ‘Constructions of Arbitration’s Informalism: Autonomy, Efficiency and Justice’ 
[2016] 1 Journal of Dispute Resolution 141. 
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produce an enforceable award, the process must be both just and respect party 
autonomy.202 For completeness, the analysis should also consider the relevance of 
cost-effectiveness, but this principle should take second place to the balance between 
the key principles of party autonomy and procedural justice.   
 
The emphasis on the two key principles will vary depending on the part of the process 
under scrutiny. However, a normative, principle-based comparative analysis, such as 
this, must engage with both procedural justice and party autonomy. As was explained 
above, this is not simply about balancing the two principles. Rather, it involves a 
deeper understanding of the interaction between them, a consequence of which is that 
party autonomy cannot be fully respected unless the process of arbitration is also just. 
It is this focus on the balance and interaction between justice and party autonomy, as 
the foundation for the comparative analysis of the SAL 2012, that distinguishes this 
thesis from the previous analyses that are more strictly doctrinal and allows this 
research to make an original contribution to the literature. 
 
1.7 The Hypotheses, Arguments and Structure of the Thesis 
As discussed above, the research that grounds this thesis is essentially qualitative in 
nature, relying on a comparative doctrinal and normative analysis of the SAL 2012. 
The aim of this analysis is to determine how well the SAL 2012 balances the core 
principles of justice, party autonomy and cost-effectiveness to establish a legal 
framework that is fit for the purposes of modern ICA. Although the research is 
qualitative, it may nevertheless be useful to explain it by explicating the main 
hypotheses and the underlying arguments reflected in the deductive nature of the 
analysis. It should, however, be noted that the reference to hypothesis should not be 
taken to imply that the analysis involves a scientific determination of fact through 
observation and statistical analysis. Rather, the hypotheses will be confirmed or 
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refuted through reasoned judgment based on data generated by the comparative 
analysis of the SAL 2012.203 
 
The main hypothesis is derived from the analysis of modern ICA presented in section 
1.3.2, which identified the ‘magic triangle’204 of party autonomy, justice and cost-
effectiveness as the three core principles that must inform the drafting and 
implementation of any legal regulatory framework.  Therefore, the main hypothesis, 
which is reflected in the research question detailed in section 1.2, is that the SAL 2012 
implements a legal framework the reflects an appropriate balance between: respecting 
party autonomy; ensuring a just process; and securing a cost-effective award. 
Whether the balance is “appropriate” is a matter of judgment rather than fact and so 
can only be supported by reasoned argument, rather than proven as true or disproven 
as false. That judgment engages with five subsidiary hypotheses that also derive from 
the discussion in section 1.3.2.  
 
The first two of these hypotheses follow from the argument that the arbitration 
process should respect party autonomy because the arbitrator’s power and jurisdiction 
to resolve the dispute flows from the private agreement between the parties and so 
derives from party autonomy. The first subsidiary hypothesis, then, is that the SAL 
2012 establishes a legal framework that respects the parties’ decision to resolve the 
dispute through arbitration. The second subsidiary hypothesis is that the provisions 
of the SAL 2012 establish a legal framework that respects party autonomy through 
an inherent flexibility that empowers the parties by allowing them to control key 
elements of the arbitration process. 
 
                                                 
203 See the discussion of hypothesis testing in: Michael Wood and Christine Welch, ‘Are 
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Innovations Online 56, 62-64, 66-67, 
204 Fabricio Fortese and Lotta Hemmi, ‘Procedural Fairness and Efficiency in International 
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The third subsidiary hypothesis follows from the argument that, as a quasi-judicial 
mechanism for resolving disputes, the legitimacy of arbitration, and hence its 
acceptability, depend on a just and fair process. The hypothesis, then, is that the SAL 
2012 establishes a legal framework that provides sufficient procedural safeguards to 
ensure a minimally just process. This raises the issue of what constitutes a minimally 
just process, which will be considered in chapter four as a part of the analysis of the 
legal frameworks regulating the arbitration tribunal and procedures. 
 
The fourth subsidiary hypothesis flows from the purpose of arbitration, which is 
essentially to resolve a dispute. The chosen mechanism for this is the arbitration 
award, which must be an effective award if the dispute is to be resolved. This requires 
that the award is legitimate, final and enforceable. As noted above, to be legitimate 
the award must result from a fair and just process. To be final, the award should 
ideally be the end of the process. To be enforceable, the national courts must have the 
power to require the relevant party to fulfil any obligations imposed by the award. 
Thus, the hypothesis is that the SAL 2012 establishes a legal framework that 
facilitates and supports the arbitration process in making an effective award that 
resolves the dispute between the parties. 
 
The fifth, and final, subsidiary hypothesis flows from the pragmatics of commercial 
activity. As explained previously, this requires that any activity should be efficient 
and provide the best possible value for money. Based on this, the hypothesis is that 
the SAL 2012 establishes a legal framework that allows the process of arbitration to 
proceed efficiently and with minimal cost, limiting the opportunity for delaying 
tactics or any other causes of inefficiency and increased expense. 
 
Before moving on to consider the arguments and structure of the thesis, it should be 
noted that these hypotheses are not of equal importance. Because they are crucial to 
the nature of arbitration and its legitimacy, the principles of party autonomy and 
justice are of prime importance. Of equal importance is the need for arbitration to 
result in an effective award that resolves the dispute. Cost and efficiency, however, 
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are pragmatically desirable features of arbitration. While important, they are not 
essential to the very nature of the process. This means that it is reasonable to treat the 
fifth subsidiary hypothesis as less important than the other subsidiary hypotheses.  
 
The initial claim that provides the starting point for the analysis in the main body of 
the thesis is: As part of its vision for modernisation (see 1.3.5), Saudi Arabia needs a 
legal framework that enables and facilitates ICA to meet the needs of the international 
commercial community. The SAL 2012, along with the Implementation Regulation 
of the Arbitration Law 2107 and the Enforcement Law 2012, is intended to provide 
just such a legal framework. The question is: how well does it fulfil that goal? A 
complete answer to this question requires a two-stage analysis. In the first stage, the 
legal framework itself must be assessed to determine how well it provides for the core 
principles of modern ICA. The second stage requires an empirical analysis to 
determine the perceptions of the stakeholders and assess whether the new framework 
adequately meets their needs. Because it would be too large a project for a PhD thesis 
to tackle both stages, this thesis focuses on the first stage of this process of analysis, 
which does the groundwork for subsequent empirical research by providing a deep 
understanding of the legal framework, its strengths and weaknesses. It also provides 
an opportunity to propose further reforms to the framework, which may also be 
included in any subsequent empirical analysis.  
 
Before explaining the thesis structure, it should be noted that the approach in this 
thesis is predicated on a pragmatic view of how arbitration works in practice, rather 
than on aspirational theories of how arbitration should work in an ideal world. This 
means that the argument proceeds on the basis that arbitration is dependent on the 
support of individual states through their national legal systems. For the foreseeable 
future, arbitration cannot function without being enabled by national law or supported 
by the national courts. This does not mean that the role of the courts and the use of 
mandatory rules should not be tightly constrained to allow arbitration to function as 
far as possible as a private mechanism for dispute resolution, independent of the 
courts. It does, however, mean that the involvement of the courts and the use of 
mandatory rules are necessary to enable a legitimate and effective system of 
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arbitration. While this issue is briefly considered in chapter two, as part of a 
discussion about conceptual models of arbitration, a full examination of the position 
adopted here would require its own thesis. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
pragmatic reality of arbitration as a system necessarily dependent on national law is 
preferred to the school of thought that conceptualises the ideal nature of arbitration 
as an autonomous system, that ought to be independent of national law.205 All 
criticisms and proposals rely on this basic attitude towards arbitration as a mechanism 
for resolving disputes that is necessarily dependent on national law. 
 
This thesis is organised around four central components of the arbitration process: 
jurisdiction; the arbitration agreement; the arbitration tribunal and proceedings; and 
the arbitration award. Based on this approach, the thesis is divided into four 
substantive chapters, along with an introduction and conclusion. Each of the 
substantive chapters deals with one of those four components. These chapters are 
divided into two main parts. The first part engages with theoretical issues, identifying 
and discussing the balance of interests reflected in the core principles of ICA and the 
role of the national courts. The second part is the comparative legal analysis. In each 
chapter, the approach taken by the Model Law is explicated as the benchmark for 
comparison. This is followed by an analysis of the approach under the Scottish Act 
and the SAR. Finally, the approach taken by the SAL 2012 is compared to both the 
Model Law and the Scottish approaches. Where appropriate, suggestions are made 
regarding future reform of the Saudi law. 
 
Chapter two addresses three issues relating to jurisdiction: the legal jurisdiction of the 
arbitration seat and lex arbitri; the arbitration tribunal’s jurisdiction to resolve the 
dispute; and the national court’s jurisdiction to determine whether an arbitration 
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award should be enforced. The first substantive section examines theoretical models 
of arbitration with the aim of using those models as a tool for assessing the approaches 
taken in practice. The next section analyses the approach taken by the Model Law, 
Scots Law and the SAL 2012. This analysis is divided into three subsections, 
explicating the legal rules governing the gateway jurisdiction of the court, the 
jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal and the court’s jurisdiction regarding the final 
award. Subsequently, the approaches taken by the Model Law and Scots Law are used 
as comparators for an assessment of the approach under the SAL 2012.  
 
In this chapter, it is argued that, consistent with the first subsidiary hypothesis, the 
SAL 2012 makes significant improvements to resolve the jurisdictional criticisms of 
the previous law. By shifting the jurisdictional balance of the legal framework from 
an over-reliance on the courts to a system that allows the arbitration tribunal greater 
authority and independence, the SAL 2012 brings the regulation of arbitration in 
Saudi in-line with the norms of modern ICA. Providing for the principles of 
competence-competence and separability reflects a greater respect for party 
autonomy and the parties’ decision to use arbitration to resolve a dispute. Consistent 
with the main hypothesis, it is further argued that this shift in favour of party 
autonomy does not unduly impact on justice or cost-effectiveness, resulting in a better 
overall balance between the three principles. It is, however, suggested that, contrary 
to the second subsidiary hypothesis, the SAL 2012 could have provided greater 
respect for party autonomy by allowing the parties greater control over the court’s 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it is argued that, contrary to the second and fifth subsidiary 
hypotheses, the SAL 2012 could have been more innovative in utilising mechanisms, 
such as the arbitration appointment referee under the Scottish Act, to provide greater 
flexibility and improve the efficiency of the process. 
 
Chapter three considers the arbitration agreement. The first substantive part of the 
chapter explores the nature, justification and limits of the arbitration agreement. This 
includes an analysis of the concept of autonomy and its relevance to the arbitration 
agreement from both western and Islamic perspectives. This theoretical part ends with 
the construction of a model conception of the arbitration agreement, which provides 
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a tool for assessing the law in practice in the second half of the chapter. The legal 
analysis is divided into three preliminary sections, which explicate and compare the 
approaches taken by the Model Law, Scots Law and the SAL 2012. The arbitration 
agreement is examined first, followed by the court’s role, and then the parties’ power 
to determine the features of the arbitration process. These analyses lead into a 
discussion of how Saudi law might be improved. 
 
In this chapter, it is argued that, consistent with the first subsidiary hypothesis, the 
SAL 2012 significantly improves on the previous law by removing the condition of 
validity that required arbitration agreements to receive judicial approval. It is, 
however, observed that the SAL 2012 fails to fully define a valid arbitration 
agreement. This is arguably inconsistent with the first and fifth subsidiary hypotheses:  
any significant lack of clarity in the law makes it more difficult for the parties to 
effectively implement their autonomous decision to resolve any dispute by 
arbitration; and it makes it more likely that an arbitration agreement will be open to 
challenge as invalid, which would increase the cost of the process and make it less 
efficient. 
 
It is also noted that the SAL 2012 requires the arbitration agreement to be completed 
in writing. This is arguably inconsistent with the first and second subsidiary 
hypotheses, since it negates the parties’ intention to arbitrate unless their agreement 
is formalised in writing, which restricts the parties’ freedom to choose the form of the 
agreement. It is however consistent with the third and fourth subsidiary hypotheses, 
since a written agreement provides greater evidentiary certainty, which allows for a 
more effective and just process. This shifts the balance away from party autonomy 
and towards justice but remains consistent with the main hypothesis. This trend is 
further reflected in the rules governing the content of an arbitration agreement, which 
are more restrictive than the equivalent rules found in the Model Law and the SAR. 
It is further argued, that to improve the consistency of Saudi law with the first, fourth 
and fifth subsidiary hypotheses, the SAL 2012 should be reformed, following the 
approach in Scotland, to include a complete set of procedural rules that explicitly 
label each rule as mandatory or default.  
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Chapter four analyses the legal rules regulating the arbitration tribunal and the 
arbitration proceedings. While chapter three primarily focuses on the principle of 
autonomy, in this chapter the focus is on the principle of justice, particularly on 
natural and procedural justice. It does, however, also engage with the principle of 
party autonomy by addressing the appropriate balance between the interests protected 
by the principle of justice and those protected by the principle of autonomy. Finally, 
the theoretical part of the chapter also examines the relevance and implications of the 
rule of law for the arbitration process. The theoretical analysis of the first half is then 
applied to the comparative analysis of the law, which is explicated in the second half 
of the chapter. While still following the order of comparison that addresses first the 
Model Law, followed by Scots law and then the SAL 2012, this part of the chapter is 
structured around issues relating primarily to justice, but also to party autonomy and 
cost-effectiveness. The analysis considers, in turn, the legal rules of the arbitration 
proceedings and the rules governing the arbitration tribunal. 
 
In this chapter, it is argued that, consistent with the third subsidiary hypothesis, the 
SAL 2012 establishes a legal framework that requires a procedurally just arbitration 
process. Like the Model Law and the Scottish Act, the SAL 2012 explicitly requires 
that the parties are treated equally by the tribunal and imposes obligations on the 
tribunal to ensure that it is impartial and allows all parties the opportunity to state and 
defend their case. It is further argued that that the framework provided for by the SAL 
2012, while a significant improvement over the previous law, imposes more 
formalities and restrictions on party autonomy than either the Model Law or the 
Scottish Act. This reflects the trend identified above that, while remaining consistent 
with the main hypothesis, the SAL 2012 favours a balance in favour of justice over 
autonomy. As with the analysis of the arbitration agreement, it is again argued that 
the SAL 2012 could be improved by following the example of the SAR and providing 
for a complete and accessible set of procedural rules. Furthermore, also following the 
Scottish approach, it would improve consistency with all the subsidiary hypotheses 
to allow for the option of using an arbitral appointments referee. It is also suggested 
that the SAL 2012 should have explicitly provided for default rules regulating 
confidentiality. 
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In chapter five, the analysis is focused on the arbitration award, its finality, 
enforcement and the opportunity for challenge. Again, the chapter is split broadly into 
two halves. The first half engages with the issues from a general and more theoretical 
perspective, while the second half then applies the outcome of that initial examination 
to the comparative legal analysis of the Model Law, the approach under Scots law 
and the SAL 2012. This part of the chapter is subdivided into specific areas, including: 
interim awards; the final award; vacating the award; and enforcement. 
 
In this chapter, proceeding through an analysis that engages with moral and legal 
duties of the arbitrators, it is argued that the SAL 2012 broadly follows the Model 
Law, reflecting a general, if inconsistent, pro-arbitration approach to the recognition 
and enforcement of arbitration awards. As in other parts of the legal framework, the 
approach is consistent with the main hypothesis, with the SAL 2012 achieving an 
acceptable balance between the core principles. As such, the SAL 2012 precludes a 
challenge on the merits of the award and only allows a court to set aside the award, 
or refuse enforcement, where tribunal has exceeded its authority or where there has 
been a significant breach of procedural or natural justice. The SAL 2012 does, 
however, give less weight to party autonomy than either the Model Law or the SAR. 
Consistent with fourth subsidiary hypothesis, and Saudi Arabia’s obligations under 
the NY Convention, the final award is considered res judicata and enforceable by the 
courts.206 However, inconsistent with the first and second subsidiary hypotheses, the 
SAL 2012 the court has no power to remit an issue back to the arbitration tribunal and 
it does not appear to allow the parties the option of challenging an award through an 
internal arbitration appeal mechanism. Furthermore, there is no option for challenging 
the award on the grounds of legal error. It is argued that, although this is consistent 
with the Model Law, it unnecessarily restricts party autonomy, making the SAL 2012 
inconsistent with the second subsidiary hypothesis.   
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The thesis ends with chapter six, which draws together the arguments set out in the 
preceding substantive chapters. As well as briefly summarising the main issues, this 
chapter considers the strengths and weaknesses of the SAL 2012 as a complete legal 
framework, combining the sectional analysis into a critique of the statute as a whole. 
Based on the research presented in this thesis, it is concluded that the SAL 2012 is a 
significant improvement over the SAL 1983, bringing the Saudi legal framework into 
line with the norms and expectations of the international arbitration community. It 
does, however, allow room for further improvement and some future options for 
reform are proposed.  
 
These proposals, which are mostly drawn from the approach in Scotland, are all 
predicated on improving the balance between party autonomy, justice and cost-
effectiveness, increasing the emphasis on party autonomy without sacrificing the 
interests of justice. They most notably include proposals for: the inclusion of an article 
stating the founding principles underlying the law; a comprehensive set of clearly 
labelled mandatory and default rules of procedure; a greater emphasis on rules 
establishing the autonomy of the arbitration process and the tribunal’s jurisdiction; 
the inclusion of rules that increase both the respect for party autonomy and the justice 
of the process by allowing the parties to refer a point of law to the court and also the 
power to include the option of a legal error challenge to an award; allowing the parties 
greater control over the composition of the arbitration tribunal, including the default 
option of using an arbitration appointment referee where the process breaks down; 
explicit rules governing confidentiality; more explicit provisions regarding the 
constraints imposed by Sharia; allowing the parties the option to use any available 
internal arbitration appeals process; allowing the courts to refer an issue back to the 
arbitration tribunal; and ensuring that awards are only set aside where a procedural 
irregularity has, or will, result in substantive injustice. 
 
1.8 The Limits of the Thesis 
The main limitation of this thesis is that it relies exclusively on a text-based analysis. 
Given the lack of readily available case law on arbitration under the SAL 2012 in 
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Saudi Arabia, the focus was essentially on the text of the legislation rather than on 
how the law works in practice. It was possible to obtain limited information of a small 
number of cases, and these have been used where possible. However, the decision to 
limit the research to a text-based analysis makes it difficult to assess how successful 
the legislation will be in practice. This is compounded by the lack of any empirical 
evidence from other sources regarding the SAL 2012 and the current legal regulation 
of arbitration in Saudi Arabia. As such, the present thesis provides a valuable critique 
of the legal framework in theory, but empirical research is required to further 
understand how well the law works in practice. 
 
The text-based focus of the present research also impacts on the proposals that have 
been made consequential to the analysis. As with the primary analysis of the SAL 
2012, and while the proposals are justified in theory, the lack of empirical research 
means that their acceptability remains untested. The next step following the research 
presented in this thesis should be to carry out empirical analyses to determine the 
attitudes of various stakeholder to both the SAL 2012 and to the proposals suggested 
as part of this thesis. 
 
The other main limitation arises from the decision to rely on two comparators for the 
comparative analysis. The decision was motivated by the goal of achieving a deeper 
comparison than would be possible with more comparators. However, the 
disadvantage of such an approach is that it limits the range of different options that 
may usefully inspire criticisms of the SAL 2012 and proposals for reform. Again, this 
limitation provides scope for future research that uses different comparators or adopts 
a different approach that focuses on breadth, rather than depth, by using a larger 
number of comparators. 
 
As a final limitation, it might also be observed that the decision to structure the 
research by focusing on the four main elements of arbitration necessarily shapes the 
analysis and influences the outcome of that analysis. An approach that was structured 
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around the three core principles, rather than the elements of the arbitration process, 
may have resulted in a substantially different analysis. 
 
1.9 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has set out the research question, the background context, 
the methodologies and research methods, and the structure of the thesis. The research 
question asks how well the SAL 2012 facilitates an arbitration process that reflects 
the demands of modern ICA. It was explained that the assessment of the SAL 2012 
involved a comparison with the Model Law and the Scottish Act. The primary tertium 
comparationis for this comparative analysis was the implementation, through the 
legal rules, of the core principles of party autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness. 
The secondary point of comparison was the relationship between arbitration and the 
national courts. 
 
The background context for the research presented in this thesis, is the troubled recent 
history of international arbitration in Saudi Arabia. As exemplified by the Aramco 
arbitration in 1963, the prioritisation of Western legal principles resulted in a 
reluctance to engage with international arbitration. Attitudes changed in the 1980s as 
international commerce became increasingly important, resulting in the SAL 1983. 
Although providing a modern legal framework, it was criticised for the limits it 
imposed on party autonomy and for maintaining a supervisory role for the courts, 
which resulted in delays and an excessive interference with the arbitration process. 
The SAL 2012 was passed with the aim of addressing these criticisms by creating a 
legal framework more consistent with the norms of ICA, making Saudi Arabia a 
commercially attractive option.  
 
The research question was designed to assess how well the SAL 2012 succeeds in the 
creation of a legal framework suitable for modern ICA. Based on a critical realist 
paradigm, the research method was a critical, interpretative analysis of text-based 
sources of information applying a mixed comparative legal methodology, including 
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both doctrinal and normative elements. As explained, the thesis is divided into four 
key components of the legal framework for regulating the arbitration process: chapter 
two considers issues of jurisdiction; chapter three examines the arbitration agreement; 
chapter four focuses on the arbitration tribunal and the arbitration proceedings; and 
chapter five, addresses the arbitration award, challenges to the award and enforcement 
of the award. This analysis is drawn together in chapter six, which sets out the final 
conclusions and proposals for reform. 
 
To conclude, then, the research methodology and methods explained in this 
introductory chapter are designed to address the specific issue targeted by the research 
question. As noted above, this asks how effectively the SAL 2012 provides a legal 
framework that, more appropriately than the SAL 1983, balances the interests 
protected by the three core principles of modern ICA. As reflected in the structure of 
the thesis, the methodological approach facilitated a systematic comparative analysis 
of the SAL 2012, which allowed identification of its strengths and weakness and 
opportunities for future reform.  
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Chapter Two: Examination of the Core Principles in the Context of 
Jurisdiction 
2.1 Introduction 
Although it has been claimed that 'the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power',207 
it is perhaps better to treat the basis of jurisdiction as a matter of 'legitimate 
authority'.208 It is not that power is irrelevant, but that it is relevant in the normative 
sense of legitimate authority,209 rather than in the descriptive sense of ability. Relying 
on this distinction, jurisdiction may be defined as: 'the power to hear and determine 
the subject matter in a controversy between parties'.210 Jurisdiction is essentially 
concerned with determining the tribunal empowered to resolve the dispute, rather 
than with the substantial merits of the case or its admissibility.211 Although it might 
be argued that a bright-line distinction between these issues is artificial,212 the 
question of jurisdiction is nevertheless an important practical consideration. 
 
The issue of jurisdiction impacts on several different aspects of the arbitration 
process. Even before arbitration begins, the issue of jurisdiction may affect whether 
it can proceed without an initial court referral.213 Jurisdiction is, of course, central to 
the existence and scope of the tribunal’s authority to decide a case or issue. It is, 
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however, also relevant beyond the restricted question of whether the arbitration 
tribunal has jurisdiction in any particular case. Indeed, it is possible to identify three 
senses in which jurisdiction is relevant. First is jurisdiction in the sense of legal 
jurisdiction of the arbitration seat, and the attendant lex arbitri; second is jurisdiction 
in the sense of the arbitration tribunal's jurisdiction to decide the case; and the third 
sense of jurisdiction relates to whether a court has the authority to determine the 
enforceability of an arbitration tribunal’s decision.214  
 
All three senses of jurisdiction raise important issues, particularly in relation to 
individual and party autonomy. Determining the legal jurisdiction and the applicable 
lex arbitri establishes the legal framework for arbitration, which shapes all aspects of 
the process of arbitration.215 Appropriately affording an arbitration tribunal the 
authority to determine the dispute is fundamental to a respect for party autonomy, 
which is embodied in the agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Ensuring that an award 
is enforceable is crucial to the effectiveness of arbitration, as well as a matter of 
procedural justice. In this regard, jurisdiction is relevant to the question of whether a 
vacated award is nonetheless enforceable.216 Furthermore, jurisdiction is germane to 
the protection afforded by the NY Convention, which may or may not have been 
implemented by the state in which the relevant assets are located. 
 
For the state, attracting lucrative arbitration business may influence the development 
of legal rules and standards that promote the legal jurisdiction as favourable to one or 
both of the parties involved.217 Historically, this is reflected in the developments 
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following the introduction of the NY Convention in 1958, which was created to 
overcome the deficiencies of the Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards 1927.218 Since then, states have increasingly relaxed their approach 
by affording greater respect to party autonomy and restricting the power of the courts 
to control the arbitration process and outcome.219 This trend has been encouraged by 
the protections afforded by the NY Convention, which allows parties to choose 
arbitration friendly states, such as France and Switzerland. To remain competitive, 
other states have subsequently followed suit.220 More recently, the Model Law 1985, 
amended in 2006, has also been hugely influential in furthering the relaxation and 
harmonisation of arbitration regimes.221 Indeed, as far back as 1995, it was observed 
that: 'the impact of the Model Law is such that no State, modernizing its arbitration 
law will do so without taking it … into account'.222 
 
This relaxation has not wholly excluded the role of national courts, which still varies 
significantly between states. Since the Arbitration Act 1996 in England, and the 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 in Scotland, these countries are more attractive as 
seats of arbitration when compared to countries with less liberal approaches, such as 
Saudi Arabia under the previous regime governed by the SAL 1983. However, as 
developments in Brazil illustrate, 'given the right climate, progress can rapidly occur', 
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and countries previously seen as unfriendly may become attractive as arbitration 
seats. 223   
 
In exploring the importance of jurisdiction in the context of ICA, several relevant 
issues will be discussed, including: the process of determining jurisdiction and the 
role of the parties; the competence-competence principle; the doctrine of separability; 
the courts’ authority to review the arbitrator's decision; and the jurisdictional issues 
affecting the enforcement of an award. The aim of the chapter, having regard to the 
three core principles of autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness, is to carry out a 
comparative analysis of how well the SAL 2012 regulates these jurisdictional issues, 
identifying opportunities for reform. The analysis begins by examining the concept 
of jurisdiction in the context of arbitration,224 and by considering the relevance of 
theoretical models of arbitration. These models are used to facilitate a critical 
assessment of the relevant provisions of both the Model law and the Scottish Act. 
That analysis is further informed by reference to the law of other countries, such as 
England, where the Model Law has not been implemented. The analyses of the Model 
Law and the Scottish Act subsequently provides the benchmark for a critical 
comparison of the SAL 2012. The chapter ends by considering possible reforms.  
 
2.2 Jurisdiction and Theoretical Approaches to Arbitration 
It is not uncommon for an alleged party to an ICA agreement to challenge the 
agreement by raising a jurisdictional issue. This is important because ensuring that 
the dispute is resolved by the appropriate forum impacts on both party autonomy and 
procedural justice. It is also important for two pragmatic reasons. First, it is costly, 
and time consuming. Second, if the issue is not appropriately resolved then it may 
lead to a subsequent challenge to the enforceability of any award made by the 
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arbitrators.225 This follows because the legitimacy of the tribunal's decision and the 
award crucially depends on whether the tribunal has the requisite authority or 
jurisdiction.  The relevance of jurisdiction, however, goes beyond the narrow territory 
of the arbitration tribunal and engages wider issues of procedural justice.  Ensuring 
that justice is done is the prerogative of the state and, along with sovereignty concerns, 
justify the state's involvement in maintaining a degree of control. 
 
The 'fundamental' importance of jurisdiction,226 then, is that it determines the 
existence and extent of a court or tribunal's legitimate authority to determine any 
particular case and make an enforceable award. In the absence of jurisdiction, a court 
or tribunal is 'as impotent as a morning mist',227 and where a court or tribunal exceeds 
its jurisdiction then the relevant decision will be considered unjust and declared 
void.228 Thus, it is essential to determine whether jurisdiction lies with the arbitration 
tribunal, the national domestic courts or both forums.  
 
Although the requirement of relevant jurisdiction applies to both the national courts 
and the international arbitration tribunals, there is a crucially important distinction to 
be made. While the jurisdiction of national courts is determined solely by the state, 
the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal is, in principle, necessarily dependent on 
party autonomy,229 since it derives from the parties’ consent to the agreement.230 The 
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effect of consent is to alter the rights and duties of the parties to that agreement, such 
that neither party should be allowed to unilaterally renege on the agreement without 
some lawful justification.231 This means that, where consent is deficient or absent, 
then the tribunal’s jurisdiction is undermined and open to challenge,232 but where 
jurisdiction is conferred by the parties' valid consent, then, at least in theory, 'neither 
party may subsequently challenge the tribunal's competence'.233  
 
Before examining the law in practice, four theoretical models of ICA will be 
considered. These models provide the necessary tools to facilitate a deep comparative 
analysis of the approach to jurisdiction under the SAL 2012. As Gaillard notes, the 
answer to any technical question, 'ultimately depends on the underlying vision one 
entertains of international arbitration'.234 This avoids presupposing any particular 
approach to arbitration and recognises that different philosophies of arbitration may 
impact on any proposed reforms.  
 
Although Gaillard has usefully constructed theoretical models of ICA based on the 
national-international axis,235 for the purposes of this thesis, the focus will be on four 
competing models that centre more directly on the conceptual nature of arbitration. 
These are the contractual, jurisdictional, hybrid (contract and jurisdiction), and 
autonomous models.236 The value of these models, for this thesis, is that they 
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differentially emphasise key principles underlying ICA, highlighting their relevance 
to alternative structural arrangements. Thus, while the contractual model prioritises 
party autonomy, the jurisdictional model is more concerned with the legitimacy 
inherent to a formal, procedurally just system. The hybrid model dialectically resolves 
the conflict between the contractual and jurisdictional models by emphasising the 
importance of both party autonomy and justice. Like the hybrid model, the 
autonomous model emphasises both party autonomy and justice by characterising the 
system of ICA as a transnational system of justice,237 wholly independent of any 
national legal system. 
 
Under the contract model, the arbitration tribunal's authority derives from the 
agreement between the parties to submit to arbitration and exclude recourse to 
litigation. The arbitration process and award are a series of contractual acts enjoying 
the same light-touch relationship with national law as any other contract.238 While 
this has the advantage of reflecting the contractual nature of the relationship between 
the parties,239 it is problematic because it fails to reflect the independent nature 
required of the arbitration tribunal. It also fails to explain the partial or complete 
immunity granted to arbitrators.240 Furthermore, it cannot explain the enforceability 
of an award, beyond simply invoking a breach of the arbitration agreement.241 In this 
regard, the contract model may be considered an idealised view of arbitration where 
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all parties to the dispute are perfectly cooperative and seek only to gain the truth of 
the contract with little need for the support or supervision of national law.242 
 
Under the jurisdiction model, arbitration is analogous to litigation, with the arbitrators 
deriving their authority from the state rather than party autonomy.243 The strength of 
this model is that it recognises the dependence of the arbitration process on the state's 
recognition of the legitimacy of the process and its willingness to recognise and 
enforce an award.244 The model’s weakness is that it underplays the importance of 
the arbitration agreement in affording the arbitration tribunal its jurisdiction to 
determine the dispute. As such, while reflecting the reality that 'it is the place of the 
[arbitration] proceedings whose law defines the scope of ... contractual autonomy' 
embodied in the arbitration agreement,245 it diminishes the role of party autonomy.  
 
The hybrid model tries to combine the strengths of both the contractual and the 
jurisdictional models, while eliminating their weaknesses. As such it recognises both 
the importance of party autonomy in opting to submit a dispute to arbitration and the 
need to situate that process within the jurisdiction of a legal framework. The process 
begins, consistently with a contractual model, by virtue of an arbitration agreement 
between the parties. Then, more consistent with the jurisdictional model, it follows a 
process bound by the procedural law and public policy of the seat and ends with a 
quasi-legal judgment making a legally enforceable award.246   
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The autonomous model 'treats arbitration as sui generis proceedings which cannot be 
automatically subjected either to the application of general contractual principles or 
to the rules regulating civil proceedings in courts of law'.247 Under this model, 'parties 
should have unlimited autonomy to decide how the arbitration shall be conducted', 
unrestrained by the law of the arbitration seat.248 It supports a delocalised approach 
to arbitration, maintains that the national laws of the seat should not play any 
supervisory role and insists that arbitrators should be entirely free to choose the 
applicable system of law or principles.249  
 
These models essentially represent a tension between party autonomy and the 
procedural justice ensured by the national legal structure. This reflects a payoff 
necessary to ensure that arbitration provides an 'effective ... and attractive alternative 
to litigation, while still ensuring that its use is predicated on the consent of the 
parties'.250 In creating or adopting a single model of arbitration with which to critique 
the law, the two issues of party autonomy and the procedural justice enabled through 
state supervision must be balanced. But this balance should nevertheless prioritise the 
basic idea of arbitration. This is that the parties are seeking to manage a broken 
relationship by voluntarily agreeing on the mechanical process by which the 
substantive dispute may be justly resolved. In other words, the administrative function 
of arbitration should be dominant to the legislative support necessary to ensure its 
efficient and effective functioning.251 In this regard it might be better to see the 
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balance as between cost-effectiveness and procedural justice, bearing in mind the 
‘fundamental’ importance of party autonomy.252 
 
Arbitration may be characterised as a ‘private form of justice’,253 which respects the 
autonomy of the parties by giving effect to their respective wills through the 
agreement to submit their dispute to arbitration. In an ideal world, this would be 
achieved entirely within an autonomous system of arbitration. All aspects of the 
process would be determined by the parties and there would be no need to rely on 
national law or have recourse to a court.254 Realistically, however, arbitration needs 
the state’s support to function effectively.255 As Kerr LJ stated:  
[d]espite suggestions to the contrary by some learned writers under 
other systems, our jurisprudence does not recognise the concept of 
arbitral procedures floating in the transnational firmament, 
unconnected with any municipal system of law.256  
Although this dictum referred to English law, national law is currently an essential 
part of any system of arbitration.257 This is partly because the individual parties may 
fail to effectively exercise their autonomy to sufficiently determine all the relevant 
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aspects of the arbitration process. The backing of national law may also be necessary 
where one of the parties challenges the process of arbitration. Furthermore, winning 
an arbitration award would be a Pyrrhic victory in the absence of the enforcement 
mechanisms provided by national legal systems.258 It is, however, because ICA is 
situated within an international matrix of national legal systems that jurisdictional 
issues arise. Although any pure system of arbitration is likely to remain a utopian 
ideal, it is nevertheless useful to consider the characteristics of such as system in 
critiquing or constructing a system in practice. 
 
A perfect system of ICA would provide the parties with a dispute resolution forum 
acceptable to both parties. The forum would need to be independent of either party, 
have the authority to determine the dispute and make an enforceable award. Given 
that the context is arbitration rather than mediation, there would need to be some 
system for challenging or appealing a decision. This might be theoretically possible 
within an autonomous system of arbitration, but in the real world it will not be feasible 
without the support of individual states.259 Since national legal systems are already 
well established and capable of providing support, it seems unlikely that there would 
be sufficient motivation for states to support a self-contained, independent system of 
arbitration. Especially when, at least for ICA, any such support would need to be 
transnational, or multinational at least. Having said that, the involvement of a national 
legal system is a matter of degree and the pragmatic ideal would be to have a system 
where the level of involvement of the national legal system is the minimum necessary 
to achieve an appropriate balance between cost-effectiveness and procedural 
justice.260 In other words, the pragmatic compromise must be a hybrid system that, 
within the constraints of any national legal system, aims to support, promote and 
                                                 
258 Alexander J Belohlavek, 'The Legal Nature of International Commercial Arbitration and the 
Effects of Conflicts Between Legal Cultures' (2011) 2 Law of Ukraine 27. 
259 Chinwe A Mordi, ‘An Analysis of National Courts Involvement in International Commercial 
Arbitration; Can International Commercial Arbitration be Effective without National Courts?’ (2016) 
6 Open Journal of Political Science 95, 103. 
260 George A. Bermann, 'The "Gateway" Problem in International Commercial Arbitration' (2012) 37 
The Yale Journal of International Law 1, 50. 
92 
 
protect the core principles of party autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness, which 
underpin an idealised autonomous system of ICA. 
 
Since the support for arbitration varies from state to state, the first issue for the parties 
is to select both the venue and seat. The question then will be how far the state in 
which the seat is situated will, through the lex arbitri, facilitate or restrict the 
autonomy of both the parties and the process of arbitration.261 In addition, as an issue 
of justice, it will be important to appreciate the level of protection provided where 
one of the parties seeks to challenge the process. Even when a seat has been selected, 
the jurisdiction of the national legal system may be engaged where there is a 
disagreement over the seat, which raises the question of the limits to the court's 
authority to determine the issue.262 The courts may also be engaged where one party 
seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement while the other party seeks to litigate. Here 
the court may be asked to address the question of whether there is a valid and 
enforceable arbitration agreement.263 How the national law and courts deal with this 
'gateway' issue is crucial to the overall success of the support provided by the state to 
ICA.264  
 
The next issue is the authority of the tribunal. In an autonomous system of arbitration, 
and respecting the autonomy of the parties who have chosen arbitration, the tribunal 
will have the authority to determine its own jurisdiction to decide the dispute, subject 
perhaps to a supervisory transnational arbitration body. In practice, however, any 
such supervision will be provided by the national legal system. This raises the 
question of the court's jurisdiction to engage with the issue of the tribunal's 
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jurisdiction. This may relate to the arbitration as a whole, or to whether the tribunal 
exceeded its authority by addressing disputes that were not arbitrable, either because 
they fell outside the arbitration agreement or for reasons of public policy.  
 
As Paulson notes, national laws may allow legal appeals to all arbitration decisions, 
prohibit arbitration in certain contexts, for certain issues or even completely prohibit 
arbitration, but that is 'emphatically not the modern trend'.265 This then raises the 
question of how far the jurisdiction of the courts extends to reviewing the decisions 
of an arbitration tribunal. The ideal would be that all issues are determined within the 
arbitration framework, but the pragmatic compromise, reflecting the hybrid model, is 
that issues of procedural justice are overseen by the courts.  
 
Once a decision has been made, the final issue is enforceability, which secures the 
value of the award. Under the ideal model, the award would be enforceable through 
the authority of a transnational arbitration body, without reliance on the national 
courts. Pragmatically, however, the national courts may be required to enforce an 
award. The issue is how far national law facilitates the arbitration process, respecting 
party autonomy and the substantive justice of the award by enforcing or refusing to 
enforce an award.266  
 
Since national law plays such an important role, it is crucial that the parties choose a 
seat that appropriately balances the interests of party autonomy, justice and cost-
effectiveness.267 In achieving that balance, the role of the courts should be limited, 
focusing on enabling arbitration and reinforcing its legitimacy. The question of how 
                                                 
265 Jan Paulsson, 'Jurisdiction and Admissibility' in Gerald Aksen (ed), Global Reflections on 
International Law Commerce and Dispute Resolution (ICC Publishing 2005) 601.  
266 Zheng Sophia Tang, Jurisdiction and Arbitration Agreements in International Commercial Law 
(Routledge 2014), 224. 
267 Ar Gor Seyda Dursun, 'A Critical Examination of the Role of Party Autonomy in International 
Commercial Arbitration and an Assessment of its Role and extent' (2012) 1 Yalova Universitesi 
Hukuk Fakultesi Dergisi 161, 180. 
94 
 
well the SAL 2012 regulates the role of the courts and the tribunal’s jurisdiction will 
now be assessed by comparison with the approach under the Model Law and Scots 
law. 
 
2.3 The Law Governing Jurisdictional Issues in Arbitration 
2.3.1 Approaches to arbitration 
It was argued above that, while the ideal of arbitration is an autonomous transnational 
system, the pragmatic reality is that ICA essentially depends on national law. Kerr 
LJ, extra-judicially, described the relationship between the courts and arbitration as a 
'partnership',268 but it is a partnership of necessity rather than consent. It is crucial, if 
arbitration is to retain the features that make it a viable alternative to litigation, that 
the role of the courts is carefully circumscribed. With that in mind, the way in which 
the Model Law defines the jurisdictional boundaries of the courts and the arbitration 
tribunal will be examined. 
 
As a compromise aimed at producing international harmonisation,269 the Model Law 
brings the advantages of consistency and predictability at the expense of choice. The 
key issue here is how that compromise impacts on the balance between the 
independence of the arbitration process and the jurisdiction of the courts. A good 
starting point is article 5, which prescribes that: 'In matters governed by this Law, no 
court shall intervene except where so provided by this Law'. This mandatory 
provision,270 which is 'critical to the structure of the Model Law',271 sets the tone that 
the courts' authority is to be restrictively determined. It provides predictability by 
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limiting judicial interference,272 while allowing the courts to support the arbitration 
process.273  
 
The strength of article 5 lies in its clarity and in the creation of a blank canvas with 
which to carefully delineate the court's jurisdiction, permitting its involvement only 
when necessary to ensure a just and cost-effective arbitration process. Any 
controversy arises not because of article 5 in isolation, but because of its effect on 
national jurisprudence when combined with the limits set on the court's jurisdiction 
by the other substantive provisions of the Model Law.274 Crucially, much depends on 
how the Model Law is implemented and varying the terms of its provisions may have 
significant effect. Consider for example, s.1(c) of the English Act, which is broadly 
equivalent to article 5. Here, s.1(c) replaces the mandatory directive of article 5 -  that 
no court 'shall intervene' - with the instruction that the court 'should not intervene', 
allowing a discretion unavailable under the Model Law.275 
 
Before moving on, it is also worth noting the importance of the place, or seat, of 
arbitration as a limiting factor on the court's jurisdiction.276 Under article 1(2): 
 The provisions of this Law, except articles 8, 9, 17 H, 17 I, 17 J, 35 
and 36, apply only if the place of arbitration is in the territory of 
this State. 
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The general effect is to limit the application of the Model Law where the arbitration 
seat has not been determined or has been established in a foreign state that has not 
adopted the Model Law.277  
 
Turning now to Scots law. The Scottish Act has moved Scots law on ICA away from 
a total reliance on the Model Law278 and what was considered an incomplete 
regulatory framework.279 To provide a comprehensive modern statute that would help 
to make Scotland an attractive location for ICA, the Act retained a strong connection 
with the Model Law, but also drew on the English Act and an earlier draft Bill from 
2002.280 As Lord Glennie commented:  
rather than simply applying the provisions of the Model Law en 
bloc to arbitrations in Scotland, it follows the [English] approach 
… setting out … a tailor made set of provisions covering all stages 
of the arbitral process in a Convention compliant way.281 
 
The whole tenor of the Policy Memorandum suggests that the primary objective was 
to provide cost-effective arbitration services that could compete in the world market 
for arbitration business. However, the Memorandum also emphasises the importance 
of ensuring 'fairness and impartiality'.282 In part, this was to be achieved by limiting 
access to the courts and replicating the approach in Singapore, where the jurisdiction 
of the courts is essentially supportive and interference with the process of arbitration 
strictly limited.283 The issue then, is whether these policy objectives have significantly 
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affected the jurisdictional matters considered in this chapter. Is the balance between 
the jurisdiction of the courts and the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal any better 
than the balance achieved under the Model Law?  
 
Perhaps the first point to make is that article 5 of the Model Law is incorporated as a 
founding principle, but with a similar modification to that found in the English Act.284 
Incorporating the provision as a 'founding principle', emphasises its importance, but, 
as noted earlier, by requiring that 'the court should not intervene ... except as provided 
by this Act', the courts are left with a discretion that is precluded by the Model Law's 
use of the mandatory imperative 'shall'. Section 1(c) is bolstered by s.13(1), which 
explicitly sets out the limits to the court's jurisdiction to intervene, making it clear 
that 'legal proceedings are competent ... only as provided for' by the applicable 
arbitration rules or 'any other provision' of the Act. 
 
As will be discussed further below, both the Model Law and the Scottish Act 
implement a hybrid model of arbitration. This is understandable because such a model 
allows a regulatory framework that best suits the needs of all relevant stakeholders, 
which include the businesses, the state, the arbitration community and the legal 
system. Their interests require an arbitration system that provides an appropriate 
balance of key features such as: cost-effectiveness; respect for party autonomy; 
independence of the arbitration system; just protection for the parties' interests; 
legitimacy; and attractiveness to the international business community.  
 
While these features are not mutually exclusive nor are they entirely consistent with 
each other. For example, ensuring a just and legitimate system impacts on the cost, 
efficiency and independence of the arbitration process. This means that the features 
must be balanced according to their relative importance, which is likely to vary from 
state to state and is reflected in the differences between the Model Law and the 
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Scottish Act. Nevertheless, both share a core philosophy of arbitration, which is 
apparent in the central features of their respective regulatory frameworks. In the 
analysis that follows, the approach under the SAL 2012 will be compared with those 
two frameworks. 
 
As should be expected in an Islamic country, the provisions must be interpreted and 
applied in a way that is consistent with Sharia. This may partly explain why, although 
'largely derived from the ... Model Law',285 the SAL 2012 has not implemented article 
5 of the Model Law, which means the courts are not restricted to interventions solely 
based on its provisions. This is relevant to the Law of Enforcement 2012, which will 
be considered later. However, it also leaves scope for the courts to intervene more 
than would be strictly warranted under the SAL 2012.  
 
It might have been better had the SAL 2012 followed the Scottish Act, which includes 
a modified version of Article 5 permitting the courts only very limited discretion to 
look outside the Act. Including this restriction - especially in the context of a 
'Founding principle' - sets the tone and encourages the courts to develop a culture of 
minimally interventional support for arbitration. Given that one of the major 
criticisms of the SAL 1983 was that it allowed too much judicial intervention,286 it is 
unfortunate that the SAL 2012 does not follow the Scottish approach, which would 
have encouraged a more pro-arbitration culture within the legal system. However, 
despite this flaw, the SAL 2012 provides a more comprehensive system of regulation 
than under the SAL 1983, applying to any arbitration proceedings in Saudi, and to 
proceedings abroad where the parties agree.287  
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2.3.2 The court’s gateway jurisdiction 
A key jurisdictional issue arises where litigation is initiated, but a party requests that 
the matter be referred for arbitration pursuant to an alleged agreement. Consider, first, 
how the Model Law deals with this issue. Article 8 of the Model Law seeks to protect 
'the arbitral process from unpredictable or disruptive court interference' by providing 
that the court:288 
shall ... refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.  
When coupled with article 5 and article 2A(2), which requires that matters not 
expressly settled by the Model Law are to be determined according to its general 
principles, the implication is that the courts should take a light touch approach to the 
existence and validity of an arbitration agreement. However, the Model Law allows 
a certain amount of discretion.  
 
The discretion allowed under article 8 is reflected in how different courts approach 
their role in ensuring a just and cost-effective arbitration process. Judges that lean 
more towards the jurisdictional model are likely to scrutinise the arbitration 
agreement in more detail than those that lean towards the contractual or autonomous 
model. For example, the courts in Hong Kong only require the prima facie existence 
of an arbitration agreement, while the English courts look more widely at all the 
relevant circumstances.289  
 
In the Canadian case of Jean Estate v Wires Jolley LLP, Juriansz JA explained that 
the choice between the court taking an 'interventionist' or 'prima facie' approach was 
determined by different perspectives on the pragmatic role of the courts as facilitators 
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of the arbitration process.290 Characterising itself as facilitator, the interventionist 
approach is based on the view that an early definitive determination of the arbitration 
tribunal's jurisdiction will save time and money. This, however, will only be the case 
where the court decides that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The 
prima facie approach is based on the idea that a fast referral to arbitration is the most 
efficient, reducing the impact of delaying tactics. However, the different approaches 
may also be explained on the basis that the interventionist approach is more concerned 
with procedural justice, while the prima facie approach, reflecting the competence-
competence principle,291 is more concerned with the autonomy of the arbitration 
process and the bedrock principle of party autonomy.292 
 
That different courts have reached disparate conclusions regarding their role under 
article 8 is both a strength and a weakness. The discretion permitted by the Model 
Law allows sensitivity to the local legal culture. This, however, undermines the aim 
of harmonisation and, where the courts take an interventionist approach, it 
undermines the autonomy of the arbitration process. How far it also interferes with 
the principle of party autonomy is complex and will be addressed later in this chapter. 
 
The court's jurisdiction under article 8 is concerned with both legitimising and 
facilitating the arbitration process. To those ends, the court has further jurisdiction to 
ensure the tribunal is properly established. Under article 11, courts are authorised to 
appoint an arbitrator, but only where the arbitration agreement and the default 
mechanism under article 11(3) both fail. As with article 8, the court must determine 
that there is a valid arbitration agreement, which again provides scope for different 
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degrees of scrutiny.293 This supportive jurisdiction cannot be excluded by the parties 
and any decision is final.294  
 
Under article 13(3), the court may be involved where a party challenges the 
appointment of an arbitrator. Limiting the court's jurisdiction to a supporting role, the 
authority only arises where a challenge is either unsuccessful under a procedure 
agreed by the parties or is rejected by the arbitration tribunal. To balance the court's 
involvement against the efficiency of an autonomous arbitration process, there is no 
jurisdiction for appeal from the court's ruling. Furthermore, as with article 8, the 
arbitration may continue while awaiting the court's determination. The point behind 
this is to prevent the use of article 13 as a delaying tactic.295 In keeping with this, the 
court has no jurisdiction to grant an injunction to stay those proceedings.296 A similar 
role for the court exists under articles 14 and 15 to remove and replace an arbitrator 
who 'becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons 
fails to act without undue delay'. Unlike the court's role under article 11, the parties 
can agree to exclude the court's jurisdiction and determine the matter by, for example, 
the rules of an arbitration institution.297 
 
Note that in all issues arising prior to the substantive arbitration, the jurisdiction of 
the court provides a failsafe where the very existence of the arbitration agreement is 
challenged, or the otherwise autonomous process of arbitration fails. In fulfilling this 
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role, the court's duty is first, as a matter of procedural justice, to legitimise and then, 
as a matter of cost-effectiveness, to facilitate the process of arbitration. Although 
courts have taken different approaches to the permitted level of scrutiny of 
jurisdictional issues, the underlying principle of party autonomy suggests that the 
courts should take a prima facie approach to the existence and validity of the 
agreement. This framework reflects the hybrid model of arbitration, but does so in a 
way that leans more towards party autonomy and the contract model. 
 
Before considering the tribunal’s jurisdiction, it should be noted that article 6 allows 
the state to establish an alternative forum to the court that would be competent to 
determine issues arising under articles 11(3),(4), 13(3), 14, 16(3) and 34(2). There is 
no reason why this forum could not be a national arbitration tribunal rather than a 
traditional court,298 so allowing the state to reflect a more autonomous approach to 
arbitration. Such a tribunal would only have jurisdiction in relation to the supportive 
role required under articles 11, 13 and 14. Where the legitimacy of the tribunal or the 
award is in question, as in articles 16 and 34, the Model Law specifically restricts 
jurisdiction to 'the court specified in article 6'. This distinction reflects the balance 
between procedural justice and cost-effectiveness that was identified in the previous 
section. 
 
Turning now to the Scottish Act, under s.10 of which the court is required to suspend 
any legal proceedings on the application of a party to a valid and effective arbitration 
agreement that relates to the subject matter of the dispute.299 The emphasis is on the 
suspension of legal proceedings rather than referral to arbitration, as under article 8 
of the Model Law. The effect, however, is equivalent and, like the Model Law, it 
applies regardless of the existence or location of the seat of arbitration.300 According 
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to the Policy Memorandum, this provision reflects '[t]he traditional approach of the 
Scottish courts ... that a valid and binding arbitration agreement suspends the 
jurisdiction of the courts and commits the party to arbitrate the dispute'.301 The key 
issue then turns on whether the Scottish courts adopt a prima facie approach to the 
arbitration agreement, or are more interventionist. 
 
Insufficient time has passed since the Act was passed for a definitive body of case 
law to build up, but some insights may be gained by looking to English case law. As 
Lord Glennie stated: 'Since the Act was closely and unashamedly modelled on the 
English Act, and reflects the same underlying philosophy, authorities on the that Act 
... in relation to questions of interpretation and approach will obviously be of 
relevance'.302  
 
In Naimi v Islamic Press Agency Inc,303 the English Court of Appeal accepted the 
approach taken in Birse Construction Ltd v St David Ltd,304 and held that it was not 
obliged to simply refer the issue of the existence and validity of the arbitration 
agreement to the tribunal under the competence-competence principle.305 Rather, it 
should make its own enquiry and at least consider the affidavit evidence. It could, 
however, look more deeply at the issue, resolving questions of procedural justice and 
balancing the rights and interests of the parties. Cost and efficiency were important 
and the court should consider whether a definitive determination by the court might 
be the most efficient course of action by forestalling possible challenges to the arbitral 
award in the future.  But, it also needed to consider the right not to be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal in the absence of a valid and effective arbitration 
agreement. While the level of scrutiny might vary, the court would have to be 
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'virtually certain' that an arbitration agreement exists before issuing a stay and 
referring the matter to the arbitration tribunal.306 Although there is no doubt that the 
court is entitled to consider the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement,307 
the approach taken by the Court of Appeal here shows a willingness to go beyond the 
prima facie approach adopted by many, but not all, Model Law jurisdictions. 
 
As with the Model Law, the court has jurisdiction, under mandatory r.7, to assist in 
the creation of the tribunal where all other mechanisms fail. Where the Scottish Act 
is more innovative is in the creation of the role of an arbitral appointments 
referee.308Although the parties can opt-out,309 a referee may be used to assist in 
creating the tribunal in preference to an application to the courts. This 'remarkable 
feature of the Act'310 should streamline the process as well as provide an additional 
option to further support party autonomy. 
 
Under mandatory rr.12-14, the Scottish courts have a similar supportive jurisdiction 
to that provided for under articles 13 and 14 of the Model Law. In other words, where 
a challenge to an arbitrator is rejected by the tribunal, an application may be made to 
the court. As under the Model Law, the arbitration process may continue while the 
application is considered. Where an arbitrator’s tenure ends, then the court may again 
be involved in the appointment of a new arbitrator in accordance with r.7. 
 
As a final point, it should be noted that the court also has the default jurisdiction, 
under s.3, to determine that Scotland is the seat of arbitration, with the implication 
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that the Scottish Act would provide the lex arbitri.311 This jurisdiction only comes into 
effect where other mechanisms to determine the seat fail. As such, it supplements 
rather than restricts party autonomy and the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal. 
The aim behind the provision is to increase certainty and 'avoid disputes' over the 
applicable lex arbitri, which should facilitate the process of arbitration.312 This may, 
however, allow a party to apply to the Scottish court to counter a foreign court's ruling 
that Scotland is not the seat.313 
 
Like both the Model Law and the Scottish Act, the SAL 2012 requires the court to 
dismiss any case before the court where the dispute is the 'subject of an arbitration 
agreement'.314 This means that, before referring a case for arbitration, the court must 
satisfy itself that the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement. As 
illustration, consider Case no.361199450, in which the Mecca Court of Appeal was 
asked to decide whether a dispute should proceed to arbitration. The case involved a 
dispute in which the plaintiffs had defaulted on a bank loan and agreed to give the 
bank a 60% share in their business. They claimed that this did not reflect the true 
value of the business and argued that the defendant bank owed them 320 million Saudi 
riyals. The defendant bank raised the point that item 15 of the company’s articles of 
association required disputes to be settled amicably or by arbitration. The court 
examined item 15 and held that it did not apply to the current dispute, which was 
concerned with the value of the ownership share, rather than ‘the execution of the 
agreement or its interpretation’.315 
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The arbitration process should not be interrupted while the court determines the 
application under article 11(1) of the SAL 2012.316  Similarly, the court must refer a 
case to arbitration where the parties form a valid agreement during a court hearing.317 
These provisions help to establish the primacy of arbitration, where an agreement 
exists. However, article 11 fails to provide guidance regarding the extent of any 
enquiry that the court must make into the existence and validity of the putative 
arbitration agreement. Clearly there must be sufficient evidence that such an 
agreement exists, but there is no explicit requirement for the agreement to be valid or 
effective. This differs from the wording of Article 12, which requires that the 
agreement must satisfy the conditions set down in Article 9. As it stands, the courts 
appear to have a wider discretion over pre-existing agreements than where the 
agreement is contemporaneous to the court hearing. The approach may arguably be 
justified as an attempt to reduce the risk of uncertainty (gharar), which may be greater 
with pre-existing than contemporaneous agreements. Indeed, arbitration clauses are 
acceptable under Sharia precisely because they reduce the uncertainty of how any 
future disputes should be resolved.318 However, it is equally important to ensure that 
the legal rules governing the courts’ role are clear and consistent. For that reason, 
especially given that Saudi courts are not bound by precedent, it would have been 
better had the two articles been similarly drafted, with greater guidance for the courts 
regarding the level of enquiry required.  
 
Given the previous the previous history of arbitration in Saudi Arabia (see 1.3.3), and 
the criticism that the national courts were too ready to intervene, it is important that 
the legal rules provided for by the legislation are sufficiently clear, precise and 
consistent regarding the limits of the court’s role. By clearly and consistently 
delimiting the scope for a court to intervene, the legal rules could help to encourage 
a more pro-arbitration culture and avoid sending mixed messages about the role of 
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the courts. However, the discretion currently left to the courts, unless combined with 
a pro-arbitration culture, could result in arbitration agreements being scrutinised to an 
extent that goes beyond the widely-accepted prima facie approach. This may be 
particularly so where the case involves an agreement for arbitration in a foreign seat. 
Zegers notes that there have been cases in the past where clauses agreeing to foreign 
arbitration have been disregarded by the Board of Grievances. He concludes: 'This is 
evidence of a generalized lack of awareness of established international practice on 
the part of Saudi judges. It also highlights a degree of inertia within the judicial 
establishment to effect meaningful change'.319 Saudi Arabia has recently invested 
substantial sums in reorganising the courts and educating judges, but the impact of 
these changes remains to be seen.320 The same can be said of the SAL 2012 itself. 
However, while articles 11 and 12 are broadly to be welcomed, absent a significant 
change of culture, the courts still retain more discretion to intervene than might be 
desirable for Saudi to be seen as arbitration friendly.  
 
Following the Model Law, the SAL 2012 allows the court jurisdiction to support the 
process of arbitration by assisting in the initial appointment of an arbitrator as a 
failsafe where the default mechanisms fail.321 As with other aspects of its supportive 
role, the court must be satisfied that the parties are bound by a valid arbitration 
agreement. For example, in a case where the defendant had assigned his legal 
obligations to a new company, the Riyadh Court of Appeal refused to oblige the 
defendant to appoint an arbitrator since the assignment had effectively transferred 
legal capacity to enter arbitration proceedings with the plaintiff company. The 
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plaintiff company should give notice of their intention to arbitrate the dispute with 
the new company, rather than the defendant.322  
 
This jurisdiction has a thirty-day time limit and the court's decision is not open to 
challenge. Both conditions should help to ensure an efficient arbitration process. 
Also, following the Model Law, the courts have jurisdiction to dismiss an arbitrator, 
but only where a prior application to the tribunal has been unsuccessful.323 Similarly 
the court has jurisdiction to assist in the removal of a non-performing arbitrator where 
the two parties fail to agree.324 There is no appeal from the court's decision under 
either of these articles. 
 
As with the Model Law and the Scottish Act, the SAL 2012 here allows the court to 
play a supportive role that should facilitate the process of arbitration. However, as 
discussed previously, the Scottish Act provides for an arbitration appointment referee, 
which should reduce the role of the court even further and help to streamline the 
process. It is a development that might also be beneficial to Saudi, even beyond the 
direct effect on the arbitration process itself. It would help to develop both an internal 
pro-arbitration culture as well as improve the perceptions of the international business 
community regarding Saudi as an arbitration friendly state. This will be discussed 
further in chapter six. 
 
2.3.3 The arbitration tribunal’s jurisdiction 
Ab initio, and within the terms of the national law, the tribunal is granted jurisdiction 
by the arbitration agreement made by the parties to the disputed contract.325 This is 
                                                 
322 Case no 3783719 (2015 (1436H)). 
323 SAL 2012, article 17. 
324 SAL 2012, article 18. 
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central to the respect for party autonomy required by the nature of arbitration and is 
unproblematic unless that jurisdiction is challenged. Under the ideal autonomous 
model, resolution of the challenge would fall to the tribunal itself, with any appeal or 
review conducted by an independent, perhaps international, arbitration tribunal. 
Under the more pragmatic hybrid model, the primary determination should again lie 
with the tribunal, in much the same way that the courts have the jurisdiction, subject 
to appeal, to determine their own jurisdiction. However, given that the legitimacy of 
the arbitration process ultimately derives from the national law, any appeal or review 
would be performed by the courts.326 Such an approach respects the autonomous 
choice of the parties to elect for arbitration, while ensuring that the process is 
procedurally just. 
 
Consistent with this, article 16(1) of the Model Law provides that: 'The arbitration 
tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the 
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement'. The use of “including” means that 
the tribunal's authority to rule on its own jurisdiction extends beyond the existence 
and validity of the arbitration agreement to include issues such as the scope and 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement.327 Article 16 implements the competence-
competence principle, but, because of article 1(2), only applies where the seat of 
arbitration has been established within that jurisdiction. The courts' responses to this 
have been mixed, with some holding that a prima facie approach to jurisdictional 
questions will only apply where the court can be sure that the seat is, or will be, in a 
state where the principle of competence-competence applies.328  
 
                                                 
326 Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of 
Pakistan [2010] UKSC 46; [2010] 3 WLR 1472 [84], per Lord Collins. 
327 M/S Anuptech Equipments Private v M/S Ganpati Co-Op Housing (1999) BomCR 331 (Bombay 
HC, India); Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, International Arbitration Practice Guidelines: 
Jurisdictional Challenges (2016), 2 < http://www.ciarb.org/guidelines-and-
ethics/guidelines/arbitration-guidelines> accessed 30 November 2017. 
328 H & H Marine Engine Service Ltd v Volvo Penta of the Americas Inc [2009] BCSC 1389 
(Canada). 
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Article 16(1) also incorporates the doctrine of separability, which requires the 
arbitration clause of any contract to be considered an independent contract. This 
allows the tribunal to rule that the main contract is 'null and void', while leaving the 
arbitration agreement - and hence its own jurisdiction - intact. As with the initial 
question of jurisdiction, the doctrine of separability could, in theory, be affected by 
article 1(2) where the seat has either not been established, or has been established in 
a foreign jurisdiction.329 However, the courts have generally applied the doctrine 
regardless of the location of the seat.330 
 
The wording of article 16 is important because it makes clear that separability can 
only apply where there is an existent contract. This may be compared with the 
explicitly wider wording of s.7 of the English Act, which provides that an arbitration 
clause may still be valid even where the main contract 'did not come into existence'. 
The problem is that if a contract does not exist it would seem to follow that the 
arbitration clause must also not exist. However, despite the apparent inconsistency in 
the wording of the English Act, Lord Hoffmann argued obiter, in the Fiona Trust 
case, that an arbitration clause might have been agreed even though the main contract 
had not been concluded.331 In other words, the arbitration clause is almost completely 
independent of the main contract. Thus, an arbitration agreement may survive an 
improperly entered-into main contract, where, for example, an agent has been bribed 
to exceed his authority. It is only where 'the ground upon which the main agreement 
is invalid is identical with the ground upon which the arbitration agreement is invalid' 
that an arbitration agreement will fail along with the contract.332 The doctrine reflects 
a clear intention to respect party autonomy and give effect, as far as possible, to the 
                                                 
329 Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192 [218ff] (FC, 
Australia). 
330 Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192 [218ff] (FC, 
Australia); Krutov v Vancouver Hockey Club Limited [1991] CanLII 2077 (BC SC, Canada), 
331 Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40 [18]. 
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parties' original intention to arbitrate a dispute. This will only fail where the 
arbitration agreement itself is null and void.333 
 
Under article 16(2), the tribunal's jurisdiction may only be challenged before 
'submission of the statement of defence'. After this, a party may only challenge the 
scope of the tribunal's jurisdiction, which must be done 'as soon as the matter' arises. 
Article 16(3) allows the tribunal to determine jurisdictional issues either as a 
preliminary issue or as part of the decision on the merits. Considering cost-
effectiveness, where jurisdiction is determined as a preliminary matter, regardless of 
the form of the decision,334 the parties have a right to refer to 'the court specified in 
article 6' without delay. The subsequent decision of that court is final. Again, there is 
a lack of consistency on the depth of inquiry the court may make when reviewing a 
preliminary jurisdictional decision. Some courts have performed a full review of the 
decision.335 Others have taken a more deferential approach, beginning with the 
'powerful presumption' that the tribunal acted within its authority.336 While the issue 
is being determined, the arbitration proceedings may continue. 
 
The Model Law itself is silent on the issue of whether article 16(3) is mandatory. 
However, the Quebec Court of Appeal has held that where the parties agreed for an 
arbitration to proceed under rules that did not provide for the right to apply for a court 
ruling on a preliminary jurisdictional decision, then such an agreement acted as an 
effective waiver of any right under article 16(3).337 Following this ruling, a valid 
                                                 
333 Fiona Trust & Holding Corporation v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40 [32-35], per Lord Hope. 
334 PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2006] SGCA 41; [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 
(CA, Singapore). 
335 See, eg: Canadian Ground Water Association v Canadian Geoexchange Coalition [2010] QCCS 
2597 (QC SC, Canada). 
336 Ace Bermuda Insurance Ltd v Allianz Insurance Company of Canada [2005] ABQB 975 (Alberta 
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waiver would effectively relieve the court of any jurisdiction to review a preliminary 
decision. 
 
There is a clear sense in this article, that the Model Law is attempting to balance 
autonomy and efficiency with the procedural justice provided by the regulatory 
oversight of the courts. In his review of the draft Model Law, Kerr criticised the draft 
article 16 for not allowing recourse to the courts until after the award had been made. 
While supporting the competence-competence principle, he opined that leaving the 
parties 'locked into' the process until after the award, while the arbitrator is free to 'act 
in uncontrollable excess of his jurisdiction', may result in an unnecessary and 
unacceptable 'waste of time and costs'.338 The current version of Article 16 goes 
someway to addressing this criticism, but only where the jurisdictional issue is 
determined as a preliminary issue. In this regard, it seems a reasonable compromise 
that allows the parties to challenge the tribunal's determination of jurisdiction, but not 
to use that challenge as a tactical response when the case is going badly. 
 
Turning now to consider Scots Law. Under mandatory r.19, the arbitration tribunal is 
given the authority to determine its own jurisdiction, consistent with the competence-
competence principle and article 16 of the Model Law. Specifically, it can determine 
the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement,339 as well as 'whether the tribunal 
is properly constituted'.340 It is not entirely clear whether this is an exhaustive list of 
issues over which the tribunal has jurisdiction, but Davidson et al. suggest that the 
equivalent s.30 of the English Act may have a wider application and include other 
jurisdictional issues.341 This conclusion was based on Seymour J’s obiter in Mackley 
& Co Ltd v Gosport Marina Ltd, that: ‘it may be arguable whether the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
338 Lord Justice Kerr, 'Arbitration and the Courts - the UNCITRAL Model Law' (1984) 50 
Arbitration 3, 15. 
339 SAR, r 19(a) and (c). 
340 SAR, r 19(b). 
341 Fraser Davidson, Hew, R. Dundas, David Bartos, Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 (W. Green 
2010) 146. 
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an arbitrator to decide on his substantive jurisdiction extends to any matter not 
specifically set out … s.30(1), because of the qualification “that is to say”’.342 Those 
words are not found in r.19 of the SAR, but the phrase ‘the tribunal may rule on’ is 
equally open to the interpretation that the list not exhaustive. 
 
It is submitted that there is nothing particularly controversial about including the 
competence-competence principle, which is widely accepted as a key component of 
an effective arbitration process. Similarly, the doctrine of separability, provided for 
by s.5 of the Act, is equally widely accepted. As with the approach under Model Law, 
s.5 and r.19 differ from the equivalent s.7 and s.30 of the English Act by precluding 
the parties from opting-out of the doctrine, which is an unnecessary restriction on 
party autonomy.343 It should be noted, however that the Scottish Act provides for 
separability and competence-competence in distinct provisions, while the Model Law 
includes both within the single article. 
 
In separating competence-competence from the doctrine of separability, the Scottish 
Act follows the English approach. However, while the English Act includes both 
within the main body of the statute, the principle of competence-competence is 
provided for by a rule, albeit a mandatory one, under Schedule 1 of the Scottish Act. 
The Policy Memorandum is silent on this, but Davidson et al. suggest it usefully 
clarifies that, while related, competence-competence and separability are distinct 
principles.344 Perhaps more important than their simple separation, is the inclusion of 
the competence-competence principle within the arbitration rules. This could be seen, 
at least symbolically, as reinforcing the association between the principle and the 
arbitration process. This, in turn, emphases the philosophy that the courts should take 
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a light touch approach and allow the arbitration tribunal to determine its own 
jurisdiction rather than engage too deeply with the issues at a preliminary stage.  
 
This effect may be amplified by explicitly providing, under s.5 of the Scottish Act, 
that the arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction to determine the validity of a clause 
containing the arbitration agreement. However, whether the structural approach of the 
Scottish Act is of any practical significance remains to be seen. Much depends on 
whether the Scottish courts follow the English line of cases that support an 
interventionist approach or if they swayed by the more arbitration friendly approach 
taken in Fiona Trust v Privalov, in which Lord Hoffmann emphasised that s.7 was 
intended to 'give effect to the reasonable commercial expectations of the parties about 
the questions which they intended to be decided by arbitration'.345 
 
Under mandatory r.20, the parties may make an objection to the tribunal regarding its 
jurisdiction. As with the Model Law, the tribunal may determine the issue as a 
preliminary matter or leave it to be decided along with the merits. Here the Scottish 
Act goes further than the Model Law and the tribunal's discretion to decide the matter 
as a preliminary issue or along with the merits is subject to any agreement between 
the parties.346 This is another example of where the Scottish approach improves on 
the Model Law by enhancing party autonomy. Furthermore, the Scottish Act imposes 
the shorter time limit of fourteen days for an appeal against the tribunal's decision,347 
which should improve the efficiency of the arbitration process.  
 
A key distinction between the Scottish Act and the Model Law is provided for by 
default r.22, which provides: 'The Outer House may, on an application by any party, 
determine any question as to the tribunal's jurisdiction'. According to the Policy 
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Memorandum, this facility, which broadly follows s.32 of the English Act, was 
included in response to suggestions made by consultees and allows the court to decide 
on difficult jurisdictional issues that would otherwise almost certainly be 
challenged.348 Again, the aim is to facilitate a speedy resolution of the arbitration 
proceedings, which are permitted to continue while the jurisdictional issue is 
determined.  Reflecting the aim of avoiding unnecessary delays, there is no appeal, 
either on the validity of the application or on the court's ruling. An application can be 
made only where both parties agree or where the tribunal consents and the court is 
satisfied that the application is timely, will 'produce substantial savings in expense' 
and that there is 'a good reason why the question should be determined by the court'.349 
These provisions are intended to limit the possibility that a party will use this as a 
delaying tactic. It remains to be seen how effective this will prove, but they serve the 
appropriate end of balancing cost-effectiveness and respect for party autonomy. 
 
The court is afforded an identical jurisdiction to intervene and determine any point of 
Scots Law.350 This follows the English Act351 and is a welcome variation to the Model 
Law that serves to further party autonomy and procedural justice, facilitating the 
arbitration process while limiting the opportunity for abuse of the process. This 
should save both time and money.352 It may, however, be considered contrary to the 
'intention to reduce court intervention to a minimum'.353 
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349 SAR, r 23. 
350 SAR, r 41, 42 
351 English Act, s 45. 
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A further authority granted to the court under the Scottish Act is the jurisdiction to 
vary any time limits set by the party.354 This is a default authority, which means that 
the court's jurisdiction can be excluded by the parties’ agreement.355 It is further tightly 
circumscribed under r.44, which precludes the jurisdiction in the face of an existing 
arbitral process to achieve the same end, and imposes the condition that the power 
must only be exercised to avoid a 'substantial injustice'. Again, this allows the courts 
a greater role than under the Model Law, but makes the court's involvement 
conditional on the pursuit of justice and the will of the parties. 
 
The aim behind these rules is to facilitate the arbitration process in an efficient, cost-
effective manner that is both just and sensitive to party autonomy. They do so by 
allowing the courts an authority that is derivative either on party autonomy or the 
authority of the tribunal. By allowing the parties to control the court's role, Scots law 
is transformed from a static set of rules into a flexible instrument, responsive to the 
needs of the arbitration process and the will of the parties. How far the law fulfils its 
promise will depend on how it works in practice, which can only be assessed when a 
more substantial body of Scottish case law has built up. 
 
Turning now to the approach under the SAL 2012. As a major development for 
arbitration in Saudi,356 the SAL 2012 follows the Model Law by including both the 
principle of competence-competence and the doctrine of separability. Like the 
Scottish Act, the SAL provides for these in two separate articles.357 Article 20 allows 
the tribunal the jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, and provides it with the 
discretion to allow time barred pleas 'if it considers the delay to be justified'. As with 
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the Model Law, the decision may be made as a preliminary issue or delayed and 
determined along with the merits.  
 
Where the tribunal dismisses a plea, any challenge to its jurisdiction must wait until 
after the arbitration award has been made and raised as a motion to set aside the 
award.358 This appears to preclude an appeal to the court until the conclusion of the 
arbitral proceedings, even where the jurisdictional challenge is determined as a 
preliminary matter. This restricts the role of the court and reduces the opportunity for 
delaying tactics. However, it will only prove to be cost-effective in those cases where 
the award is not subsequently challenged. Since a challenge during the arbitration 
hearing could be heard by the court while the arbitration proceedings continue, as 
under the Model Law, there is likely to be a greater delay to enforcement where any 
challenge must wait until after the award has been made. It might have been better 
had the SAL 2012 followed the Model Law and the Scottish Act and allowed an 
earlier appeal to the court. Following the Quebec Court of Appeal's interpretation of 
the Model Law,359 the parties should be allowed to waive this right, respecting party 
autonomy by giving them control over the choice. 
 
Even greater respect for party autonomy might have been provided had the SAL 2012 
followed the English Act and allowed the parties to opt-out of the principle of 
competence-competence. However, since allowing the tribunal the authority to rule 
on its own jurisdiction is a significant development for Saudi arbitration, making the 
principle mandatory may play a crucial role in fostering a pro-arbitration culture and 
encouraging the courts to take a more supportive and less interventionist approach. 
The same concern does not apply to following the Scottish Act and giving the parties 
control over whether the jurisdictional issue is determined as a preliminary matter or 
along with the merits. 
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Under article 21, the 'arbitration clause contained in a contract is deemed independent 
from the other terms of the contract' and its validity is to be determined separately. 
Again, this is an important new development for Saudi arbitration. Providing for the 
doctrine of separability in an independent provision follows the approach taken in the 
Scottish Act and has the benefit of clearly distinguishing it from the principle of 
competence-competence. This clarity is important in a jurisdiction with a tradition of 
heavy court supervision and intervention as it emphasises that the doctrine of 
separability applies regardless of whether the arbitration clause is scrutinised by the 
court or by the arbitration tribunal. 
 
Al-Hoshan argues that article 21 is: 'an odd provision given .... that when a contract 
is declared void under the Shari'a Law, such nullity affects all the clauses contained 
in said contract. Several authors specialized in Shari'a Law have confirmed the 
same'.360 This criticism is perhaps misguided, as explained in the dissenting judgment 
of Al-Khasawneh in Pakistan v India:  
under Islamic law, the problem of separability would seem to be 
governed by the maxim “Ma La Udraku kulluh La Utraku Julloh”- 
that which cannot be attained in its entirety should not be 
substantially abandoned. A concept remarkably similar to the 
Roman Law principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat - a document 
should be given validity wherever possible.361  
Although the context is different, the implication is that Sharia need not be a barrier 
to separability, particularly given that ‘the doctrine of severance exists under rules of 
Sharia’.362 Furthermore, the separability of the arbitration clause has recently been 
enforced by a Saudi court, which held that the arbitration clause was not subject to a 
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choice of law clause in the main contract.363 The possibility, however, that there may 
be different interpretations of Sharia law and separability makes it even more 
important that the SAL 2012 clearly separates the doctrine from the principle of 
competence-competence, entailing that it applies equally to the court as to the 
arbitration tribunal. 
 
Following the approach under both the Model Law and the Scottish Act, the parties 
are not free to opt-out of the separability provision. Allowing the parties to opt-out 
would have provided a greater respect for party autonomy. However, given that 
incorporating the doctrine is a significant advance for Saudi arbitration, it is better to 
leave it as a mandatory provision until a more pro-arbitration culture is firmly 
established. The mandatory provision of the principle of competence-competence and 
the doctrine of separability sends a strong message regarding the relationship between 
the courts and the arbitration process and it is better to allow this message to bed-in 
before allowing the parties more autonomy to vary these core components of the new 
regulation. 
 
As might be expected, the SAL 2012 follows the Model Law, rather than the Scottish 
Act, precluding the parties from applying to the court for a decision on questions 
regarding the tribunal's jurisdiction or to determine a point of national law. Again, 
given the need to develop a more pro-arbitration culture, this circumspect approach 
may be justified. However, the approach under the Scottish Act allows the parties 
more autonomy to control the arbitration process. As discussed earlier, the Scottish 
Act includes, under r.23, conditions intended to ensure that that the power to apply to 
the court will only be available where it will serve to increase justice and cost-
effectiveness. A similar approach could work in Saudi, if supported by suitable 
guidance, explanation and education. 
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2.3.4 The arbitration award and the court’s jurisdiction364 
The Model Law provides that once the award has been made, the tribunal's 
jurisdiction ends.365 The court is then granted jurisdiction to set aside an award 
provided the application is made within three months and one of the conditions under 
article 34(2) is satisfied. Article 34(2)(a) sets out a number of grounds reflecting flaws 
in the arbitration process, while article 34(2)(b) allows the court to set aside the award 
on grounds of arbitrability or public policy. The role of the court and the acceptable 
level of intervention was considered by the Court of Appeal of British Columbia. 
Gibbs JA explained:366 
The reasons ... for restraint in the exercise of judicial review are 
highly persuasive. The “concerns of international comity, respect 
for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and 
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for 
predictability in the resolution of disputes” spoken of by Blackmun 
J. are ... compelling ... It is meet therefore, as a matter of policy, to 
adopt a standard which seeks to preserve the autonomy of the forum 
selected by the parties and to minimize judicial intervention ... 
 
The court's jurisdiction is limited to the specified grounds and precludes a review of 
the merits.367 This, however, does not prevent an appeal to 'an arbitral tribunal of 
second instance if the parties have agreed on such a possibility'.368 There may also be 
a limited scope for the parties to exercise their autonomy by excluding or limiting the 
right for review by the court. Any such exclusions would be subject to public policy 
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and the mandatory provisions of the implementing national law.369 There is, however, 
no equivalent scope for the parties to exercise their autonomy by extending the scope 
of review by the court.370 
 
The final jurisdictional issue is that, under article 35, the court is required to recognise 
and enforce an arbitral award 'irrespective of the country in which it was made'. This 
empowers a court regardless of whether it would have jurisdiction to resolve a 
contractual dispute between the parties.371 However, irrespective of the mandatory 
wording of Article 35(1),372 pragmatic concerns, such as where enforcement is 
impossible because the defendant has no assets within the relevant state, may result 
in a court declining jurisdiction.373 
 
Article 36 sets out the exhaustive grounds on which the national court has jurisdiction 
to refuse recognition or enforcement.374 These grounds, taken from article V of the 
NY Convention,375 are the same as those for setting aside an award, i.e., where the 
process was flawed, where the subject matter of the dispute was not arbitrable or on 
grounds of public policy. Importantly, however, only the courts of the state in which 
an award was made have the jurisdiction to set aside an award,376 while any court has 
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the authority, under the Model Law, to recognise and enforce, or refuse to enforce, an 
award. This may result in different public policy concerns being applied. 
 
Since this jurisdiction arises at the end of the arbitration process, issues of procedural 
justice take priority over cost-effectiveness, which is nevertheless reflected in the 
limited grounds available for challenging the award and its enforcement. The courts' 
powers under articles 34-36 support the arbitration process by ensuring that legitimate 
awards are appropriately recognised and, where feasible, enforced. Through this 
enforcement, the courts support the effectiveness of the arbitration process. It also 
respects party autonomy, which is expressed in the parties’ agreement to arbitrate the 
dispute. Finally, restricting the court's role to reviewing issues of procedural justice, 
rather than the substantive justice of the merits, reflects the Model Law's attempt to 
preserve as much autonomy for arbitration as possible within the pragmatic reality of 
the hybrid model.  
 
Turning now to consider the approach under Scots law. Under mandatory r.67, the 
courts have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the award on the grounds that that 
the tribunal lacked substantive jurisdiction. The appeal is made to the Outer House of 
the Court of Session, which may confirm, vary or set aside the award. A further appeal 
may be available to the Inner House only where there is an 'important point of 
principle or practice' or some other 'compelling reason'.377 Other than a challenge on 
jurisdiction, the SAR also permit a challenge for serious irregularity, under mandatory 
r.68, or legal error under the default r.69.378  
 
Of these grounds for challenge, the most controversial is legal error, which is not part 
of the Model Law and may be criticised as 'directly contrary to ... [its] philosophy'.379 
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It should, however, be noted that the parties can agree to waive any right to appeal on 
this basis, which appropriately respects party autonomy by allowing them to decide 
on the inclusion of this safeguard against the possibility of an unjust award. In so 
doing, it 'strikes the appropriate balance' between the efficient autonomy of the 
arbitration process and the legitimacy provided by allowing a degree of judicial 
intervention in the interests of justice.380 Although generally respecting party 
autonomy, the flexibility promised by r.69 is partially undermined by r.70, which sets 
out the procedure for making an appeal under r.69 and allows the courts to robustly 
reject an appellant’s ‘attempts to dress up its attack on the arbitrator’s findings in the 
cloak of a legal error appeal’.381  
 
Under r.70(3), before granting leave to appeal, the court must be satisfied that the 
tribunal's decision on the point of law was obviously wrong, or was seriously open to 
doubt and a point of general importance.382 While this can be avoided if the parties 
agree to appeal, where an appeal is sought by only one party, this provision cuts into 
the parties’ original agreement that an appeal under r.69 should be available. 
Davidson suggests that the English Act took this approach to avoid 'deterring 
international parties from arbitrating in England for fear that the courts would be too 
willing to scrutinise the substance of the award'. This policy concern, he suggests, is 
not so obviously relevant to Scotland.383 As such, there seems to be little justification 
for imposing this barrier. If the issue is sufficiently important to the party making the 
appeal, then it should not need to be a point of general importance.384 
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In Arbitration Application (No 3 of 2011),385 Lord Glennie was asked to grant leave 
to appeal on the grounds of legal error. In considering the statutory provisions he 
quoted Rix LJ, who stated that the effectively identical s.69 of the English Act: 'enacts 
a concern, in the interests of party autonomy, privacy and finality, that such awards 
should not be readily transferred to the courts for appellate review'.386 His comment 
perhaps oversimplifies the impact on party autonomy. Restricting court access is 
more respectful of the parties' original agreement to arbitrate the dispute. However, 
where the parties have chosen not to exclude the court's jurisdiction with regard to 
legal error appeals, requiring that the point must be of general public importance can 
only be seen as a condition that infringes autonomy. Given that the court is only 
required to give leave where one of the parties has refused to agree to the appeal, such 
an approach seems to favour the autonomy of the party withholding its consent at the 
expense of the party seeking leave to appeal. It is unlikely that either party would 
agree to an approach that does this when making the initial agreement not to opt-out 
of allowing an appeal on legal error. As such, the law should give equal effect to the 
autonomy of each individual party. An approach that favours one party, even where 
it acts to restrict court intervention in the process of arbitration, fails to give due 
respect to the original agreement as an incident of party autonomy. 
 
Under s.12 of the Scottish Act, the courts have the jurisdiction to enforce an award 
regardless of the seat, but enforcement may be refused under s.12(3), in whole or part, 
where the court is satisfied that the tribunal lacked the requisite jurisdiction. The 
courts’ jurisdiction regarding NY Convention awards where the arbitration seat lies 
outside the UK, is set out in ss.18-22. Fulfilling Scotland's obligations as a party to 
the NY Convention, the grounds for refusing to recognise or enforce an award reflect 
those found in the NY Convention and article 36 of the Model Law. It should be noted 
that, under the terms of these provisions, and given the pro-arbitration bias of the NY 
Convention, the courts retain a discretion to enforce an award even where one of the 
grounds has been made out. This discretion should be exercised to achieve a 'just 
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result in all the circumstances',387 but following the English courts, it is likely to be 
rarely, if ever, used.388 
 
Turning now to consider the approach under the SAL 2012, which precludes any 
appeal on the merits,389 only allowing an award to be set aside on specified grounds.390 
This is consistent with the general approach to arbitration, and with both the Model 
Law and the Scottish Act. It is, however, a significant change for the law in Saudi, 
and one that certainly makes the country more arbitration friendly.391 The specific 
grounds are provided for by Article 50, which essentially follows the Model Law, 
restricting the grounds to issues of procedure or public policy. Here the SAL 2012 
makes it explicit that a contravention of Sharia law is also a ground for setting aside 
the award. 
 
Given the fundamental importance of Sharia law in Saudi, this is hardly surprising. 
Such a condition is unlikely to be open for debate or reform and it remains to be seen 
how big an impact it will have on the perception of the ICA community. It is possible 
that, despite the many changes made by the SAL 2012 taking the country towards a 
more pro-arbitration position, the clause may have a chilling effect. In this regard, 
future empirical research may be necessary to review the impact of the changes 
considered alongside the condition that any awards must be consistent with Sharia, 
but such research is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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 Unlike the Scottish Act, but following the Model Law, there is no appeal on the 
ground of legal error.392 Again this could be considered a necessarily conservative 
approach that will help to create the perception of an arbitration friendly country, but 
it does so at the expense of party autonomy. The court already has a supervisory role 
in ensuring an award is procedurally legitimate and consistent with public policy and 
Sharia. Given this existing role, allowing an appeal on legal error, and making it 
subject to the parties’ agreement, would not further erode the independence of 
arbitration. It would, however, enhance both justice and party autonomy, and the 
arbitration process may be protected by educating judges in the principles and practice 
of ICA, or establishing a specialised committee for managing these cases.393 
 
Where the competent court affirms the award,394 then there is no further appeal and 
the court is required to enforce the award. Where the court sets aside the award then 
a further appeal may be made, to the Supreme Court,395 within a thirty-day time 
limit.396 This reflects a pro-arbitration bias that again may help to alter both the legal 
culture within Saudi, and the perception of the ICA community. Fitting with the 
jurisdictional and hybrid models of arbitration, the arbitration award has res judicata 
authority,397 and shall be enforced by the court.398 Under article 55, the competent 
court is provided with limited grounds determining its jurisdiction to refuse 
enforcement. This article must be interpreted in the light of article 2, which requires 
the courts to make decisions under the SAL 2012 that are consistent with Saudi’s 
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obligations under any international convention to which it is a party, which most 
importantly includes the NY Convention. Subject to those international obligations, 
the court shall refuse to enforce an award if it conflicts with the judgment or decision 
of a court, committee or commission with jurisdiction in Saudi to decide the dispute. 
Again, the court has jurisdiction to refuse to enforce an award where it is contrary to 
public policy or Sharia. 
 
On the issue of enforcement, the SAL 2012 lacks detail, particularly regarding the 
requirements of Saudi’s international commitments. Zegers makes the reasonable 
point that: 'An important opportunity has therefore been missed to address explicitly 
the procedure for enforcement of foreign awards and to reiterate the limited grounds 
on which such awards may be refused enforcement under the relevant international 
agreements to which Saudi Arabia is party'.399 The Chairman of the ICC Saudi 
Arbitration Committee has also made an appeal for a clear and simple procedure for 
enforcing foreign awards.400  
 
As a final point, it should be noted that the Enforcement Law 2012 provides for a new 
and specific enforcement jurisdiction that replaces the old procedure of enforcement 
by the Board of Grievances.401 This should expedite enforcement proceedings and 
allow the judges to build up specific expertise. Under article 9, the Enforcement judge 
has jurisdiction to compel enforcement of an award, but under article 11, enforcement 
of foreign awards will only proceed on the basis of reciprocity. 
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2.3.5 The approach to jurisdiction under the SAL 2012 
Any system of arbitration should be designed to reflect the interests and needs of the 
principle stakeholders. Since these may not always coincide, there are likely to be 
tensions regarding any particular approach, and it is unlikely that all parties will be in 
agreement about the features given prominence. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify 
the central or core attributes. At the very least, the stakeholders must have confidence 
in the system, which means that it must provide a just, reliable, effective and efficient 
means of resolving disputes. Furthermore, since ICA is designed to resolve 
contractual disputes the system should reflect the underlying philosophy of 
contractual relationships. This means it should respect the autonomy of the parties, 
both individually and jointly within the context of the contract and arbitration 
agreement. The way in which the legal framework provides for the norms of cost-
effectiveness, justice and party autonomy, however, will be shaped by the social, 
cultural and historical context of the jurisdiction.402 In the Saudi context, the legal 
rules must be consistent with Sharia and must overcome any institutional inertia or 
resistance to the changes introduced by the SAL 2012, which might otherwise be 
restrictively interpreted and applied. 
 
Under the SAL 2012, supported by the Enforcement Law 2012, Saudi has established 
a system, at least in the context of jurisdiction, that has moved from a jurisdictional 
model to one that now firmly reflects a hybrid approach. The role of the courts has 
been diminished, with clear recognition afforded to the authority of arbitration 
tribunal, as indicated by the inclusion of the principles of competence-competence 
and separability. The court's role is now essentially to legitimise and support the 
process of arbitration and its jurisdiction has been modified accordingly, largely 
reflecting the structure of the model law. The court’s role will be considered further 
in subsequent chapters. It should, however, be noted that, in pursuit of the commercial 
developments envisaged under Vision 2030, a more arbitration friendly approach may 
be predicted following the recent introduction of specialised enforcement courts and 
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commercial courts,403 along with the positive impact that the new Saudi Centre for 
Commercial Arbitration (SCCA) is likely to have on a pro-arbitration culture.404 
Some confirmation for this optimism is provided by the Saudi Ministry of Commerce 
and Investment, which recently included the SCCA’s arbitration clause in three of the 
Ministry’s model contracts.405 
 
In shifting from the jurisdictional to the hybrid model, 'the new Law represents a more 
liberal approach to arbitration',406 which is consistent with the institutional changes 
highlighted above. Furthermore, it is arguable that such an approach, which facilitates 
the use of arbitration is more consistent with the Sharia,407 which considers arbitration 
a valuable means of resolving disputes408 and seeks to make life easier by not creating 
unnecessary difficulties or barriers to the prevent the use of useful facilities or 
mechanisms.409 In so doing, it affords greater respect for party autonomy,410 but could 
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have gone even further. Rather than simply following the Model Law, the SAL 2012 
could have followed the Scottish Act and chosen to allow the parties greater choice 
and power within the process of arbitration. Allowing an appeal to the court on the 
grounds of legal error and making the appeal subject to the parties' agreement would 
serve both to enhance the legitimacy of the arbitration award while also showing 
greater respect for party autonomy.411  
 
A similar flexibility could be introduced at other points in the process. For example, 
the SAL 2012 could have followed the Scottish Act and allowed an application to the 
court to determine a point of law prior to the final award being made. Provided the 
arbitration process is not halted, such an approach could increase the efficiency of the 
process. Allowing the parties to determine the availability of the application would 
also enhance party autonomy and move arbitration in Saudi more towards the 
contractual end of the hybrid model. 
 
The application of the competence-competence principle, and the doctrine of the 
separability, could also be made subject to the parties' agreement as in the English 
Act. However, it was a huge step to simply incorporate these principles for the first 
time in Saudi law. It may be unwise to then appear to pull back from a commitment 
to the authority of the arbitration tribunal by allowing the parties to control how far 
the court is involved in determining the tribunal's jurisdiction. It may, therefore be 
better for such a step to be taken at some point in the future when the SAL 2012 has 
bedded in and the effect of the changes can be more fully assessed. 
 
Establishing the new enforcement courts with a very specific jurisdiction to enforce 
the arbitration award is a commendably progressive step. The judges in such courts 
should develop sufficient expertise to enhance the efficiency and the effectiveness of 
the arbitration process. The efficiency of the process could be further enhanced by 
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following the Scottish Act and creating arbitration appointment referees, which would 
reduce the need for court intervention during the preliminary stage of the process. 
Again, the involvement of the referees could be made subject to the parties' agreement 
so enhancing both efficiency and party autonomy. As a further institutional change, 
an internal arbitration appeals mechanism could be established under the auspices of 
the SCCA, which could deal not just with appeals against the award, but also consider 
appeals regarding issues of jurisdiction.412 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
Like the Model Law, the Scottish Act is best characterised as a hybrid approach, 
which is unsurprising, given that the Scottish Act builds on the English Act and draws 
directly on the Model Law.413 Both the Scottish Act and the Model Law also lean 
more towards the contract, rather than jurisdictional, end of the spectrum within the 
hybrid category. However, there are some significant differences and, for the most 
part, the Scottish Act is more nuanced towards respecting party autonomy and the 
independence of the arbitration process. Although the Scottish Act allows greater 
recourse to the courts, this is subject to the parties' agreement, or the tribunal's 
authority and evidence that it will benefit the arbitration process.  
 
As discussed above, there are several points where the parties are afforded greater 
power under the Scottish Act to adapt the process to their joint needs. This respect for 
party autonomy is further supplemented by the creation of arbitration appointment 
referees. The Scottish Act, however, is not entirely consistent. Precluding any opt-out 
from the separability and competence-competence provisions follows the Model 
Law, but is unduly restrictive of party autonomy. It may be countered that those 
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principles are so central to the independence of the arbitration process that the parties 
should not be free to opt out of them. However, this favours the institution of 
arbitration over party autonomy, which is further compromised by the anomaly of 
r.70(3).  
 
It should also be remembered that the Scottish Act relies on the courts' discretion to 
interpret the provisions. Thus, much depends on how interventional the courts choose 
to be. This should be influenced by the philosophy behind the statute, made explicit 
by the inclusion of the Founding Principles in s.1. Equally, a general legal culture of 
support for arbitration is likely to be reflected in the judicial approach. However, 
regardless of the pro-arbitration stance of the Act, the courts still retain the discretion 
to intervene to a greater or lesser extent. 
 
The SAL 2012 brings Saudi Arabia into line with the general approach to arbitration 
within the international community. Consistent with the first subsidiary hypothesis, 
the courts’ jurisdiction has been significantly curtailed, with greater authority and 
independence delegated to the arbitration tribunal. The SAL 2012 is a major advance 
for the regulation of arbitration in Saudi, resolving many of the heavily criticised 
jurisdictional issues under the SAL 1983. Final judgment will have to be reserved 
until the full effect of the law can be seen in practice. However, the SAL 2012 is 
certainly a huge step in the right direction and the process of arbitration now sits 
firmly within the generally applicable hybrid model, providing a reasonable balance 
between justice, party autonomy and cost-effectiveness.  
 
Although providing a significant improvement over the regime under the SAL 1983, 
the legal framework established by the SAL 2012 is not fully consistent with the 
second and fifth subsidiary hypotheses. In reforming the SAL 1983, it could have 
gone further and, following the Scottish and English Acts, allowed a more flexible 
approach granting the courts additional jurisdiction contingent on the agreement of 
the parties. Given the infancy of the hybrid model approach within Saudi’s regulation 
of arbitration, it is understandable that the SAL 2012 closely follows the model law, 
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rather than the more radical approach of the Scottish and English Acts. Allowing the 
parties greater control over the applicability of the principles of competence-
competence and separability is better deferred until it is clear that the judiciary have 
developed a more pro-arbitration culture, although the impact of this may be 
mitigated by establishing an internal arbitration appeals mechanism that can deal, 
inter alia, with jurisdictional issues. It is, however, unfortunate, that the SAL 2012 
did not allow the parties to decide for themselves whether to allow an application to 
the courts on a point of law, or an appeal against the award on the ground of legal 
error. It is also unfortunate that it did not follow the Scottish Act and establish the 
role of arbitration appointment referee, which would provide an alternative to relying 
on the less efficient route of involving the court in establishing the tribunal.  
 
Despite those criticisms, the SAL 2012 has re-addressed the jurisdictional balance 
between the courts and the tribunal that was so strongly criticised under the SAL 
1983. There is, however, still some fine tuning that could serve to further improve the 
balance between the three core principles, particularly the cost-effectiveness of the 
process and its respect for party autonomy. Having considered the regulation of 
jurisdictional issues in this chapter, chapter three focuses on the regulation of 
arbitration agreements. Consistent with the approach throughout this thesis, but with 
an emphasis on autonomy, the analysis in chapter three examines how well the legal 
framework established by the SAL 2012 balances the principles of autonomy, justice 
and cost-effectiveness. 
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Chapter Three: Examination of the Core Principles in the Context of 
Arbitration Agreements 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter two, the analysis of jurisdictional issues suggested that the SAL 2012 is a 
significant advance over the SAL 1983. Although much still depends on developing 
a supportive pro-arbitration culture, the SAL 2012 goes a long way to restricting the 
power of the Saudi courts to interfere in the arbitration process. While arbitration 
remains anchored to the national legal system, the balance of power between 
arbitration and the legal system is now more consistent with the expectations of the 
international arbitration community, with Saudi arbitration readily characterised as a 
hybrid model. Although improving on the previous regime, the comparison with 
Scots law suggests that the SAL 2012 is more rigid than it needs to be. Particularly, 
the SAL 2012 could have allowed the parties greater control over the jurisdictional 
issues. This highlights the issue of party autonomy and control over the arbitration 
process, at the heart of which lies the arbitration agreement. 
 
In the first half of this chapter the analysis focuses on the nature of an arbitration 
agreement, its limits and justification. As part of this analysis, the relevance of 
different conceptions of autonomy will be examined. Since different cultural 
understandings of autonomy may explain and justify different approaches to the law, 
this includes a consideration of both Islamic and Western conceptions of autonomy. 
This examination of autonomy and the arbitration agreement allows the construction 
of an ideal model, which provides a tool to facilitate the comparative analysis of the 
SAL 2012. The comparative analysis is set out in the second half of the chapter. It 
begins by examining the approaches to the arbitration taken by the Model Law, the 
Scottish Act and the SAL 2012. The discussion then explores the regulatory 
approaches to the role of the court before analysing the power afforded to the parties 
to determine the arbitration process. The chapter is drawn to a conclusion by a 
consideration of how the SAL 2012 might be improved. 
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3.2 The Nature of Arbitration Agreements 
3.2.1 The arbitration agreement 
An arbitration agreement is a private commitment by two or more parties to relinquish 
any right to submit a dispute to a judicial forum, such as a national court, and instead 
to resolve any relevant disputes by arbitration. The agreement may be made ex ante, 
when it will usually be documented as a clause contained within the main contract 
between the parties. Where such a clause is absent, the parties may nevertheless make 
an ex post submission agreement to resolve a dispute by arbitration.414 Like any 
contractual device,415 an arbitration agreement alters the rights and obligations 
between the parties. This allows the parties to ‘create their own private system of 
justice'.416 
 
The legal rights and obligations are those necessary to allow the dispute to be resolved 
by arbitration and include the right to submit a dispute to arbitration and an obligation 
to comply with both the agreed process of arbitration and the decision of the 
arbitrators. In establishing the arbitration process, the parties must agree on: the rules 
governing the process; the location; the language to be used; the national law, or lex 
arbitri, and the arbitrators. Through the arbitration agreement, the parties 
contractually agree to transfer the legal power to resolve the relevant dispute from the 
national court to the arbitrators.417 
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Consistent with the private nature of the arbitration agreement within the context of 
a national legal framework, '[t]he agreement to submit disputes to arbitration is 
governed by two intertwining principles: party autonomy and the contractual nature 
of the agreement'.418 As discussed below, the parties' power to make the agreement, 
as with all contracts, derives from the capacity and right to autonomy. The contractual 
nature of the agreement, which is facilitated and regulated by the national legal 
framework, relies on a negotiation between parties to arrive at a mutually acceptable 
agreement that complies with the legal requirements for a valid contract.419 
 
3.2.2 The justification behind the arbitration agreement 
The essential justification for arbitration lies in the two related principles of autonomy 
and liberty. Arbitration is etymologically related to autonomy and, as Paulsson 
explains: '[t]he argument for arbitration begins with respect for private 
arrangements'.420 Whether arbitration, as an alternative to litigation, is supported by 
the state, depends on the ideology and political will of that state.421 It crucially relies 
on the acceptance that private parties should be free to resolve their own disputes, 
provided they can do so in a way that does not harm society. 
 
While submitting to the law is a matter of authority, submitting to arbitration is a 
matter of consensual participation. Arbitrators gain their authority from the parties' 
legally enforceable agreement, which is normatively predicated on autonomy and 
consent.422 It is the power of autonomy that allows the parties, consistent with the 
national legal framework, to construct an arbitration agreement that satisfies their 
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mutual needs.423 It is the responsibility flowing from autonomy that obliges the parties 
to respect the agreement, submit to the arbitration process, accept the decision and 
honour the award.  
 
Because the freedom to make an arbitration agreement is predicated on autonomy, it 
is important to understand the nature and extent of the concept to appreciate its 
implications for arbitration. Autonomy, however, is a contested concept, with many 
competing conceptions.424 These different approaches to autonomy may have 
important implications for arbitration agreements, the parties’ rights and obligations 
and the legitimate role for the state to support the arbitration process through 
facilitation, regulation and enforcement.425 Examining the concept of autonomy and 
its relevance for the arbitration agreement is particularly important since much of the 
arbitration literature treats autonomy as a fully determined concept with a unitary 
meaning.426  
 
3.2.2.1 Autonomy 
The basic idea of autonomy is straightforward. Deriving from the Greek for self-rule, 
the essence of autonomy is self-determination and 'authority over one's choices and 
actions'.427 It is here, however, that any consensus ends.428 Although there are many 
variations on the theme of autonomy, for the purposes of this thesis, the differing 
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conceptions may be broadly grouped into three categories429 These categories are 
broadly distinguished by the degree of liberty allowed to the individual and,  
conversely, the extent to which the state may be justified in limiting individual liberty 
and self-determination. These three groups will be labelled as libertarian, liberal or 
social autonomy. 
 
The libertarian conception of autonomy simply means self-determination, while the 
liberal view includes a requirement for rationality. For both the liberal and the 
libertarian forms of autonomy, the state is justified in limiting autonomy only to 
prevent harm to others. The liberal conception of autonomy would also justify state 
intervention to protect individuals who lack the capacity for rational self-
determination. The third category conceives of autonomy as inevitably grounded in a 
richer social context that positions the individual within a network of personal and 
societal relationships. Individual autonomy is seen as both reliant on, and constrained 
by, those relational others.430 Because this view sees individual autonomy as 
embedded in society, it arguably justifies a greater role for the state than under the 
liberal or libertarian conceptions (see section 3.2.2.3). 
 
The point of identifying these different approaches is to highlight that autonomy is a 
socially-constructed and contested concept. Each conception reflects the ideological 
biases of those who argue for their view of autonomy. The different ideologies are 
reflected in both the meaning of autonomy and its limits. Since the arbitration 
agreement is predicated on a respect for party autonomy, it is important to appreciate 
that the meaning and limits of the agreement are crucially dependent on how 
autonomy is conceived. This, in turn, defines the extent to which it is legitimate for 
the state to interfere in the arbitration process. Thus, the relationship between the 
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authority of the arbitration agreement and the authority of the national courts is 
derivative of the conception of autonomy. As such, it is unfortunate that, despite being 
a normative and culturally-laden concept, autonomy is often relied on as a 
justification without further explication.431 
 
Consider Carbonneau's explanation that: 
The law of arbitration ostensibly emphasizes individual 
responsibility and accountability when it provides that arbitration 
agreements will be enforced as written. It thereby reduces the role 
of the state and the prospect of state regulation. The marketplace 
becomes the central purveyor of norms.432 
Although he does not here explicitly refer to party autonomy, the concept underpins 
the quote. He subsequently notes: 'the central significance of party autonomy in the 
process of international commercial arbitration',433 but this reference to autonomy is 
not explained any further. His explication, however, reflects a conception of 
autonomy situated towards the liberal/libertarian end of the spectrum.  The parties are 
characterised as idealised rational decision-makers, who should be free to commit to 
arbitration agreements, without state interference and subject only to market 
regulation. This approach is entirely consistent with Anglo-American law and 
                                                 
431 Hiro N Aragaki, ‘Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?’ 
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neoliberal capitalism,434 which constituted the dominant Western institutional 
influence when this article was written in 2003.435 
 
Other Western authors also rely on a liberal approach to the concept of autonomy.436 
Watt, for example, notes that: 'party autonomy developed ... as an essential 
component of the liberal model of market regulation'.437 When this approach to 
international commerce is applied to arbitration, it creates the ideal of arbitration 
determined by party autonomy through the arbitration agreement unfettered by state 
intervention. The consequence of this is a 'neo-liberal model of private governance' 
grounded in an economically valuable market for the business of arbitration in which 
nation-states must compete by liberalising their domestic laws and removing 
constraints imposed on party autonomy to meet the needs and interests of 
international commerce.438 The arbitration agreement becomes essentially a matter of 
cooperation between private parties, empowering these autonomous agents and 
curtailing the power of national governments, whose role is restricted to facilitation 
and enforcement.439 This Western model of arbitration is reflected in both the Model 
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Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote “Autonomy”?’ (2016) 91 Indiana Law 
Journal 1143, 1160-1161. But, see section 3.2.4. 
141 
 
Law and the NY Convention,440 creating a competitive and normative pressure on all 
states to develop their own domestic regulation consistently with that model. The 
development of domestic regulation, however, will also be subject to the cultural 
norms of the individual country. In Saudi Arabia, Islam provides the main cultural 
constraint on the development of a regulatory framework driven by secular 
international norms. It is, therefore, important to understand the meaning of autonomy 
in Islam. 
 
3.2.2.2 Islam and autonomy 
Under Islam, humans are individuals with free will, physical needs and emotional 
desires. For the human being's immortal soul to live alongside the faithful and good 
in the 'Gardens of Perpetuity',441 each person must follow Allah's path (the Sharia). 
By following the Sharia faithfully, Muslims will be guided along a way of moderation 
that will balance and satisfy the needs of the body, the emotions, the will and the soul 
to achieve a state of harmony.442 
 
The free will and rationality that are characteristic of human beings in Islamic 
ontology,443 is of fundamental importance with each person responsible for their own 
choices. This recognised in the Holy Qur'an, which states, for example, that: ‘Surely 
Allah changes not the condition of a people, until they change their own condition’.444 
Indeed, the first choice for Muslims is to decide whether to accept Allah as their Lord 
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and be 'bound by the standards, criteria and laws of God alone'.445 Prior to this choice, 
the Islamic conception of human free will appears consistent with the 
liberal/libertarian view. Once Allah is accepted then autonomy becomes bounded by 
the demands of Sharia, and more closely resembles the social conceptions of 
autonomy that ethically constrain self-determination.  
 
The ethical dimension of Islam acknowledges the context of individual existence, 
which has both a social earthly dimension and an afterlife that ground a responsibility 
to the self, to others, and also to the community whose fate rests in their hands.446 
Islam grounds a form of relational autonomy 'based on belief, love, mutual respect, 
assistance, and understanding instead of ... realization of personal interest'.447 The 
Islamic conception of autonomy, then, is a relational autonomy established within the 
faith-based, community-situated framework of Sharia that encompasses all aspects 
of life, including commercial activity.448 This framework both supports and 
constrains individual self-determination and necessarily impacts on the making of 
contracts and arbitration agreements. As Wilson comments: 'The business decision-
maker has free choice, but religious principles provide a framework for the 
appropriate exercise of that choice'.449   
 
3.2.2.3 The relevance of different conceptions of autonomy 
The importance of appreciating the different conceptions of autonomy lies in the 
impact that the differences have on the relationship between state and individual 
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sovereignty. The liberal and libertarian conceptions prioritise the individual over the 
community, emphasising the liberty of the autonomous person to pursue his or her 
goals. This autonomy is limited only by the respect due to other autonomous agents 
and the role of the state is restricted to those interventions necessary to provide a 
socio-legal framework that supports the smooth running of society.  
 
At its most extreme, a libertarian conception of autonomy is consistent with the 
autonomous model, with arbitration seen entirely as matter for the parties to 
determine through a sui generis arbitration agreement.450 This approach sees 
arbitration as entirely private, with no role for the state’s public policy concerns.  A 
more liberal conception is consistent with the contractual model. This acknowledges 
a role for the state, but accepts only a minimal harm-based role for public policy.451 
Under this harm principle, the state should not exercise its power based on concerns 
for the moral or spiritual well-being of individuals, who are absolutely 'sovereign' 
over those things that affect only themselves.452 
 
In contrast to the limited role for the state under the libertarian and liberal 
conceptions, social and moral conceptions of autonomy, such as the Islamic view, are 
more consistent with the hybrid or jurisdictional models, allowing the state and public 
policy a more expansive role. The Muslim’s commitment to Islam, as discussed 
above, entails obedience to the Sharia, in both its narrow sense as the basis for Islamic 
law and its widest sense as a way of life. Under the Sharia, an Islamic state has a 
responsibility for both social justice and the support of individuals in their journey 
towards the state of spiritual perfection that is the aim of all faithful Muslims. Muslim 
autonomy is necessarily constrained by this commitment to Islam and the guidance 
of the Sharia. Since this applies in all areas of life, including the commercial context, 
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the freedom of the Muslim business person to enter into an arbitration agreement is 
contingent on the agreement being consistent with Sharia.  
 
An Islamic state has a responsibility, not just for the smooth running of society, but 
also for the spiritual well-being of the community. When coupled with the Sharia 
constraint on the autonomy of individual Muslims, this provides the Islamic state with 
sufficient justification to exercise its power over the arbitration process to guarantee 
that it is consistent with Sharia. This includes limiting party autonomy to ensure that 
any agreement is Sharia compliant, bearing in mind that the Sharia is not intended to 
create unnecessary barriers that make life more difficult.453 There are two key 
implications. First, while it is appropriate to critique Western legal frameworks by 
reference to Western conceptions of autonomy, the SAL 2012 should be judged 
against the Islamic conception of autonomy. Second, any proposals to reform the SAL 
2012 must be consistent with an Islamic conception of autonomy. 
 
3.2.3 The importance of the arbitration agreement 
The arbitration agreement, which gives expression to party autonomy, has been 
described as 'the soul of arbitration'.454 It is important because it affords the parties 
the freedom to determine the parameters of the arbitration process.455 Crucially, it 
determines how the relevant dispute should be resolved.456 Arbitration offers an 
alternative to litigation for resolving private international commercial disputes and 
that choice is effected through the arbitration agreement. The value of the agreement, 
therefore, is that it respects the parties’ autonomy, empowering them to 'tailor the 
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arbitral process' to meet their own needs as mutually agreed.457 The freedom, 
flexibility and certainty that accompany a process centred on party autonomy makes 
arbitration a stable and commercially attractive alternative to litigation.458 
 
Through the arbitration agreement, the parties transfer the authority to resolve a 
particular dispute from the courts to the arbitrators, whose jurisdiction derives from 
the agreement.459 With the support of the national legal system, the arbitration 
agreement and any subsequent award are legally enforceable, making the arbitration 
agreement important because it both respects individual autonomy and establishes 
jurisdiction.460 Furthermore, the arbitration agreement is important because of the 
effect it has on the parties. 
 
As an expression of autonomy, the arbitration agreement creates a relationship 
between the parties, or helps to define and cement a wider contractual relationship. 
An agreement entails a commitment by all parties who consent to the terms of the 
agreement, and hence to the process of arbitration defined by the agreement. This 
commitment does not just act to provide the chosen arbitrators with the authority to 
resolve the relevant dispute, but also obliges both parties to respect and honour the 
agreement. At the least, this precludes either party from unilaterally withdrawing 
from the agreement, which embodies both a moral and legal commitment.461 This 
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minimal commitment flows from a liberal conception of autonomy. More social or 
moral conceptions, such as relational or Islamic autonomy, justify additional 
reciprocal obligations to respect the interests of the other party and the relationship 
between them.462 Through such a mutual and voluntary commitment to resolving any 
disputes by arbitration, the arbitration agreement may play an important role in 
maintaining a good commercial relationship between the parties.463 
 
3.2.4 The limits of the arbitration agreement 
3.2.4.1 Autonomy and public policy 
Lew states that: '[p]arty autonomy gives contracting parties the power to fashion their 
own remedial process within the limits of public policy'.464 The problem is that public 
policy is a vague, amorphous concept. If party autonomy and the authority of the 
arbitration agreement are to be limited by public policy, then the policy issue must be 
capable of justification. It should also be of sufficient importance to outweigh the 
value of individual autonomy. 
 
Since autonomy provides the justification for situating the jurisdictional authority of 
the arbitrators in the arbitration agreement, then the limits of the agreement should be 
broadly consistent with the limits to autonomy. Regardless of which conception is 
relied on, autonomy is limited by the social context of our existence. Within any 
community, one person's autonomy is necessarily limited by the obligation not to 
unjustly interfere with another person's autonomy or to wrongly cause the other 
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person harm,465 defined as a setback to that person's interests.466 This does not 
preclude fair competition, but does justify state interference to restrict the parties' 
freedom to gain an advantage through, for example, fraud, coercion, 
misrepresentation.  
 
This harm principle may also justify restricting autonomy to prevent harm to the 
wider community, although only where non-trivial interests are threatened.467 For the 
liberal/libertarian conceptions, the harm principle provides the sole justification for 
limiting individual autonomy, allowing public policy exceptions precluding 
arbitration in, for example, situations that engage the criminal law. It could also justify 
public policy exceptions for contracts involving goods and services that may 
justifiably be characterised as causing harm to the community. This includes those 
activities prohibited, for that reason, by the Sharia, including pornography, alcohol 
and gambling. 
 
For moral conceptions of autonomy, public policy exceptions are widened beyond 
the issue of harm to include a concern for public morality. For the Islamic conception, 
public policy should relate to the maqasid al Sharia (the objectives of Sharia), which 
are centred on three concerns: the development of individual character; justice (adl) 
and public interest (maslahah).468 The six maqasid are: preservation of life, property, 
family, religion, dignity, and rational knowledge.469 Provided the public policy 
furthers one of these, a restriction of autonomy, and hence the arbitration agreement, 
is justified. Furthermore, both as a matter of public morality and the prevention of 
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community harm, those things prohibited by the Sharia may also constitute a public 
policy exception. Apart from the Sharia prohibitions noted above, the obvious 
exception is the prohibition of riba (interest).470 In addition to riba, Sharia also 
prohibits gharar (uncertainty).471 Arbitration agreements that involve riba or lack 
sufficient certainty, may be invalidated under Sharia.472  
 
Beyond the public policy exceptions to the validity of an arbitration agreement, 
Sharia may also impact on the parties’ freedom to determine the arbitration process. 
The freedom to appoint arbitrators may be limited, and may require male Muslim 
arbitrators with a knowledge of Sharia.473 This, however, is controversial and the 
approach is not uniform. The Hanafi school, for example, allows female arbitrators 
and some scholars have argued that it is acceptable to use non-Muslim arbitrators 
provided any award is Sharia compliant.474 It should be noted that Saudi follows the 
Hanbali school,475 and while women were not explicitly excluded under the SAL 
1983, in practice they were not accepted as arbitrators. Al-Fadhel notes that the Holy 
Qur'an places more value on the testimony of a man and suggests that the reluctance 
to accept female arbitrators derived from the historic law based on the Hanbali school, 
which required arbitrators to have the same qualifications as judges.476 
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In addition to restrictions on the choice of arbitrators, Sharia, as a divine system of 
laws does not recognise any freedom of choice that prefers a different law. In Saudi, 
this has led, under the SAL 1983, to the automatic application of Saudi law regardless 
of the parties’ agreement. However, the choice of a non-Islamic law may be 
acceptable under the principle of necessity in countries where Sharia law does not 
apply.477 This follows because the parties would be unable to choose Sharia law and, 
by necessity, would have to rely on an alternative. This means that any awards made 
on this basis should be enforced within Saudi. Beyond this, the position needs further 
analysis to determine whether a choice of law is compatible with the Sharia.478 Such 
an analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
3.2.4.2 National law 
Apart from the restrictions based on the justified limits of autonomy, the arbitration 
agreement may also be restricted by the national legal framework to ensure that the 
process of arbitration offers the certainty of formal justice. This is important because 
there must be sufficient confidence in the process to justify enforcement of arbitration 
awards by the national courts. This applies particularly to foreign awards. 
 
In understanding the relationship between national law and arbitration it is important 
to appreciate that, barring the most caricatured libertarian conceptions, autonomy 
must exist within a social context. Part of that context is national law and politics. 
Rather than simply acting as a constraint on party autonomy, however, the national 
legal framework goes beyond defining the boundaries of the arbitration agreement to 
enable and facilitate the whole process of arbitration.479 Given the dependence of 
enforcement on the national legal system, the absence of this supportive framework 
would make the unrestricted freedom to create an arbitration agreement a Pyrrhic 
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victory for party autonomy. What value is there in completely unfettered autonomy 
if the arbitration award is unenforceable? 
 
While autonomy justifies arbitration as a type of private dispute resolution, the goal 
of arbitration is to resolve the dispute. This requires the arbitrator to make a just and 
final award, but the process will only work if the award is enforceable. While 
autonomy and enforceability are interacting rather than competing issues, there is a 
balance to made. Constraining autonomy within a supportive legal framework ensures 
a reasonable equilibrium between formal and substantive justice that protects the 
interests of both parties, facilitates a just procedure, enables a substantively just award 
and protects the public good.480 In so doing, the facilitation of party autonomy within 
the national legal framework 'preserve[s] the integrity’ of arbitration, providing a 
strong basis for arbitration awards to be accepted internationally.481 As de Vries 
states: ‘[t]hough the most important principle of international commercial arbitration 
is the freedom of the parties … the process cannot be fully detached from national 
law’.482  
 
3.2.5 A model of the arbitration agreement 
A concept may be characterised by an underlying theory that explains its core 
attributes that serve to distinguish it from other similar concepts.483 For present 
purposes, and based on the preceding discussion, the explanatory theory of the 
arbitration agreement is: 
                                                 
480 Mia Louise Livingstone, 'Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Popular 
Fallacy or Proven Fact' (2008) 25 Journal of International Arbitration 529, 532-533. 
481 Mia Louise Livingstone, 'Party Autonomy in International Commercial Arbitration: Popular 
Fallacy or Proven Fact' (2008) 25 Journal of International Arbitration 529, 529, 535. 
482 Henry P de Vries, 'International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National 
Courts' (1982) 57 Tulane Law Review 42, 72.  
483 Based on: Gregory L Murphy, Douglas L Medin, 'The role of theories in conceptual coherence' 
(1985) 92 Psychological review 289; Douglas L Medin, 'Concepts and conceptual structure' (1989) 
44 American psychologist 1469. 
151 
 
A mutually binding reciprocal commitment, enabled and supported by the national 
legal framework, to define the parameters of the arbitration process and, through the 
autonomous consent of the parties, to transfer jurisdictional authority from the 
national courts to the chosen arbitrators. 
This theory underlies the eight core attributes of the arbitration agreement: the parties; 
its form; its independence; its validity; its effectiveness; its subject matter; its content; 
and its effect.  
First, any agreement requires at least two parties. In the context of ICA, the signatory 
parties to the agreement are likely to be the parties to a contract, with the arbitration 
agreement designed to determine how particular disputes arising out of the contract 
will be settled. Disputes arising out of a contract may, however, involve third parties 
who are not signatories to the arbitration agreement itself. This raises the question of 
whether non-signatories can compel arbitration between the signatories.484 A further 
question is whether a non-signatory may be subject to the process of arbitration and 
arbitral award. In theory, the involvement of third parties must rely on a social or 
relational conception of autonomy rather than the more individualistic nature of 
liberal and libertarian autonomy, which support a stricter privity of contract.  
 
Consider Watt’s suggestion that support for third party involvement derives from 'the 
myth of an international community of merchants … [which] is enough to draw 
participants into a contractual network'.485 This argument relies essentially on the 
relationship nexus within this international community, reflecting a relational 
conception of autonomy. A more liberal approach would require that the third party 
had agreed to the clause. For example, with regard to a choice of forum clause in a 
bill of lading, the European Court of Justice applied a liberal conception of autonomy, 
constrained by the national legal framework, to hold that a third party would only be 
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bound by the choice if they had 'succeed[ed] [by the effect of national law] to the 
rights and obligations of one of the original parties ... [or had] actually accepted the 
jurisdiction clause'.486 Similarly, in Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Co v 
Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme 
Court applied French Law to hold that, in the absence of explicit evidence, such as a 
signature, there must be sufficient evidence of a common intention that the party 
should be bound by the agreement.487 
 
Second, in theory, the form of the agreement should be for the parties to determine. 
Thus, an agreement might be verbal or written, signed or unsigned, electronic or on 
paper. In practice, however, some restrictions, may be imposed for evidentiary 
certainty. 
 
Third, the arbitration agreement is considered to be independent of the main contract 
between the parties. Where the agreement is contained as a contractual clause then 
the principle of separability means that the arbitration clause is treated as an 
agreement distinct from the main contract. As a consequence of this distinction, the 
validity of the arbitration agreement is not subject to the validity of the main 
contract.488 
 
Fourth, to be effective the agreement must be valid. As with any legally binding 
agreement, the arbitration agreement gains its authority from the consent of the 
parties, which must be competent, voluntary, and informed. However, this authority 
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must itself be recognised and supported by the national laws that provide the ultimate 
source of validity for the arbitration agreement.489  
 
Fifth, if the agreement is to be of any value, then it must be effective. The agreement 
must demonstrate an intention to submit disputes to arbitration. It should also be 
sufficiently well defined to make clear that the agreed procedure is characterisable as 
arbitration.490 In other words it must establish a framework that empowers an 
arbitration tribunal to produce a final and legally binding decision.491 The agreement 
should also clearly define the scope of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, but legal 
jurisdictions generally supportive of arbitration have tended to afford a wide 
interpretation of the scope of the agreement.492 In Fiona Trust v Privalov, Lord 
Hoffmann held that, unless clearly and explicitly stated otherwise:  
the construction of an arbitration clause should start from the 
assumption that the parties … are likely to have intended any 
dispute arising out of the relationship ... to be decided by the same 
tribunal.493 
The intention is to respect party autonomy, as far as objectively possible. This 
objective approach, however, is likely to be affected by cultural attitudes towards 
arbitration. For example, in the context of an arbitration-friendly culture, English 
courts developed the 'doctrine of sufficiently close connection' to allow that tortious 
                                                 
489 Julian DM Lew, 'Arbitration Agreements: Form and Character' in Petar Sarcevic (ed), Essays on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Graham & Trotman 1989) 51, 53. 
490 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2013) 21. See the French case 
heard by the Cour de cassation: Civ. 2e, 7 July 1971, JCP, 1971, II, 16898. 
491 Henry P de Vries, 'International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for National 
Courts' (1982) 57 Tulane Law Review 42, 47. 
492 Julian DM Lew, 'Arbitration Agreements: Form and Character' in Petar Sarcevic (ed), Essays on 
International Commercial Arbitration (Graham & Trotman 1989) 51, 54-55; Hong-Lin Yu, 
Commercial Arbitration: The Scottish and International Perspectives (Dundee University Press 
2011), 56-57. 
493 Fiona Trust v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, [13], 
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disputes may be resolved under the authority of an arbitration agreement if the claim 
is sufficiently closely connected to the parent contract.494  
 
Sixth, the agreement must relate to suitable subject matter. The starting point is that 
any private dispute should be arbitrable. This is then subject to the constraint that 
disputes engaging with matters of public interest may be better resolved in the public 
and formal setting of the national courts. Thus, arbitrability may be restricted by 
public policy,495 with the extent of those restrictions dependent on how autonomy is 
conceived. As discussed earlier, the more social and relational conceptions of 
autonomy justify greater restrictions on the freedom to arbitrate. 
 
Seventh, the agreement must include the necessary content to enable the dispute to be 
arbitrated. As a mechanism that allows the process of litigation to be replaced by 
arbitration, the agreement must establish equivalent rules of procedure, creating a 
framework for the arbitration process.496 This includes: which disputes should be 
subject to arbitration; the arbitration seat and the lex arbitri; the arbitrators; the 
procedural rules; the substantive law; the language; the timetable; the availability of 
interim measures; and the arrangements for paying the costs. 
 
Finally, the eighth core attribute is the effect of the agreement. Where it is both valid 
and effective, an arbitration agreement transfers the jurisdictional power to resolve 
the relevant disputes from the court to the arbitration tribunal. It replaces the right to 
litigate a dispute with an obligation to submit the relevant dispute to arbitration, to 
fulfil any duties established by the agreed rules of procedure, to cooperate with the 
                                                 
494 Woolf v Collis Removal Service [1948] 1 KB 11, 18-19 
495 L Yves Fortier, 'Arbitrability of Disputes' in Gerald Asken, Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Micheal J 
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process and, absent any flaws in that process, to respect the tribunal’s decision and 
abide by its award.   
 
3.3 The Law Governing Arbitration Agreements 
The fundamental importance of the arbitration agreement and its justification should 
be reflected in the provisions of the legal framework that governs arbitration. As 
discussed above, the justification for arbitration lies in the parties’ autonomy, which 
raises the question of how may the law ensure the arbitration agreement reflects the 
will of the parties? Although party autonomy provides its justification, arbitration is 
not a free-floating device for promoting individual autonomy. Rather, arbitration is 
designed to resolve disputes between the parties to the agreement. This raises a second 
question, which asks how the legal framework should be designed to ensure that the 
agreement enables a just and cost-effective resolution, consistent with party 
autonomy? This question encompasses two issues, which are whether the restrictions 
on party autonomy enhance the justice or cost-effectiveness of the process. Finally, 
as noted earlier, autonomy is not without limits. Given the state interest in ensuring 
disputes are justly resolved without harming society, the state may impose limits on 
the matters that may be arbitrated. This raises a third question, which asks what 
restrictions may be justifiably imposed on the parties' freedom to arbitrate a dispute 
and to determine the arbitration process? The issues raised by these questions 
highlights the necessary balance between autonomy, procedural justice and cost-
effectiveness. As discussed above, this balance may be influenced by the attitude 
towards individual and party autonomy situated within the socio-legal context of the 
relevant jurisdiction. It will be addressed by comparing the approach under the SAL 
2012 with the approach under the Scottish Act and the Model Law. 
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3.3.1 Approaches to arbitration agreements 
Considering first, the Model Law. This is silent on the meaning of arbitration, which 
is perhaps unfortunate since it may result in otherwise unnecessary litigation.497 
Rather, the Model Law assumes that the meaning of arbitration is generally 
understood and deals directly with the arbitration agreement in three articles. Article 
7, which 'was amended in 2006 to better conform to international contract 
practices',498 provides two options. In following the NY Convention, option I defines 
both the nature and form of the arbitration agreement. While option II relies on the 
same definition of the arbitration agreement, it leaves the form unspecified and for 
the parties to determine.  
 
In both options, an arbitration agreement is defined as: ‘an agreement by the parties 
to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise 
between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not’. 
Under option I, the agreement may be a contractual clause or a separate agreement, 
but must be in writing. Regardless of how it is concluded: ‘an arbitration agreement 
is in writing if its content is recorded in any form’.499 This includes: ‘electronic 
communication’;500 the statements of claim and defence, provided the agreement is 
not denied by one of the parties;501 and a contractual reference that incorporates an 
arbitration clause in any document.502 However, this is not the case for option II, 
which, as noted above, requires no written formality. 
 
                                                 
497 Norbert Horn, 'The arbitration agreement in light of case law of the UNCITRAL Model Law (Arts 
7 and 8) (2005) 8 International Arbitration Law Review 146. 
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<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration.html> 
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499 Option I, article 7(3). 
500 Option I, article 7(4). 
501 Option I, article 7(5). 
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Both options for article 7 require that the parties mutually demonstrate an intention 
to submit the dispute to arbitration,503 which must be ongoing and not withdrawn 
through, for example, termination or waiver.504 This is a necessary prerequisite for 
the agreement to be effective, which must be applicable to the dispute presented for 
resolution.505 While the agreement must, by definition, reflect a mutual commitment 
to arbitration, it should still be effective even where it permits one of the parties to 
unilaterally refer the dispute to arbitration, provided that this was the mutual intention 
of the parties.506 This reflects the freedom allowed by the principle of party 
autonomy,507 but remains subject to that intention being clearly expressed. 
 
In Jagdish Chander v Ramesh Chander, the Supreme Court of India held that a clause 
stating that a dispute 'shall be referred for arbitration if the parties so determine' was 
not an arbitration agreement. Raveendran J explained that: 'the words used [in an 
arbitration agreement] should disclose a determination and obligation to go to 
arbitration and not merely contemplate the possibility'.508 The problem was the phrase 
'if the parties so determine', which suggests that there was no firm agreement. Rather, 
arbitration would be an option only if both parties subsequently consented. The clause 
was interpreted as an agreement to consider the use of arbitration and not an 
arbitration agreement.   
 
                                                 
503 Bundesgerichtshof, Germany, VII ZR 105/06, 25 January 2007 <http://www.dis-
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The agreement in Chander may be distinguished from those that allow either party 
the option of dispute resolution through arbitration. While the agreement in Chander 
required the contemporaneous consent of both parties, an agreement that allows one 
or other party to refer a dispute to arbitration is the exercise of an option to arbitrate 
that had been previously authorised by the mutual consent of the parties.509 Such an 
option may be conditional on a time limit for referral. If the time limit passes without 
the option being taken up, then the consent to arbitration lapses and it can no longer 
be considered a valid and effective arbitration agreement.510 However, where there is 
an arbitration agreement that sets a time limit for referral of a dispute, a failure to 
refer within the time limit does not render the agreement "inoperative".511 
 
Where a clause is ambiguous as to the parties' intentions, contextual evidence from 
the parties' behaviour and any additional communication between them may be used 
to resolve the ambiguity.512 As far as that contextual evidence reflects the intentions 
of the parties, this is a pragmatic approach that respects party autonomy and facilitates 
arbitration. It would be unfortunate if a party was able to hide behind the technicality 
of a poorly drafted agreement where there is good contextual evidence of the parties' 
intentions. This supports the mutually binding nature of the autonomous commitment 
to an agreement,513 which the law should enforce regardless of technical failings 
where there is sufficient evidence that the parties had, in fact, made such an 
agreement. Ultimately, however, whether an arbitration agreement exists will depend 
on the precise wording used and the court's attitude to arbitration.514 
 
                                                 
509 Grandeur Electrical Co Ltd v Cheung Kee Fung Cheung Construction Co Ltd [2006] HKCA 305. 
510 Thorn Security (Hong Kong) Ltd v Cheung Kee Fung Cheung Construction Co Ltd [2004] HKCA 
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513 See the explanatory theory of the model arbitration agreement (section 3.2.5). 
514 ICAC International Consultech v Silverman (1991) CanLII 2868 (Quebec CA, Canada). 
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Although defining the meaning of an arbitration agreement, the Model Law fails to 
fully define what constitutes a valid agreement. It provides only the minimal guidance 
under article 34,515 that an award may be set aside where a party to the agreement 
'was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which 
the parties have subjected it'. This is presumably because the validity of contractual 
and other legal agreements is generally understood to require a voluntary and 
competent consent based on a true belief regarding the agreement and its 
consequences. Thus, an agreement will be void where the party has not consented,516 
where any consent has been induced by duress,517 fraud or misrepresentation,518 or 
where the party lacked the legal capacity to enter into such an agreement.519 The 
failure to fully define the substantive conditions of agency required for a valid 
agreement is, however, unfortunate because it misses the opportunity to ensure that 
the rules are sufficiently clear and specifically focused on the particular nature of the 
arbitration agreement.  
 
Watts, for example, recently noted in relation to the Commonwealth common law on 
contracts, that the 'case law on the relevant points of agency is fairly thin'.520 Even as 
recently as 2014, the UK Supreme Court was required to determine that capacity was 
not to be determined globally, but was relative to the specific decision.521 This was 
based on the approach take under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and it is by no means 
certain that other jurisdictions would take the same approach.522 Consider the 
question of incapacity further. The common law takes an objective approach and 
                                                 
515 See also article 36 on the Grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement. 
516 Mariana Maritime SA v Stella Jones Inc [2002] FCA 215 (Canada). 
517 Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104 (PC). 
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holds that the contract is binding if the other party had no reason to believe the person 
lacked legal capacity.523 Whether this is just depends on perspective. If liberal 
individual autonomy is relied on, then it is arguable that the law should adopt a 
subjective approach that voids the agreement because of incapacity regardless of 
whether the other person was aware of the person's incompetence. If the imperfections 
of human communication are acknowledged, then a more balanced approach would 
be justified, with the arbitration deemed as valid, but subject to additional safeguards 
protecting the interests of the party lacking capacity. Given the importance of the 
agreement, and of party autonomy, it would have been better had the Model Law set 
out the basic rules of validity. 
 
Given the relatively thin definition of the arbitration agreement, with no consideration 
of substantive validity, the value of article 7 lies primarily in its approach to the 
agreement’s formal validity. Here it provides the choice between imposing a 
requirement for the agreement to be in writing, or allowing the parties complete 
freedom, with no restrictions on the form of the agreement. Option I retains the 
evidentiary security of requiring the agreement to be in writing, but widens the scope 
of what constitutes a written agreement to allow for the more modern electronic 
means of communication. Furthermore, it no longer requires the parties to sign the 
agreement or formally exchange messages.524 The 2006 version also clarifies that 
only the content of the agreement needs to be recorded in writing, which resolves any 
conflict regarding the need for the assent to also be in writing.525  
 
This more liberal approach to the “in writing” requirement was applied in AQZ v ARA, 
which concerned, inter alia, the validity of an arbitration agreement.526 The 
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agreement in question had been concluded orally. There was, however, adequate 
written record of the content of the agreement and no evidence that the lack of 
signatures represented any disagreement with the clause. Based on the 2006 version 
of article 7, the High Court of Singapore accepted the validity of an arbitration 
agreement recorded unilaterally and unsigned. It held that, provided the parties had 
concluded the agreement and the content was recorded, an oral agreement would be 
sufficient.527  
 
Option I for article 7 therefore strikes a practical balance between certainty and 
flexibility. Allowing the requirement to be satisfied retrospectively through an 
exchange of claim and defence statements where the existence of the agreement is 
not in question removes a potential technical barrier that could be used to unjustly 
obstruct the arbitration process. This facilitation of arbitration and party autonomy is 
further enhanced by the recognition that the statements of claim and defence are not 
limited to those made during formal proceedings, but include informal statements 
made prior to the commencement of any proceedings.528 
 
Option II is even more liberal in its approach, imposing no formal requirements. 
While this maximises party autonomy, it may subsequently create evidentiary issues 
unless the agreement is at least recorded in some form. Although the form is not 
specified, it would be unwise to leave an agreement undocumented. The timing and 
manner of documentation, however, is entirely up to the parties. Furthermore, this 
latter option means that the form of the agreement is simply a matter of evidence and 
not validity, while under option I, an agreement not in writing will be deemed invalid. 
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Turning now to the Scottish Act, which immediately sets the pro-arbitration tone of 
the statute in its founding principles under s.1. It states: 
S 1(b) that parties should be free to agree how to resolve disputes 
subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public 
interest 
S 1(c) that the court should not intervene in an arbitration except as 
provided by this Act. 
These founding principles provide a liberal context for the legal framework 
supporting the arbitration process. The freedom to agree to arbitrate, subject only to 
'necessary' public interest exceptions establishes the Act's 'focus on party 
autonomy'.529 
 
Like the Model Law, the Scottish Act does not explicitly define the meaning of 
arbitration, although it does state that the object of arbitration is the just and efficient 
resolution of a dispute between the parties.530 Similarly, it also fails to define what 
constitutes a valid agreement, which presumably will be subject to the same 
conditions as any other legally binding agreement. The Act does, however, provide a 
very wide definition of a dispute that may be the subject of an arbitration agreement. 
Under s.2: 
"dispute" includes -  
(a) any refusal to accept a claim, and 
(b) any other difference (whether contractual or not) 
This is an 'inclusive' definition, not restricted to contractual disputes and allowing the 
arbitration of claims even where it may be argued that 'the matters in question are ... 
beyond dispute'.531 It does not, however, make a 'dispute capable of being arbitrated 
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if, because of its subject-matter, it would not otherwise be capable of being 
arbitrated'.532  
 
The intention behind the broad definition was to avoid any restrictions on what may, 
or may not, be considered arbitrable. The Scottish Parliament highlighted the 
difficulties in setting out ‘clearly in statute what is and what is not arbitrable’, 
explaining that: ‘matters such as public policy are constantly evolving’.533 It was 
undoubtedly wise not to put on the straight jacket of a statutory list of public policy 
exceptions to what may be the subject matter of an arbitration agreement. This allows 
the Scottish Parliament the freedom to change or add to established exceptions. It 
does, however, leave the decision in practice at the discretion of the judiciary, which 
sacrifices certainty for flexibility. 
 
The Scottish Act provides the framework for arbitration agreements in three sections, 
which are supported by the SAR. Under s.4, an agreement may be made ex ante and 
included as a contractual clause. Alternatively, the parties may specifically agree to 
arbitrate a dispute ex post. S.4 also allows that the agreement may be part of the main 
contract or incorporated by reference to an agreement in another document.534 This is 
consistent with the general international approach to arbitration and maximises party 
autonomy. 
 
In line with option II of the Model Law,535 the Scottish Act imposes no formal 
requirements on the agreement, which may be oral, or in writing.536 This ensures that 
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oral agreements are subject to the Act and not governed by the common law, which 
would have been 'a recipe for disaster, given the dire state of that common law'.537 As 
noted previously, this maximises flexibility and party autonomy, but may create 
evidentiary problems where there is not at least some record of the agreement. While 
it would be unwise for parties not to record the agreement, the advantage of the 
Scottish approach is that it does not impose formalities on the parties, who are free to 
choose how best to maintain a record. This is, of course, subject to the caveat that, 
where a party may seek to enforce the award in a foreign jurisdiction, the NY 
Convention still requires a written agreement.538 
 
The doctrine of separability is implemented by s.5 of the Scottish Act. This provides 
that an arbitration clause ‘is to be treated as a distinct agreement’, wholly separate 
from the main contract.539 Consequentially, the validity of the agreement is 
independent of the validity of the main contract.540 This issue was discussed in chapter 
two and is essentially consistent with the Model Law and generally accepted 
principles of ICA. It is significant because it respects party autonomy by preserving 
the intention to arbitrate even where the dispute relates to an invalid contract. It also 
has symbolic importance, since it emphasises that the agreement to arbitrate is an 
independent, legally binding agreement and not simply a derivative clause of a private 
contract. 
 
Consistent with the Model Law and the Scottish Act, the SAL 2012 treats the 
arbitration agreement as wholly separate to any contract.541 By making it clear that 
the validity of the arbitration agreement is independent of the validity of any parent 
contract, article 21 reflects the dominant approach in ICA. Furthermore, it avoids the 
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problems of legal challenge and conflicting judgments that beset jurisdictions such as 
the United Arab Emirates, where the Federal Civil Procedures Law 1992 fails to 
explicitly provide for the doctrine of separability.542  
 
In determining what constitutes a valid agreement, article 1(1) of the SAL 2012 
defines the arbitration agreement as: 
An agreement between two or more parties to refer to arbitration all 
or some of the disputes that have arisen or may arise between them 
with respect to a particular legal relationship, whether contractual 
or otherwise, and whether the arbitration agreement is in the form 
of an arbitration clause included in the contract, or in the form of a 
separate arbitration agreement. 
Other than specifying that there can be more than two parties to an agreement, this is 
effectively the same as the definition provided by the Model Law. Like both the 
Model Law and the Scottish Act, this definition fails to fully determine what 
constitutes a valid arbitration agreement. Some clarification is found in article 2, 
which states that the SAL 2012 ‘shall not apply to disputes related to personal status 
and to matters in respect of which no settlement is permitted’. This means that there 
cannot be a valid arbitration agreement to resolve disputes relating to personal status 
or that involve crimes against God (hudud) and divorce following adultery (lian).543 
 
Further clarification is provided by article 9, which provides that arbitration 
agreements may be valid whether they are made in anticipation of possible disputes 
or as a response to a dispute that has arisen. In the former case, article 9(1) makes it 
clear that such agreements will not be voidable simply because of the uncertainty 
inherent to future disputes. This is important because, as discussed, uncertainty 
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(gharar) is prohibited under Sharia law. In the latter case, the agreement will still be 
valid ‘even if a claim in respect of that dispute had been filed before the competent 
court’, provided it avoids gharar by specifying ‘the issues to be covered by 
arbitration’. This is a significant liberalisation of the approach to arbitration, with the 
SAL 2012 removing any need to seek judicial approval of arbitration submission 
agreements.544 
 
Under article 9(2), the arbitration agreement must be in writing, which under article 
9(3) will be the case: ‘if it is included in an instrument that was issued by the two 
parties to arbitration, or if it is included in certified mutual correspondence, cables, or 
in any other written or an electronic communication’. Furthermore, under article 9(3) 
an arbitration agreement may be formed by reference in the contract ‘to any document 
which incorporates an arbitration clause’.  Where an agreement is made by reference, 
it must be clear that the referenced arbitration clause ‘is an integral part of the 
contract’. In requiring that the agreement be in writing, article 9(2) reflects option I 
of the Model Law. Article 9(3) defines when the requirement will be satisfied and is 
similar to the Model Law provision on which it is based, offering a flexible range of 
ways to ensure that an agreement is valid. However, while the Model Law allows that 
an agreement may be concluded orally and recorded in any form, the SAL 2012 
requires a mutually issued instrument or an exchange of documents, whether or not 
in electronic form. This means that 'an arbitration agreement ... cannot be concluded 
orally'.545  
 
Precluding orally concluded arbitration agreements restricts the autonomy of the 
parties more than either the Model Law or the Scottish Act. It is, however, consistent 
with the requirements of the NY Convention and balances the reduction in flexibility 
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by ensuring greater evidentiary certainty. Furthermore, it may be argued that this 
constraint is a reasonable attempt to reduce the risk of uncertainty regarding the 
existence or scope of an agreement, which would be consistent with the Sharia, given 
its prohibition of gharar However, it should be noted that, both in Arabic culture and 
under the Sharia, parties are bound by agreements, whether oral or written.546 As 
Tarin observes, ‘there is no specific requirement to have a written agreement to 
arbitrate’.547 There is, therefore, a tension between the need to avoid uncertainty and 
the need to enforce oral agreements. The SAL 2012 resolves this tension in favour of 
avoiding uncertainty, but at the complete expense of oral agreements and party 
autonomy. 
 
Article 10(1) of the SAL 2012 helpfully clarifies that an arbitration agreement will 
only be valid where both parties or their representatives, whether natural or legal 
persons, have the legal capacity to alter their rights and obligations through the terms 
of the agreement. Grounded in the understanding that competence is a prerequisite of 
autonomy, this explicitly confirms that any agreement made by an incompetent 
person will be invalid. The SAL 2012, however, does not define when a person would 
be considered incompetent, which must be determined by reference to the national 
law. This reflects the approach that is implicit to the Scottish Act.  
 
3.3.2 Arbitration agreements and the court’s role 
A valid arbitration agreement allows the parties to resolve the dispute by the specified 
arbitration process. This gives effect to party autonomy and should be respected by 
the courts. Thus, in determining whether to stay legal proceedings and refer the 
dispute to arbitration, the courts tend to appeal to the importance of party autonomy 
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as the justification underlying the arbitration agreement.548 Under the Model Law, the 
court’s obligation is set out in article 8(1): 
A court before which an action is brought in a matter which is the 
subject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests not 
later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of 
the dispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that the 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed. 
Thus, under article 8, where a dispute that is the subject matter of an arbitration 
agreement is also the subject of a court action, the court is obliged to comply with a 
valid request by one of the parties to refer the dispute to arbitration. To be valid, the 
request must be made at the time of the first substantial submission and is subject to 
the court's judgment that the arbitration agreement is valid and effective as 
determined by reference to national law and public policy. In determining these 
matters, as discussed in chapter two, the court is allowed some discretion, but in 
principle should refer the matter for arbitration where there is prima facie evidence 
of the existence of a valid and effective agreement.549 
 
The issues of autonomy, agency and consent were considered earlier. Here it remains 
to be noted that party autonomy is limited by the state's public policy interest in 
ensuring procedural justice, with some subject matters not considered suitable for 
arbitration and so reserved for the state to resolve. Any arbitration agreement relating 
to such matters, which may include issues of criminal or family law, will be deemed 
null and void. Thus, disputes regarding whether a contract defrauds one of the parties 
may be reserved for determination by the courts.550 An arbitration agreement may 
also be deemed null and void where it is unconscionable or manifestly unfair, 
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although standard form contracts, such as those found in consumer transactions, are 
not inherently unfair.551 Beyond this, an arbitration agreement may be deemed 
incapable of performance because of invalid or ineffective provisions. For example, 
where an agreement included the appointment of a sole arbitrator who was neither 
impartial nor independent, then it was an invalid provision rendering the arbitration 
agreement ineffective.552 
 
Under article 8(2), parallel arbitration proceedings may be initiated while the court is 
making its decision and, under article 16, the arbitration tribunal may itself rule on 
the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. As discussed in chapter one, 
this implements the competence-competence principle and, together with article 8, 
establishes a framework that balances party autonomy and the intention to arbitrate 
against certainty and the procedural injustice of enforcing arbitration in the absence 
of a valid and effective agreement. Thus, while article 16 limits party autonomy by 
not allowing the parties the freedom to exclude the arbitration tribunal's power to 
determine its own jurisdiction,553 it does provide for the opportunity to challenge a 
decision. Furthermore, article 16 implements the doctrine of separability, making it 
clear that the arbitration agreement’s validity is independent of the validity of the 
parent contract.554  
 
The Model Law allows that a party may request interim measures of protection, 
without the request being incompatible with an arbitration agreement.555 Following 
article 1(2), a request for interim measures may be made regardless of whether the 
                                                 
551 Bundesgerischtshof, Germany III ZR 265/03, 13 January 2005 <http://www.dis-
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place of arbitration is undetermined or in a foreign jurisdiction.556 This recognises the 
need for national legal systems to support the process of arbitration and protects the 
parties’ interests. Such an approach may be justified by three main reasons.557 First, 
such measures may be needed before the arbitration tribunal is formed. Second, 
arbitration orders for interim measures may be difficult to enforce. Third, the interim 
measures may need to bind third parties beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.  
 
An alternative approach would have been to require that interim measures of 
protection should be provided for as part of the arbitration agreement. This would be 
more consistent with a liberal approach to autonomy, and the autonomy model of 
arbitration. The advantage of the approach under article 9, however, is that it 
acknowledges the pragmatics of arbitration where one or both parties may choose to 
act self-servingly and destroy evidence or assets, ignoring the obligations created by 
their voluntary commitment to the agreement.  
 
Turning now to consider the Scottish Act. Under s.10(1), which applies regardless of 
whether the arbitration is seated in Scotland,558 the court must suspend legal 
proceedings where the applicant is a party to an arbitration agreement regarding the 
disputed issue. This requires the courts to respect a valid arbitration agreement and 
so to respect the principle of party autonomy embodied by the parties’ choice to 
submit the dispute for resolution by arbitration. This also respects the autonomy of 
the arbitration process by supporting, rather than undermining, the jurisdiction of the 
arbitration tribunal to ensure a substantively just resolution to the dispute. As 
discussed in chapter two,559 the impact of s.10 does depend on how interventionist 
the courts choose to be regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement. Following 
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the approach of the English courts, 560 which is predicated on the need to preserve a 
just balance of the parties’ rights and interests, the Scottish courts may go beyond a 
prima facie approach and require that the agreement to arbitrate be ‘virtually 
certain’.561 Such an approach, although prioritising justice over autonomy, would not 
be inconsistent with the obligation to have regard to the founding principles under 
s.1. 
   
Turning now to consider the approach under the SAL 2012. The mandatory effect of 
the word “shall” in Article 11(1) implements article 8 of the Model Law and is similar 
in effect to s.10 of the Scottish Act. Article 11(1) provides that, where ‘an agreement 
with respect to that dispute exists’ and the respondent raises the agreement as a 
defence, the court is disallowed from further consideration of the claim. Therefore, 
the Saudi courts are required to respect a valid arbitration agreement, which has the 
standard effect of empowering the arbitration tribunal with the primary jurisdiction 
for resolving the relevant dispute. Again, this adequately respects party autonomy, 
but is contingent on the Saudi courts implementing article 11 as intended and may 
require a cultural shift in the attitude of the courts to foreign arbitration, particularly 
under foreign governing law.562 As noted previously, such cultural change is being 
encouraged by the implementation of the SAL 2012 itself coupled with the 
establishment of the SCCA. It is also made more likely by the reform of the Saudi 
judicial system, which includes the establishment of specialised commercial courts.  
 
Under article 12, the obligation on the court to refer a dispute to arbitration, contingent 
on a valid arbitration agreement, extends to agreements concluded during the process 
of a litigation. This provision, along with article 9(1), provides flexibility and respects 
the autonomy of the parties who agree to resolve a dispute by arbitration regardless 
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of the timing of that agreement. It is both a practical and symbolic reflection of the 
priority given to arbitration agreements over the jurisdiction of the national law. As 
such, it should help with the ongoing cultural shift mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph. 
 
3.3.3 Arbitration agreements and the parties’ power to shape the arbitration 
process 
Apart from the specific provisions discussed above, the Model Law also allows the 
parties to determine many features of the arbitration process, while including a default 
procedure in case the agreement fails to make an adequate specification. This means 
that neither the validity nor the effectiveness of an arbitration agreement will be 
compromised by the failure of the parties to make explicit provision for an essential 
aspect of the arbitration process. Thus, in MMTC Ltd v Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd, 
the Supreme Court of India held that the validity of the agreement did not depend on 
whether the parties had appointed the required number of arbitrators. Furthermore, 
the default rules made up for any deficiencies in the provisions made by the parties.563 
 
Articles 10 and 11 allow the parties to agree on the appointment of arbitrators and the 
composition of the tribunal, with the option of seeking the court's assistance to 
overcome any failure in the process, so facilitating the arbitration process.564 Article 
19 allows the parties to determine the arbitration procedure, although this is subject 
to the explicit provisions of the Model Law. The Model Law also allows the parties 
to determine the place of arbitration;565 to vary the commencement date;566 and to 
determine the language to be used in the proceedings.567 The parties are free to restrict 
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their freedom to amend or supplement statements of claim and defence.568 
Furthermore they can determine the nature of the proceedings held by the arbitration 
tribunal,569 the consequences where one party defaults on the process,570 and the role 
played by expert witnesses.571 
 
Under Article 28, the parties are free to choose the rules of law applicable to the 
substance of the dispute. To reduce the possibility of misunderstanding, article 28(1) 
clarifies that any designation of national law refers, unless explicitly stated otherwise, 
to the substantive law rather than conflict of laws rules. The parties may also 
determine the rules for decision making where the tribunal is comprised of more than 
one arbitrator. Under article 29, the default is a majority decision, but this may be 
varied by the arbitration agreement. Although the parties have no control over the 
requirement that the award be in writing, signed and dated,572 they can determine 
whether reasons for the award should be given by the arbitrators.573 The parties may 
also determine the time-period for requesting the correction of awards and the option 
of requesting an additional award. They cannot, however, preclude the arbitration 
tribunal from correcting errors 'on its own initiative'.574 Finally, articles 34(2)(b) and 
36(1)(b) allow that national law and public policy to act as constraints on the subject 
matter of the arbitration agreement and any subsequent award. 
 
The Model Law’s approach to the arbitration agreement prioritises the positive aspect 
of autonomy, which is the liberty to self-determine. However, it provides a safety-net 
of default rules that apply where the parties fail to determine the issue. Similarly, it 
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seeks to preserve the option of arbitration by allowing the court to make interim 
measures without being inconsistent with the arbitration agreement. This approach 
facilitates the arbitration process and enhances the effectiveness of arbitration 
agreements. In providing a safety net of default rules, the Model Law takes a social 
or relationally supportive approach that facilitates the autonomous choice of the party 
to resolve any contractual disputes by arbitration. A liberal approach that was 
ambivalent to the choice between arbitration and litigation would not see it as 
necessary to provide the default rules. Rather, it would set out the rules for when an 
arbitration agreement would be considered valid and effective and then leave the 
parties with the full responsibility of determining the content of the agreement, 
accepting that a failure to provide for an essential procedural element may render the 
agreement inoperative.  
 
For a state seeking to create an arbitration friendly culture, the supportive Model Law 
approach is preferable to the ambivalence of a liberal approach. Despite its pro-
arbitration framework, the Model Law necessarily acknowledges the roles of national 
law and public policy. Thus, relying on a pro-arbitration culture that encourages 
judicial deference to arbitration,575 it accepts the role of the courts in determining the 
validity of an arbitration agreement, while affording an equivalent jurisdiction to the 
arbitrators.576 Furthermore, it pragmatically accepts that the state should be allowed 
to impose restrictions based on subject-matter arbitrability and public policy, 
explained as 'serious departures from fundamental notions of procedural justice'.577 
Overall then, the Model Law takes a pragmatic approach to the arbitration agreement 
that seeks to facilitate party autonomy by allowing the parties to determine the content 
and subject matter of the procedure, supported by default rules that apply to preserve 
the agreement should the parties fail to make the relevant determination. Party 
autonomy is limited by the need to ensure the integrity of the arbitration process by 
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establishing a procedure that is formally just.578 It is further limited by the recognition 
of state sovereignty in determining arbitrability and varying the procedural justice 
requirements based on public policy. It is silent, however, on the privity of the 
agreement and the role of third parties. 
 
Turning now to Scots law. Section 6 of the Scottish Act provides for the law 
governing the arbitration agreement and allows the parties to determine the governing 
law through the arbitration agreement. Where, however, the parties fail to specify the 
law of the arbitration agreement, then it will be governed by Scots law.579 This 
provides a default rule based on the presumption that, in the absence of an explicit 
statement, the choice of seat is the best evidence of the parties' intention. For the 
benefit of cost-effectiveness, this assumes the parties' will and so may not reflect their 
actual wills, but since the parties have failed to make the choice of law explicit they 
must shoulder the responsibility if the default rule does not reflect their intention. As 
such, it is consistent with a conception of autonomy that ties self-determination to 
responsibility.  
 
Given its importance, it is perhaps surprising that arbitration agreements often fail to 
effectively determine the seat of arbitration.580 Section 6, therefore, has the significant 
advantage of precluding any dispute arising over the choice of law, facilitating the 
arbitration process. This provides much greater certainty and efficiency for the parties 
when contrasted with the conflict of laws approach that is followed in Model Law 
jurisdictions, such as Ireland.581 It should avoid the need for a court hearing to 
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determine the governing law as happens, for example, under English law.582 The 
English courts ask ‘with what system of law the agreement has the closest and most 
real connection’, which means the applicable law depends on context and may be 
either that of the main contract or the law of the seat.583 
 
The Scottish Act establishes a system of mandatory and default rules. The aim behind 
this is to balance the need to ensure a just and efficient system against the interest that 
the parties have in exercising their autonomy to determine for themselves the process 
of dispute resolution.584 Thus, s.7 provides: ‘The Scottish Arbitration Rules set out in 
schedule 1 are to govern every arbitration seated in Scotland (unless, in the case of a 
default rule, the parties agree otherwise)’. Under this approach, the mandatory rules 
are those seen as necessary to ensure a just and efficient process while the default 
rules respect party autonomy by allowing the parties the choice of their own or the 
default rules.585 The default rules also play an important role in ensuring the 
effectiveness of arbitration and the parties' arbitration agreement by providing a 
safeguard against an incomplete agreement. 
 
Under s.8, ‘"mandatory rules", cannot be modified or disapplied’. Under s.9, default 
rules, however, only apply where ‘the parties have not agreed to modify or disapply 
that rule (or any part of it)’. Rules may be disapplied by the arbitration agreement, or 
                                                 
582 C v D [2007] EWCA Civ 1282; Abuja International Hotels Ltd v Meridien SAS [2012] EWHC 87 
(Comm). In those cases the courts held that the law of the seat should apply, but in Sonatrach 
Petroleum Corrp v Ferrell International Ltd [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 627, the court held that the 
law of the main contract should apply; Hew R Dundas, 'The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010: 
Converting Revision into Reality' (2010) 76 Arbitration 2, 12. See also: Arsonovia Ltd v Cruz City 1 
Mauritius Holdings [2011] EWHC 3702(Comm); Hew R Dundas, 'An old friend reappears: which 
law governs the arbitration agreement? (2013) 79 Arbitration 325. 
583 Sulamerica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v Enesa Engenharia SA [2012] EWCA Civ 638, [32]. 
584 Scottish Parliament, Arbitration (Scotland) Bill Policy Memorandum (2009), para 78 
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/16034.aspx> accessed 30 November 
2017. 
585 Hong-Lin Yu, 'A Departure From The UNCITRAL Model Law - The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 
2010 And Some Related Issues' (2010) 3 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 283, 292. 
177 
 
‘any other means’, at any point before or during the arbitration process.586 This makes 
it clear that a default rule may be disapplied explicitly by an intentional agreement 
between the parties. A default rule may also be disapplied implicitly where the parties 
choose to apply a law other than Scots law, or where an inconsistency is created by 
‘anything done with the agreement of the parties’ or by the adoption of an alternative 
set of arbitration rules.587 This approach should reduce the opportunity for disputes to 
arise over whether a default rule has, in fact, been disapplied. 
 
The combination of mandatory and default rules 'provide a ready made framework' 
to facilitate the arbitration process and strike a balance between party autonomy, 
procedural justice and cost effectiveness. Furthermore, by separating the rules out 
from the main body of the Act and including them in a single schedule, the Scottish 
Act fulfils its aim to make the process simpler and more accessible.588 The list of 
mandatory rules is long, with the original list of 28 in the draft Bill expanded to 36 
mandatory rules in the final Act.589 The very length of the list may cause concerns 
regarding party autonomy. However, there was a 'conscious effort … [minimise] the 
number of mandatory rules' and mandatory rules are only provided where necessary 
'in key areas of the process to ensure the smooth and efficient running of an 
arbitration'.590 One may disagree with which rules should be mandatory or default, 
but the general approach is justified by the aim of respecting party autonomy while 
ensuring a just and effective process of arbitration. The consequence of enforcing 
arbitration through the legal machinery of the state provides the state with the 
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mandate to address issues of public policy and justice. This is achieved through 
mandatory provisions, including the mandatory rules. provided these are kept to the 
minimum necessary to ensure a just, efficient and effective process then they are a 
justifiable infringement of party autonomy.591 
 
Rather than consider each of the rules here, the relevant rules are considered in the 
appropriate chapter. For example, in chapter two it was argued that party autonomy 
would have been better served by allowing the parties to opt out of mandatory rule 
19, which provides for the principle of competence-competence. Although a similar 
criticism may be levelled at other mandatory rules, the overall balance of mandatory 
and discretionary rules provides a reasonable payoff between party autonomy and the 
need to ensure an effective and just process of arbitration. This is reflected in the lack 
of Scottish cases arising out of the arbitration agreement. 
 
Turning now to consider the approach under the SAL 2012. In addition to providing, 
albeit incompletely, for the validity of the arbitration agreement and for its effect, the 
SAL 2012 also provides for its content. Although less clearly organised and presented 
than in the Scottish Act, the SAL 2012, like the Model Law, sets out a number of 
mandatory and default procedural rules.592 As with the Model Law and the Scottish 
Act, the aim is to provide a framework that facilitates party autonomy while ensuring 
that the intention of the parties to arbitrate a dispute is effected through a just and 
efficient process. For example, under article 13, the parties are free to choose any 
number of arbitrators provided it is an odd number, which facilitates majority 
decision-making and avoids a deadlock.  
 
                                                 
591 Vladimir Pavic, 'Bribery and International Commercial Arbitration - the Role of Mandatory Rules 
and Public Policy' (2012) 45 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 661, 669. 
592 Jean-Pierre Harb, Alexander G Leventhal, 'The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to the 
Tune of Shari'a' (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration 113, 118-119. 
179 
 
Article 14 imposes the additional restriction that at least one of the arbitrators has a 
university degree in Sharia or legal sciences. This restriction goes beyond the 
provisions of the Model Law and the Scottish Act, which leave the qualifications of 
the arbitrators in the hands of the parties. Again, this limits party autonomy, but may 
be justified by the need to ensure that the tribunal includes an arbitrator who 
understands Saudi law and due process. It is, however, debatable whether this 
justification is sufficient, and it may be argued that such a requirement will tend to 
impose a juridical character on the proceedings. This may narrow the distinction 
between arbitration and litigation, but is not necessarily detrimental providing it 
enhances procedural justice without unduly eroding party autonomy or cost-
effectiveness.593 Apart from this, the arbitrators must be legally competent and of 
good character, but there is no restriction on gender, which means that the parties may 
choose female arbitrators. 
 
Under article 25, the parties are also free to 'agree on the procedure to be followed by 
the arbitral tribunal'. Thus, they can choose to apply a set of arbitration rules 
regardless of whether they originate inside Saudi. This power is a ‘key feature of 
arbitration',594 since it respects party autonomy by allowing the parties to determine 
many of that features that will affect the length, formality and costs of the process. 
The power is, however, subject to the caveat that those rules must be Sharia 
compliant. For example, it would not be possible to apply a rule that allowed the 
arbitrators to award interest, since this would be forbidden as riba under Sharia. This 
imposes a restriction on party autonomy not found in either the Model Law or the 
Scottish Act, but it is necessary under Saudi’s formal commitment to Islam. Such a 
restriction, however, may be considered unacceptable by a non-Muslim and may deter 
non-Muslim businesses from agreeing to arbitrate in Saudi. 
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Under article 28, the parties are free to determine the arbitration forum, which need 
not be situated within Saudi. This liberalisation of the law595 importantly allows the 
parties the freedom to arbitrate under the SAL 2012 regardless of location,596 which 
respects their autonomy and reduces the possibility of inconsistencies rendering the 
agreement invalid. Where the arbitration is conducted in Saudi, however, there is no 
freedom to choose the law applicable to the proceedings. For all such arbitrations, 
article 2 requires compulsory application of the SAL 2012 ‘to any arbitration, 
irrespective of the nature of the legal relationship forming the subject of dispute’. 
 
The parties are free, under article 29, to determine the language of the proceedings, 
with Arabic being the default should the parties fail to specify otherwise. 
Furthermore, consistent with the Model Law approach, under article 38, the parties 
may choose the law applicable to the substantive dispute, with a default authority 
invested in the arbitral tribunal should they fail to indicate the law. Unlike the Model 
Law, however, but again consistent with Saudi’s commitment to Islam, any such 
applicable law must not be inconsistent with Sharia, or any other public policy.  
  
From the perspective of party autonomy, the SAL 2012 offers a vastly improved legal 
framework compared to the SAL 1983. It 'represents a significant liberalization of the 
requirements for a valid arbitration agreement',597 and the parties are given far greater 
power to 'tailor their arbitration procedure' to suit their needs.598 Despite the more 
liberal approach, arbitration in Saudi remains subject to Sharia, which impacts on 
party autonomy. While the parties are free to choose the law applicable to resolving 
the dispute as well as the institutional rules governing the arbitral process, the chosen 
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law and institutional rules must be consistent with Sharia.599 For instance, where the 
rules allow the arbitrators the discretion to award interest, this power is superseded 
by the prohibition of riba under Sharia and any attempt by the arbitrators to award 
interest will be invalid. The same may apply in relation to speculative damages such 
as those for loss of profit, which are prohibited as gharar under Sharia.600 
 
Much will depend on how the SAL 2012 is implemented in practice, and here cultural 
traditions may still be influential. For example, there is nothing in the SAL 2012 that 
restricts the appointment of female arbitrators. In 2013, Raffa noted that: 'there are 
female judges in almost every Muslim country except in Saudi Arabia'.601 This 
reflects that, at least as far as gender equality is concerned, Saudi is a "conservative" 
Islamic country that significantly restricts female autonomy.602 The lack of female 
judges suggests a recalcitrance that may, in practice, restrict party autonomy by 
making it difficult to appoint female arbitrators even if they are permissible in 
principle. It appears, however, that the culture is changing. Saudi has recently 
permitted women to practice as lawyers, with the first female lawyer appearing in 
court in 2013 and the first female law firm opening in 2014.603 Furthermore, women 
are now also studying and graduating from arbitration courses run in Saudi,604 and it 
was reported that, in May 2016, the first female arbitrator was appointed to a tribunal 
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without objection from an administrative court of appeal exercising its power under 
article 15(2).605  
 
3.3.4 SAL 2012 – room for improvement 
The general approach to the arbitration agreement under the SAL 2012, which 
broadly follows that of the Model Law, is essentially consistent with the explanatory 
theory of the concept. It provides a supportive legal framework and allows the parties 
to remain in control of the arbitration process. The main constraint is the need for 
Sharia compliance. From a liberal perspective, this may be considered an unwelcome 
restriction. From the perspective of Islamic autonomy, it is necessary, expected and 
justified by Saudi’s commitment to Islam. The SAL 2012 achieves a reasonable 
balance between a respect for autonomy in a liberal sense and the obligation of 
Islamic autonomy to follow the Sharia. 
 
Although the SAL 2012 adequately reflects the theory underlying the concept of an 
arbitration agreement, there are aspects relating to the core attributes of the concept 
that could be improved. While it is helpful that the SAL 2012 makes explicit that 
there can be more than two parties, like the Model law and the Scottish Act,606 it is 
silent on the issue of privity. This means that one must look beyond the SAL 2012 to 
determine whether third parties are engaged by the arbitration agreement. This might 
have been left for the courts to determine by reference to the general law of privity in 
contract, relying on 'grounds such as apparent agency, veil-piercing, alter ego, and 
estoppel'.607 Given that the arbitration agreement is distinct from the main contract, 
and serves a very different purpose to main commercial contracts, it may, however, 
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be argued that a different approach should apply.608 In this regard, then, it is useful 
that the issue has now been dealt with by article 13 of the IRSAL 2017. Article 13 
provides that the tribunal may allow a third party to intervene or join the arbitration 
proceedings, with joinder contingent on the agreement of all parties, including the 
third party. This approach has the advantage of clarity and appears to balance the 
interests of the main parties with the third party, thus appropriately respecting 
individual and party autonomy. It does, however, allow the tribunal the discretion to 
act contrarily to the parties wishes, either by permitting third party intervention or by 
refusing to allow the third party’s joinder. Furthermore, it imposes no justice-based 
restrictions on the tribunal’s discretion, nor does it require the tribunal to give reasons 
for its decision or provide for the power to challenge the decision before a court. 
Finally, although the Board of Grievances has previously held that an arbitration 
agreement is binding on legal successors,609  article 13 fails to deal explicitly with 
legal succession. 
 
Beyond the issue of privity, the main restriction under article 10 is that government 
bodies are not competent to enter into an arbitration agreement unless authorised by 
legislation or by the consent of the President of the Council of Ministers. This is an 
understandable restriction given the 'experience of the ARAMCO arbitration'.610  
While this represents a limitation of party autonomy, since it relates only to 
government bodies it is a legitimate restriction emanating from the government's 
authority as an autonomous entity. Such a restriction reflects the jurisdictional 
elements of the SAL 2012 and consequently has the advantage of alerting foreign 
parties to the policy. 
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Regarding the form of the agreement, the SAL 2012 is too restrictive in precluding 
agreements that are concluded orally. Although it is more restrictive than the 
approach to proof under both the SAL 1983 and Islamic law more generally,611 the 
requirement for writing is reasonable, given that it provides evidentiary certainty and 
ensures consistency with the NY Convention. This, however, could have been 
achieved with an unmodified implementation of option I of the Model Law, which 
allows agreements to be concluded orally provided they are then recorded. The 
following hypothetical situation is a good example of a situation that may arise in 
practice where it may be useful to recognise oral agreements: 
A disabled supertanker is heading for the rocks. A salvage tug 
appears and its captain radios the captain of the supertanker offering 
to take the tanker in tow if the tanker captain accepts Lloyd’s Rules 
on Salvage which contain an agreement that any dispute will be 
resolved using arbitration. If the tanker captain replies orally over 
the radio that he or she accepts Lloyd’s Rules that is then an 
agreement to arbitrate any subsequent dispute about the salvage.612 
 
While the SAL 2012 at least requires the parties to be legally competent, it would 
have been helpful had it gone beyond this and set out the requirements for a valid 
agreement more explicitly. Serving both the interests of autonomy and efficiency, this 
again would have allowed the requirements to be specifically tailored to the needs of 
arbitration rather than relying on the general national law. In this regard, it should be 
amended to include a more complete and explicit definition of the arbitration 
agreement explaining the need for the parties to be competent and for their consent to 
be given freely and with sufficient understanding of the agreement and its effect. 
                                                 
611 Mohammed I Aleisa, ‘A Critical Analysis of the Legal Problems associated with Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Saudi Arabia: Will the New Saudi Arbitration Law (2012) 
Resolve the Main Legal Problems?’ (PhD thesis, University of Essex 2016), 44.   
612 Scottish Parliament, Arbitration (Scotland) Bill Policy Memorandum (2009), para 73 
<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/Bills/16034.aspx> accessed 30 November 
2017. 
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By providing for mandatory and default rules consistently with the approach of Model 
Law, the SAL 2012 provides a reasonable safety net of provisions that facilitate the 
effectiveness of the arbitration agreement. It also makes explicit that there are limits 
to what subject matters are capable of arbitration. Given, however, that the SAL 2012 
includes international arbitration, with the possibility of involving non-Muslim 
parties, it would have been helpful to include a more explicit and detailed explanation 
of non-arbitrable subject matter than is currently provided by article 2. 
 
Finally, the SAL 2012 creates a reasonably strong framework to facilitate the 
arbitration agreement in providing an alternative process to litigation. The specifics 
will be considered in subsequent chapters. For now, it is sufficient to note that, 
excepting the additional restriction of Sharia compliance, the framework balances 
party autonomy against the need for a just and efficient process in a way that is 
consistent with the Model Law.613 The essential content of the agreement is 
adequately provided for by the SAL 2012. There is, however, much to be said for the 
approach taken by the Scottish Act. Providing a complete set of procedural rules as a 
discrete part of the Act both creates a comprehensive safety net and allows the parties 
additional choices for how to determine the arbitration process. Furthermore, the 
clarity of explicitly labelling rules as mandatory or default is also useful. It would 
have been preferable had the SAL 2012 taken a similar approach. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on the concept of an arbitration agreement, including its 
justifications, effect and limits. It began with a theoretical analysis, explaining the 
distinction between autonomy from a liberal western perspective and autonomy from 
the perspective of a Muslim. The conclusion from this was that, while the essential 
concept of an arbitration agreement is consistent, differing conceptions of autonomy 
may affect the expression of the core attributes of the concept. Specifically, the 
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commitment to Sharia in Islam, means that any arbitration agreement with a Muslim 
party must be consistent with Sharia, which provides an additional limit to the scope 
of the agreement. 
 
In the second half of the chapter, the law in practice was examined. The Model Law 
and Scots law approaches were explicated and used as comparators to assess the 
approach taken under the SAL 2012. This comparative analysis allowed the 
identification of those aspects that fell short of the requirements of the theoretical 
model. While the approach under the SAL 2012 is wholly consistent with the 
underlying explanatory theory of the concept of an arbitration agreement, it could be 
improved, particularly with regard to the first, fourth and fifth subsidiary hypotheses, 
by dealing explicitly, or in more detail, with issues of privity, validity, the limits on 
arbitrability and the rules of procedure, whether default or mandatory. Furthermore, 
to improve consistency with the first and second subsidiary hypotheses, orally 
concluded agreements should be permitted, provided they are recorded for 
evidentiary purposes.  
 
In conclusion, then, the SAL 2012 provides a good framework for arbitration 
agreements and vastly improves on the previous law. By no longer requiring judicial 
approval as a condition of validity of the arbitration agreement, the SAL 2012 is 
consistent with the first subsidiary hypothesis. Regarding the main hypothesis and the 
balance between the three core principles of autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness, 
however, there is still room for improvement. The failure to fully define a valid 
arbitration agreement limits the clarity and predictability of the law, increasing the 
risk of legal challenge. Contrary to the second subsidiary hypothesis, this would risk 
undermining the parties’ autonomous decision to rely on arbitration and, contrary to 
the fifth subsidiary hypothesis, would be more expensive and less efficient. The 
balance achieved by the SAL 2012 will again be considered in chapter four in the 
context of the regulations governing the arbitration tribunal and proceedings. 
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Chapter Four: Examination of the Core Principles in the Context of 
The Arbitration Tribunal and Proceedings 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter three, it was argued that arbitration agreements are justified by the parties' 
right to autonomy expressed through their consent to the agreement. Through the 
agreement, the parties opt-out of litigation and vest jurisdictional authority in the 
chosen arbitrators. This allows the parties to avoid unfamiliar foreign legal systems 
and instead to shape the process of dispute resolution to meet their own, mutually 
agreed, needs. This flexibility makes arbitration a commercially attractive alternative 
to litigation. Unbridled flexibility, however, may create or reinforce inequalities 
between the parties. This raises the question of how the flexibility required by a 
respect for party autonomy is balanced against the demands of procedural justice, 
given the power afforded the arbitrators by virtue of the arbitration agreement and 
backed by the support of the national legal system.  
 
When power is exercised without the constraints imposed by justice, it risks being 
arbitrary, reflecting rule by domination rather than a more legitimate form of 
governance.614 Justice, particularly in the procedural sense, is necessary to legitimise 
the state’s use of power. 615 Law, as 'an instrument of government',616 should also be 
an instrument of justice. Indeed, justice provides the foundations for the rule of law.617 
                                                 
614 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1690) II, XI, para 136, digitised edition provided by 
the Project Gutenberg (2010) <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7370/7370-h/7370-h.htm> accessed 
23 July 2018; TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford 
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Political Power 137; J Skelly Wright, ‘Beyond Discretionary Justice’ (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 
575, 588.  
615 St Augustin, 'How Like Kingdoms Without Justice are to Robberies' in Philip Schaff (ed), JF 
Shaw (trans), Marcus Dods (trans), City of God and Christian Doctrine, A Select Library of the 
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Volume II (The Christian Literature 
Company 1887), 66. 
616 Martin Loughlin, Sword &Scales (Hart Publishing 2000), 9. 
617 Martin Loughlin, Sword &Scales (Hart Publishing 2000), 69. 
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As Aristotle explained: ‘justice exists only between men … governed by law; and law 
exists for men between whom there is injustice’.618 Where disputes are resolved 
through litigation then the rule of law demands a just resolution mechanism. Where 
disputes are resolved through arbitration as a private alternative to litigation, the 
question is what this means for justice and the rule of law. In this chapter, that 
question will be addressed in context of the arbitration tribunal and the arbitration 
process. The chapter begins with a theoretical analysis of justice and arbitration, 
which is then applied to the comparative analysis of the SAL 2012.  
 
4.2 Justice and Arbitration 
4.2.1 Arbitration 
Arbitration is a system that supports a process designed to resolve a dispute between 
two or more parties. It provides a less formal and more flexible alternative to 
litigation. While a judge is a public official exercising a judicial authority that comes 
directly from the state, the arbitrator's authority to adjudicate arises from the parties' 
consent to an agreement to arbitrate and is vested in private citizens who are directly 
or indirectly chosen by the parties. The system and process of arbitration allow the 
arbitrator to resolve the dispute by making a final and legally binding award that is 
res judicata.619   
 
In chapter two, four theoretical models of arbitration were briefly explored. Based on 
that analysis, it was suggested that, while the ideal is a wholly autonomous system, 
arbitration in practice is best seen as a hybrid system based on a contractual agreement 
between the parties, but necessarily enabled and facilitated by national legal systems 
                                                 
618 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (written 350 BCE, WD Ross (tr)), Book V, Ch 6,   
available at: <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html>, accessed 30 November 2017. 
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New York University Law Review 1031; Jean-Francois Poudret, Sebastien Besson, Comparative Law 
of International Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell 2007), 3; Margaret L Moses, The Principles and 
Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2012), 1-2. 
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that serve to both legitimise the process of arbitration and enforce the valid awards 
made by the arbitrators. As a hybrid system, arbitration must maintain a three-way 
balance between cost-effectiveness, justice and party autonomy.620  
 
4.2.2 Arbitration as an alternative to litigation 
The purpose of arbitration is to provide a flexible alternative to litigation for 
effectively resolving disputes, which requires a solution that is acceptable to both 
parties. This means that both the system and the process must respect party autonomy 
by providing the flexibility necessary to allow the parties to tailor the process to meet 
their particular needs. The process must also be sufficiently legitimate for both parties 
to willingly accept the final award, regardless of whether it is in their favour. The 
requirement for legitimacy derives from the parties’ need to be treated with dignity 
as equal moral agents, reflecting a desire to be treated justly.621 Indeed, for Rawls: 
‘Justice is the first virtue of social institutions ... Each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice’.622  
 
Rawls’ position is based on a modified social contract view of society, with the 
legitimacy of the state and its institutions dependent on the hypothetical consent of 
its members. His conception of justice as fairness reflects the idealised social 
arrangements to which the members of a 'well-ordered society' would, or rationally 
should,623 be willing to agree if their own place within that ordered society were 
concealed behind a veil of ignorance. Although engaging with both formal and 
substantive justice, Rawls' primary concern is with substantive justice, focusing on 
                                                 
620 See chapter one, text at n 184. 
621 See the discussion in: Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Tom R Tyler, 'Procedural Justice and the Rule 
of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution' (2011) Journal of Dispute 
Resolution 1. 
622 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (The Belknap Press 1999), 3. 
623 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (The Belknap Press 2001), 9. 
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the distributive role of justice in 'assigning basic rights and duties and determining 
the division of advantages'.624 
 
If substantive justice were the sole concern, there would be little demand for 
arbitration as an alternative to litigation. Arbitration, however, provides a dispute 
resolution mechanism that is more accessible and flexible than litigation. The 
emphasis on flexibility and party autonomy allows arbitration to better meet the needs 
of the parties. In a 2013 international survey, 73% of respondents strongly agreed that 
arbitration was well suited to their needs.625 When asked to rank seven specified 
benefits of arbitration as reasons for preferring arbitration to other dispute resolution 
mechanisms, 28% of respondents ranked neutrality of the arbitrators as the most 
important feature, with a further 15% placing it second. Although the expertise of the 
arbitrator was overall ranked ahead of neutrality, it was placed first less frequently 
(19%).626 Both issues concern justice. While the expertise of the decision-maker is 
concerned with the substantive justice of a "correct" decision, the neutrality of the 
arbitrator is an issue of natural and procedural justice. Procedural flexibility and 
confidentiality were ranked in 5th and 3rd places respectively, with speed and cost 
ranked as the least important. This ranking suggests that, for the parties, a just process 
and outcome are the most important characteristics of a desirable mechanism for 
dispute resolution. 
 
Further to the parties' interest in justice, the state also has an interest in ensuring that 
arbitration is just. This derives from the state's role in enabling and facilitating 
arbitration as a private alternative to the public process of dispute resolution available 
through the courts. Specifically, if the state is to enforce an arbitration award, then it 
                                                 
624 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (The Belknap Press 1999), 113 
625 School of International Arbitration Queen Mary University of London, Corporate choices in 
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must be satisfied with the legitimacy of arbitration as a process capable of ensuring 
the just resolution of private disputes.  
 
Although many of the advantages of arbitration result from the flexibility, privacy 
and simplicity of the process, these features must be balanced against the need for 
procedural justice. As Haydock notes: '[a]rbitration provides a different forum, but 
does not restrict the rights and remedies available to a party'.627 Therefore, as an 
alternative to litigation, arbitration should be built on the twin pillars of autonomy 
and procedural justice. While arbitration must provide the flexibility to meet the 
varied pragmatic needs of the parties, a system that failed to provide a just process 
would lose credibility and be considered illegitimate.  
 
4.2.3 Justice 
While difficult to define concisely, the basic idea of justice concerns the expectation 
of fair treatment and ‘what people are due'.628 This, however, simply begs the question 
of how to determine what is just. There are several end-points that may be used as 
ways to determine and measure justice. These include: equality, desert, reciprocity 
and need,629 although this list could be extended to include measures such as status, 
entitlement, capacity to benefit. Most of these measures relate specifically to 
substantive justice and in the context of arbitration, they are most relevant to the 
fairness of the final award rather than to the process that leads up to the award. Here 
a distinction should be drawn between justice as equality and the other measures.  
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Unlike the measures of substantive justice, such as need or desert, equality is a 
concept empty of substance.630 It does not tell us how to treat someone, only that 
people should be treated equally, which is to treat them the same unless there is good 
reason to treat them differently. This fulfils the logical requirement of 
universalisability, which demands that the judgment in a particular case should be 
universally applied to all identical cases.631 It reflects the Aristotelian principle that 
like should be treated alike and unalike should be treated differently.632  
 
The Aristotelian principle concerns the way in which rules should be applied rather 
than their content.633 As such, it is an example of formal justice. In discussing what 
he terms 'the inner morality of law', Fuller identifies eight principles of formal justice. 
The first of these, which broadly reflects Aristotle's principle, is that there must be 
generally applicable rules rather than ad hoc judgments. The other principles are that 
the rules should: be public; be prospective; be accessible; be consistent; require 
practically achievable conduct; be relatively stable; be applied in a way that is 
congruent with the published rules.634 These principles provide a framework for the 
substantive rules that respects the dignity of autonomous agency and so may be 
described as formally just and substantively important.635 They define the boundaries, 
and hence prescribe the form, of what a natural lawyer would deem law and what a 
positivist would define as good law. 
 
In contrast to formal justice, procedural justice relates specifically to the rules that 
determine the adjudicative proceedings. Procedural justice, which may be as 
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important to the parties as the substantive justice of the arbitral award,636 is concerned 
with whether the procedures treat the parties fairly and so enable a decision that is 
both formally and substantively just. Minimally, it requires: consistency; validity of 
the procedures allowing a high-quality decision accurately based on the facts; 
correctability, which is the opportunity to complain of procedurally unfair treatment; 
control within the process; impartiality; and ethicality as a respect for the rights of the 
parties.637 This list could be expanded to include concerns over cost and the length of 
time taken to resolve a dispute. While these latter factors may not be prime concerns, 
it would nevertheless be unjust to the parties if their expenses and the duration of the 
adjudication process were disproportionate to the value of the award.638 
 
Closely related to procedural justice is the common law principle of natural justice, 
which may be applied to ensure that statutory obligations are procedurally just.639 As 
Solum explains: 'procedural justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea 
that a process that guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an essential 
prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms'.640 Natural 
justice, which has been judicially equated to 'common fairness',641 or fairness 'writ 
large and juridically',642 reflects the belief that justice is an essential part of all 'well-
ordered human societies' and is 'naturally good for humans ... [because] it is part … 
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of human flourishing'.643 In other words, natural justice is an essential element of what 
it means to be human in the context of a social existence and its demands may be 
rationally determined from the facts of human social existence. While the idea of 
natural justice may be criticised for making an illegitimate move from fact to value, 
or for concealing ideological bias, it is unnecessary to here defend the philosophical 
basis for the concept.644 This is for three reasons: first, it would be an unhelpful detour 
from the main focus of the chapter; second, space precludes such a discussion; and 
third, the use of the concept by judges in deciding cases imbues the concept with 
factual substance, creating a term of art somewhat distanced from its natural law 
origins.645 
 
Speaking extra-judicially, Lord Neuberger explained the relevance of natural justice 
by stating that, at least in England, a foreign arbitral award will not be enforced if the 
principles of natural justice have been violated.646 These principles are: ‘nemo index 
in causa sua (nobody should be a judge in his own cause) and audi alterem partem 
(both parties have the right to be heard, and in each other's presence)’.647 There is 
ample authority for their relevance to arbitration in English law. In Cukurova 
Holdings AS v Sonera Holding BV, for example, the Privy Council was asked to 
consider whether an arbitration award should not be enforced because of an alleged 
breach of natural justice.648 While there had not actually been a breach of natural 
justice, there was no question of its relevance, including the principle audi alterem 
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partem,649 which required the equal opportunity to be heard and imposed a general 
duty on arbitrators to give reasons for their decision.650 
 
In Adams v Cape, the English Court of Appeal was asked to consider Scott J's refusal 
to enforce a United States (US) judgment because it was contrary to natural justice.651 
Slade LJ explained that any alleged breach of natural justice should be determined 
according to the 'fundamental principles of justice and not ... the letter of the rules 
...designed to give effect to those principles'.652 Relying on Jacobson v Frachon,653 
Slade LJ further explained that the principles of natural justice are largely, but not 
wholly, comprised of the due process requirements that the party be given both 
adequate notice and the opportunity to attend the hearing. Finally, the principle of 
natural justice allowed the court to respond to a 'procedural defect' only if it was 
sufficient 'to constitute a breach of … substantial justice'.654 
 
The importance of this connection to substantive justice, is that a mere breach of 
procedure will be insufficient to support a refusal to enforce a foreign judgment. 
Rather, the procedural irregularity must be sufficiently serious to cause a clear 
substantive injustice.655 Here it may be tempting to limit judgments of substantive 
injustice to the actual decision and award. It is, however, also applicable to significant 
breaches of procedure, sufficient to amount to a procedural injustice, regardless of 
the substantive justice of the decision or award. A failure to apply the required 
procedural rules is to treat unjustly one, or both, of the parties. The formal rules of 
procedure create a moral (and legal) obligation on the court or tribunal to apply those 
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rules in all cases and equally to both parties. Thus, a failure to fairly apply a rule is a 
breach of that obligation and a substantive injustice,656 distinct from, but related to, 
the final decision and award.657 
 
To summarise, because of its quasi-judicial nature,658 arbitration is treated by the 
courts as subject to the principles of natural justice, or the related concept of due 
process.659 The nature of the arbitrator's power,660 at the very least, requires that both 
parties are given a fair opportunity to present their case and that the arbitrator(s) 
should be impartial,661 having no personal interest in the outcome. As the Court of 
Appeal stated in Locobail v Bayfield Properties: 'In determination of their rights and 
liabilities ... everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal'.662 It is 
arguable, however, that a breach of natural justice is actionable only where a 
procedural defect is sufficient to constitute a substantive injustice such that the award 
must be considered unfair. 
 
4.2.4 Arbitration, autonomy and procedural justice 
Given that the authority for arbitration derives from party autonomy while judicial 
authority comes from the state, it is reasonable to suggest that justice would allow, 
and may require, arbitration procedural rules that are different to those used to ensure 
                                                 
656 Lorand Shipping Ltd v Davof Trading (Africa) BV [2014] EWHC 3521 (Comm), [30] per Eder J. 
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procedural justice in litigation. This follows from Aristotle's formal principle of 
justice that like should be treated alike, and unalike should be treated differently. In 
the context of dispute resolution, the source of the adjudicator's authority is a relevant 
reason to justify different treatment, particularly as the source of the authority is party 
autonomy. It might be argued that, since it is only because of party autonomy that 
ICA exists as a viable form of dispute resolution, the rules of procedure, and hence 
what constitutes procedural justice, should be fully determined by the parties. This 
would be consistent with the autonomous model of arbitration discussed in chapter 
two. This model, however, is aspirational, with the hybrid model being more 
consistent with arbitration in practice. 
 
Under the hybrid model, while the authority for arbitration derives from party 
autonomy, the process of arbitration remains dependent on the authority of the state, 
which must both permit arbitration within its jurisdiction as well as agree to enforce 
domestic and foreign arbitral awards through the national courts. This reliance on 
state authority requires the state to ensure, through national law, that arbitration is a 
just system of dispute resolution. Nevertheless, if the jurisdictional authority of the 
arbitrators is to genuinely derive from party autonomy then the state's interest should 
be sensitive to that autonomy. This does not mean that autonomy should be a trump, 
since justice is a vital interest. Rather, it requires that the parties' interest in autonomy 
must be balanced against the state's interest in justice. 
 
This balance must be satisfied by at least a minimal concern with justice, which 
explains the courts' emphasis on natural justice. Although arbitration is a private form 
of dispute resolution, the role of the arbitrators is quasi-judicial and so has a public 
quality. Furthermore, the reliance of arbitration on the state for facilitation and 
enforcement means that arbitration cannot be a wholly private matter. For the state, a 
focus on procedural justice allows arbitration to resolve the dispute in a way that 
reflects party autonomy, but it also crucially ensures that justice is both done and seen 
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to be done.663 In the context of arbitration, the balance between party autonomy and 
procedural justice means that the courts will take a less rigid approach to the rules of 
procedure than in litigation.664  
 
Pullé highlights three issues that emphasise the importance of the state maintaining 
an interest in arbitration as a just, and hence legitimate, form of dispute resolution. 
First, arbitration may take place in a location with an immature arbitration culture, 
which, when combined with foreign proceedings and language, may raise concerns 
regarding the justness of proceedings. Second, arbitration may involve parties, such 
as those signing standard form contracts, who have no real choice regarding the option 
of arbitration for resolving disputes. Third, subjecting the enforceability of arbitral 
awards to limited grounds for appeal makes arbitration 'more potent than litigation'.665 
The state's interest in justice, however, must be balanced against the interests of party 
autonomy. After all, the parties have intentionally chosen arbitrators as commercial 
rather than legal experts and have chosen arbitration as a more flexible and less formal 
process than litigation.666 
 
The view that, in the context of arbitration, the role of justice is tempered by a respect 
for party autonomy is supported by Bowsher J, who held that the principles of natural 
justice may not be applied as rigorously to the arbitration process as to litigation.667 
This is, at least in part, due to a respect for the binding nature of the NY Convention 
and a pro-arbitration culture encouraged by the state's desire not to appear hostile to 
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665 Austin I Pullé, 'Securing Natural Justice in Arbitration Proceedings' (2012) 20 Asia Pacific Law 
Review 63, 65. 
666 Austin I Pullé, 'Securing Natural Justice in Arbitration Proceedings' (2012) 20 Asia Pacific Law 
Review 63, 66-67. 
667 Groundshire v VHE Construction [2001] 1 BLR 395, [40]. 
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arbitration, so deterring valuable arbitration business.668 Furthermore, the courts may 
be sceptical of claims for a breach of natural or procedural justice, resulting in a 
restrictive approach that requires not simply a procedural failure,669 but a clear 
infringement of natural justice resulting in a patently unjust outcome.670 
 
Extrajudicially, Lord Neuberger observed that: '[b]y the far the most common reason 
for refusing to enforce awards relate to the procedural fairness of arbitral proceedings 
themselves'.671 Some of the claims may be disingenuous attempts to avoid an 
unfavourable award. There is, however, good evidence from psychological research 
that individuals are strongly affected by their perceptions of the procedural fairness 
of an adjudicatory process and are more likely to comply with a decision if they 
believe they were fairly treated.672 Even where the individual sees the final award as 
unjust, the power of procedural justice is that it 'confer[s] legitimate authority on 
incorrect outcomes'.673 The consequence of this conferred legitimacy is that 
individuals are more likely to respect an unfavourable decision where they perceive 
the procedure as just, emphasising the importance of ensuring that justice is both done 
and seen to be done.  
 
                                                 
668 Austin I Pullé, 'Securing Natural Justice in Arbitration Proceedings' (2012) 20 Asia Pacific Law 
Review 63, 68. 
669 See: Lorand Shipping Ltd v Davof Trading (Africa) BV [2014] EWHC 3521 (Comm), [22] per 
Eder J, accepting that the English Act sets a high threshold for procedural irregularities. 
670 Austin I Pullé, 'Securing Natural Justice in Arbitration Proceedings' (2012) 20 Asia Pacific Law 
Review 63, 67-68; Groundshire v VHE Construction [2001] 1 BLR 395, [40]. 
671 Lord Neuberger, 'Arbitration and the Rule of Law' (Speech to the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators Centenary Celebration, Hong Kong, 10 March 2015), para 26; (2015) 81 Arbitration 276, 
282. 
672 Tom R Tyler, 'Procedural Justice' in Austin Sarat (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Law and 
Society (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004) 435, 440-441. 
673 Lawrence B Solum, 'Procedural Justice' (2004) University of San Diego Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper 2, 7 <http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art2> accessed 30 
November 2017. 
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This psychological need for fair treatment establishes another interest that must be 
added to the balance, along with the individual's interest in autonomy and the state's 
interest in ensuring a just outcome that may be legitimately enforced. While party 
autonomy, as the immediate source of arbitral authority, is a crucial interest, 
procedural justice must be afforded sufficient weight to protect the interests of both 
the individual parties and the state. Informality, speed and flexibility may be valuable, 
but they must be balanced against the importance of a just process,674 without which 
arbitration loses its legitimacy, its respect and its authority to resolve disputes. The 
whole point of arbitration is to resolve a dispute as effectively as possible. As Tyler 
notes: 
An ideally resolved conflict is one in which the parties involved 
accept the decisions ...; continue their relationship with each other; 
and feel good about the ... authorities with whom they dealt.675 
This can only be achieved where the process of resolving the dispute is perceived as 
fair.676 Central to the perception of fairness is the need for each party to have a "voice" 
in the decision-making process,677 which - along with the neutrality of the adjudicator 
- is a principle of natural justice. 
 
                                                 
674 John Fellas, 'A Fair and Efficient International Arbitration Process (February/April 2004) Dispute 
Resolution Journal 79, 80. 
675 Tom R Tyler, 'Procedural Justice' in Austin Sarat (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Law and 
Society (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004) 435, 435-436. 
676 See, John Thibaut, Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice: A Psychological Analysis (Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates 1975); E Allan Lind, Tom R Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice 
(Springer 1988); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, 'The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal 
Courts' (2011) 63 Hastings Law Journal 127. 
677 Joel Brockner, Grant Ackerman, Jerald Greenberg, Michele J Gelfand, Marie Francesco, Zhen 
Xiong Chen, Kwok Leung, Gunter Bierbrauer, Carolina Gomez, Bradley L Kirkman, Debra Shapiro, 
'Culture and Procedural Justice: The Influence of Power Distance on Reactions to Voice' (2001) 37 
Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology 300. 
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4.2.5 Arbitration and the rule of law 
Along with academic consideration,678 two recent speeches by the distinguished UK 
law Lords, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Neuberger, have focused on arbitration and the 
rule of law.679 This raises two questions. First, is the rule of law applicable to 
arbitration? Second, if the rule of law is relevant, what are the implications for the 
arbitration tribunal and proceedings.  Before addressing those questions, it should be 
noted that, while the rule of law is a Western term, the concept is not limited to the 
West. The very nature of the Sharia is that it applies equally to all and, as such, the 
essence of the rule of the law is inherent to Sharia.680 Thus, the two questions noted 
above are not Western-centric and apply as much to arbitration in Saudi Arabia as to 
arbitration in Scotland. 
 
For Lord Neuberger, the rule of law applies to arbitration because, inter alia, the 
quasi-judicial role of arbitrators requires them, like judges: ‘to administer justice, and 
they must therefore act in accordance with the law and be seen to act in accordance 
with the law’.681 Furthermore, the freedom and power afforded to arbitration, as an 
alternative to litigation, require the arbitrators to act with due responsibility and 
ensure that the parties' fundamental rights are protected. The validity of his view 
depends on one’s conception of the rule of law.  
 
                                                 
678 See, eg: Richard C Reuben, 'Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration' 
(2004) 67 Law and Contemporary Problems 279; Thomas Buergenthal, 'The Proliferation of 
Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Respect for the Rule of Law' (2006) 22 Arbitration 
International 495. 
679 Olga Boltenko, 'Hong Kong: Lord Hoffmann’s Rule of Law musings’ (2014) 10 Global 
Arbitration Review; Lord Neuberger, 'Arbitration and the Rule of Law' (Speech to the Chartered 
Institute of Arbitrators Centenary Celebration, Hong Kong 10 March 2015).  
680 Tarek E Masoud, ‘The Arabs and Islam: The Troubled Search for Legitimacy’ (1999) 128 
Daedalus 127, 195; Timur Kuran, ‘The rule of law in Islamic thought and practice: a historical 
perspective’, in James J Heckman, Robert L Nelson, Lee Cabatingan (eds), Global Perspectives on 
the Rule of Law (e-book edn, Routledge 2009) 71.  
681 Lord Neuberger, 'Arbitration and the Rule of Law' (Speech to the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators Centenary Celebration, Hong Kong, 10 March 2015), para 8; (2015) 81 Arbitration 276, 
277. 
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Narrowly construed, the rule of law applies solely to those working in positions of 
public authority, operating as a political tool to constrain the abuse of government 
power. In this conception, the rule of law provides substance to the formal 
Aristotelian principle of justice, that like should be treated alike, and unalike should 
be treated differently. That substance is simply that those in public positions of power 
are no different to any other person and should be equally subject to the law. In other 
words, there is no relevant reason why those in government should not be governed 
by the law in the same way as any private citizen. Given the explanatory theory that 
underlies this conception is that the rule of law operates to constrain public abuse of 
power, it seems of little relevance to ICA.682 This is because the arbitrators gain their 
authority from the private agreement of the party and are not public officials. If, 
however, the conception of the rule of law is construed more widely, then it can be 
made relevant to arbitration. 
 
The narrow conception of the rule of law is reflected in Waldron's description of the 
concept as a: 
crucial ideal … that is appropriately invoked whenever 
governments try to get their way by arbitrary and oppressive action 
or by short-circuiting the norms and procedures laid down in their 
countries' laws or constitution.683 
Conceived narrowly, the rule of law clearly does not apply to arbitration, which is a 
private means for resolving disputes. While arbitration requires the support of the 
state and the national courts, it is not part of the government or state system.  
 
A broader conception is apparent in Waldron's explanation that the rule of law: 
‘give[s] central place to a requirement that people in positions of authority should 
exercise their power within a constraining framework of public norms, rather than … 
                                                 
682 It may, however, be relevant where a government or other public body is a party to the dispute. 
683 Jeremy Waldron, 'The Concept and Rule of Law' (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1, 5. 
203 
 
their own preferences’.684 Here, the rule of law applies to anyone in a position of 
power over others, regardless of whether the source of the authority is public or 
private. Since arbitration involves the creation of a triadic power structure between 
the arbitrators and the disputing parties, there seems no good reason why it should 
not apply to constrain the arbitrators’ power.  
 
The narrow conception of the rule of law, restrictively applied, would be consistent 
with the autonomous model of arbitration as a system wholly independent of any 
national legal system. The broad conception, however, is reflected in the current 
approach in practice, in which national legal systems provide a supportive framework 
facilitating arbitration and ensuring that the awards are formally and procedurally 
just. Here, the rule of law adds weight and immense symbolic value to the argument 
that the state is both justified and has a duty to maintain sovereignty and ensure that 
any arbitration proceedings within its jurisdiction, and the enforcement of foreign 
awards, are governed by the principles of natural justice.685 Furthermore, the rule of 
law is not a special rule constructed just for those in public positions of power, rather 
it applies to everyone to ensure that all persons are equally governed by the law.  
 
The assumption behind the rule of law is that all private citizens are subject to the 
law. It demands that the law governs all equally: not just private citizens, but 
everyone, including those acting in a public or governmental office. This reflects 
Dicey's second sense of the rule of law,686 which is that: ‘every man, whatever be his 
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm’.687 This applies as much 
to arbitrators as to any other citizen, which means that any exercise of arbitral power 
should not be arbitrary, but should be governed by the same principles of justice that 
                                                 
684 Jeremy Waldron, 'The Concept and Rule of Law' (2008) 43 Georgia Law Review 1, 6. 
685 Lord Neuberger, 'Arbitration and the Rule of Law' (Hong Kong 10 March 2015) Speech to the 
Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Centenary Celebration, para 13; (2015) 81 Arbitration 276, 279. 
686 Dicey provides three different meanings for the rule of law. 
687 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed (1915), Liberty 
Classics 1982), 114. 
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govern the application of the law.688 Furthermore, effective dispute resolution is part 
of the core aspect of democratic governance that is concerned with the administration 
of justice.689 This creates a strong public interest in the system of arbitration as an 
effective means of securing a just outcome for private disputes.690 As such, arbitration 
must be subject to the rule of law, which is part of the democratic armoury necessary 
to legitimise any process that affords one person power over another. 
 
Since, as has been argued, the rule of law applies to arbitration, the next issue is to 
identify the implications, if any, for arbitration proceedings. At the least, the rule of 
law adds symbolic weight to the need to ensure a basic level of formal and procedural 
justice. This means that the law applies as equally to arbitrators as to any other quasi-
judicial decision-maker, which again emphasises the relevance of natural justice. It 
also means that relevant distinctions between arbitration and litigation must be 
recognised and reflected in the formal and procedural requirements. In other words, 
the rule of law requires attention to the formal and procedural elements of 
arbitration.691 This does not require that the context of arbitration be ignored. To the 
contrary, the rule of law should be context sensitive. Thus, the private, flexible and 
informal nature of arbitration should be acknowledged when determining whether 
arbitration proceedings are formally and procedurally just.  
 
Lord Bingham identified 8 attributes (or 'sub-rules') that may be identified from the 
application of the rule of law.692 Lord Neuberger tried, more-or-less successfully, to 
                                                 
688 This reflects Dicey's first sense of the Rule of Law: AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution (8th ed (1915), Liberty Classics 1982), 110. 
689 Richard C Reuben, 'Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration' (2004) 67 
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690 Geoffrey Ma CJ, 'Opening address' (2015) 81 Arbitration 299, 301. 
691 Thomas Buergenthal, 'The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Respect 
for the Rule of Law' (2006) 22 Arbitration International 495, 497. 
692 Tom Bingham, 'The Rule of Law' (Penguin 2011); Lord Bingham, 'The Rule of Law' (2007) 66 
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fit these to the context of arbitration.693 His approach, while bold, is unnecessary since 
many of these 8 attributes are not part of the core concept, but reflect different, and 
context dependent, conceptions of the rule of law. Thus, in the context of the 
arbitration proceedings it is appropriate to identify and apply only those attributes that 
are relevant. The attributes are:694 
1. 'the law must be accessible ... intelligible, clear and predictable'; 
2. 'questions of legal right and liability should be resolved by application of the 
law and not … discretion'; 
3. 'the laws of the land should apply equally to all'; 
4. 'the law must afford adequate protection of human rights'; 
5. 'means must be provided for resolving without prohibitive cost or inordinate 
delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves are unable to 
resolve ... everyone ... should be able, in the last resort, to go to court'; 
6. 'public officers ... must exercise the powers conferred on them reasonably, in 
good faith, for the purpose for which the powers were conferred and without 
exceeding the limits of such powers'; 
7. 'adjudicative procedures provided by the state should be fair'; 
8. 'compliance by the state with its obligations in international law'. 
 
The most fundamental attribute is that the law applies equally to all. As noted earlier, 
this both justifies and requires the state to ensure arbitration is subject to relevant legal 
rules implementing an arbitration system that is consistent with natural justice, 
without undermining the nature of arbitration as a flexible, informal and private 
system. While arbitration is a private system of dispute resolution and so not directly 
provided by the state, the supportive legal framework that enables arbitration engages 
                                                 
693 Lord Neuberger, 'Arbitration and the Rule of Law' (Speech to the Chartered Institute of 
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the seventh of Lord Bingham's attributes. Furthermore, it might be argued that 
limiting the seventh attribute to procedures provided by the state is unduly restrictive. 
If the rule of law is intended to apply to all citizens to prevent the abuse of power, 
then all adjudicative processes should be fair, regardless of whether they are public 
or private. An alternative way of achieving the same conclusion is to argue that 
adjudicative processes are quasi-judicial and so public in nature, if not in the 
immediate source of the adjudicator’s authority. Thus, they should be subject to the 
rule of law and the same requirements as those adjudicative processes more 
immediately connected to the state as a source of authority.  
 
Although it may be relevant to the state's obligations under the NY Convention, in 
the specific context of the arbitration proceedings themselves the eighth attribute has 
little relevance. Given the private nature of arbitration, the fourth attribute of the 
formal protection of human rights, is of limited relevance. Even as a private system, 
however, it is arguable that the quasi-judicial nature of arbitration requires that the 
parties have a right to a fair trial. Thus, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
held that '[t]he principle of the rule of law and the notion of fair trial enshrined in 
article 6 [of the ECHR]' applied to arbitration to preclude the Greek government from 
interfering through legislation with the administration of justice in the dispute before 
the court.695 
 
                                                 
695 Application No 13427/87 Stran Greek Refineries and Sratis Andreadis v Greece, Series A No 
301-B; (1995) 19 EHRR 293. In Case No 31737/96 Suovaniemi v Finland, 23 Feb 1999, the ECtHR 
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allow a hearing that is manifestly unfair: David Altaras, 'Arbitration in England and Wales and the 
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Furthermore, the state should ensure that the parties' interest in privacy is given 
adequate protection through the legal framework for arbitration. Although the parties' 
interest in privacy should be protected, it may nevertheless need to be balanced 
against competing interests that require greater transparency. In Ali Shipping 
Corporation v Trogir, for example, the English Court of Appeal held that 
confidentiality was so inherent to the arbitration that an obligation of confidence was 
implied by an arbitration agreement. This duty, however, was not absolute and could 
be limited by, inter alia, the public interest in justice.696  
 
The remaining attributes (one, two, five and six), are concerned with both formal and 
procedural justice and should apply to arbitration for two main reasons. First, 
arbitration is a quasi-judicial system that affects the parties' legal rights. Second, 
arbitration is enabled, facilitated and legitimated by the state through the national laws 
that regulate it. Thus, because it is a state-endorsed system that provides third parties 
with the power to alter the legal rights and obligations of the affected parties, 
arbitration should be subject to those formal and procedural attributes of the rule of 
law. Thus, both the legal framework and the applicable procedural rules of arbitration 
should be 'accessible ... intelligible, clear and predictable'; arbitration decisions 
should not be arbitrary, but should be based on the applicable law or set of principles 
as agreed by the parties; the proceedings should be efficient and should allow the 
parties the right to litigate procedural issues that raise questions of justice while 
limiting the opportunity for procedural delaying tactics;697 and the arbitrators should 
act in good faith, without exceeding their authority. 
 
If, then, the rule of law is to demand anything of arbitration, it is that the system 
should be just. This means that arbitration must function within a framework of 
principles and rules designed to ensure that each party to the dispute is treated fairly 
and that those rules are respected by the arbitrators and, where necessary, enforced 
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by the courts. Each party should be afforded an equal opportunity to be heard by 
impartial arbitrators who resolve the dispute by reasoned decision-making based on 
the substantive laws or principles agreed to by the parties. The rule of law may 
linguistically be anathema to arbitration, particularly the autonomous model of 
arbitration. The spirit of the concept, however, is the rejection of the arbitrary and 
partial exercise of power,698 which ought to be the goal of any just system of dispute 
resolution, whether public or private. Symbolically, rhetorically and politically, the 
rule of law is an important tool for countering the abuse of power and this can be 
similarly applied to arbitration as to any quasi-judicial system. Substantially, 
however, it does little more, at least in the context of arbitration proceedings, than to 
emphasise the importance of formal, natural and procedural justice. 
 
4.3 The Law Governing Arbitration Proceedings 
Before considering the law in practice, it may be helpful to summarise the desirable 
features of the arbitration process. From the discussion above, arbitration should be: 
fair and just; clear, predictable and reliable; efficient and cost-effective; capable of 
effectively resolving disputes through an enforceable award; and sufficiently flexible 
to meet the reasonable needs of the parties. From the parties' perspective, these are all 
important. The process, however, would be meaningless in the absence of an 
acceptable and enforceable final award. For the parties, the award is more likely to be 
acceptable where the process is at least procedurally just. For the state, the process 
must at least satisfy the requirements of natural justice. One point where the interests 
of the parties and the state may clash is the question of confidentiality. From the 
parties’ perspective, confidentiality is important for commercial reasons. For the 
state, however, transparency is important to ensure that justice is both done and seen 
to be done. Furthermore, since transparency enables the flow of information and 
knowledge, it may also be important for the development of arbitration.  
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In the analysis that follows, the discussion will be according to the demands of justice. 
It should, however, first be noted that, when it comes to providing a legislative 
framework for arbitration, the Scottish Act and the SAL 2012 have a significant 
advantage over the Model Law. While the Model Law must provide a framework that 
meets the interests and needs of different sovereign nations, national laws must only 
meet the interests and needs of their respective countries. Although compromises may 
be required to attract ICA business, a national legislature can still provide a more 
comprehensive framework, with specific procedural rules that facilitate a just system 
of arbitration within the national context of law and commerce. In the context of Saudi 
Arabia, this most notably requires compliance with the Sharia. The relevance of the 
Sharia was introduced in chapter one and will be considered further in chapter six. 
For present purposes, however, it should be noted that the main procedural concern 
of the Sharia is that all parties to a dispute should have an equal opportunity to be 
heard. This is consistent with natural justice and due process. Indeed, it has been noted 
that: ‘The Sharia rules relating to arbitral procedures do not seem to clash with 
modern arbitration practices’.699 
 
4.3.1 Equality and justice 
Article 18 of the Model Law requires that: '[t]he parties shall be treated with equality 
and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his case'.  As the most 
fundamental principle of formal justice, this obligation is 'applicable to the entire 
arbitral proceedings'.700 The overarching effect of article 18 makes it the most 
significant provision governing the arbitration proceedings. In the original draft, this 
provision was simply to be a sub-provision of article 19, but by placing it in its current 
form, UNCITRAL has symbolically emphasised the fundamental importance of the 
                                                 
699 Mutasim Ahmad Alqudah, ‘The Impact of Sharia on the Acceptance of International Commercial 
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principle. As an independent provision, it has a prominent place that befits a principle 
forming the bedrock of any just system of dispute resolution.  
 
The first part of article 18 is the formal principle of equality. As discussed above, 
equality is empty of substance, demanding nothing beyond equal treatment. This is a 
requirement of the rule of law and follows from the view that all human beings are 
afforded the same status of human dignity simply by being a member of the human 
community in the context of a democratic civil society.701 The second part of the 
article reflects the principle of natural justice (audi alterem partem) that each party 
should have the opportunity to be heard. It ensures that both parties have a voice, 
which is essential for a psychological appreciation that the process is fair.702 
 
Article 18 provides for such a fundamental principle that the parties should not be 
allowed to derogate from it or exclude it as a justification for having any award set 
aside under article 34.703 Given its fundamental nature, it is unsurprisingly a 
mandatory provision,704 which constrains the parties' freedom to determine the 
procedural rules, ensuring that they apply equally to both parties and that each party 
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has the opportunity to present its case and defend any claim against it.705 In Soh Beng 
Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd, Rajah JA held that: 
it is an indispensable … requirement in every arbitration that the 
parties should have an opportunity to present their respective cases 
as well as to respond to the case against them ... all established legal 
systems require parties to be treated fairly ... includ[ing] the 
opportunity to be heard and the equality of treatment.706 
 
Article 18 applies to all stages of an arbitration, including: adequate notice of any 
hearings; the opportunity for each party to present its case; the opportunity to attend 
any hearings and to review and rebut the other party's case; and to receive all pertinent 
documentation.707 To satisfy the requirement, the tribunal 'must give the parties a "fair 
opportunity to address its arguments on all of the building blocks in the tribunal's 
conclusions"'.708 It also includes the requirement that the parties are given the 
opportunity to respond to a point that the 'arbitrator is impressed by', but which was 
not raised by the other party.709 Thus, it protects the vital interests of each party 
against procedural impropriety, but should not serve to protect them against bad 
choices or a failure to exercise one of the rights afforded to them.710  
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Whether there has been a breach of procedural fairness or natural justice should be 
assessed objectively.711 The threshold for establishing a breach is generally set quite 
high. In Corporation Transnacional de Inversiones, SA de CV v STET, Lax J held 
that: 
 to justify setting aside an award for a violation of Article 18, the 
conduct of the Tribunal must be sufficiently serious to offend our 
most basic notions of morality and justice.712 
Furthermore, the right to be heard does not include the right to a particular form of 
hearing. Thus, where appropriate, the right would be satisfied by the opportunity to 
present written submissions and would not necessarily be breached by the refusal of 
a request for a hearing in person.713 
 
Turning to the Scottish Act, s.1 establishes the founding principles that apply to the 
interpretation and implementation of all substantive provisions. This is both 
symbolically and practically important since the founding principles 'underpin all 
questions of arbitration in Scotland',714 including the procedural rules, whether 
mandatory or default. In this regard, they play a similar role to article 18 of the Model 
Law. There is, however, an obvious distinction in the wording of the provisions. 
Rather than requiring an overarching duty of equal treatment, s.1(a) states that: 'the 
object of arbitration is to resolve disputes fairly, impartially and without unnecessary 
delay or expense'.  
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712 Corporation Transnacional de Inversiones, SA de CV v STET (1999) 45 OR (3d) 183; (1999) 
CanLII 14819, (Ontario SC, Canada); see also, Xerox Canada Ltd v MPI Technologies Inc (2006) 
CanLII 41006 (Ontario SC, Canada). 
713 CLOUT case No 659, Oberlandesgericht Naumburg, Germany, 10 Sch 08/01, 21 February 2002 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-naumburg-az-10-sch-08-01-datum-2002-02-21-
id166> accessed 30 November 2017. 
714 Arbitration Application (No 1 of 2013) [2014] CSOH 83, [10] per Lord Woolman. 
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Although the Scottish Act refers to fairness and impartiality, rather than equality, this 
is unlikely to be of practical significance since, in the context of arbitration 
proceedings, a duty of fairness and impartiality implies equality of treatment. A more 
significant difference is that, while article 18 of the Model Law requires that the 
'parties shall be treated with equality', s1 of the Scottish Act only requires that those 
interpreting and applying the Act 'have regard to the founding principles'. The duty 
to 'have regard' implies that the founding principles must be given due consideration, 
which allows scope for discretion when construing the Act and leaves open the 
possibility for deciding that other factors are more important. It is a less strict duty 
than that required by the more imperative command of 'shall be treated', which leaves 
no room for discretion. It would have been better to eliminate that small window of 
discretion and impose a stronger obligation, requiring that any interpretation and 
application of the Act be consistent with the founding principles.  Hopefully, 
however, the courts focus on the spirit of the principles, rather than the literal wording 
of the section. 
 
Section 1(a) goes beyond the obligation of equal treatment and helpfully emphasises 
that arbitration proceedings should be as efficient as possible regarding both time and 
money. This reflects the formal goal of promoting 'Scottish arbitration as a cost-
effective and efficient choice'.715 Section 1(a) also reflects the key policy objective of 
ensuring 'fairness and impartiality in the process'.716 Relying on existing 
jurisprudence, this means that arbitration must comply with the principles of natural 
justice. As the Lord President argued, in Forbes v Winton, that 'the position of an 
arbiter is very much like that of a judge' and carries similar obligations.717 In Kyle and 
Carrick District Council v AR Kerr & Sons the duty to apply the rules of natural 
justice was made explicit, with Lord Penrose concluding that the court had 
jurisdiction: 
                                                 
715 David Wilson, 'The Resurgence of Scotland as a Force in International Arbitration: The 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010' (2010) 27 Journal of International Arbitration 679, 684. 
716 Arbitration (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum (2009), para 26. 
717 Forbes v Winton (1886) 13 R 465, 467-468. 
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to review the procedures adopted by arbiter and to decide whether 
decrees have proceeded ... in accordance with the interests of 
substantial justice as reflected for example in the traditional rules 
of natural justice.718 
 
Considering now the SAL 2012. With the support of ‘about 300 verses’ of the Qur’an, 
justice is considered 'a central principle in Islam’.719 In chapter 16, verse 90 of the 
Qur'an, for example, it states: 'Surely Allah enjoins justice'.720  This obligation of 
justice is founded on the equality of all persons before Allah, which follows from the 
origins of all humankind in a single soul.721 Given the importance of justice and 
equality to Islam and the Sharia,722 it is not surprising that the SAL 2012 faithfully 
reproduces article 18 of the Model Law. Thus, article 27 of the SAL 2012 requires 
that all parties are 'treated on an equal footing' and provided with a 'full and equal 
opportunity to present their case or defence'. This latter obligation, as noted above, is 
consistent with the Sharia, which also demands that all parties to a dispute have an 
equal opportunity to be heard.723 
 
It is clear, then, that the overarching formal justice principle of equality required by 
article 18 of the Model Law, is given expression in both the Scottish Act and the SAL 
                                                 
718 Kyle and Carrick District Council v AR Kerr & Sons 1992 SLT 629, 633. See also Lord Philip in 
Re Partners of Dallas McMillan [2015] CSOH 136, [35]. 
719 Emad El-Din Shahin, 'Government' in Gerhard Bowering (ed) Islamic Political Thought: An 
Introduction (Princeton University Press 2015) 68, 70. 
720 English translation of the Qur'an by Maulana Muhammad Ali (2002) 
<http://www.muslim.org/english-quran/quran.htm> accessed 30 November 2017. 
721 Emad El-Din Shahin, 'Government' in Gerhard Bowering (ed) Islamic Political Thought: An 
Introduction (Princeton University Press 2015) 68, 70. Shahin relies on chapter 4, verse 1 of the 
Holy Qur'an. 
722 Ahmad S Moussalli, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism (University Press of Florida 
1999), 62-63. 
723 Mutasim Ahmad Alqudah, ‘The Impact of Sharia on the Acceptance of International Commercial 
Arbitration in The Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council’ (2017) 20 Journal of Legal, Ethical 
and Regulatory Issues 1, 11. 
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2012. Although the Scottish Act is drafted in terms of fairness rather than equality, 
the obligation imposed by the relevant provisions is essentially the same. The caveat 
to this is, as discussed above, the apparently greater scope for discretion under the 
Scottish Act. It is, however, unlikely that this discretion will have any effect in 
practice on the requirements of justice and equal treatment. 
 
4.3.2 The natural justice principle of audi alterem partem 
As noted previously, this principle requires that both parties have an equal right to be 
heard. This means that both parties must have an equal opportunity to present their 
case or defence as provided for by article 18 of the Model Law and article 27 of the 
SAL 2012. This obligation is implicit to the founding principle set down in s.1(a) of 
the Scottish Act and is more explicitly provided for by mandatory r.24, which puts 
the principles of natural justice on a statutory basis. Under this rule, the tribunal must 
'treat the parties fairly' by, inter alia, 'giving each party a reasonable opportunity to 
put its case and deal with the other party's case'. It should be noted that while the 
Model Law and the SAL 2012 require that both parties are given 'full ... opportunity' 
to present their case, r.24 of the SAR only requires that the parties be given 'a 
reasonable opportunity'. The Scottish approach appears to be more flexible, affording 
some discretion to arbitrators. It is arguable, however, that there will be little 
difference in practice since the concept of 'full ... opportunity' is likely to be 
interpreted objectively and determined by what is reasonable in the circumstances. 
 
Having set down the formal requirement, it could have been left to the courts to 
further define the specific rules. This would require cases to be brought before the 
courts and is potentially a long, drawn-out process sustaining uncertainty until the 
rules are more fully determined. While this has the advantage of allowing the law to 
be responsive to the circumstances of the cases, it is contingent on appropriate cases 
being brought before the courts. Furthermore, the uncertainty that persists while the 
rules are in the process of development makes the outcome of a case less predictable. 
While the need for interpretation and judicial discretion is unavoidable, the formal 
justice requirements for certainty and predictability require that discretion to be 
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limited. This achieves a balance between those elements of formal justice and the 
discretion that facilitates a more substantively just decision by allowing judges to be 
more sensitive to the circumstances of the case. Consistent with this, the Model Law, 
the Scottish Act and the SAL 2012 all provide for greater certainty by further 
specifying more fully determined rules.   
 
Article 21 of the Model Law provides a default rule specifying that, subject to the 
parties’ agreement, arbitral proceedings 'commence on the date on which a request 
for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent'. A similar 
requirement is found in default r.1 of the SAR and in the default rule under article 26 
of the SAL 2012. Although this obligation may be varied by the parties’ agreement, 
any such variation would still need to provide an effective mechanism for notifying 
the other party. As such, and consistent with international practice, it ensures that the 
arbitration cannot lawfully commence until the respondent party has received an 
adequate notice,724 allowing the party to appreciate the nature of the dispute to be 
arbitrated. This is a crucial prerequisite for ensuring an equal opportunity for the party 
to present its case. Indeed, the importance of the request is reflected in article 9 of the 
IRSAL 2017. This provides for the minimum content of the request, which includes: 
the name of the claimant and his or her representative; a summary of the contractual 
relationship and arbitration agreement; a summary of the ‘claimant’s request for 
relief’; and notice of the claimant’s nominated arbitrator, or ‘proposal for the 
appointment of a sole arbitrator’ where the constitution of the panel has not been 
determined by the arbitration agreement. 
 
Another important consideration is that the arbitration is conducted in a juridical 
location and venue that do not prejudice a party's ability to present its case. Article 20 
of the Model Law allows the tribunal the default power to determine both the juridical 
location, or "seat", and the physical meeting place, or "venue", for the arbitration 
                                                 
724 Fung Sang Trading Ltd v Kai Sun Products & Food Co Ltd [1991] HKCFI 190 (Hong Kong), 
[25-30]. 
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proceedings.725 Article 20 of the Model Law is implemented by Article 28 of the SAL 
2012. In the Scottish Act, s.3(1)(a)(iii) allows the tribunal to determine the location 
and default r.29 allows the tribunal to choose the venue. 
 
While these provisions appear to provide the tribunal with absolute discretion to 
determine the venue, they are still subject to the overarching principles of fairness 
and equality. This means that the power afforded the tribunal must be exercised fairly, 
with equal consideration given to the interests of the party, including a fair notice of 
the location and venue.726 With specific regard to the location, article 20(1) of the 
Model Law and article 28 of the SAL 2012 require the tribunal to also 'have regard 
to the circumstances of the case',727 which means having: 
regard to any connections with one or more particular countries that 
can be identified in relation to (i) the parties; (ii) the dispute which 
will be the subject of the arbitration; (iii) the proposed procedures 
in the arbitration, including (if known) the place of interlocutory 
and final hearings; (iv) the issue of the award or awards.728 
While not making any such conditions explicit, s.3 of the Scottish Act would still be 
subject to the founding principles set down in s.1 and the general duties imposed on 
the tribunal by mandatory r.24. This is likely to require the tribunal to similarly 
consider the circumstances of the case when determining the location. These 
constraints, if respected, should ensure that the choice of location is at least 
pragmatically reasonable and equally fair to both parties. 
 
                                                 
725 Shashoua v Sharma [2009] EWHC 957 (Comm), [2], distinguishing the "venue" from the "seat" 
of arbitration. 
726 Sulaikha Clay Mines v Alpha Clays (2005) 1 Arb LR 237 (India) 
<http://indiankanoon.org/doc/252644/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
727 Model Law, article 20(1) 
728 Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC v Paymentech Merchant Services Inc [2001] 1 All ER 514 (Comm), 
[52]. 
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4.3.2.1 Choice of language 
Because an inability to understand the language of the proceedings may affect a 
party’s ability to participate, the main issue is to ensure that the choice of language 
rules do not prejudice a party’s opportunity to present its case or respond to the other 
party's case.729 By allowing the parties to determine the language of proceedings, 
article 22 of the Model Law protects the parties' right to natural justice. This is 
supplemented by the default power afforded to the arbitrators, who may also order 
translations of documentary evidence under article 22(2). A similar default power is 
afforded by r.28(g) of the Scottish Act. Article 29 of the SAL 2012, however, provides 
that Arabic is the default language.  
 
Since article 29 still leaves the parties, or tribunal, entirely free to determine the 
language, it represents a symbolic compromise allowing a significant liberalisation 
compared to the old Law,730 which imposed Arabic as the mandatory language.731 
More importantly, the wording of article 29 fails to indicate any priority for the 
parties' agreement to preclude the authority of the tribunal to determine the language. 
While this could allow the tribunal to require the arbitration to be conducted in 
Arabic, the overarching effect of article 27 constrains the tribunal's power and should 
prevent it from being exercised in a way that prejudices the party’s ability to present 
its case. As such, despite the wording of the provision, article 29 should provide a 
similar protection of the parties' right to be heard as the equivalent provisions of the 
Model Law and the Scottish Act. 
 
4.3.2.2 Statements 
                                                 
729 Oberlandesgericht München, Germany, 34 Sch 26/08, 22 June 2009, SchiedsVZ 2010, 169 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/|datenbanken/rspr/olg-münchen-az-34-sch-26-08-datum-2009-06-22-
id1065> accessed 30 November 2017. 
730 Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 443, 448. 
731 Jean-Pierre Harb, Alexander G Leventhal, 'The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to the 
Tune of Shari'a' (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration 113, 119. 
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The principle of audi alterem partem necessarily requires that the dispute is clearly 
stated. For a party to establish a defence it is first necessary to have a clear statement 
of the claim. Similarly, the party making the claim needs to know the other party's 
defence to fully present their case to the tribunal. Furthermore, clear statements of 
claim and defence are necessary for the arbitrators to understand the dispute and the 
scope of their jurisdiction.  
 
Article 23 of the Model Law requires the parties to make clear statements of claim or 
defence. Since it is essential that both the parties and the arbitrators know what is to 
be adjudicated, article 23 is mandatory. This means that arbitration cannot proceed in 
the absence of adequate statements.732 However, the parties have the power to alter 
the elements of the statements, which by default must include: the supporting facts; 
the points of dispute and the remedy sought. Even though the parties may use the 
arbitration agreement to vary the required elements, the statements must still be 
sufficient, when read with the benefit of the notice of request and the contract, to 
determine the scope of the arbitration.733 Where the arbitration tribunal considers the 
statements to be inadequate, it may invite the parties to amend them to correct any 
deficiencies and ensure that the subject and scope of the arbitration is sufficiently well 
defined to allow a just adjudication.734   
 
While statements of claim and defence rule are mandatory under the Model Law, 
default r.28(2)(b) of the SAR provides that 'the tribunal may determine ... whether 
parties are to submit claims or defences'. The word “may” appears to suggest that the 
tribunal has the discretion to waive the need for any formal statements of claim and 
defence. As with any provision of the Scottish Act, this is subject to the founding 
                                                 
732 Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Germany, 4 Z Sch 02/99, 29 September 1999 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/bayoblg-az-4-z-sch-02-99-datum-1999-09-29-id18> 
accessed 30 November 2017. 
733 Quintette Coal Ltd v Nippon Steel Corp [1991] 1 WWR 219; [1990] BCJ No 2241 (BC CA, 
Canada), [18-21]. 
734 Alenco Inc v Niska Gas Storage US, LLC [2009] ABQB 192 (Alberta QB, Canada). 
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principles under s.1 and the general duties of the tribunal imposed by mandatory r.24, 
which should constrain the tribunal's discretion to prevent a breach of natural justice. 
Nevertheless, the implication of the rule is that the statements are not essential, even 
though they provide valuable information that helps both the tribunal to determine 
the scope of its jurisdiction and the parties in deciding how best to respond to the 
other party's case. Given that statements of claim and defence are standard practice 
in arbitration cases,735 it seems unlikely that a tribunal would not require the parties 
to submit them. Indeed, the need for, and the importance of, statements of claim and 
defence contrarily appears to be confirmed by r.37, which deals with how the tribunal 
should respond where there has been a failure to submit a statement of claim or 
defence.   
 
Implementing article 23 of the Model Law, article 30 of the SAL 2012 requires the 
parties to submit statements of claim or defence.736 Like the Model Law, this is 
mandatory, with the time-frame determined by agreement, or as a default by the 
tribunal. Varying from the Model Law, article 30 imposes a duty on the relevant party 
to submit their statement to the other party and to all the arbitrators. Under the Model 
Law, the statements need only be submitted to the arbitration tribunal, which then has 
the responsibility under article 24(3) to communicate the statement to the other party. 
Although providing more specific details of what should be included in the 
statements, article 30 of the SAL 2012 is consistent with the Model Law except for 
one important difference. Under article 23(2) of the Model Law, the parties may, 
subject to the tribunal's approval, 'amend or supplement [their] ... claim or defence 
during … the arbitral proceedings'. Under article 30 of the SAL 2012, claimants may 
not amend their claim, but the respondent is permitted to subsequently raise additional 
defences provided the tribunal is satisfied that there are 'reasons for the delay'. 
 
                                                 
735 See eg, Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, Scottish Short Form Arbitration Rules (2012), 4.3. 
736 Supported by article 6, which sets out the conditions that determine whether the delivery of the 
notification has been fulfilled. 
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This appears to treat the respondent more favourably than the claimant. However, it 
is arguable that differential treatment is justified and, therefore, that the parties are 
treated fairly as equals. This follows because, at the start of any adjudication, the 
claimant will know the full circumstances of the claim and should be well placed to 
determine its scope and content. The respondent, however, may have less complete 
knowledge of the circumstances, which may only become apparent during the 
proceedings. Permitting respondents to amend their defences allows this imbalance 
of information to be managed. Giving the tribunal the authority to refuse to allow 
such amendments in the absence of good reasons for the delay means that the 
respondent should be prevented from unjustly using the power for a strategic 
advantage. Thus, these provisions appear to be fair, but it is arguable that the Scottish 
approach, which simply allows the tribunal complete discretion, subject to the parties' 
agreement, is preferable. Nevertheless, any impact on the claimant will be lessened 
by article 32 of the SAL 2012, which allows either party, subject to the tribunal’s 
approval, to 'review or compliment the relief it has claimed within the course of the 
proceedings'.  
 
4.3.2.2 The right to be heard 
To protect the parties' right to be heard, article 25(a) of the Model Law provides for 
the default rule that the tribunal must terminate the proceedings if, without sufficient 
cause, 'the claimant fails to communicate his statement of claim in accordance with 
article 23(1)'. This is mandatory for the proceedings relating to the claimant's case,737 
but should not result in the termination of proceedings in relation to the respondent's 
counter-claim.738 Under article 25(b), the respondent's failure 'to communicate his 
statement of defence' must not lead to the termination the proceedings. These must 
be continued 'without treating such failure in itself as an admission of the claimant's 
allegations', but the arbitration tribunal is allowed to consider the causes of any such 
                                                 
737 Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Germany, 4 Z Sch 02/99, 29 September 1999 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/bayoblg-az-4-z-sch-02-99-datum-1999-09-29-id18> 
accessed 30 November 2017. 
738 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd v Atv Projects India Ltd (2004) DLT 701 (Delhi HC, India) 
<http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1944087/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
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failure and draw appropriate inferences, even if adverse.739 Under article 25(3), the 
failure of a party 'to appear at a hearing or to produce documentary evidence' allows 
the tribunal the discretion to 'continue the proceedings and make the award on the 
evidence before it'. This article importantly allows the arbitration tribunal to continue 
with proceedings where one of the parties fails to cooperate, although the tribunal 
must still give notice of hearings to the uncooperative party and ensure that it retains 
the opportunity to be heard.740  
 
Under the Scottish Act, default r.38 of the SAR provides for a similar response to 
article 25(3) of the Model Law where a party fails to attend a hearing or provide 
evidence. Default r.37 applies to the failure to submit a statement of claim or defence 
and is also similar to the Model Law provision. Rule 37, however, gives the tribunal 
greater discretion to continue proceedings. Differing from the Model Law 
requirement that the proceedings be terminated where a statement of claim is not 
submitted timeously, r.37 only obliges the tribunal to terminate proceedings where 
the delay: 
(c) …  
(i) gives, or is likely to give, rise to a substantial risk that it will 
not be possible to resolve the issues in that claim fairly, or 
(ii) has caused, or is likely to cause, serious prejudice to the 
other party. 
Allowing the tribunal such discretion, subject to the contrary agreement of the parties, 
should allow some arbitrations to proceed that would otherwise be terminated under 
the rigid approach of the Model Law, while at the same time ensuring that justice for 
both parties is preserved. 
                                                 
739 M/S Prime Telesystem Limited v Sasken Communication Technologies Ltd, High Court of Delhi 
India, 18 December 2009, OMP 35/2008 [2009] INDLHTC 5430 
<http://indiankanoon.org/doc/53159237/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
740 CLOUT case No 968, Coruña Provincial High Court, Spain, Section 6, Case No 241/2006, 27 
June 2006. 
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Under the SAL 2012, articles 34 and 35 effectively implement article 25 of the Model 
Law with one notable substantive difference.741 Unlike article 25(b) of the Model 
Law, article 34 of the SAL 2012 does not preclude the tribunal from taking any failure 
to submit a statement of defence as an admission of the other party's claims. This 
allows the tribunal the discretion to take the failure into account, but that discretion 
remains subject to the overarching principles of equality and justice. Whether it is of 
practical significance will depend on how the tribunal approach the matter in practice. 
 
It should be noted that the Model Law, the Scottish Act and the SAL 2012 all provide 
for different consequences depending on whether the claimant or respondent fails to 
submit their respective statement. Where the claimant fails to submit a statement then 
proceedings must be terminated. Where, however, the respondent fails to submit a 
statement, then proceedings must continue. While this treats the parties differently, it 
does not conflict with the formal justice principle of equal treatment under article 18 
of the Model Law. This follows because the claimant has initiated the arbitration 
proceedings so creating a responsibility to submit details of the claim. Since the 
statement of claim is essential to establishing the content and scope of the arbitration 
tribunal's jurisdiction, and since the proceedings only come into existence because of 
the claimant's acts, it is reasonable to terminate proceedings where the statement is 
not submitted. If the tribunal's jurisdiction is not clearly defined ab initio, this 
prejudices the respondent's ability to make and present a case. The respondent's 
failure, however, is irrelevant to the tribunal's jurisdiction and is of no consequence 
for the initial claim. Thus, while the provisions treat the claimant's and respondent's 
failure differently, the treatment is not unequal. The procedural justice of the approach 
is also contingent on allowing the parties to justify the failure by showing 'sufficient 
cause', which is a matter for the tribunal and not the courts.742 This ensures that the 
                                                 
741 Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 443, 455. 
742 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd v Atv Projects India Ltd (2004) DLT 701 (Delhi HC) 
<http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1944087/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
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parties are not prejudiced by circumstances that adequately explain the failure, 
absolving the party of its responsibility for the failure. 
 
As far as the proceedings themselves are concerned, the precise form of the hearings 
is not an issue of justice. Article 24 of the Model Law leaves the matter to the parties, 
with a default power granted to the arbitration tribunal. Provided both parties have an 
equal opportunity to be heard, natural justice will be served even where the tribunal 
resolves the dispute without any oral hearings.743 This is, however, subject to any 
subsequent request for a hearing, which the tribunal is obliged to honour, unless the 
parties have exercised their autonomy and agreed otherwise. Should the tribunal 
refuse such a request, it could be considered a violation of the natural justice right to 
be heard.744  
 
To ensure that the parties have an equal opportunity to present their case, article 24(2) 
requires that both are given adequate notice of any hearing or meeting. Where a 
failure to provide sufficient notice prevents a party from adequately presenting its 
case, this infringes natural justice, undermines the authority of an award and 
constitutes a breach of both article 24 and article 18.745 Similarly, article 24(3) 
imposes an obligation on the tribunal to ensure that relevant documents, including 
expert reports and evidentiary documents, are equally available to both parties. The 
point of requiring disclosure, as part of the right to be heard, is to allow the parties 
the opportunity to take such information and evidence into account and to respond to 
it. In the context of arbitration, this obligation should be narrowly construed to include 
only those documents pertinent to the right to be heard. Thus, in Methanex Motinui 
                                                 
743 Government of the Republic of the Philippines v Philippine International Air Terminals Co Inc 
[2007] 1 SLR (R) 278; [2006] SGHC 206 (HC, Singapore). 
744 Supreme Court, Austria, 30 June 2010, Docket 7 Ob 111/10i. 
745 Impex Corporation v Elenjikal Aquamarine Exports Ltd AIR (2008) Ker 199 
<http://indiankanoon.org/doc/653638/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
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Ltd, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the duty did not apply to the 
disclosure of documents to enable a criticism of the tribunal's decision.746   
 
Consistent with article 24, default r.28(f) of the SAR provides the tribunal with the 
discretionary power to determine whether there should be oral hearings, written or 
oral arguments and the use of documents or other evidence. Unlike article 24 of the 
Model Law, the Scottish rule imposes no specific obligation to ensure that the parties 
are given adequate notice of any hearings and to ensure that all documents are 
communicated to the parties. Although such an obligation is likely to follow from the 
general duties of natural justice imposed by mandatory r.24 of the SAR and s.1 of the 
Scottish Act, it might have been better had the duty to provide adequate notification 
been made explicit. 
 
Article 33 of the SAL 2012 broadly follows article 24 of the Model Law, imposing 
the natural justice obligation to hold a hearing 'in order to enable either party to 
explain its case and produce the evidence on which it relies' made explicit by article 
33(1). The parties' right to be heard is further protected by article 33(2), which 
implements article 24(2) of the Model Law and, unlike the Scottish Act, explicitly 
requires the parties to be given adequate notice of any hearings or substantive 
meetings of the tribunal. As with the Model Law and the Scottish Act, the form of the 
hearings is left to the discretion of the tribunal.  
 
Unlike the Model Law and the Scottish Act, article 33(3) of the SAL 2012 requires 
that any meeting be recorded in minutes, which must be signed by all those attending 
the hearing. Unless otherwise agreed, a copy of the minutes must be delivered to each 
party. This provision may be criticised for imposing formality on the proceedings. It 
opens the door for a technical challenge regarding a failure of the process of 
producing the minutes. On the other hand, the minutes provide a formal and agreed 
                                                 
746 Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman [2004] 3 NZLR 454, [129-160] (CA, New Zealand). 
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record of the hearings that could reduce the likelihood of subsequent legal challenge 
on the grounds of a procedural irregularity. By ensuring that a contemporaneous 
record is made, the obligation to produce signed minutes should reduce the risk of 
any future uncertainty regarding the meeting, which is consistent with the Sharia’s 
rejection of gharar.  
 
Before moving on, article 26 of the Model Law deserves mentioning. Although this 
article, which allows the tribunal to appoint experts, is essentially concerned with 
substantive justice and the efficacy of arbitration, it also engages with natural and 
procedural justice. The power, which is subject to any contrary agreement of the 
parties, is entirely discretionary and the appointment of experts is a matter for the 
tribunal. Any decision to not appoint an expert, or give reasons why an expert has not 
been appointed, will not be considered prejudicial to the parties' right to be heard.747 
If an expert is appointed, however, and again absent any contrary agreement, the 
expert may be required, at the request of one of the parties or at the discretion of the 
tribunal, to attend a hearing allowing the parties to question the expert and 'to present 
expert witnesses in order to testify on the points at issue'. 
 
Providing the parties with the right to request a hearing, allowing them the 
opportunity to examine the expert, is an important procedural safeguard. Since expert 
evidence may prejudice a party's case, the natural justice right to be heard requires 
that the parties are given an equal opportunity to challenge the expert’s testimony and 
counter it with their own expert witnesses.748 It is unsurprising then, that under default 
r.34(2), the Scottish Act ensures a similar protection of the natural justice right to be 
heard.749 A comparable protection is also provided by the SAL 2012. Under article 
                                                 
747 CLOUT case No 375, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Germany, 4 Z Sch 23/99, 15 
December 1999 <http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/bayoblg-az-4-z-sch-23-99-datum-
1999-12-15-id16> accessed 30 November 2017. 
748 Paklito Investment Limited v Klockner East Asia Limited [1993] 2 HKLR 39, [52-62] (HC, Hong 
Kong); Norbrook Laboratories v Tank [2006] EWHC 1055 (Comm) [138-139]. 
749 Re Partners of Dallas McMillan [2015] CSOH 136, [31] per Lord Philip. 
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36(3), parties must be allowed to examine and comment on the draft expert report. 
Under article 36(4), either party may request a hearing to allow the expert to be 
questioned.  
 
4.3.3 The formal justice principle of accessibility 
Accessibility was previously identified as both a principle of formal justice and the 
rule of law. It demands that arbitration should be relatively straightforward to use. 
This requires internally consistent rules that are clear, easy to understand, and 
sufficiently well-defined to allow the parties to reasonably predict their application in 
practice. In general, the Model Law and the Scottish Act have been drafted in clear 
language that is readily understood. While the SAL 2012 varies the wording of the 
Model Law it is also generally clear and intelligible. Furthermore, all three 
instruments are readily available in English, which is important given the global 
nature of English as a language,750 and its prevalence as a common language in 
international commerce.751 
 
In terms of predictability the approach of establishing a broad general principle that 
influences the application of the more specific rues is useful. All three of the 
instruments do this through the requirement for equal treatment, which is given 
substance by the natural justice requirement that all parties are given a fair 
opportunity to be heard. This is then supplemented by more detailed provisions 
setting out specific rules such as those regarding adequate notice, statements of claim 
and defence, and the opportunity to examine expert evidence and question expert 
witnesses. 
 
                                                 
750 David Crystal, English as a global language (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2003); Anne 
Johnson, 'The Rise of English: The Language of Globalization in China and the European Union' 
(2009) 22 Macalester International 131; Jacques Melitz, 'English as a global language' (2015) 
Heriot-Watt University Economics Discussion Papers No 2015-05. 
751 Jan Fidrmuc, Jarko Fidrmuc, 'Foreign Languages and Trade' (2009) Brunel University Economics 
and Finance Working Paper No 09-14, 25. 
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The Scottish Act provides the most accessible solution through its comprehensive set 
of arbitration rules, which are 'designed to be user-friendly'.752 Under s.7, the SAR 
‘govern every arbitration seated in Scotland (unless, in the case of a default rule, the 
parties otherwise agree)'. The rules are set out in schedule 1, which may be used as a 
stand-alone procedural framework for the arbitration proceedings. This has the 
advantages of clarity, predictability and accessibility,753 which are important 
requirements for any formally just system. It also has the advantages of convenience 
and efficiency. The parties simply need to agree that Scotland will be the seat and the 
rules will automatically be engaged. This obviates the need for any further time-
consuming negotiation and ensures that there is a complete set of rules for the 
proceedings.754 
   
While the SAL 2012 was inspired by and is based on the Model Law,755 the two 
instruments are not identical. This is because the SAL 2012 must account for the 
specific national context of arbitration and the relevance of Sharia law. In adapting 
the Model Law, the clarity of its provisions is sometimes lost. For example, article 
29, which deals with the language of the proceedings states that: 'Arbitration shall be 
conducted in ... Arabic ... unless the arbitral tribunal or both parties agree on any other 
language'. The problem with this is that, while the Model Law is clear that the tribunal 
has the power to determine the language only where the parties have not done so, 
article 29 appears to allow the power to be exercised by either the tribunal or the 
parties. Unlike article 28 of the SAL 2012, which clearly gives the parties priority to 
                                                 
752 David Wilson, 'The Resurgence of Scotland as a Force in International Arbitration: The 
Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010' (2010) 27 Journal of International Arbitration 679, 683 
753 See the explanation provided by Jim Mather SMP (Minister for Enterprise, Energy and Tourism), 
Scottish Parliament Official Report, 25 June 2009, col 18955. See also: William W Park, 
'Arbitration's Protean Nature: The Value Of Rules And The Risks Of Discretion' (2004) 19 Mealey's 
International Arbitration Report 1, 3ff.  
754 Hong-Lin Yu, 'A Departure From The UNCITRAL Model Law - The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 
2010) And Some Related Issues' (2010) 3 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 283, 293. 
755 Jean-Pierre Harb, Alexander G Leventhal, 'The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to the 
Tune of Shari'a' (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration 113, 124; Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-
Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative Examination of the Law and its Effect 
on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal of International Law 443, 444-445. 
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agree on the arbitration forum, article 29 appears to afford equal priority to the parties 
and the tribunal. This makes it difficult to predict what should happen where the 
tribunal opts, for example, to conduct the proceedings in Arabic while the parties 
agree that the language should be English. This is unfortunate since it confuses what 
would otherwise be a straightforward issue and it could easily have been avoided by 
taking a similar approach to the Scottish Act and drafting simple rules, clearly labelled 
as default or mandatory.  
 
The relevance of Sharia is made clear in article 25 of the SAL 2012, which allows 
the parties or tribunal to use any rules of procedure providing they are consistent with 
Sharia. This is helpful, but does nothing to explicate the limits imposed by Sharia, 
which makes the law less accessible to those unfamiliar with Sharia. A more detailed 
approach would have been helpful, setting out the specific constraints of Sharia that 
apply to the procedural rules. For example, under the SAR, r.50 allows interest to be 
awarded, but this would be inconsistent with the Sharia's prohibition of riba. Given 
the importance of Sharia in Saudi, and its relevance to the SAL 2012, a more 
complete set of rules following the Scottish approach would have been helpful. 
 
4.3.4 Balancing justice and autonomy 
In drafting rules of procedure, the key tension is between ensuring justice and 
respecting party autonomy. The whole point of arbitration is to fairly and effectively 
resolve a dispute in a way that serves the parties’ needs better than other forms of 
dispute resolution, such as litigation. Arbitration is attractive because it is flexible, 
allowing a greater respect for party autonomy than is possible within the more rigid 
system of litigation. In the 2015 survey of International Arbitration, respondents 
ranked flexibility as the third most valuable characteristic of arbitration, behind the 
enforceability of awards and the ability to avoid specific national legal systems.756 As 
discussed previously, the procedural flexibility that respects party autonomy must be 
                                                 
756 School of International Arbitration Queen Mary University of London, 2015 International 
Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration (2015), 6. 
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balanced against the parties', and the state's, interest in ensuring a just process. 
Furthermore, that balance of interests must be achieved within the context of cost-
effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
The clearest evidence of the context-sensitive balance between autonomy and justice 
may be found in s.1 of the Scottish Act, which provides for the founding principles. 
While, s.1(a) requires the arbitration process to be both cost-effective and just, s.1(b) 
states: 'that parties should be free to agree how to resolve disputes subject only to 
such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest'. Neither the Model Law nor 
the SAL 2012 make the balance of principles so explicit. Both provide for the 
overarching principles of equality and audi alterem partem. There is, however, no 
equivalent reference to the principle of party autonomy. Rather, the flexibility 
necessary to respect party autonomy is provided for within the text of individual 
articles that establish a default rule, which may be varied or disapplied by the parties’ 
agreement.  
 
The balance between justice and autonomy is evident in the distinction between 
mandatory and default rules. An approach that excluded mandatory rules would serve 
autonomy by maximising flexibility. It would, however, fail to recognise the 
possibility of a power imbalance between the parties, which may allow a stronger 
party to negotiate an agreement prejudicing a weaker party. Mandatory rules can 
ensure that there are sufficient procedural safeguards to constrain the effect of any 
such power imbalance. Those procedural safeguards may also be valuable to 
minimise the impact of any bias in the management of the arbitration process by the 
tribunal, whether that bias arises from partiality or substandard conduct. 
 
While both the Model Law and the SAL 2012 rely on mandatory and default rules, 
the Scottish Act provides the most complete scheme through a statutory set of rules. 
The flexibility necessary to respect party autonomy is provided for by the inclusion 
of default rules under s.9 of the Act. This provides that the default rules apply unless 
the parties agree to disapply the rule. As default rather than mandatory rules, the 
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parties are free to opt out of, or modify, any, or all, of them through the arbitration 
agreement or any other form or means of agreement.757  
 
While default rules will apply in the absence of any contrary agreement,758 maximum 
flexibility, and hence autonomy, is ensured by allowing that these rules may be 
modified or disapplied at any time, even after the arbitration proceedings have 
begun.759 A potential problem with default rules that may be disapplied, is the risk of 
inconsistency. This is reduced by s.9(4), which provides that any inconsistencies 
should be resolved in favour of the parties' agreement. This is achieved by treating 
them as an implicit agreement that the default rule was to be modified or disapplied. 
While this may not always reflect what the parties had intended, it does, at least have 
the significant benefit of providing a clear and definite rule that should enhance the 
predictability and efficiency of the arbitration process.       
 
There are 36 mandatory rules that, under s.8, 'cannot be modified or disapplied … in 
relation to arbitration seated in Scotland’. According to the Explanatory Notes: 
The mandatory rules take precedence over any agreement between 
the parties which conflicts with those rules. If an arbitration is not 
conducted in accordance with the rules … the tribunal or arbitrator 
may … be open to removal or dismissal … and an award may be 
liable to challenge.760 
The point of the mandatory rules is to 'facilitate' and ensure a procedurally just 
arbitration process.761 To ‘preserve the principle of party autonomy’, however, the 
                                                 
757 Scottish Act, s 9(2), (3). 
758 Arbitration Application (No 3 0f 2011) [2011] CSOH 164, [4]. 
759 Scottish Act, s 9(3)(b). 
760 Explanatory Notes to the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010. 
761 Arbitration (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum (2009), para 78. 
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mandatory rules were ‘kept to a minimum’.762 This is a reasonable approach that 
attempts to balance the two core principles of justice and party autonomy. As 
discussed previously, this inevitably requires a compromise where there is tension 
between the principles. The question is how well the mandatory/default rules 
approach does this, which may be determined by identifying mandatory rules that 
should be default and default rules that should be mandatory. 
 
A good example of a mandatory rule that imposes a justice-based constraint on the 
exercise of party autonomy is the obligation to ensure that the parties are treated 
equally, with a full, or at least fair, opportunity to present their case. As discussed 
above, this mandatory rule is provided for by article 18 of the Model Law and by 
article 27 of the SAL 2012. The wording of article 27 reflects the mandatory nature 
of the Model Law provision by issuing the imperative that the parties ‘shall be treated' 
equally. This language is supported by the absence of any clause allowing the parties 
the discretion to vary or disapply the provision.  Similarly, the Scottish Act uses 
mandatory r.24 to impose a general duty of justice on the tribunal. The provision in 
the Scottish Act, however, goes further than those found in the Model Law or the 
SAL 2012.  
 
Reflecting the commercial interest in efficiency and cost-effectiveness, r.24 also 
requires the tribunal to conduct the arbitration 'without unnecessary delay, and ... 
expense'. Mandatory r.25 places a similar obligation on the parties. According to a 
policy memorandum, this provision was 'intended to make it clear to parties that ... 
deliberate delaying tactics by one or other of the parties' are unacceptable and may be 
considered when calculating liability for expenses.763 As a mandatory rule imposing 
a good faith duty not to employ delaying tactics, r.25 appears to limit party autonomy 
                                                 
762 Jim Mather MSP, 'Arbitration (Scotland) Bill: Stage 1' Economy, Energy and tourism Committee, 
Session 3, 3 June 2009, col 2237.  
763 Scottish Parliament, Arbitration (Scotland) Bill Policy Memorandum (2009), paras 147-148 
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for the benefit of efficiency. Delaying tactics, however, may be used by a party with 
deeper pockets, to exploit the other party's lack of financial resources. This creates an 
inequality that may allow the stronger party to achieve a better outcome than would 
otherwise be expected. As such, the mandatory nature of the provision is concerned 
with precluding unjust outcomes resulting from the manipulation of the arbitration 
process. While the SAL 2012 imposes an obligation, under article 30, to submit the 
statements of claim and defence timeously, there is no such general obligation on 
either the parties or the tribunal. From a justice perspective, such a general obligation 
serves a useful purpose and the SAL 2012 should accordingly be amended. 
 
4.3.4.1 The submission of statements, hearings and confidentiality 
Under the Model Law, a further mandatory rule is the obligation on the parties under 
article 23(1) to submit statements of claim and defence.764 This rule does, however, 
allow the parties to determine the necessary elements of the statements, with the 
tribunal afforded the role of ensuring that the parties have the opportunity to amend 
any deficiencies.765 The SAL 2012 similarly mandates, under article 30, that the 
parties must submit statements of claim and defence. Like the Model Law, some 
discretion is given to the parties regarding the elements that may be included. Article 
30, however, also requires that the statement of claim include the elements specified 
in article 30(1). This is a greater restriction on autonomy than under the Model Law, 
but improves the efficiency of the arbitration process by reducing the risk of a 
deficient statement. As discussed previously, the Scottish Act provides for the 
statements under default r.28(2)(b). While this respects party autonomy, the approach 
under the Model Law and the SAL 2012 provides greater certainty and, since the 
statements are relevant both to the tribunal's jurisdiction and to each party's ability to 
respond the other party's case, better serves the interests of justice and efficiency.  
 
                                                 
764 Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Germany, 4 Z Sch 02/99, 29 September 1999 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/bayoblg-az-4-z-sch-02-99-datum-1999-09-29-id18> 
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Under article 24, the Model Law also provides mandatory rules that impose a duty on 
the tribunal to provide adequate notice of hearings and to ensure both parties are 
provided with all relevant documents and information. The SAL 2012 imposes 
similar obligations under articles 31 and 33. Although mandatory, these rules impose 
a duty on the tribunal rather than the parties. They serve both the interests of justice 
and party autonomy, ensuring that the parties have the necessary information and 
opportunity to present their case to the tribunal.  
 
Under the Scottish Act, these issues are left to the discretion of the tribunal under the 
default r.28. This respects both party autonomy and the autonomy of arbitration 
proceedings, affording the tribunal sufficient power to ensure the efficiency of the 
proceedings regardless of any deficiencies in the parties' agreement.766 There is no 
explicit duty to give the parties notice of hearings, but this is implicit to the general 
duty imposed by mandatory r.28. While discretionary, the power afforded the tribunal 
under r.28(2)(c) to determine whether documents should be disclosed to the parties 
remains subject to the general duties of natural justice imposed by the founding 
principles and mandatory r.24. This provides greater flexibility, but at the expense of 
certainty and the possibility that a party may challenge the rationality of any decision 
to exercise that discretion. Given that, as mandatory rules under the Model Law and 
the SAL 2012, the duties are imposed on the tribunal rather than the parties, there 
seems to be little benefit to be gained from the discretionary approach taken by the 
Scottish Act in this regard. 
 
Before turning to consider the laws governing the arbitration tribunal, it is worth 
noting one further distinction between the approach under the Scottish Act and the 
approach taken by the Model Law and the SAL 2012. Neither the Model Law nor the 
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SAL 2012 make any provision for a duty of confidentiality. The Scottish Act does, 
however, provide under default r.26 a 'robust confidentiality provision'.767  
 
Confidentiality is often in the commercial interests of the parties, and a norm of 
ICA.768 Providing a default rule serves those interests and respects the principle of 
party autonomy. By explicating the duty and the exceptions, the Scottish Act balances 
the private autonomy-based interests in confidentiality and the public interest in the 
disclosure required to ensure justice is transparent. This approach provides both the 
certainty and clarity required by formal justice and, given that the duty is not 
uniformly protected in all jurisdictions,769 it is perhaps unfortunate that the SAL 2012 
is silent on the question. 
 
The reason for the different approach taken by the Scottish legislation may be found 
in the intention to provide a comprehensive framework of rules for arbitration. The 
Model Law, by contrast, aims only to provide a skeleton for national legislation. 
Given the complexity of the issue and lack of a uniform across the various national 
jurisdiction, it is understandable that the Model Law made no attempt to deal with 
confidentiality. In following the Model Law, the SAL 2012 has missed the 
opportunity for clarity and certainty regarding the confidentiality of arbitration 
proceedings. It would have been better had Saudi followed the Scottish lead by taking 
the opportunity to set down clear guidance on the extent of any duty of confidence 
and the consequences for breaching that duty. 
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4.4 The Law Governing the Arbitration Tribunal 
Apart from their relevance to the procedural rules, natural and procedural justice are 
also relevant to the rules governing the arbitration tribunal. The tribunal has two 
functions. First, it manages the arbitration proceedings and is responsible for ensuring 
that they are cost-effective, efficient, fair and compliant with the rules. Second, it 
decides the case and makes the award to resolve the parties’ dispute. In fulfilling these 
functions, the tribunal performs a quasi-judicial role,770 which imposes an obligation 
to make a just and reasoned decision and highlights the relevance of the natural justice 
principle of nemo index in causa sua (nobody should be a judge in his/her own cause).  
 
In addition to that natural justice principle, the law governing the arbitration tribunal 
must also be informed by the principle of party autonomy. It is the consent of the 
parties, and the contractual relationship between the two parties and each of the 
arbitrators,771 that provides the arbitrators with the jurisdictional authority to manage 
proceedings and determine the dispute. This affords the arbitrators a significant power 
over the parties and the law must ensure that this power is exercised justly and 
appropriately, within the limits defined by the arbitration agreement.772  
 
Regardless of which party is responsible for appointing an arbitrator, that arbitrator's 
power and authority derives from the consent of all parties. As the French Cour de 
Cassation explained, ‘even when initiated by one party’, the appointment of an 
arbitrator: ‘which forms an important part of the arbitration agreement, results from 
the common intention of the parties’.773 The implication, which is consistent with a 
quasi-judicial role, is that the arbitrators must be impartial between the parties,774 and 
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should be sufficiently independent of their interests to ensure that there is no good 
reason to doubt their lack of bias. As Lord Clarke explained in the English case of 
Jivraj v Hashani: 
The arbitrator is in critical respects independent of the parties. His 
functions and duties require him to rise above the partisan interests 
of the parties ... He is in effect a “quasi-judicial adjudicator”.775 
 
Arbitrators, then, should not be afforded the 'special status of a "non-neutral"'.776 
Indeed, the arbitrator’s independence and impartiality 'underpin the entire arbitral 
process' and are necessary to ensure a just resolution of the dispute.777 This 
impartiality, which reflects the requirements of the natural justice principle nemo 
index in causa sua,  helps to preserve the legitimacy required to maintain the 
confidence of both nation states and the world of commerce in arbitration as a private 
system of dispute resolution.778 Although in practice the parties may expect the 
arbitrator to be predisposed towards the appointing party's interests,779 that 
predisposition should be constrained by their natural justice duty. As Franck notes, 
ICA is expected to avoid partisan decision-making and provide a 'fair process that 
justifies the expenditure of significant legal fees on dispute resolution in pursuit of 
broader commercial objectives'.780 Thus, the rules governing the arbitration tribunal 
must provide a balance between party autonomy and justice that is both efficient and 
cost-effective.  
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4.4.1 Party autonomy and the appointment of arbitrators 
The importance of arbitrator selection is reflected in Hummer's observation that: 'An 
old axiom … is that arbitrations are won or lost in the panel selection process'.781 As 
Lew et al note: 'the quality of arbitration proceedings depends to a large extent on the 
quality and skill of the arbitrators chosen'.782 This highlights the parties’ interest in 
selecting the arbitrators, which is protected by the principle of party autonomy. This 
principle requires that the parties should be free to both determine the size of the 
tribunal and choose the individual arbitrators that will adjudicate the dispute. It is 
reflected in articles 10 and 11 of the Model Law. 
 
Article 10 of the Model Law allows the parties complete freedom to decide on the 
number of arbitrators,783 with a default rule providing for three. Similarly, article 11 
provides a default process, but allows the parties the freedom to agree on their own 
procedure for appointing the arbitrators. This approach prioritises the principle of 
autonomy while ensuring that the efficiency of the arbitration process is not unduly 
compromised by a failure of the parties to agree on the procedure.784 Consistent with 
the formal justice principle of equality, article 11(3) ensures that both parties have the 
same opportunity to appoint or agree to the arbitrators. Thus, where there are to be 
three arbitrators, then each party chooses one of the arbitrators, with the third 
arbitrator chosen by the two party-appointed arbitrators. Where there is to be a sole 
arbitrator, the selection must be agreed by both parties, with the court, or equivalent 
body, acting as an impartial selector where the parties are unable to agree. Under 
article 11(4), the court takes on a similar role where the party-agreed appointment 
procedure fails.  
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The provisions of article 11(4), which only comes into operation where the 
appointment procedure fails, are mandatory, imposing a limit on party autonomy in 
the interests of ensuring the efficiency and the effectiveness of the arbitration 
process.785 Rather than supplanting party autonomy, the court's role is essentially to 
provide assistance in minimising any delays in the arbitration process.786 Indeed, in 
Pacific International Lines (Pte) Ltd v Tsinlien Metals and Minerals Co (HK) Ltd, 
Kaplan J went so far as to allow the parties an additional 7 days to make the selection 
before making the decision on their behalf.787 The continuing importance of party 
autonomy was also apparent in the Kenyan case of Mvungo v Rosiello, in which the 
court held that its selection of an arbitrator should be informed by 'input from the 
parties', who should suggest suitable candidates for selection.788 
 
Under the Scottish Act, the SAR similarly allow the parties the freedom, under default 
r.2, to appoint the members of the tribunal or specify how the tribunal should be 
appointed. This is supported by default r.5 and r.6, which provide for the appointment 
procedure where the parties do not include the arrangements in their agreement. Like 
the Model Law, the SAR specifies a default number of arbitrators, which avoids the 
uncertainty of the approach under the SAL 2012 (see below). Unlike the Model Law, 
however, the default is a sole arbitrator, rather than a panel of three. This has the 
advantage of minimising the cost of the default procedure, which seems sensible 
given that the parties may specify the number of arbitrators where they prefer the 
dispute not to be resolved by a single adjudicator. 
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Like the SAL 2012 (see below), the SAR require that the arbitrator be legally 
competent, but does not impose any requirements that the arbitrator be of good 
character or legally qualified. Similarly, the SAR impose no restrictions on the 
number of arbitrators required for a valid tribunal. Thus, the parties are free to select 
an even number of arbitrators.  Mandatory r.3, however, requires that only individuals 
may be appointed to act as an arbitrator. This precludes the possibility that a party 
may appoint a legal entity rather than a natural person as arbitrator, emphasising 'the 
"personal nature" of the arbitrator’s remit'.789 
 
As with the Model Law, the SAR specify the procedure where the tribunal selection 
process breaks down. Rule 7 is a mandatory rule, which means that the parties are not 
free to opt-out of the rule. Mandatory rules generally limit the freedom of the parties, 
which appears to infringe the principle of party autonomy. However, where a 
mandatory rule serves to correct a defect in the parties’ agreed procedure, then it 
supports party autonomy in the context of the obligations arising out of the 
relationship created by the parties’ agreement.790  
 
While this is generally consistent with the approach taken by the Model Law, the 
SAR provide for an alternative mechanism to correct a defective selection process. 
Rather than requiring an application to the court, r.7 allows the parties to refer the 
issue to an arbitral appointments referee. Under s.24 of the Scottish Act, an arbitral 
appointments referee may be authorised by ministerial order and should be persons 
with relevant experience of arbitral appointments as well as the capability to provide 
training and disciplinary procedures 'to ensure that arbitrators conduct themselves 
properly'.  
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The arbitral appointments referee is an innovative role that serves to facilitate both 
the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of arbitration,791 since it is likely to be quicker 
and cheaper to use an experienced referee than to apply to the court for assistance. 
Indeed, Dundas notes that while the courts make '5-10 appointments a year', the type 
of professional bodies that have been accredited as arbitral appointment referees make 
thousands of such appointments.792 Furthermore, their role in ensuring arbitrators 
conduct themselves properly should reduce the risk that there will be breaches of 
natural or procedural justice in the arbitration proceedings. Finally, they also enhance 
party autonomy by providing parties with the choice of using an arbitral appointments 
referee or applying for the court's assistance. Thus, this ‘remarkable feature of the 
Act'793 should further not just efficiency and cost-effectiveness, but also party 
autonomy and justice. It is a feature that would only enhance the SAL 2012, which 
should be amended to include such a facility. 
 
Turning to the SAL 2012, this also respects party autonomy by allowing, under article 
15, that the 'parties to arbitration may agree to the appointment of arbitrators', with 
no explicit restriction on gender, religion or nationality.794 This is supported by a 
similar default procedure that serves to avoid any unnecessary delay caused by the 
failure of the parties to agree on an appointment procedure. Although similar to the 
Model Law default, the procedure is streamlined under the SAL 2012, minimising 
any delays. Under the Model Law, the default procedure allows thirty days for the 
appointment of the third arbitrator. The SAL 2012 halves this time-period, allowing 
only fifteen days for the selection.  
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Where party autonomy is frustrated by the failure of the agreed procedure, then, like 
article 11(4) of the Model Law, article 15(2) of the SAL 2012 allows the court 
jurisdiction to respond to a request from one of the parties to complete the selection 
of the tribunal. Like the Model Law, the court's decision, under article 15(4), is not 
subject to appeal. The SAL 2012, however, goes further than the Model Law by 
imposing a thirty-day time limit on the court, which should limit the delay caused by 
the breakdown in the selection process. Furthermore, the SAL 2012 explicitly 
provides for a greater respect for party autonomy by requiring, under article 15(3) 
that the 'court shall ensure that the arbitrator appointed ... satisfies the conditions 
provided for in the mutual agreement of the parties'. This goes further than article 
11(5) of the Model Law, which simply requires the court to have 'due regard to any 
qualifications required of the arbitrator by the agreement of the parties'. Given, 
however, the pro-autonomy approach of the courts when giving effect to article 11(5) 
of the Model Law, the difference between the Model Law and the SAL 2012 may not 
be of any practical consequence. However, following the approach under the Scottish 
Act, the SAL 2012 should be amended to provide for the appointment of arbitration 
referees, which would serve the interests of both autonomy and efficiency. 
 
While the Model Law and the SAR allow the parties complete freedom to determine 
the number of arbitrators and the appointment procedure, the SAL 2012 restricts that 
freedom. Under article 13, the tribunal must comprise an odd number of arbitrators. 
This is presumably to avoid the possibility that an even number of arbitrators will be 
unable to reach a majority decision.795 While this is a limit on party autonomy, any 
infringement is offset by the goal of facilitating the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the arbitration process. It should also be noted that the SAL 2012 is not alone in 
precluding a tribunal with an even number of arbitrators. For example, a similar 
provision is found in s.10(1) of the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, 
which remained un-amended by the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act 
2015. It should further be noted that article 13 does not specify a default number of 
                                                 
795 Ahmed A Altawyan, ‘Overview of Arbitral Tribunal Under the Saudi Arbitration Law: A 
Comparison with International Rules’ (2017) 12 Journal of Strategic and International Studies 88. 
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arbitrators. This creates uncertainty regarding the consequences of the parties failing 
to specify the number of arbitrators in their agreement. Article 13 could be interpreted 
as implying that the default number is one. Alternatively, it could be understood as 
providing that a failure to agree on the number of arbitrators renders arbitration null 
and void. Such uncertainty could have been avoided by following the Model Law and 
Scottish Act and providing for a default number of arbitrators. 
 
The freedom of the parties to choose the arbitrators is limited by article 14, which 
imposes three conditions. The first requires the arbitrator to be legally competent. 
While the principle of autonomy would, in theory, allow the parties to choose a legally 
incompetent arbitrator, justice requires that any adjudicator is competent to fulfil his 
or her role. While legal competence does not guarantee the competency to adjudicate, 
it provides a threshold requirement that serves the formal justice aim of certainty. 
While this provision seems innocuous on the surface, it has been suggested that it 
could be used to preclude the appointment of female arbitrators, who may not be 
considered legally competent.796 However, as discussed in section 3.3.3 of this thesis, 
women are training in Saudi to be arbitrators and an administrative Court of Appeal 
recently accepted the appointment of a female arbitrator without objection. 
 
The second restriction is that the arbitrator must 'be of good conduct'. This is of far 
more practical importance than the first restriction. While the first restriction is clear, 
the concept of good conduct is vague and open to interpretation. If it had been limited 
to precluding the appointment of a person convicted of serious criminal offences, such 
as fraud, then the restriction would be a reasonable justice-based limit on party 
autonomy. As it stands, it provides too much leeway for the appointment of an 
arbitrator to be challenged, despite any presumption in favour of the arbitrator.797 It 
                                                 
796 Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 443, 451. 
797 Mohamed Khairi Al-Wakeel, Comments on the New Saudi Arbitration Law (King Fahd National 
Library, 2014/1435H), 48. 
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may, however, be argued, that this restriction is required to ensure that the legal rules 
are consistent with the Sharia. In the Holy Qur’an it states that: ‘Surely Allah 
commands you to make over trust to those worthy of them, and that when you judge 
between people, you judge with justice’.798 The requirement to trust those that are 
‘worthy’ to act in a judicial, or quasi-judicial, role suggests that judges and arbitrators 
must be of good character or ‘conduct’. The difficulty is to provide a legal rule that 
is consistent with the need for a ‘worthy’ person but is not overly vague. This will be 
discussed further in chapter six. 
  
The final restriction is that at least one of the arbitrators must 'be a holder of a 
university degree in Shari'a or legal sciences'.  While this is a significant limit on the 
autonomy of the parties, the impact of the requirement is diminished by the caveat 
that, for tribunals of three or more arbitrators, only the chairperson must be so 
qualified. Furthermore, given that the tribunal must both identify and apply applicable 
law, it is reasonable to require at least one of the arbitrators to have a legal 
qualification.799  
 
4.4.2 Natural justice and the tribunal 
As discussed above, the natural justice principle of nemo index in causa sua requires 
that the arbitrators must be independent and impartial. The elements of independence 
and impartiality, which are implicit to the requirement that the parties be treated 
equally, provides a ground for challenging the appointment of an arbitrator under 
article 12(2) of the Model Law.800 The fundamental nature of this natural justice 
principle was emphasised by the Quebec Court of Appeal. In Desbois v AC Davie 
Industries, it was held that, as 'a judicial act [an] essential quality of [arbitration] is 
                                                 
798 Chapter 4, verse 58. 
799 Won L Kidane, The Culture of International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2017), 286. 
800 A challenge may also be brought where the arbitrator lacks the agreed qualifications. 
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the independence and impartiality of the [arbitrators]'.801 Because of this, an 
agreement for one of the parties to the contract to act as arbitrator was null and void. 
 
Article 12(1) of the Model Law imposes an ongoing obligation on the arbitrator to 
'disclose any circumstances likely to give rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
impartiality or independence'. Importantly, and reflecting the need to respect party 
autonomy and allow the parties to assess the appointment,802 this duty is wider than 
any concomitant duty on the arbitrator to withdraw from the tribunal because of the 
possibility of impartiality or lack of independence. As Wong J explained: 
A failure to disclose, of itself … may give rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias … A failure to disclose, no matter how 
unwitting, can undermine public confidence in the integrity of, and 
the administration of justice by, the judicial officer or the tribunal 
concerned ... The facts to be disclosed are not confined to those 
warranting or perceiving to be warranting disqualification but those 
that might found or warrant a bona fide application for 
disqualification.803 
This duty to disclose is to be determined by an objective assessment of the facts 
relevant to the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator.804 
 
Where doubts exist regarding the arbitrator's impartiality or independence, article 
12(2) allows the parties to challenge the appointment. Where a party has appointed 
an arbitrator, or participated in the appointment, then the challenge is only permitted 
where the party becomes aware of the reasons supporting the challenge after the 
                                                 
801 Desbois v AC Davie Industries [1990] CanLII 3619 (Quebec CA, Canada). 
802 Judge Dominique Hascher, 'Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators: 3 Issues' (2012) 27 
American University International Law Review 789, 795 
803 Jung Science Information Technology Co Ltd v ZTE Corporation [2008] HKCFI 606, [57-58]. 
804 CLOUT case No 665, Oberlandesgericht Naumburg, Germany, 10 Sch 03/01, 19 December 2001 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-naumburg-az-10-schh-03-01-datum-2001-12-19-
id165> accessed 30 November 2017. 
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appointment has been made. Importantly, evidence of actual bias is not essential, as 
the challenge procedure may be initiated where there are 'justifiable doubts' regarding 
the arbitrator's impartiality or independence.805 In other words, article 12(2) provides 
a pre-emptive measure for preserving natural justice. Furthermore, the standard of 
‘justifiable doubts’ should be determined by reference to the viewpoint of an 
'objective, fair-minded and informed observer'.806 Using  such an objective standard 
is consistent with the justice-based principles of equality and impartiality, since it sets 
the bar at a level that allows a meaningful challenge of the arbitrator's impartiality or 
independence and avoids the bias of a subjective viewpoint.807 It also limits the risk 
that the challenge process will be used as a self-serving tactic. The standard may, 
however, be criticised for prioritising the state's interest in justice over the party's 
more subjective interest in the perception of a just process. 
 
The challenge procedure itself is provided for by article 13, which allows the parties 
to agree on the procedure. In one German case, the court held that the parties were 
free to waive the challenge procedure entirely.808 This appears to prioritise party 
autonomy and efficiency over justice and effectiveness, but it does not preclude the 
request for a court to determine the matter. As the parties' freedom to agree on a 
procedure under article 13(1) is 'subject to the provisions of paragraph (3) of this 
article', the agreement to waive the procedure will also be so subject. Thus, the 
interests of justice are preserved, while affording respect to party autonomy.  
                                                 
805 Kammergericht Berlin, Germany, 28 Sch 24/99, 22 March 2000 <http://www.dis-
arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/kg-berlin-az-28-sch-24-99-datum-2000-03-22-id118> accessed 30 
November 2017. 
806 Jung Science Information Technology Co Ltd v ZTE Corporation [2008] HKCFI 606, [52]; 
CLOUT case No 665, Oberlandesgericht Naumburg, Germany, 10 SchH 03/01, 19 December 2001 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-naumburg-az-10-schh-03-01-datum-2001-12-19-
id165> accessed 30 November 2017. 
807 Chiara Giorgetti, 'Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment Arbitration' (2014) 35 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 431, 478-480 
808 Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 9 Sch 01/05, 12 July 2005 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/hanseat-olg-hamburg-az-9-schh-01-05-datum-2005-
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Should the parties not make any arrangements for the challenge procedure, then 
article 13(2) provides a default procedure that facilitates the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the arbitration process. Article 13(2) requires a challenge to be made 
within fifteen days of actual knowledge of the reasons for the challenge. These 
reasons must be submitted in writing to the tribunal, which will decide on the 
challenge unless the arbitrator withdraws or the other party agrees to the challenge. 
Under article 13(3), an unsuccessful challenger may apply to the court for 
determination of the issue.  
 
The provisions for challenging the arbitrator's appointment provide a reasonable 
balance between party autonomy, natural justice and efficiency. This balance is 
reflected in the parties’ power to determine the procedure for making a challenge, 
which is subject to restrictions that ensure the arbitration process is not unduly 
delayed.809 Thus, there is a reasonable time limit of fifteen days for making the initial 
challenge. This allows the party time to prepare a challenge while reducing the risk 
that it will be used as a delaying tactic. Furthermore, while the party making an 
unsuccessful challenge may make an application to the court, there is no further 
appeal from the court's decision. This allows the party to have the matter decided by 
a judge sitting outside the arbitration process, but prevents the challenge from unduly 
obstructing the process by limiting the party's freedom to appeal that decision.810 The 
efficiency of the process is further protected by article 13(3), which allows the 
arbitration process to continue while the court is deciding the issue.811 
 
Turning to Scotland, like the Model Law and the SAL 2012 (see below), mandatory 
r.8 of the SAR imposes a duty on prospective arbitrators to disclose any circumstances 
                                                 
809 CLOUT case No 442, Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany, 9 Sch 30/00, 14 September 2000 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-köln-az-9-schh-30-00-datum-2000-09-14-id131> 
accessed 30 November 2017. 
810 UNCITRAL, Report of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (on the work of its 
eighteenth session), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No 17, 
A/40/17 (UN 1985), paras 121-125. 
811 Nikiforos v Petropoulos [2007] QCCS 3144 (Quebec SC, Canada). 
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that 'might reasonably be considered relevant when considering whether the 
individual is impartial and independent'. While both the Model Law and Scottish Act 
make explicit that the duty applies once a person is asked to be an arbitrator, the SAL 
2012 appears to impose the duty only once the appointment has been taken up. The 
approach of the Model Law and Scottish Acts may allow the issue to be resolved prior 
to the appointment, which is more efficient than the procedure under the SAL 2012. 
Similarly, the absence, under the Scottish Act and Model Law, of any requirement 
that the disclosure should be in writing, may facilitate the process. Given the 
availability of electronic communication, however, any advantage that this brings is 
outweighed by the evidentiary certainty of making the disclosure in writing, as 
required by the SAL 2012.  
 
Under default r.10 of the SAR, the arbitrator's appointment may be challenged for the 
same reasons provided for by the Model Law, but with the additional reason that the 
arbitrator 'has not treated the parties fairly'. Since unfair treatment raises doubts 
regarding the arbitrator's impartiality and independence, this additional ground is 
arguably implicit to the grounds for challenge under both the Model Law and the SAL 
2012. The benefit of making this ground explicit, however, is greater clarity and 
certainty. Rule 10 also makes explicit that the challenge must state the facts and that 
notice must be given to the other party, which again provides greater clarity and 
certainty for the parties. 
 
While r.10 imposes different time limits, the most significant substantive distinction 
between the Scottish Act and the SAL 2012, is that r.10(4) provides that where a 
tribunal fails to decide within the fourteen-day time limit then the arbitrator's 
appointment is automatically revoked. The SAL 2012 requires the tribunal to decide 
within fifteen days, but is silent on any consequence for exceeding this time limit. 
The clarity and certainty of the Scottish approach is to be preferred as more cost-
effective and just, although automatically removing the arbitrator prioritises the 
interests of the party bringing the challenge.  
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The interests of the party bringing the challenge are further favoured by the challenge 
procedure. Like the Model Law and the SAL 2012, the Scottish Act allows an 
application to be made to the court where a challenge fails. In the interests of 
efficiency, however, there is no appeal against a successful challenge. While this 
impacts on the autonomy of the party opposing the challenge, it constrains the delays 
caused by the challenge procedure. Furthermore, it prioritises the natural justice 
principle of nemo index in causa sua and the importance of ensuring that justice is 
seen to be done by prioritising the removal of an arbitrator whose impartiality or 
independence has been challenged.  
 
The main difference between the Scottish Act and the SAL 2012 is that, through 
mandatory rr.12-14, the Scottish Act provides the clarity and certainty of more 
detailed rules, which might usefully be emulated by the SAL 2012. Thus, r.12 clearly 
sets out the grounds on which a court may remove an arbitrator. These broadly 
correspond to those allowed under the SAL 2012, but include the ground that a 
substantial injustice has been caused because the arbitrator has failed to comply with 
the procedural rules agreed by the parties or contained within the SAR. This provides 
Scottish courts with an additional power, but one that serves the interests of justice 
and party autonomy. Furthermore, under mandatory r.13, the SAR allows the court 
the power to dismiss the whole tribunal for the same reason, which again serves the 
interests of justice and party autonomy.  
 
These provisions, which go beyond the power traditionally available under a judicial 
review procedure, 812 usefully draw an explicit connection between the conduct of the 
arbitrator, the implementation of the agreed rules of procedure and natural and 
procedural justice. It should, however, be emphasised that the court's role in policing 
arbitration, is limited to those cases where the procedural failings breach natural 
justice or result in a substantial injustice.813 Thus, minor procedural failings will not 
                                                 
812 See, eg, Kyle and Carrick District Council v AR Kerr & Sons 1992 SLT 629. 
813 Arbitration (Scotland) Bill: Policy Memorandum (2009), paras 130-131. 
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justify dismissal of an arbitrator or tribunal.814 This provides a reasonable balance 
between facilitating an efficient and cost-effective process, party autonomy and 
justice. The power to remove an arbitrator both allows the court to act where natural 
justice has been breached, but also acts as a deterrent, discouraging the arbitrator from 
acting unfairly. This deterrence is supported by mandatory r.16 of the SAR, which 
allows the court to make an order regarding the arbitrator's entitlement to fees and 
expenses, or the arbitrator's liability to make repayments of money already received. 
Under this rule, the court may make an order that reflects the arbitrator's culpability 
for significant breaches of procedural or natural justice.815   
 
Turning to Saudi Arabia, article 12 of the Model Law, which provides for the grounds 
on which an arbitrator may be challenged, is implemented by article 16 of the SAL 
2012. While the wording has changed, the effect of article 16 should broadly 
correspond to the Model Law provision. One difference is that the arbitrator must 
notify the parties in writing of any circumstances likely to raise 'reasonable doubt as 
to his impartiality'. Under the Model Law, there is no requirement for writing and the 
duty refers to 'justifiable doubt'. Since justifiable doubt effectively means that any 
doubt must be supported by reasons, the change of wording should not be of practical 
importance. The requirement for writing is a useful clarification that should facilitate 
evidentiary certainty in any challenge to the arbitrator's mandate. 
 
A second difference is that article 16(2) of the SAL 2012 specifies that arbitrators are 
precluded from sitting on a tribunal, regardless of whether their mandate has been 
challenged, where the same circumstances would preclude a judge from hearing a 
case. This emphasises the quasi-judicial role of the arbitrator and the state's interest 
in ensuring justice is both done and seen to be done. While there is no equivalent 
provision in the Model Law, national courts have interpreted the natural justice 
                                                 
814 Derek P Auchie, Richard Farndale, Chris Mackay, Coral Riddell, The Scottish Arbitration Survey: 
Report No 1 (2015), 6.3.2. 
815 Fraser Davidson, 'Some thoughts on the Draft Arbitration (Scotland) Bill (2009) 1 Journal of 
Business Law 44, 56-57. 
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requirement of impartiality and independence to be the same as that imposed on 
domestic judges.816 A similar approach is taken by the English courts.817  
 
While this means that the standard of the test is broadly equivalent, although parasitic 
on the national law, it still leaves the key difference that the Model Law requires the 
arbitrator to disclose relevant circumstances and the parties to make a challenge, but 
the SAL 2012 imposes a duty on arbitrators to recuse themselves. While this provides 
a useful safeguard for the parties' interests, it does so at the expense of party 
autonomy. Furthermore, it creates the uncertainty that an award may be open to 
challenge where an arbitrator remained on a tribunal in circumstances raising 
reasonable doubt as to the arbitrator's impartiality regardless of any actual bias.818 
Despite these concerns, the additional uncertainty and the limited impact on party 
autonomy are outweighed by the greater protection of the parties' and state's justice-
based interests. 
 
Like article 13 of the Model Law, article 17 of the SAL 2012 balances autonomy and 
justice by allowing the parties to determine the procedure for challenging an 
arbitrator's mandate, while also providing a default procedure. Although the Model 
Law imposes a fifteen-day limit on the challenge, with no time limit imposed on the 
tribunal for deciding the issue, article 17(1) of the SAL 2012 imposes a five-day limit 
on the initial application and a fifteen-day limit on the tribunal for issuing a decision. 
This should limit any delays caused by the challenge, improving the efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of the process. 
                                                 
816 CLOUT case No 1062, Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany, 9 Sch 22/03, 2 April 2004 
<http://www.dis-arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-köln-az-9-sch-h-22-03-datum-2004-04-02-
id291> accessed 30 November 2017; Jung Science Information Technology Co Ltd v ZTE 
Corporation [2008] HKCFI 606, [49]. 
817 AT&T Corp v Saudi Cable Co [2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 625, 637-638 per Lord Woolf MR. 
818 Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 443, 453. 
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Like the Model Law, the SAL 2012 allows the parties thirty days to appeal a failed 
challenge to a competent court, whose subsequent decision is not subject to appeal. 
Also like the Model Law, the SAL 2012 allows the arbitration process to continue 
while the court considers the application. Unlike the Model Law, however, article 
17(3) of the SAL 2012 requires arbitration proceedings to be suspended while the 
challenge is being decided by the tribunal. This makes explicit what should be the 
pragmatic approach of the tribunal in any case. Where an arbitrator's mandate has 
been challenged, it makes sense, on grounds of efficiency, for the challenge to be 
resolved by the tribunal before continuing with the arbitration, especially given the 
fifteen-day time limit imposed on the tribunal. 
 
Unlike the Model Law, which appears to preserve all prior proceedings and awards, 
article 17(4) of the SAL 2012 provides that a successful challenge renders ‘non-
existent’ any prior proceedings or award. This has the disadvantage of effectively 
requiring the arbitration process to start afresh, rehearing all witnesses and re-
examining all documents and other evidence. While this is likely to impact on the 
duration and cost of the arbitration, it removes a possible ground for subsequently 
challenging any award and the danger that the entire process will be undermined. 
Thus, it provides greater certainty for the parties at the expense of the additional delay. 
It also provides greater protection for the justice-based interest of the parties and the 
state since it reflects the Islamic legal maxim that declares as false anything that has 
itself been built on a falsehood.819 It is further supported by the opinion of Umar ibn 
Al-Khattab (583 CE-644CE), a respected Muslim Caliph and authoritative jurist,820 
who explained that: 'returning to the truth is better than persisting in falsehood'.821 
                                                 
819 Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 443, 454 (n 78). 
820 See Ali Muhammas as-Sallabi, Umar Ibn Al Khattab: His Life and Times (volumes 1 and 2) 
(International Islamic Publishing house 2008). 
821 Sa'eed ibn Mut'ib Al-Qahtaanee, ‘A Study of the Legal Maxim "No Validity is Attached to 
Conjecture which is Obviously Tainted by Error (Laa Ibrata Bidh-Dhann-il Bayyani Khata'uhu)" and 
its Juristic Applications' (2014) Issue 62 Al-Adl 41, 84. 
253 
 
Finally, article 17(2) of the SAL 2012 makes clear that parties cannot reapply for 
dismissal unless they have new, previously unknown, grounds for challenging the 
arbitrator’s mandate. This provision is lacking from the Model Law, but, in practice, 
is likely to be implicit to the rule provided for by article 13(2). Since a party must 
bring a challenge within fifteen days of gaining actual knowledge of the reasons 
raising doubts regarding the arbitrator's impartiality or independence, there is little 
opportunity for the party to bring a second challenge relying on the same reasons. 
This becomes even more unlikely under the five-day limit imposed by the SAL 2012. 
Thus, article 17(2) is unlikely to be of any practical significance beyond the additional 
clarity it provides to the limits on the parties' freedom to make an application 
challenging the arbitrator.  
 
4.4.3 Efficiency and effectiveness 
While a concern with the efficiency and effectiveness of the tribunal and arbitration 
process is apparent in most of the provisions, article 14 of the Model Law is 
specifically devoted to these issues. It provides that, where an arbitrator ‘becomes de 
jure or de facto unable to perform his functions or for other reasons fails to act without 
undue delay, his mandate terminates if he withdraws from office or if the parties agree 
on the termination'. This means that an inefficient or ineffective arbitrator may be 
removed,822 allowing the appointment of a substitute arbitrator under article 15. Thus, 
arbitrators may be removed where they have been arrested and detained,823 are unable 
to fulfil their duties because of illness,824 or where the delay caused by their failure to 
                                                 
822 UNCITRAL, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, A/CN 9/264 (UN 1985), 34. 
823 Noble Resources Pte Ltd v China Sea Grains and Oils Industry Co Ltd [2006] HKCFI 334 (Hong 
Kong). 
824 Oberlandesgericht Köln, Germany, 9 Sch 27/02, 11 April 2003 <http://www.dis-
arb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-köln-az-9-schh-27-02-datum-2003-04-11-id323> accessed 30 
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complete their duties has 'been so inordinate as to be unacceptable' clearly falling 
below 'the standard of what may reasonably be expected from an arbitrator'.825  
 
These provisions minimise unnecessary delay and ensure an effective panel of 
arbitrators, capable of carrying out their tasks. They also respect party autonomy by 
allowing the parties to agree to waive the provisions of article 14 and permitting the 
issue to be determined by, for example, the appropriate institutional rules.826 Where 
article 14 is not waived, party autonomy is respected by empowering the parties to 
jointly terminate the arbitrator's mandate and, under article 15, appoint a substitute 
arbitrator according to the original arbitration appointment procedure. Furthermore, 
the interests of autonomy and justice are served by allowing an application to the 
courts where the parties are unable to agree on the termination. Again, undue delay is 
prevented by precluding any appeal from the court's decision, but article 14(1) is 
deficient in failing to provide a time-period limiting the freedom of the party to apply 
to court for a decision. 
 
Similar provisions are found in the Scottish Act, although default r.9 makes it clear 
that, where an 'arbitrator becomes ineligible to act as arbitrator', then the arbitrator's 
mandate terminates automatically. This means that there is no need for the parties to 
agree or involve the tribunal, unless, presumably, there is doubt regarding the 
arbitrator's incapacity. Default r.11 allows the parties to agree to remove the 
arbitrator, and does not require any reason to justify the removal, which maximises 
respect for the principle of party autonomy. Although not requiring any reasons, r.11 
allows the parties to jointly remove an arbitrator who has caused unnecessary delay 
by failing to fulfil the responsibilities imposed by mandatory r.24. Where the parties 
are unable to agree on removal, then an application may be made to the court to 
                                                 
825 UNCITRAL, Analytical Commentary on Draft Text of a Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration A/CN 9/264 (UN 1985), 34. 
826 UNCITRAL, Report of the UN Commission on International Trade Law (on the work of its 
eighteenth session), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No 17, 
A/40/17 (UN 1985), para 136. 
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remove an arbitrator who is 'incapable of acting as an arbitrator' or who has caused a 
substantial injustice by failing to conduct the arbitration consistently with the SAR, 
which includes the duty under mandatory r.24 to not cause unnecessary delay. Along 
with default r.17, which provides for the reconstitution of the tribunal, these serve to 
facilitate the efficiency and effectiveness of the arbitration process.  
 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, which follows the Model Law, articles 18 and 19 of the 
SAL 2012 provide for the removal and replacement of arbitrators who are no longer 
able to complete their duties or have suspended performance causing an undue delay. 
Like article 14 of the Model Law, article 18 provides the parties with the power to 
jointly dismiss the arbitrator, or to apply to the competent court for a decision where 
they are unable to agree. The decision of the court is similarly not open to appeal. 
Following article 15 of the Model Law, article 19 provides that a replacement must 
be appointed according to the rules that applied to the appointment of the original 
arbitrator. This respects the autonomy of the parties as expressed in their original 
agreement. Where a replacement arbitrator is not appointed then any award may be 
vacated for procedural irregularity under article 50(1) of the SAL 2012.827 
 
Although, as explained previously, the SAR provide a clearer and more 
comprehensive set of rules than either the Model Law or the SAL 2012, the 
substantive approach is broadly similar. Thus, consistent with the Model Law, both 
the SAL 2012 and the Scottish Act allow for the arbitrators to be removed and 
replaced where they are incapable of acting as arbitrator or where they caused undue 
delay by failing to fulfil their obligations. Perhaps the main substantive difference, 
apart from explicitly allowing the court the power to make an order regarding the 
arbitrator's entitlements and liabilities under mandatory r.16, is that the court's power 
to remove the arbitrator for causing an undue delay is limited to those cases where 
the delay has resulted in substantive injustice.828 This does not prevent the parties 
                                                 
827 Arbitration case, (2015 (1437H)) case no 37165818, Mecca Court of Appeal. 
828 SAR, mandatory rule 12(e). 
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from jointly removing an arbitrator who has caused a delay, but it does limit the 
court’s power where the parties are not in agreement. This shifts the balance towards 
the principle of autonomy, while still allowing the court to deal with cases where the 
delay results in a substantive consequence. This is more consistent with the spirit of 
arbitration than the approach under the Model Law and the SAL 2012. As such, the 
SAL 2012 could be improved by following the Scottish approach, both in terms of 
providing a clearer and more explicit set of rules, but also by limiting the court's 
power through an explicit requirement for a substantive injustice. Such an approach 
would further help to encourage a pro-arbitration culture and counter the criticisms 
made of the 1983 law, that the Saudi courts had too much scope for intervening in the 
arbitration process. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
The whole point of arbitration is to resolve a dispute between two or more parties in 
a way that provides an attractive alternative to litigation. This means the arbitration 
process must meet the needs of the parties and protect the interests of both the parties 
and the state that enables, facilitates and supports the process by enforcing the final 
award. While arbitration should be sufficiently flexible to allow the parties the 
autonomy to shape the proceedings to suit their needs, some interests are common to 
all parties. Because of their commonality, they coincide with the interests of any state 
seeking to attract commercial arbitration business. These interests constitute the 
procedural justice principles that the arbitration process should be effective, efficient 
and cost-effective. Also important are the principles of formal justice that the parties 
should be treated equally, and that the rules should clear and accessible. The formal 
principle of equality is given substance through the natural justice principle of audi 
alterem partem. It is further supported by the natural justice principle of nemo index 
in causa sua, which demands the independence and impartiality of arbitrators.  
 
All three legal frameworks explicitly provide for equality and the natural justice 
principles of audi alterem partem and nemo index in causa sua. This provides the 
necessary support for ensuring that arbitration is indeed formally just by requiring 
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that the tribunal is impartial, treats all parties equally and gives them an equal and 
'full' or 'reasonable' opportunity to be heard. On this, there is little to choose between 
the Model Law, the Scottish Act, and the SAL 2012, which provides for a 
procedurally just legal framework in line with the third subsidiary hypothesis. The 
real test is how the arbitration process works in practice and how the courts respond 
to any irregularities. If the experience of the Model Law in other countries is anything 
to go by, then the approach is likely to be one that sees the courts interfering only 
where a breach results in substantive injustice. It is, however, difficult to predict given 
the absence of any concept of precedence and the lack of any formal system for 
reporting judicial decisions.829  
 
All three legal frameworks provide the basis for a cost-effective process, albeit to 
different degrees. While the SAL 2012 is based on the Model Law, and 'relaxe[s] 
many of [the] once stringent conditions such as location, language and procedure of 
arbitration',830 it still imposes more formalities and restrictions on party autonomy. 
The negative impact of these differences on the flexibility of the arbitration process 
are offset, at least to a degree, by the greater efficiency and evidentiary certainty that 
they bring. They do, however, open the door for technical challenges, but these should 
not affect the award unless there has been a substantive injustice. It is, however, 
unfortunate that the SAL 2012 did not follow the example of the SAR and provide a 
comprehensive and accessible set of rules that provide flexibility through the default 
rules and protect formal, natural and procedural justice through clearly stated 
mandatory rules. It is also unfortunate that the SAL 2012 does not provide for rules 
on confidentiality. Furthermore, the SAL 2012 might be improved through the 
creation of a role like the arbitral appointments referee under the Scottish Act. 
Nevertheless, it is more liberal then the SAL 1983 and provides a reasonable 
implementation of the Model Law's approach to the arbitration tribunal and 
                                                 
829 Dina Elshurafa, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law and the Sharia factor: a friend or foe in 
construction?' (2012) 15 International Arbitration Law Review 132. 
830 Dina Elshurafa, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law and the Sharia factor: a friend or foe in 
construction?' (2012) 15 International Arbitration Law Review 132, 139. 
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proceedings,831 allowing the parties the freedom to define their own rules or to choose 
institutional rules, necessarily subject to Sharia compliance. 
 
In this chapter, the focus has been on the legal framework regulating the arbitration 
tribunal and proceedings. As with the approach throughout the thesis, the SAL 2012 
was assessed by examining how well it balanced the three core principles of ICA and 
it was suggested that the framework could be improved through the provision of a 
complete set of arbitration rules along with the creation of role like the Scottish 
arbitral appointments referee. In chapter five, the focus shifts to consider the balance 
between the core principles achieved by the legal framework in the context of the 
arbitration award. 
  
                                                 
831 See, Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 443, 455. These authors suggest the differences between the new KSA Law and 
the Model Law are 'superficial'. This analysis suggests that they understate the distinctions. 
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Chapter Five: Examination of the Core Principles in the Context of 
The Arbitration Award 
5.1 Introduction 
The goal of arbitration is to provide disputing parties with a solution that resolves 
their respective rights and obligations.832  It provides an alternative to litigation, but 
to be viable arbitration must offer the parties an advantage over litigation. This 
advantage is found primarily in the procedural flexibility afforded by arbitration 
compared to the more rigid formality of litigation. That procedural flexibility, which 
was considered in the previous chapter, however, cannot be achieved at the expense 
of a satisfactory outcome. No amount of flexibility can compensate for an inability to 
resolve the dispute. Regardless of arbitration’s appeal as a flexible mechanism for 
resolving disputes, no one will choose arbitration unless it can offer an effective 
solution.833 Barring settlement, that solution is found in the award 'rendered at the end 
of the arbitral process'.834 
 
The ability to effectively resolve the dispute by making an award is fundamental to 
the success of arbitration. Not any award will do, however, since it is unlikely that a 
wholly unjust award will provide an acceptable resolution. In a discussion of what 
parties want from arbitration, Paulsson pithily comments: 'We seek fairness, but settle 
for law'.835 This highlights the importance of justice embodied by the fairness of the 
procedure 'as consonant with [the] legitimate expectations' of the parties in their 'quest 
                                                 
832 Julian DM Lew, Loukas A Mistelis, Stefan Michael Kroll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003), 1-3 
833 The same might be said of other attractive features of arbitration, such as the expertise of the 
arbitrators, the freedom to select arbitrators, confidentiality: see, School of International Arbitration 
Queen Mary University of London, 2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and 
Innovations in International Arbitration (2015), 6. 
834 Michael Hwang SC, Yeo Chuan Tat, 'Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral awards' in 
Michael Hwang SC, Selected Essays in International Arbitration (Singapore International 
Arbitration Centre 2013) 237, 239. 
835 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2103), 14. 
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for civilized closure' of their dispute.836 As such, if arbitration is to be effective, and 
provide a desirable alternative to litigation, it must be capable of producing a just, 
acceptable and final award that resolves the parties’.837  
 
In identifying the goal of arbitration as an acceptable, just and final resolution to the 
dispute, it should be noted that these conditions are not independent of each other. 
The relationship between the three concepts is well illustrated by the saying attributed 
to Rudyard Kipling, that "nothing is ever settled until it is settled right".838 The parties 
expect that arbitration will result in a final, binding and enforceable award,839 but it 
is only final in the sense that it terminates the arbitration proceedings. In this chapter, 
the binding finality and enforcement of arbitration awards will be examined. The 
discussion will also address the nature of an award, the arbitrator's power to make an 
award, the procedure for making the award and the possibility of challenging the 
award. As with the preceding chapters, this examination will rely on the core 
principles of party autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness as the normative basis for 
the comparative analysis. 
 
5.2 The Nature of the Award 
Gaillard and Savage observe that: 'The concept of the arbitral award has been the 
subject of considerable debate', which is reflected in the lack of definition of the term 
in most of the instruments governing ICA.840 Blackaby et al similarly note: 'There is 
                                                 
836 Jan Paulsson, The Idea of Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2103), 13. 
837 Julian DM Lew, Loukas A Mistelis, Stefan Michael Kroll, Comparative International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2003), 6. 
838 Vladimir Balas, 'Review of Awards' in Peter Muchlinski, Frederico Ortino, Christoph Schreuer 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 1126. 
839 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Redfern & Hunter: Law 
and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015), 
1.101, 9.01-9.03. 
840 Emmanuel Gaillard, John Savage (eds), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 1999), 735-736. 
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no internationally accepted definition of the term "award"'.841 They suggest that: 'The 
term "award" should generally be reserved for decisions that finally determine the 
substantive issues with which they deal'.842 Moses also suggests that an "award" is 
the 'final decision by the arbitrators, dispositive of the issues of the case'.843 In 
principle, a final arbitration award should, then, at least have the force of res judicata, 
precluding further arbitration or litigation of the same dispute.844 Following these 
definitions, the arbitration award is, in the absence of a settlement, the mechanism for 
resolving the dispute between the parties and terminating the arbitration proceedings. 
Like a legal judgment, an arbitration award alters the parties' rights and obligations 
with the aim of restoring a balance that is a substantively acceptable solution to the 
parties' disagreement.  
 
5.3 The Arbitrator's Power to Make an Award and the Accompanying Duties  
As discussed in chapter two, the tribunal's power to make an award flows essentially 
from its jurisdictional authority generated by the parties’ agreement and enabled by 
national law.845  Implicit to this is the expectation that the arbitrators’ power will be 
exercised responsibly. The parties trust the arbitrators to act rationally and fairly in 
making an award and the transfer of power is made on the condition that the trust 
placed in the arbitrators will not be breached. This trust creates a moral duty that 
supports the legal duty imposed by the contract between the parties and the 
                                                 
841 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Redfern & Hunter: Law 
and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015), 9.05. 
842 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern, Martin Hunter, Redfern & Hunter: Law 
and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2015), 9.08. 
843 Margaret Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 
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844 Stavros Brekoulakis, 'The Effect if an Arbitral Award and third Parties in International 
Arbitration: Res Judicata Revisited' (2005) 16 American Review of International Arbitration 177; 
Margaret Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, 
Cambridge University Press 2012), 198. 
845 Susan D Franck, 'The Role of International Arbitrators' (2006) 12 ILSA Journal of International 
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262 
 
arbitrators.846 Furthermore, given that arbitration takes place within the context of a 
national legal system, the mandatory rules of the relevant national law create an 
additional source of duty on the arbitrators.847 These duties limit the extent of the 
arbitrators' power to make an award. 
 
The content of the arbitrators' moral duty may be determined by using Rawls' veil of 
ignorance as a theoretical device allowing a consideration of what the parties would 
want from arbitration if they did not know whether they were a claimant or a 
respondent. As Rawls explains:  
The idea ... is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed 
to will be just ... [by] nullify[ing] the effects of special 
contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit 
social and natural circumstances to their own advantage.848  
A good starting point is the result of a survey of parties involved in arbitration, which 
found that 81% of 130 participants ranked a "fair and just result" as the most important 
feature of arbitration, as previously discussed.849 This is further supported by the more 
recent 2013 survey discussed in chapter three, which emphasised the importance of 
both arbitrator neutrality and the expertise of the arbitrator.850  
 
The distinction between arbitrator neutrality and expertise reflects the distinction 
between procedural and substantive justice. Both are important, regardless of whether 
one is a claimant or a respondent. Although it is likely that opposing parties will have 
                                                 
846 Martin Platte, 'An Arbitrator's Duty to Render Enforceable Awards' (2003) 20 Journal of 
International Arbitration 307, 309. 
847 Gunther J Horvath, 'The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award' (2001) 18 Journal 
of International Arbitration 135, 138-140. 
848 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (The Belknap Press 1999), 118. 
849 Richard W Naimark, Stephanie E Keer, 'What do parties really want from international 
commercial arbitration?' 57 (2002) Dispute Resolution Journal 78, 80.  
850 School of International Arbitration Queen Mary University of London, Corporate choices in 
International Arbitration: Industry perspectives (2013), 1, 8. 
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different views of a substantively just outcome, from behind the veil of ignorance 
they are likely to agree that the arbitrator has a duty to make the award as "accurate" 
as possible.851 As Park explains: ‘The arbitrator should aim to get as near as 
reasonably possible to understanding what actually happened between the litigants, 
and how the pertinent legal norms apply to the controverted events’.852 This at least 
requires that the award is warranted because it is rationally based on the evidence and 
arguments presented during the hearing of the dispute.853 It might also be argued, 
however, that it implies a further duty to give reasons, explaining how the award is 
consistent with the facts and the parties' cases. Giving reasons may make it easier for 
the losing side to understand and accept the award.854 
 
In addition to the substantive duty of accuracy, the parties’ interest in justice also 
requires duties to be imposed on the tribunal to ensure a procedurally fair process.855 
These include ensuring that the arbitrators are independent of the dispute, precluding 
any conflict of interest. It also imposes the natural justice duty of equal treatment, 
requiring that the arbitrators are impartial and afford all parties an equal and sufficient 
opportunity to be heard.  
 
Related to both procedural and substantive justice, but fundamentally driven by the 
respect required for party autonomy is the obligation that the arbitrators remain within 
the limits of their jurisdictional authority. To make an award that exceeds the 
                                                 
851 William W Park, 'Arbitrators and Accuracy' (2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 
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boundaries of the tribunal's jurisdiction is to exceed the power granted by the parties' 
agreement and is both unjust and an infringement of the parties' right to determine the 
scope of the arbitration. 
 
While the duties to make an award that is both accurate and procedurally just are 
perhaps the most important, the arbitrators also have an obligation to ensure that the 
award is made without undue cost or delay.856 That the parties have an interest in the 
process being efficient and cheap is reflected consistently in survey responses, which 
show that cost857 and speed are considered important attributes, but less important 
than features serving the interests of justice.858 
 
A final, and important859 if controversial obligation, is the duty on the arbitrators to 
do 'their best to render an enforceable award'.860 In his empirical study, based partly 
on interviews with 20 practising arbitrators, Karton noted that the duty was taken 
seriously by the respondents, as an obligation ‘imbued ... with a kind of moral force'.  
Consider, for example, the response of a London-based barrister who 
acknowledged:861 
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a legal obligation on you and also, I would say, a moral obligation 
to very carefully consider the decision you're going to make. That 
for me is a key point. 
For Platte, this duty arises because the raison d'être of arbitration lies in the resolution 
of a dispute provided by a final, binding and enforceable award. Platte suggests that 
the duty may be satisfied by the arbitrator complying with both the lex arbitri and the 
NY Convention.862 Such a duty is recognised by, for example, the current 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules of Arbitration 2017, which provide 
under article 42 that: ‘… the Court and the arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit of 
the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable at 
law’.863 
 
While it is difficult to argue against the duty as Platte defines it, problems arise if it 
is relied on as a fundamental obligation without appreciating the need to more fully 
determine the nature of the duty. Boog et al, for example, note that:  
An arbitral tribunal’s duty to render an enforceable award is 
frequently used by commentators and counsel alike in support of 
positions on myriad matters ranging from procedural fairness and 
jurisdiction to the application of mandatory foreign law. Its 
considerable malleability has indeed made it very attractive as 
conceptual support for practically any argument.864 
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Such a duty, they suggest, may cause the tribunal to be overly prudent and affect its 
ability to conduct proceedings efficiently. They not only suggest that: 'there is little 
persuasive evidence that such a duty exists to the extent claimed', but also that: 
it is self-evident that the arbitral tribunal should make efforts, to the 
extent it can, to provide for enforceability of its award. But we do 
not need to, nor could we, capture every practical or common sense 
responsibility of the arbitral tribunal as a formal duty.  
 
Boog et al have a strong argument if, as they define it, the duty is to render an 
enforceable award. This, however, is not the duty as defined by Platte, or as reflected 
in the ICC rule. First, it is crucial to recognise that the duty is limited by what is 
feasible. Second, while it might be argued that complying with the mandatory rules 
of arbitration and the NY Convention are self-standing duties, a general duty has the 
advantage of providing explanatory force to the specific duties. It organises them 
through a general principle that allows the content of the duty to be developed or 
amended as arbitration changes. If, as Boog et al, acknowledge, the arbitration 
tribunal has a 'common sense responsibility' to make all feasible efforts to render an 
enforceable award, then the duty exists. Rather than leaving it as a vague matter of 
common sense, it is better to formalise and properly define the duty. As Menon 
comments, the global growth and professionalisation of arbitration,865 makes it: 
‘impossible for the industry to continue to depend on implied norms, understandings, 
peer standards, and shared values when these might no longer exist’.866 
 
Although the tribunal cannot guarantee enforceability, it can nevertheless be expected 
to do what is reasonable to ensure an enforceable award. This duty, however, must be 
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balanced against the interconnected duties of efficiency, respect for party autonomy 
and justice. Boog et al's argument against a duty to ensure enforceability emphasises 
the obligation of efficiency. Although time and cost are important, they do not 
outweigh the need for arbitration to be effective. This requires the process to produce 
an enforceable award. Winning an arbitration would be a Pyrrhic victory if the award 
is unenforceable. After all, the parties' interests are better served by acknowledging 
that arbitration’s primary goal is to resolve the dispute by making an enforceable 
award. It is cost-effectiveness, rather than efficiency per se, that must be balanced 
against justice and autonomy. The importance of focusing on cost-effectiveness, with 
the emphasis on effectiveness, is reflected in the results of the 2015 survey of ICA, 
which found that "enforceability" was ranked as one of the three most valuable 
characteristics of arbitration by 65% of respondents, while cost and lack of speed 
were ranked as one of the three worst features of arbitration by 68% and 36% 
respectively.867 
 
From behind the veil of ignorance, then, the following duties might be imposed on an 
arbitrator in relation to an arbitration award. First, accepting that enforceability cannot 
be guaranteed, it would be reasonable to expect the arbitrator to render an award in a 
manner that ensures that enforcement would not be refused under the NY Convention 
or the lex arbitri. While arbitration should be managed to maximise efficiency, 
effectiveness - and hence cost-effectiveness - should not be compromised by cost-
cutting shortcuts that jeopardise enforceability.  Second, the award must be consistent 
with party autonomy and the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Third, the arbitrators should act 
with fairness and impartiality in rendering the award. Fourth, the award should be 
based on a reasoned argument that accurately reflects the evidence and the parties' 
arguments. Finally, the reasons for the award should be made explicit, so that the 
parties can understand the justice of the award.  
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5.4 The Limits on the Arbitrator's Power to Make an Award and the 
Opportunity for Challenge 
In taking a dispute to arbitration, the parties place their trust in the arbitrators to 
efficiently make a just and enforceable decision, based on the evidence and arguments 
presented during the hearing of the dispute. The problem with trust is that it can be 
broken, whether intentionally or unintentionally. The consequence of such a breach 
of trust is an unfair or unenforceable award that fails to restore a just balance of rights 
and obligations between the parties, leaving the dispute inadequately resolved. This 
raises two issues: the ex ante limits to the tribunal's power to make an award, which 
determines its validity; and the ex post power afforded to the parties to challenge an 
award or resist its enforcement. 
 
Ex ante, the tribunal is constrained by the extent of the jurisdiction afforded by the 
parties' agreement and the procedural rules,868 which act to ensure that the arbitrators 
do not exceed their power and conduct the arbitration in a way that is fair to both 
parties. These constraints, which were discussed in chapters two and three, define the 
extent of both the arbitrators' power and their duties. Furthermore, in making a valid 
and enforceable award, the tribunal must comply with any formal requirements set 
down by the applicable rules of arbitration.869 Where the arbitration tribunal exceeds 
its power, or breaches its duty, then any adversely affected party may have grounds 
for challenging the award rendered by the tribunal. 
 
Once made, the award may still be open to limited judicial review, which raises the 
question of how to balance the values of legal accuracy, finality, efficiency, justice 
and autonomy.870 As a starting point, the opinion of the European Court of Justice 
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(ECJ) in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV, reflects the general 
attitude towards judicial review of arbitration. In deciding that the national courts of 
a member state must vacate an award that is contrary to fundamental community law, 
the ECJ observed that: 
it is in the interest of efficient arbitration proceedings that review of 
arbitration awards should be limited in scope and that annulment of 
or refusal to recognise an award should be possible only in 
exceptional circumstances.871 
Lying behind this attitude is the argument that the parties’ presumed intention is for 
the dispute to be arbitrated rather than litigated, with the arbitration award effectively 
resolving the dispute. This would allow the parties to put the issue behind them and 
return to "business as usual".872  
 
As Rogers explains:  
The standards for national court review of arbitral awards were 
designed with a strong pro-enforcement bias … The purpose of the 
pro-enforcement bias is to avoid having the substantive decision-
making effectively shifted back to national courts under the guise 
of award review, with attendant risk that awards would have less 
currency.873 
This highlights the tension between the need to ensure that the dispute is resolved by 
rendering a fair award and the need to respect the parties’ original intentions to resolve 
the matter through arbitration, rather than litigation. In defining the relationship 
between arbitration and litigation, there is a second tension between ensuring that the 
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award is just or correct and ensuring that the award is final and legally certain.874 
These tensions are resolved by allowing the parties the option of applying to the 
national courts for judicial review of the award, but limiting that review, in most 
jurisdictions, to the jurisdictional or procedural aspects the case.875 This review 
procedure provides the applicant with the possibility of having the award set aside, 
but is not an opportunity to appeal the tribunal's decision on its merits.876 
 
Although the international trend is to restrict any review to procedural or 
jurisdictional issues, in a significant minority of jurisdictions877 an application may 
be made to set aside the award because the tribunal made an error of law.878 
Jurisdictions that allow an application to be made where there has been an error of 
law notably include the US and England.879 The US approach provides a good starting 
point for considering whether the courts should have the power to set aside an award 
for legal error. 
 
US arbitration is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),880 which allows 
domestic arbitration awards to be vacated where there has been a manifest disregard 
of the law. The FAA is clear that the NY Convention applies to foreign awards, but 
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since the US Supreme Court decision in Hall Street Associates v Mattel, Inc.,881 the 
US Federal Courts of Appeal (circuit courts) are split on whether non-domestic 
awards rendered in the US may be set aside under the manifest disregard doctrine.882  
 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the US position in detail. The US 
approach, however, highlights two controversies regarding judicial review. First is 
the question of whether an award may be vacated where there has been an error of 
law. The second is whether the parties may expand the scope of judicial review by 
agreement. In Hall Street, the Supreme Court held that the grounds for vacating an 
award under the FAA were exclusive and could not be expanded by the parties. This 
issue will be discussed below, but for the present it is the impact of Hall Street on the 
manifest disregard doctrine that warrants consideration. Chen notes that, even before 
the Hall Street decision, the circuit courts had failed to develop a 'uniform standard', 
although it was generally applied restrictively and infrequently, and had been 
completely rejected by the Seventh Circuit.883 While Hall Street held that the grounds 
for vacating an award under the FAA were exclusive, it left open the possibility that 
the manifest disregard doctrine could nevertheless still be applied. The confusion 
caused by the Supreme Court has resulted in an inconsistent approach, with the 
doctrine applied by some,884 but not all the circuit courts.885 
 
                                                 
881 Hall Street Associates v Mattel, Inc 552 US 576 (2008). 
882 Annie Chen, 'The Doctrine of Manifest Disregard of the Law after Hall Street: Implications for 
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For Chen: 
The manifest disregard doctrine in theory can be a useful tool to 
ensure that arbitrators do not act in a manner that is clearly and 
fundamentally contrary to the law, which should be beyond the 
powers of any arbitrator.886 
She does however acknowledge that it provides losing parties with an extra ground 
for challenging an award, which may increase the cost of arbitration and make the US 
a less competitively attractive arbitration forum. Because of the disadvantages of 
allowing a challenge based on legal error, she goes on to argue that the doctrine 
remains useful in cases of mandatory arbitration, but not in the context of ICA 
involving sophisticated business parties who freely agree to arbitrate disputes.887 
Whether national laws should allow for an arbitration award to be vacated for legal 
error remains a controversy and both sides make valid points. One side argues that 
there is a need to protect parties from a tribunal's egregious failure to apply the law 
correctly. The other side argues that allowing litigation to vacate an award for legal 
error undermines the finality and efficiency of arbitration.888  
 
In England, the law has the certainty and clarity of a statutory provision. Under s.69 
of the English Act, subject to any contrary agreement, a party may apply to the court 
for review of an award 'on a point of law'. The court will only give leave where the 
tribunal's decision was 'obviously wrong' or where 'the question is one of general 
public importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious doubt'. 
Furthermore, leave will only be granted where, despite the agreement to arbitrate: 'it 
is just and proper in all the circumstances for the court to determine the question'. 
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This is a 'highly restrictive' approach that limits appeals to those awards resulting 
from a 'misapprehension or misapplication of the law', acknowledging that ordinarily 
it should be left to the arbitration tribunal, as 'the masters of the facts',889 to resolve 
the dispute.890 The limited scope for challenge is reflected in the findings of a survey 
of cases between 2009-2013 involving either s.68 or s.69, which found that less than 
2% of the 'more than 800 known cases' of arbitration held annually in England 
resulted in litigation.891 
 
The balance of interests reflected in s.69 depends on judicial interpretation and 
application, which is contingent on the judges’ attitude towards arbitration and their 
willingness to support rather than interfere with the arbitration process. Indeed, by 
comparison with the traditionally interventionist approach taken, inter alia, in Saudi 
Arabia under the now-repealed SAL 1983, it was observed that: 
what is notable … is the readiness of the English judges to recognise 
their limited scope of review under s.69 and to respect the parties' 
choice to submit their dispute to arbitration and the intended finality 
that flows from that choice.892 
 
This supportive attitude is reflected in Thornton J's interpretation of s.69(3)(d), that 
the court should only give leave to appeal on a point of law where it was 'just and 
proper in all the circumstances'. He stated: 
the court should take account of, and give weight to, the policy that 
ordinarily party autonomy should dictate that all questions in 
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dispute, including questions of law, should be decided by the 
arbitrator.893  
Thus, ‘[a]s a matter of general principle, the courts strive to uphold arbitral awards’.894 
Under s.69, then, the court's role is limited to those circumstances where it would be 
patently unjust or contrary to the public interest to allow the award to stand without 
review. It strikes a reasonable balance between the state's interest in justice and the 
value of respecting the autonomy of the arbitration process. Crucially, party 
autonomy is respected by allowing the parties to exclude judicial review on a point 
of law through the arbitration agreement.  
 
The English approach has the advantage of providing the opportunity to make an 
application to the courts while leaving the choice of precluding such an option up to 
the parties. This achieves a better balance of the interests served by arbitration than 
does an approach that completely precludes the court from addressing errors of law. 
While the standard position is to argue that the choice to arbitrate reflects an intention 
to resolve a dispute exclusively through arbitration, 'it cannot be assumed that every 
party who elects to go to arbitration necessarily wishes to preclude the possibility of 
an appeal on a point of law'.895 Indeed, a ten-year review of the Act, which surveyed 
522 respondents, found that 60% supported the retention of s.69.896 Furthermore, 
although a minority preference, 17% of respondents in the 2015 survey of ICA 
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highlighted the lack of an appeal mechanism on the merits as one of the three worst 
features of arbitration.897  
 
The value of the English approach is that it reduces injustice and, most importantly, 
provides parties with the choice of excluding the default right to appeal on a point of 
law.898 It could, however, even be argued that, despite preserving the option for legal 
error review, s.69 is too restrictive, allowing 'erroneous decisions to go uncorrected 
and inhibit[ing] the development of commercial law'.899 Regardless of whether 
English law has achieved an appropriate balance of interests, it at least seems that 
s.69 has not prevented London from remaining one of the five most popular 
arbitration seats.900 This suggests that the approach is acceptable, at least to 
commercial parties, if not to purists who prefer arbitration to be wholly autonomous. 
 
Turning to the issue of whether parties should be able to expand the scope for review 
of the award. This raises the question of how much control should the parties be 
afforded over the arbitration process.901 If arbitration is conceived of as a wholly 
autonomous system of private dispute resolution, then this issue should be fully 
resolved by market mechanics and a respect for party autonomy. The implication of 
party autonomy, as the 'foundation' of arbitration, is that: 'the parties own the dispute 
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and should be able to control the details of their disputing process'.902 It follows from 
this that the arbitration institutions should allow the parties to determine the balance 
between, efficiency, legal accuracy and the finality of the award by affording them 
control over the option of an appeal mechanism.903 If the demand is there,904 then it 
both respects party autonomy and makes commercial sense for arbitration institutions 
to provide an appeal mechanism, including the option of an appeal on the merits of 
the tribunal's decision. This assumes, however, that the process of review is managed 
internally by the arbitration system. Although some international arbitration 
institutions, such as the European Court of Arbitration,905 have established internal 
arbitration appeal mechanisms,906 arbitration currently still relies substantially on the 
national legal system to provide access to the courts for review. 
 
The reliance on the national courts for review of the award impacts on the issue for 
two main reasons. First, the uneasy relationship between arbitration and litigation, 
coupled with the current emphasis on judicial non-interventionism, creates a pressure 
on the national legal system to limit the review of the award and to resist any 
expansion of this restrictive approach. Second, the national legal system is a public 
institution controlled by government and the public interest, rather than the private 
interests of the parties to the arbitration. Since the protection of individual rights is a 
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matter of public interest, the extent of that protection is not something that should be 
left completely to private negotiation. This does not mean that the parties should have 
no control over the involvement of the court. If party autonomy is a crucial source of 
the power granted to the arbitration tribunal, then it should also be afforded an 
appropriate role in defining the nature of the relationship between arbitration and 
litigation.907 It does mean, however, that the maximum involvement of the courts is 
something that should be determined by the government pursuant to its policy goals. 
Thus, in Hall Street Associates, the US Supreme Court emphasised that the FAA 
implemented national policy, which was reflected in the provisions of the Act that 
clearly set out the availability of judicial review leaving no scope for expansion 
through a private contractual agreement.908 
 
The state's interest in ensuring that arbitration is a procedurally fair system, means 
that the parties should not be able to completely preclude a review by the courts. Thus, 
national law should determine both the maximum and the minimum levels of 
intervention. This leaves a bounded, but valuable, opportunity for the parties to decide 
the scope of judicial review and manage the risk of an unjust award, self-determining 
the balance between efficiency and finality.909 Under s.69 of the English Act, for 
example, the parties can apply to the courts for review where there has been a legal 
error, but that option may be waived through the arbitration agreement. Alternatively, 
a similar balance of interests may be achieved through an opt-in approach, rather than 
the opt-out provision of s.69. This is, for example, the approach taken in Hong Kong 
and provides a more emphatic respect for the process of arbitration reflected in the 
finality of the award.910 
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How far the courts should be involved in reviewing arbitration awards depends on 
how one conceives the system of arbitration and its relationship to litigation. While a 
fully autonomous system of arbitration is the ideal, a hybrid system is more consistent 
with arbitration in practice. The reliance on the national legal system to facilitate the 
arbitration process and enforce the award, provides the courts with the justification 
and opportunity to provide the parties with a measure of public protection to ensure 
that the arbitration process is at least minimally just. The international trend is for any 
judicial review to be limited to issues of procedural justice. Some jurisdictions, 
however, also allow judicial review on points of law. Thus, with the precise scope of 
the review dependent on the jurisdiction, the parties have the option of applying to a 
national court of the seat to have the arbitration award set aside or varied.911 
 
5.5 Enforcement and the NY Convention 
As an alternative to challenging the award in the place of arbitration, a losing party 
may also seek to prevent the award being enforced.912 Enforcement of an ICA award 
is subject to the provisions of the NY Convention, which was developed in response 
to the demand for cross-border enforceability of arbitration awards that accompanied 
the growth of global commerce and transnational contracts.913 For Slate: '[t]he 
singular importance of the New York Convention cannot be overstated'.914 He further 
explains that: '[t]he proverbial bottom line here is that millions of business 
agreements, worldwide, rely upon the enforceability of an international award 
promised in the New York Convention'.915 
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The importance of the NY Convention flows from its instrumental role in achieving 
harmonisation and effective enforcement, which are two of the main characteristics 
that make ICA an attractive option.916 Its importance has increased since its inception 
in 1958, which is evidenced by the growing reliance on the NY Convention in cases 
brought before the courts. In a survey of US case law, Strong noted that between 
1970-1979, US federal courts referred to the NY Convention in 30 decisions. By the 
2000-2009 period, this had risen to 544 decisions. The trend continued in 2010-2011 
and a similar trend is apparent in the UK.917 
 
The impact of the NY Convention is such that Redfern, who acknowledges its 'great 
significance' as the 'foundation stone of modern international arbitration', is plausibly 
able to claim that: '[i]f parties are looking for a binding and enforceable decision on 
an international dispute, to be given by a neutral and independent tribunal, then 
international arbitration is "the only game in town"'.918 Indeed, its ongoing 
significance is both recognised and ensured by the number of countries, which 
currently stands at 157, that have become parties to the NY Convention. This includes 
both Scotland, as part of the UK, and Saudi Arabia, which signed and ratified the 
Convention in 1994.919 Because both Saudi and Scotland are parties to the NY 
Convention, it is worth considering its main provisions before addressing the 
domestic law of those two countries. 
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The NY Convention creates a 'strong presumption in favour of enforcement',920 that 
applies, under article I, to all foreign and non-domestic awards. The scope of this 
latter type of award is determined by the state in which enforcement is sought and 
may include those awards made in the enforcement state: under a foreign law; where 
there is a foreign or international element; or where the arbitration was not governed 
by national law.921 Under article I(3), recognition and enforcement may be 
reciprocally restricted to those awards rendered by other parties to the convention. 
Subject to subsequent provisions, article III requires contracting states to: ‘recognize 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure 
of the territory where the award is relied upon ...’ 
 
Despite the presumption in favour of enforcement, the NY Convention allows 
contracting state parties the discretion to refuse recognition and enforcement where 
the award satisfies one of the seven exhaustive grounds for refusal set out in article 
V. Under article V, enforcement 'may be refused' where: the original arbitration 
agreement was invalid under the national relevant law; the arbitration process 
breached the natural justice requirements that parties are given adequate notice and 
opportunity to present their case; the arbitration tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction; the 
tribunal composition or procedure was not consistent with the arbitration agreement 
or the national law; the award has been vacated; the subject matter is not arbitrable in 
the country where enforcement is sought; enforcement 'would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country'. 
 
It should be noted that these grounds cover jurisdictional errors, procedural flaws and 
matters of public policy, but do not allow refusal for errors of fact or law. In other 
words, there is no jurisdiction to refuse enforcement based solely on substantive 
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injustice or the merits of the case. The substantive elements of the case are relevant 
only insofar as they are evidence that the tribunal exceeded its authority.  
 
It should also be noted that the consequence of a refusal of recognition does not mean 
that the award has been set aside. The effect of the court's judgment is restricted to its 
own jurisdiction and the affected party may still seek enforcement of the award in 
another jurisdiction. Indeed, one of the features of, or issues with, the NY Convention 
is that it allows the moving party to initiate actions simultaneously, or sequentially, 
in multiple courts.922 Since one of the grounds for refusal of enforcement is the fact 
that the award has been vacated by the national courts of the country in which the 
award was rendered, the distinction between vacatur and a refusal of enforcement is 
crucial. Unlike a refusal of enforcement, the effect of vacatur extends beyond the 
jurisdiction of the court that sets aside the award. Controversially, however, article 
VII of the NY Convention allows a party to seek enforcement of an award vacated by 
the jurisdiction in which the award was rendered.923 Since, under article V, the refusal 
of enforcement is discretionary,924 the door is left open for a national court of the state 
where enforcement is sought to enforce an award that has been vacated by the foreign 
court.925 
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5.5.1 The NY Convention and the public policy exception 
One of the criticisms levied at the NY Convention is that it allows national courts to 
favour state owned, or even local, companies over foreign parties. This bias, evidence 
of which may be found in the experience of seeking enforcement in Russia,926 is 
facilitated by allowing public policy as a ground for refusing to enforce an award.927 
Glusker highlights, in particular, the 'notorious case' of United World Ltd v Krasny 
Yakor, in which the court of cassation refused to enforce an award on the "public 
policy" grounds that 'it would lead to Red Anchor's bankruptcy and consequently 
adversely affect the regional economy and the Russian Federation as a whole'.928  
 
The problem with the concept of public policy is that it is inherently vague and 
difficult to define, which allows states to protect interests central to their identity, 
while preventing its misuse to protect its economic interests. Given its importance to 
national sovereignty, however, it is unlikely that any reform of the NY Convention 
would remove the public policy exception.929 Despite the possibility for abuse, and 
the Russian experience, the public policy (and arbitrability) exceptions, as Gaillard 
claims, 'have not created great disharmony where one might have thought they 
would'.930  
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The relatively harmonious application of the public policy exception is perhaps a 
consequence of the national courts' willingness to rely on the spirit of the NY 
Convention when interpreting its provisions. In Parsons & Whittemore v Societe 
Generale De L'Industrie Du Papier (RAKTA), for example, the US Court of Appeals 
(2nd circ) looked to the history of the NY Convention, which reflected a pro-
enforcement bias. The court relied on this to argue that: the defence should be 
'construed narrowly’, with enforcement denied: 'only where enforcement would 
violate the forum State’s most basic notions of morality and justice'.931 From the 
perspective of an Islamic country, such as Saudi Arabia, this crucially allows the 
public policy exception to apply where the award contravenes the Sharia. This is 
similarly illustrated by the approach of the Tehran Court of Appeal, which refused to 
enforce the part of an award that ordered the payment of compound interest. This was 
deemed to be riba, which is forbidden by Sharia and so was considered contrary to 
Iranian public policy.932 
 
5.6 The Law Governing the Arbitration Award and Recourse Against the Award 
5.6.1 Interim measures and preliminary orders 
While the focus of this analysis is on the final award, it should first be noted that the 
Model Law, under article 17 and articles 17A to G, allows the tribunal, unless 
precluded by the parties' agreement, to grant interim measures and preliminary orders. 
Under article 17J, the national court is similarly afforded the power to grant interim 
measures. An interim measure is defined as 'any temporary measure' granted prior to 
the final award with the intention of preserving evidence and/or assets.933 They must 
be enforced by the court unless one of the grounds under article 17I is satisfied.934 
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These are the same as for final awards, with additional grounds that are specific to 
interim measures. These are: that the security conditions attached to the measure have 
not been complied with; that the interim measure has been suspended or terminated; 
or that the 'interim measure is incompatible with the powers conferred upon the court'. 
The court has no power to 'review ... the substance of the interim measure'.935  
 
In support of an application for an interim measure, article 17B allows the applicant 
to request a preliminary order 'directing a party not to frustrate the purpose of the 
interim measure'. Like the power to award an interim measure, the power to grant a 
preliminary order may be precluded by the parties' agreement. While a preliminary 
order is binding, it is not considered an award and is not enforceable by a court.936 
 
From a procedural justice perspective, article 17C requires that the other party be 
notified and given the opportunity to be heard and raise objection. To avoid any 
substantive injustice, article 17D allows the interim measure and preliminary order to 
be modified, suspended or terminated. Furthermore, the applicant is under an ongoing 
obligation to disclose any relevant matters to the tribunal,937 may be required to 
provide 'appropriate security',938 and may subsequently be ordered to pay costs and 
damages: 'if the tribunal later determines that, in the circumstances, the measure or 
the order should not have been granted'.939 
 
While using a different terminology, the SAR provide for a default power allowing 
the tribunal to 'make a provisional award granting any relief on a provisional basis 
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which it has the power to grant permanently'.940 This includes the power to 'order a 
party to refrain from doing something',941 which, as with the Model Law, allows the 
tribunal to preserve evidence or assets to ensure justice at the enforcement stage and 
a meaningful final award. As with the Model Law, this is supported by the courts' 
power to grant interdict or 'any other interim or permanent order'.942 The parties must 
be formally notified of any provisional award.943 Perhaps the only significant 
difference between the two approaches is that the Model Law distinguishes between 
interim measures, which are enforceable by a court, and preliminary orders, which 
are not. Under the SAR, however, there is no such distinction, with provisional orders 
characterised as provisional awards, making them enforceable by the courts.944 
 
Turning to the SAL 2012, which provides for provisional remedies under articles 22 
and 23. Under article 23, the parties are free to agree that that the tribunal may make 
a provisional or conservatory order, if so requested by one of the parties. Under article 
22, any of the parties may apply to the court before the arbitration proceedings have 
commenced for an order for provisional or conservatory measures. The arbitration 
tribunal may also make an independent application to the court for a provisional 
measures order at any point during the proceedings. This latter power is presumably 
contingent on the parties' agreeing, under article 23, that the tribunal may make 
provisional or conservatory orders at the request of one of the parties. 
 
These two articles provide far less detail than the Model Law regarding the nature of 
the provisional measures. Under article 23, the tribunal is simply granted the 
discretionary power to make whatever measures are 'appropriate, with regard to the 
nature of the dispute'. This lack of detail allows more discretion than under the Model 
                                                 
940 SAR, r 53. 
941 SAR, r 49. 
942 SAR, r 46. 
943 SAR, r 51(3), r 83. 
944 But see also the availability of tribunal directions under rule 31. 
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Law provisions, which require that any such interim measures are justified by a harm-
benefit analysis and that: 'There is a reasonable possibility that the requesting party 
will succeed on the merits of the claim'.945 In this regard, the approach under the SAL 
2012 is closer to the approach under the Scottish Act, which affords the tribunal the 
power to make any award on a provisional basis that it has the power to make as a 
final award.  
 
Articles 22 and 23 of the SAL 2012 'represent a significant liberalization' of the 
approach under the SAL 1983, making the Saudi arbitration regime more consistent 
with the current international approach.946 By allowing the parties to control whether 
provisional measures should be available, the SAL 2012 respects party autonomy. It 
is, however, unfortunate that it makes no formal provision for notification or the 
opportunity to object to the measures. It may, nevertheless, be argued that article 27, 
which requires equal treatment and the 'full opportunity’ to present their case, obliges 
the tribunal to allow the parties to object to a provisional measure. Finally, articles 22 
and 23, while liberalising the law, suffer from a lack of clarity that could be improved 
by redrafting the provisions, particularly regarding the relationship between the 
tribunal's powers under the two articles. 
 
5.6.2 The nature and form of the final arbitration award 
In resolving the dispute and making the final award, article 28 of the Model Law 
requires the tribunal to respect party autonomy. The tribunal must apply the rules of 
law as chosen by the parties, which may not be limited to the rules of a single legal 
system.947 The decision must also be 'in accordance with the terms of the contract'. 
This respect for party autonomy is further emphasised by the condition that the 
tribunal may decide 'ex aequo bono or as an amiable compositeur' only if 'expressly 
                                                 
945 Model Law, article 17A. 
946 Jean-Pierre Harb, Alexander G Leventhal, 'The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to the 
Tune of Shari'a’ (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration 113, 119. 
947 Gerold Herrmann, 'UNCITRAL's Work Towards a Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration' (1984) 4 Pace Law Review 537, 558. 
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authorized' by the parties. Furthermore, the tribunal must consider any 'usages of the 
trade applicable to the transaction'. While not strictly reflecting a respect for party 
autonomy, this provision is nevertheless consistent with such a respect since it relies 
on the norms of trade practice and published principles of good practice,948 which are 
likely to coincide with the expectations of the parties.  
 
In the interests of cost-effectiveness, the tribunal may choose the applicable law, 
through conflict-of-law rules, where the parties have failed to specify it.949 Also in 
the interests of cost-effectiveness, article 29 of the Model Law provides that the 
tribunal decision will be valid if agreed by a majority of the tribunal. This is subject 
to any contrary agreement of the parties, which ensures that party autonomy remains 
the dominant concern. Similarly, cost-effectiveness is enhanced by allowing that 
purely procedural issues may be determined by a presiding arbitrator, but only 'if so 
authorized by the parties or all members of the arbitral tribunal'. 
 
Although not defined by the Model Law, the Ontario Court of Appeal defined a final 
award as 'the judgement or order of an arbitral tribunal that "disposes of part or all of 
the dispute between the parties”'.950 The Model Law allows final awards to be made 
either on the basis of the tribunal's decision or, under article 30, as a consent award 
to implement the terms of a settlement agreed by the parties. Where the award is based 
on the parties' settlement, the tribunal may only record it as an award if so requested 
by the parties. As such, article 30 both respects party autonomy and provides a 
                                                 
948 Federal Supreme Court, Switzerland, 16 December 2009, Decision 4A_240/2009, (2011) 30 ASA Bull 457. 
The court held that it was appropriate for the tribunal to rely on the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts 2004. 
949 Model Law, article 28. 
950 Inforica Inc v CGI Information Systems and Management Consultants Inc (2009) ONCA 642, 
[29]. 
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mechanism for ensuring that any such settlement, assuming it is properly recorded,951 
will acquire the status of an arbitration award and be enforceable by national courts.952 
 
Article 31 of the Model Law sets out the ex ante formal requirements for the validity 
of the final award. It must be in writing and signed by the majority of the tribunal, 
which provides evidentiary certainty where the award is subsequently challenged. 
Subject to any contrary agreement between the parties, the tribunal’s reasons must be 
stated, but the Model Law is silent on the scope of this duty. It is arguable, however, 
that the arbitrator's duty should be less demanding than the obligation on a judge to 
explain a judicial decision.953 Arbitration is of a fundamentally different nature to 
litigation and the extent of the duty should be limited by the balance between justice 
and those of cost-effectiveness. Thus, as the New South Wales' Court of Appeal 
observed, the arbitrators should not be required to set out a full explanation of how 
they reached their decision, but should provide a '[crisp summary] statement of factual 
findings and legal or other reasons' for the award.954 This requires the reasons, but not 
necessarily the reasoning, for an award.  
 
The extent of the explanation required depends on the complexity of the case,955 but 
any obligation to provide complete reasons may be balanced against the value of 
achieving finality in the award. Thus, the Swedish Supreme Court explained that, 
                                                 
951 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt aM, Germany, 3 Sch 01/99, 28 June 1999 
<http://www.disarb.de/en/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-frankfurt-am-case-no-3-sch-01-99-date-1999-06-
28-id49> accessed 30 November 2017; Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt aM, Germany, 20 Sch 01/02, 14 
March 2003 <http://www.disarb.de/en/47/datenbanken/rspr/olg-frankfurt-am-case-no-20-sch-01-02-
date-2003-03-14-id240> accessed 30 November 2017. 
952 Yaraslau Kryvoi, Dmitry Davydenko, 'Consent Awards in International Arbitration: From 
Settlement to Enforcement' (2015) 40 Brook Journal of International Law 827, 835. 
953 But see: Oil Basins Ltd v BHP Billiton Ltd [2007] VSCA 255 (Australia). 
954 Gordian Runoff Ltd v Westport Insurance Corporation [2010] NSWCA 57 (Australia), [218-220]. 
See also: Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Westzucker GmbH (No 2) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Reports 
130, 132-133; Bay Hotel and Resort Ltd v Cavalier Construction Ltd [2001] UKPC 34, [25]. 
955 Westport Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd [2011] HCA 37 (Australia), [53]; Geoff 
Farmsworth, 'Sufficiency of Reasons in Arbitration Awards' (2012) 26 Australian and New Zealand 
Maritime Law Journal 69, 72, 75. 
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while the obligation served as 'a guardian of the rule of law', an award would only be 
vacated where there was 'a total lack of reasons, or reasons that are so lacking that 
they can be equated to a total lack of reasons'.956 However, the reasons must make 
sense and be consistent with the decision, supporting it without contradiction.957  
 
As discussed earlier, the obligation to provide reasons derives from the arbitrator's 
duty to make an award that accurately reflects the correct application of the law to the 
circumstances of the case. While a reasoned award may provide the information 
necessary for an appeal on a matter of law,958 the duty has a wider significance. The 
Model Law precludes judicial review on the merits of the case, which makes the duty 
to give reasons particularly significant as a way of demonstrating the justice of the 
decision.959 An obligation to give reasons reinforces the legitimacy of the arbitration 
process as a rational mechanism for resolving disputes,960 serves to guard against 
arbitrary decision-making and mitigates any sense of injustice from an unwelcome 
decision.961 As the Victoria Supreme Court explained, the obligation:  
is grounded in the notion that justice should not only be done but 
be seen to be done ... deriv[ing] from the fundamental conception 
                                                 
956 Case No T4387-07, Soyak International Construction & Investment Inc v Hochtief AG, 31 March 
2009, Stockhokm, Swedish Supreme Court, translation from 
<http://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com> accessed 30 November 2017. Sweden did not implement 
the Model Law, but it did provide an important 'source of inspiration' for the Swedish Arbitration Act 
1999, see: Harald Nordenson, Marie Ohrstrom, 'Arbitration in Sweden' in Torsten Lorcher, Guy 
Pendell, Jeremy Wilson (eds) CMS Guide to Arbitration, vol 1, (4th edn, CMS Legal 2012) 845, 847. 
957 CLOUT case No 569, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 11 Sch 01/01, 8 June 
2001 <http://www.disarb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/hanseat-olg-hamburg-az-11-sch-01-01-datum-
2001-06-08-id1274> accessed 30 November 2017. 
958 Trave Schiffartsgesellschaft mbH v Ninemia Maritime Corporation [1986] QB 802, 807 per Sir 
John Donaldson MR. 
959 Peter Gillies, Niloufer Selvadurai, 'Reasoned Awards: How Extensive Must the Reasoning Be?' 
(2008) 74 Arbitration 125, 126. 
960 Trave Schiffartsgesellschaft mbH v Ninemia Maritime Corporation [1986] QB 802, 808 per Sir 
John Donaldson MR; SI Strong, 'Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: 
Embracing and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy' (2015) 37 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1, 20. 
961 Lord Justice Bingham, 'Differences Between a Judgment and a Reasoned Award' (1988) 16 
Arbitration International 141. 
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of fairness that a party should not be bound by a determination 
without being apprised of the basis on which it was made.962 
 
The award is treated as the final resolution of the dispute,963 which means 'all matters 
that the arbitral tribunal was expected to decide',964 so terminating the proceedings 
and the tribunal’s mandate. This, however, does not preclude the correction of errors 
in the award.965 The power to correct a mistake in the award is not subject to the 
parties' agreement, although the parties may vary the thirty-day limitation period. 
Within that period, the parties may request the tribunal to explain a specific point or 
correct a mistake in the award, which prevents the award from becoming binding until 
the matter is resolved.966 Any interpretation provided by the tribunal becomes part of 
the award, which makes it part of the substance of the award and not open to 
subsequent judicial review. The tribunal may also correct errors on its own initiative. 
In neither case may the award be recalled, reversed or revised by the correction of 
substantive errors of judgment.967 Reflecting the finality of the decision, the power to 
correct the award is restricted to 'errors in computation, any clerical or typographical 
errors or any errors of a similar nature',968 which includes errors of omission, drafting, 
and calculation.969  
 
                                                 
962 Oil Basins Ltd v BHP Billiton Ltd [2007] VSCA 255 (Australia), [56]. 
963 Model Law, article 32. 
964 Tang Boon Jek Jeffrey v Tan Poh Leng Stanley [2001] 3 SLR 237 (CA, Singapore). 
965 Model Law, article 33. 
966 CLOUT case No 625, Relais Nordik Inc v Secunda Marine Services Limited and Anor, Federal 
Court, Canada, 12 April 1990. 
967 CLOUT case No 207, Arb no 6 of 1996, 6 February 1998, Singapore International Arbitration 
Centre; Tan Poh Leng Stanley v Tang Boon Jek Jeffrey [2001] 1 SLR 624. 
968 Model Law, article 33(1)(a). 
969 CLOUT case No 625, Relais Nordik Inc v Secunda Marine Services Limited and Anor, Federal 
Court, Canada, 12 April 1990; CLOUT case No 267, Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Commission v 
Genius Joel Maposa, Harare High Court, Zimbabwe, 29 March and 9 December 1998. 
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The tribunal may also, subject to any contrary agreement between the parties, respond 
to a request from one of the parties 'to make an additional award as to claims presented 
in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the award'.970 This power provides a 
substantive justice safeguard to ensure all claims are resolved. Again, the time limit 
is thirty days, which does not unduly interfere with the finality of the original award. 
It does, however, seem inconsistent with the absence of any power to correct 
substantive errors within the same limited period. 
 
Turning to Scots law, r.47(1) of the SAR respects party autonomy by requiring the 
tribunal to resolve the dispute: 'in accordance with - (a) the law chosen by the parties 
as applicable to the substance of the dispute'. Under r.47(2), the parties may also agree 
that the tribunal should resolve the dispute based on 'general considerations of justice, 
fairness or equity'. In resolving the dispute, the tribunal must consider: relevant 
contractual provisions; 'normal commercial or trade usage' to aid interpretation of the 
contract; 'established commercial or trade customs'; and 'any other matter which the 
parties agree is relevant in the circumstances'.971 While not identical, this is consistent 
with the approach under article 28 of the Model Law, except that article 28 refers to 
the 'rules of law' rather than the law. As noted above, this means that the parties are 
not restricted to choosing the rules of law from a single jurisdiction. By referring to 
‘the law chosen’, rather than the ‘rules of law’, it appears that the SAR do not afford 
the parties the same freedom. It should be noted, however, that r.47 is a default rule 
and so may be excluded by the parties. 
 
Like the Model Law, the approach under the SAR is not just about party autonomy, 
but also addresses the need for cost-effectiveness. Thus, like article 28(2), r.47(1)(b) 
of the SAR allows the tribunal to determine the applicable law where the parties have 
failed to decide. The SAR also provide, under r.30, for how the award should be 
determined where the tribunal are not unanimous. This includes allowing a majority 
                                                 
970 Model Law, article 33(3). 
971 SAR, r 47(3). 
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decision or, where there is no majority, by the nominated chair, the last arbitrator 
appointed or an appointed umpire.  
 
The SAR provides a more comprehensive framework than the Model Law, resolving 
any issues where a tribunal is comprised of an even number of arbitrators who are 
unable to make a majority decision. While in most cases the Model Law and SAR 
will function similarly, the SAR have usefully closed the lacuna left by the Model 
Law. Under article 10, the Model Law allows the tribunal to be comprised of an even 
number of arbitrators, but provides no mechanism for dealing with cases where such 
a tribunal is unable to make a majority decision. The approach under r.30, then, 
provides a framework that more completely ensures a cost-effective process. By 
relying on a default rule that may be varied or excluded, party autonomy is also 
respected. 
 
Like the Model Law, the Scottish Act does not formally define an award, but a 
definition may be derived from the provisions of the SAR. As with article 32 of the 
Model Law, r.57 provides that the arbitration process is terminated by the final or 'last 
award'. Like article 30 of the Model Law, r.57(3) allows for the termination of the 
proceedings where the parties settle the dispute, and that settlement may be 
formalised as an enforceable award.972 While the Model Law is silent on type of 
remedies that may be awarded, the SAR mandate a monetary award, including 
payment for damages,973 and the payment of interest.974 Other remedies, which are 
subject to the parties' agreement, allows the tribunal to make: a declaratory order; an 
order for performance or non-performance; or an order to rectify or reduce any deed 
or other document.975 
                                                 
972 SAR, r 57(4). 
973 SAR, r 48. 
974 SAR, r 50. 
975 SAR, r 49. 
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Like the Model Law, the default r.83 treats the award as a formal communication, 
requires it to be in writing, signed by all assenting arbitrators,976 and formally 
delivered to the parties. Subject to the agreement of the parties, any award made under 
the Scottish Act is be treated as an award made in Scotland,977 which means that it 
may only be set aside by a Scottish court. Under mandatory r.54, the tribunal may 
make the award in whole or in parts. Furthermore, subject to the parties' agreement, 
the tribunal may issue a draft award, allowing the parties to make representations 
regarding the draft, which must be considered by the tribunal within a time limit set 
as part of the draft award process.978  
 
The draft award facility, which is not available under the Model Law, should alert the 
tribunal to potential issues before the award is finalised. This allows the tribunal to 
resolve those issues, avoiding a subsequent challenge. While it may slightly prolong 
the arbitration process, that delay is more than offset by the advantage of greater 
certainty regarding the finality of the award. Where a subsequent challenge is 
avoided, then cost-effectiveness is enhanced. Furthermore, allowing the parties to be 
engaged in the drafting process respects their autonomy and may improve the 
accuracy of the final award. 
 
Like article 31(2) of the Model Law, r.51 requires the tribunal to give reasons for the 
award. The duty was clarified in Arbitration Application 1 of 2013, in which Lord 
Woolman took a pragmatic approach, explaining: ‘The nature and length of the 
reasons ... depend upon the whole context’. Providing the reasons are ‘sufficient to 
explain the conclusion’, they need only ‘deal with the essential issues, not every 
point’.979 This duty is a default rule, which may be excluded by the parties' agreement. 
If, however, the parties chose to disapply the rule, then this will also 'exclude the 
                                                 
976 SAR, r 51. 
977 SAR, r 52. 
978 SAR, r 55. 
979 In Arbitration Application 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83, [23-24]. 
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court's jurisdiction to consider a legal error appeal'.980 Without undermining the wider 
significance of the obligation to give reasons, this makes explicit the connection 
between the duty and the ability of the court to assess the merits of the award. 
 
Subject to the contrary agreement of the parties, r.58 affords the tribunal 'significant' 
power to correct an award,981 either on its own initiative or following an application 
by one of the parties, which must be made within 28 days of the final award. As with 
the Model Law, the corrections are restricted to formal rather than substantive errors. 
Thus, the tribunal cannot revise the award, but for procedural compliance may correct 
clerical errors, typographical errors and errors of omission. It may also modify the 
wording to 'clarify or remove any ambiguity in the award'. The 28-day time limit 
relates to the 30 days under the Model Law, limiting any impact on the efficiency of 
the process. Unlike the Model Law, however, r.58(5) requires that the tribunal gives 
the parties 'a reasonable opportunity to make representations about the proposed 
correction'. This serves the natural justice duty that obliges the tribunal to ensure that 
each party has a fair opportunity to be heard and may reduce the risk that the award 
will subsequently be challenged by a party objecting to the corrections. 
 
Turning to the SAL 2012. Article 38 effectively implements article 28 of the Model 
Law. Although using different wording and structure, the substance of the provisions 
is the same except in two matters. First, article 38(1) imposes an obligation on the 
tribunal to ensure that the arbitration proceedings and award will not contravene 
Sharia or Saudi public policy. This constrains, but is consistent with the arbitrators' 
duty to do what is reasonable to ensure an enforceable award. The content of that duty 
is determined by the grounds available for challenge. As such, article 38(1) usefully 
clarifies part of that duty, but does not extend it.  
 
                                                 
980 SAR, r 69(2). 
981 In Arbitration Application 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83, [15]. 
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Second, in addition to considering trade usages when issuing an award, the tribunal 
is also required, under article 38(1)(c), to consider the 'practice and the previous 
dealings between the parties'. This reflects what the parties might reasonably expect 
and may be useful to the tribunal when tailoring the award to all the circumstances of 
the case. It is, however, less respectful of party autonomy than r.47(3)(d) of the SAR, 
which allows the parties to agree on 'any other matter ... relevant in the circumstances'. 
This could include their previous dealings, but leaves the choice with the parties rather 
than the tribunal.  
 
As with both the Model Law and the SAR, article 39 of the SAL 2012 provides that 
an award may be rendered by a majority. It differs, however, in being a mandatory 
rule. As with most choices regarding arbitration rules, this engages a balancing of 
interests and values. On the one hand, making the rule mandatory reduces the 
flexibility of the process and is less respectful of party autonomy. On the other hand, 
the mandatory rule is clear and certain, ensuring an efficient decision-making process 
and reducing the risk of subsequent challenge where the process varied from the 
arbitration agreement.   
 
Usefully, article 39(2) provides that an umpire may be appointed to resolve a decision 
where there is no majority. This has a 15-day time limit, which should prevent 
unnecessary delays, so serving the interests of efficiency. As noted above, r.30 of the 
SAR also provides a mechanism to resolve the tribunal’s failure to reach a majority 
decision, which fills the lacuna under the Model Law. Article 39(2) of the SAL 2012 
has the advantage of simplicity and clarity over r.30. Rule 30, however, avoids the 
need to appoint an external umpire except in the limited circumstances of a two-
arbitrator panel without a nominated chair. This should make the process more 
efficient, in most cases, under the SAR. 
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The exception to majority decision-making is where the tribunal has been authorised, 
under article 39(4), to resolve the dispute equitably as an amiable compositeur.982 In 
such a case, the award must be unanimous. Neither under the Model Law nor the 
SAR, was it considered necessary to draw this distinction. Regardless of the other 
constraints on the arbitrators, relying on equity and fairness may increase the risk of 
arbitrary decision-making, which may be counterbalanced by requiring a unanimous 
decision. The problem with the SAL 2012, however, is not that it requires a 
unanimous decision, but that it provides no a mechanism for resolving a failure of the 
tribunal to reach unanimity. This is a lacuna that needs to be closed. 
 
Following the Model Law, there is no formal definition of an arbitration award, which 
may, under article 39(5), be rendered as interim or partial awards in anticipation of 
the final award. As with both the Model Law and the SAR, the proceedings and the 
tribunal's mandate are terminated by the final award.983 The SAL 2012 also follows 
the Model Law by allowing the tribunal to formalise, as an award, a settlement 
between the parties.984 Under article 52, these final awards are considered res judicata 
and enforceable by the courts.985 This encourages a pro-arbitration attitude, limits the 
courts' involvement and greatly simplifies the arbitration process since the award no 
longer needs to be approved by the competent court as was the case under the SAL 
1983.986 
 
                                                 
982 For a discussion of what it means to resolve a dispute by amiable composition, see: Mark Hilgard, 
Ana Elisa Bruder, 'Unauthorised Amiable Compositeur?' (2014) 8 Dispute Resolution International 
51, 51-54. 
983 SAL 2012, article 41. 
984 SAL 2012, article 45. 
985 Janoup Al Jazira v Assim Arab Centre for Environmental Consultations (2017 (09/07/1438))) 
Case no 38249619, Riyadh Court of Appeal. 
986 Faris Nesheiwat, Ali Al-Khasawneh, 'The 2012 Saudi Arbitration Law: A Comparative 
Examination of the Law and Its Effect on Arbitration in Saudi Arabia' (2015) 13 Santa Clara Journal 
of International Law 443, 461-462. 
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Following article 31 of the Model Law, article 42 of the SAL 2012 requires the award 
to be written and signed by a majority of tribunal members, with the reasons for any 
non-signatories to be recorded. The SAL 2012 also requires the tribunal to provide 
the reasons for the award. As discussed previously, this serves the interests of justice, 
enhancing the legitimacy and integrity of arbitration as a rational, non-arbitrary, 
dispute resolution mechanism. Unlike the Model Law, or the approach under the 
SAR, article 42 of the SAL 2012 is mandatory, prioritising certainty and justice over 
flexibility and party autonomy. 
 
In the interests of efficiency, and to ensure the procedural and natural justice 
requirement of equal treatment, article 43 of the SAL 2012 requires the tribunal to 
deliver the arbitration award to all parties within 15 days. It must not publish any part 
of the award without the parties’ written consent. It must also deposit a copy of the 
award with the competent court. The time limit, which is not required by the Model 
Law, should reduce delays and the publication restrictions protect the confidentiality 
of the award and party autonomy. Requiring a copy of the award to be deposited with 
the court goes beyond both the Model Law and Scottish Act. It may make any 
subsequent challenge to the award more efficient, but is otherwise of little 
consequence.  
 
Following article 33 of the Model Law, article 46 of the SAL 2012 allows the parties 
to request an interpretation of the award, article 48 allows omissions to be rectified 
through an additional award and article 47 allows the award to be corrected, either on 
the tribunal’s initiative or following a request from one of the parties. Under article 
47, the 30-day time limit imposed by the Model Law is reduced to 15 days, which is 
also shorter than the 28 days allowed by the SAR. Differing from the Model Law and 
the SAR, this time limit is not subject to the parties' agreement, which restricts the 
flexibility of the process, prioritising certainty and efficiency over party autonomy. 
Article 47(2) of the SAL 2012 also explicitly states that if the tribunal exceeds its 
powers of correction, then the award may be nullified under articles 50 and 51. While 
this makes explicit the consequences for unauthorised corrections, it does not vary 
the substantive approach under the Model Law since article 24(2)(a)(iv) allows an 
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award to be challenged where the arbitration procedure was not in accordance with 
the parties' agreement or governing law.  
 
5.6.3 Vacating the award 
Under the Model Law, a party may apply to the court of the state in which an award 
was rendered to have the award set aside.  To constitute an award that may be set 
aside by the court, the tribunal's decision must be a final disposition regarding the 
merits of the case, rather than an interim measure of protection or a procedural 
order.987 An award will only be set aside, in whole or in part,988 if the tribunal's 
decision offends one of the grounds exhaustively listed under article 34(2).989 These 
grounds are intended to ensure an approach that is consistent with the NY 
Convention.990 This has the advantage of international harmonisation by ensuring a 
coherent and consistent approach, regardless of whether the challenge is against the 
award itself or its enforcement.  
 
As a safeguard for procedural justice, the Model Law provides four grounds that may 
be relied on by the party making an application to the court.991 These are: where the 
agreement is invalid under the relevant national law or due to an incapacity of one of 
the parties; where natural justice has been breached by the failure to give adequate 
notice or provide the party with an opportunity to be heard; where the arbitrators have 
exceeded their jurisdiction under the arbitration agreement; and where the tribunal 
                                                 
987 The Gazette, Une division de Southam inc v Rita Blondin [2003] RJQ 2090; [2003] CanLII 33868, 
[48] (Quebec CA, Canada). 
988 United Mexican States v Metalclad Corp (2001) 89 BCLR (3d) 359; [2001] BCJ No 950 (BC SC, 
Canada). 
989 UNCITRAL, 'UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 With 
amendments as adopted in 2006' (UN 2008), 35-36. 
990 UNCITRAL, 'UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 With 
amendments as adopted in 2006' (UN 2008), 35. 
991 Model Law, article 34(2)(a). 
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composition or arbitration process was not in accordance with the agreement of the 
parties or any mandatory legal provisions.  
 
Under article 34(2)(b), the Model Law allows the court, on its own initiative, to set 
aside an award where the dispute is not arbitrable, or where the award is contrary to 
public policy. The public policy ground extends to both procedural and substantive 
issues that, according to the Canadian courts, 'offend our most basic notions of 
morality and justice'.992 This includes awards made subsequent to an illegal contract, 
which may engage with errors of law made by the arbitration tribunal.993 It may also 
include, as a matter of natural justice, the failure to provide reasons that mitigate the 
risk of arbitrary decision-making and allow the award to be properly reviewed by the 
courts.994  
 
Although the public policy ground may include substantive issues, under the Model 
Law there is no appeal to the court specifically on the merits of the award.995 This 
precludes applications to set aside an award because of either factual or legal error.996 
This respects the finality of the award, and the autonomy of the parties in choosing 
arbitration as an alternative to litigation,997 but it does so at the expense of substantive 
justice.  
                                                 
992 CLOUT case No 391, Re Corporación Transnacional de Inversiones SA de CV v STET 
International SpA (1999) 45 OR (3d) 183; [1999] CanLII 14819 (Ontario SC). Affirmed by: Re 
Corporación Transnacional de Inversiones SA de CV v STET International SpA (2000) 49 OR (3d) 
414 (Ontario CA, Canada). See also: Schreter v Gasmac Inc (1992) 7 OR (3d) 608, 623 (ON, 
Canada). 
993 AJU v AJT [2011] SGCA 41, [66-69]. 
994 Smart Systems Technology Inc v Domotique Secant Inc [2008] QCCA 444, [21-28]. 
995 PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation, [2010] SGHC 202, 
affirmed in CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 3. 
996 Government of the Republic of the Philippines v Philippine International Air Terminals Co [2007] 
1 SLR 278, [38]. 
997 CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] 4 SLR 305; [2011] 
SGCA 3, [25]. 
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The grounds for vacating the award connect them to the other provisions of the Model 
Law that set out the arbitrators' duty to respect party autonomy and the parties’ 
procedural and natural justice rights. For example, a failure to apply the rules of law 
agreed by the parties under article 28 will satisfy the fourth ground for setting aside 
the award provided for by article 34(2)(a)(iv). This provision, however, is concerned 
with procedural, rather than substantive, justice since it applies only to the actual 
choice of legal rules, and not to whether those rules were applied correctly.998 
Similarly, not providing the parties with an adequate opportunity to respond to 
evidence and arguments as they arise in the course of proceedings may justify the 
award being set aside under article 34(2)(a)(iv).999 Likewise, failing to give the parties 
adequate notice regarding the non-participation of an arbitrator in making the award 
means that award could be set aside under article 34(2)(a)(iv) because the tribunal 
and procedure is inconsistent with the parties' agreement.1000 Party autonomy is 
further respected by article 34(2)(a)(iii), which allows the award to be set aside where 
the arbitrators exceed the scope of their powers under the arbitration agreement.1001 
 
The grounds for setting aside an award under article 34(2)(a), which should be 
'construed narrowly',1002 reflect the values of autonomy, procedural justice and natural 
justice. These focus on protecting the parties’ rights and interests. The grounds 
provided for by article 34(2)(b) focus entirely on the state’s interests, which explains 
why they are matters that may be considered on the court's own initiative. The goal 
                                                 
998 CLOUT case No 375, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, Germany, 4 Z Sch 23/99, 15 
December 1999 <http://www.disarb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/bayoblg-az-4-z-sch-23-99-datum-
1999-12-15-id16> accessed 30 November 2017; CLOUT case No 569, Hanseatisches 
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, Germany, 11 Sch 01/01, 8 June 2001 
<http://www.disarb.de/de/47/datenbanken/rspr/hanseat-olg-hamburg-az-11-sch-01-01-datum-2001-
06-08-id1274> accessed 30 November 2017. 
999 Methanex Motunui Ltd. v Spellman [2004] 3 NZLR 454 (CA, New Zealand). 
1000 CLOUT case No 662, Saarländisches Oberlandesgericht, Germany, 4 Sch 02/02, 29 October 
2002 <http://www.disarb.de/en/47/datenbanken/rspr/saarländisches-olg-case-no-4-sch-02-02-date-
2002-10-29-id200> accessed 30 November 2017. 
1001 PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK v CRW Joint Operation [2010] SGHC 202, [26], 
affirmed by CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] SGCA 3. 
1002 CLOUT case No 391, Re Corporación Transnacional de Inversiones SA de CV v STET 
International SpA (1999) 45 OR (3d) 183 [1999] CanLII 14819 (Ontario SC). 
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is to ensure the protection of fundamental values, so preserving the integrity of the 
arbitration process, while respecting the autonomy of the arbitration process by 
restricting the court's involvement to the minimum necessary.1003 As, Allen J 
explained: 
In the interest of comity ... predictability ... and respect for 
autonomy ... it is only in exceptional circumstances that an arbitral 
decision will be set aside ... 
While there is great deference shown to arbitral tribunals, the 
Tribunal has the obligation, pursuant to Articles 18 and 34 of the 
Model Law, to ensure equal treatment of the parties, that minimum 
procedural standards are observed and that their decision does not 
offend public policy.1004  
The opportunity for deference to arbitration, and to respect party autonomy, is further 
provided for by the discretionary nature of the court's power. Even where a ground 
for vacating an award has been satisfied, the court may still refuse to set aside the 
award where it decides that the procedural flaw had no effect on the substantive 
outcome.1005 
 
Article 34(3) imposes a non-extendable time limit on an application to have the award 
set aside.1006 The application must be made within three months of physically 
receiving the final award,1007 allowing for any requests for correction under article 33 
                                                 
1003 Quintette Coal Limited v Nippon Steel Corporation [1991] 1 WWR 219, 229; [1991] CanLII 
5708 (BC CA, Canada); CRW Joint Operation v PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK [2011] 
SGCA 3; [2011] 4 SLR 305, 317-318 [25-27]. 
1003 Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman [2004] 3 NZLR 454, [105]; Louis Dreyfus SAS v Holding 
Tusculum BV [2008] QCCS 5903 (Canada). 
1004 Bayview Irrigation District #11 v United Mexican States (2008) CanLII 22120, [13-14] (Ontario 
SC, Canada).  
1005 Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corporation v Shanghai Zhonglu Industrial Co Ltd [2009] 
HKCFI 94, [40]. 
1006 CLOUT case No 566, ABC Co v XYZ Ltd [2003] 3 SLR 546 (Singapore). 
1007 Moohan v S & R Motors (Donegal) Ltd [2009] IEHC 391, [3.4-3.11]. 
302 
 
to be disposed of by the tribunal. This three-month period provides a reasonable 
length of time that balances the applicant's interest in justice against the values of 
efficiency and finality, both of which are important features of arbitration. By 
allowing an appeal to the courts, which provides a guarantee against procedural errors 
or an abuse of the arbitrators' power, the integrity of the arbitration process is 
reinforced. Further reinforcement of arbitration’s integrity is provided for by article 
33(4), which allows the court to:  
suspend the setting aside proceedings ... to give the arbitral tribunal 
an opportunity to resume arbitral proceedings or to take such other 
action as in the arbitral tribunal's opinion will eliminate the grounds 
for setting aside. 
 
As a final point, article 34 of the Model Law makes no explicit reference to whether 
the parties may exclude or vary the right to apply to the court to have an award set 
aside. This might be taken to imply that the rule providing for the right is mandatory. 
Certainly, the grounds are for vacating the award are presented as exclusive, meaning 
that the scope of judicial review under the Model Law may not be widened.1008 How 
far the parties should be allowed to vary the arrangement engages a balance primarily 
between autonomy and justice, but also involves the values of finality and efficiency. 
While some courts have held that article 34 is not a mandatory provision and so may 
be varied by the parties,1009 it has been held that any such power does not extend to 
breaches of natural justice.1010 Other courts, however, have treated the provision as 
mandatory.1011 
 
                                                 
1008 Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman [2004] 3 NZLR 454, [105]. 
1009 Noble China Inc v Lei Kat Cheong (1998) 42 OR (3d) 69. 
1010 Methanex Motunui Ltd v Spellman [2004] 3 NZLR 454. 
1011 Shin Satellite Public Co Ltd v Jain Studios Ltd [2006] 2 SCC 628 (India). 
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Turning to Scots law, the SAR provide three grounds of appeal that allow a party to 
challenge a final award through an application to the courts.1012 Under mandatory 
r.67, a challenge may be raised where the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. A 
challenge may also be raised under mandatory r.68 where there has been a 'serious 
irregularity' in the arbitration proceedings. A list of qualifying irregularities is set out 
under r.68(2), which includes: procedural irregularities; breaches of natural justice; 
an incapable or unqualified arbitrator; an arbitrator or arbitral appointments referee 
acting ultra vires; an uncertain or ambiguous award; and an award that is obtained by 
fraud or is otherwise contrary to public policy. For an irregularity to be characterised 
as 'serious', it must cause a 'substantive injustice'.1013 Legal error provides the third 
ground, under r.69, for challenging an award,1014 but requires the applicant to identify 
a clearly discernible point of law.1015 Unlike the other two grounds, this is a default 
rule that may be disapplied by the parties’ agreement. For all three grounds, the 
court’s decision may be appealed, but the appellate court’s decision may not. This 
limits court involvement, serving the interests of efficiency and finality.1016 
 
While not identical, the grounds provided for by the mandatory r.67 and r.68 are 
equivalent to those allowed by the Model Law. The most significant difference is the 
option for a legal error challenge under r.69. This provides the parties with some 
control over the availability of judicial review, respecting party autonomy more than 
the Model Law’s approach. In so doing, the SAR allow the parties a degree of 
freedom to determine the balance between justice, accuracy, efficiency and finality. 
At the same time, the mandatory nature of r.67 and r.68 means that the state's interests 
in justice and other matters of public policy are secured. This balance of interests is 
maintained against the background concern of maintaining a pro-arbitration culture 
                                                 
1012 Under r 71: 'No appeal may be made against a provisional award'. 
1013 SAR, r 68(2). 
1014 SGL Carbon Fibres Ltd v RBG Ltd [2012] CSOH 19; Manchester Associated Mills Ltd v 
Mitchells & Butler Retail Ltd [2013] CSOH 2. 
1015 In Arbitration Application 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83, [28-30]. 
1016 Hew R Dundas, 'The Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010: converting Vision into Reality', (2010) 76 
Arbitration 2, 14. 
304 
 
that respects party autonomy and the finality of the award,1017 with minimal court 
interference as a means of supporting the arbitration process. This is reflected in the 
threshold requirements, such as the 'substantive injustice' condition that must be 
satisfied for legal error and serious irregularity challenges. It is further reflected in 
the additional conditions imposed on a legal error challenge. Under r.70(2), a legal 
error appeal cannot be made unilaterally by one of the parties, but requires either the 
agreement of both (or all) parties or leave from the court. Under r.70(3), leave will be 
granted only where: 'deciding the point will substantially affect a party's rights'; 'the 
tribunal was asked to decide the point'; and the tribunal's decision is 'obviously wrong' 
or for points considered to be of ‘general importance’, the decision ‘is open to serious 
doubt'.1018 A decision will only be considered 'obviously wrong' where it involves ‘a 
major intellectual aberration, or "making a false leap in logic or reaching a result for 
which there was no reasonable explanation"’.1019  
 
A further difference between the Scots Law and the Model Law approaches is that 
the SAR make it explicit that any challenge based on a serious irregularity,1020 or a 
legal error,1021 must involve a substantive injustice. Although substantive injustice is 
not an explicit requirement under the Model Law, its terms have been interpreted and 
applied by the courts to produce a similar standard of review. Thus, the Model Law 
requires that the grounds are 'construed narrowly', protecting the fundamental rights 
of the parties where the flaws in the arbitration proceedings have significantly 
affected the substantive outcome of the dispute resolution. The similarity of the 
standard may be seen in the following comparison.  In Bayview Irrigation District 
#11 v United Mexican States, Allen J commented that: 'it is only in exceptional 
                                                 
1017 Arbitration Appeal No 3 of 2011 [2011] CSOH 164; 2012 SLT 150, [7]. 
1018 Arbitration Appeal No 3 of 2011 [2011] CSOH 164, [26]. 
1019 In Arbitration Application 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83, [32]. The quote relied on by Lord 
Woolman is from HMV UK Ltd v Propinvest Friar Partnership [2012] 1 Lloyd's Rep 416. 
1020 SAR, r 68. 
1021 SAR, r 69. 
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circumstances that an arbitral decision will be set aside'.1022 The Departmental 
Advisory Committee on Arbitration Report on the Arbitration Bill 1996, relied on in 
Arbitration Application 1 of 2013, similarly explained that serious irregularity appeals 
were designed as: 'available only in extreme cases'.1023 
 
It should also be noted that the SAR, designed as procedural rules, understandably 
provide far more detailed guidance regarding the procedures for challenging the 
awards. The Model Law simply sets down the grounds and the time limits for 
challenge, leaving it to the individual states to furnish the detailed procedural rules. 
The SAR, by contrast, establish a comprehensive framework of rules, providing the 
advantages of both clarity and certainty. This notably includes the requirements that: 
'the appellant has exhausted any available arbitral process of appeal or review', but 
only insofar as they can resolve the issue with the award;1024 the applicant notifies 
both the other parties and the tribunal; the court’s decision may be appealed provided 
it grants leave and the appeal is brought within 28 days.1025 
 
Under r.68, where the issues relate to public policy, procedural or natural justice, 
allowing the courts to vary the award would undermine the integrity of the arbitration 
process by infringing on the tribunal’s jurisdiction. Thus, r.68 precludes the court 
from varying the award, but allows it to 'order the tribunal to reconsider the award (or 
part of it)'. A similar power is available as a remedy for a legal error under r.69. In 
both cases, the presumption is to order reconsideration of the award. The option of 
setting aside should only be utilised where the court 'considers reconsideration 
inappropriate'. This respects the mandate of the arbitration tribunal and supports the 
integrity of arbitration by preserving, as far as possible, the final award. Because the 
                                                 
1022 Bayview Irrigation District #11 v United Mexican States (2008) CanLII 22120, [13-14] (Ontario 
SC).  
1023 In Arbitration Application 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83, [18]. Note that the Scottish provision was 
based on s 68 of the English Act. 
1024 In Arbitration Application 1 of 2013 [2014] CSOH 83, [16]. 
1025 SAR, r 71. 
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tribunal may be required to reconsider the award, this impacts on finality balancing it 
against justice and legal accuracy. It also impacts on the efficiency of the process, but 
this is limited by the three-month time limit for reconsideration imposed by the 
mandatory r.72. 
 
Turning now to consider the SAL 2012. As under the Model Law and Scottish Act, 
article 49 allows an award to be challenged before the courts only by the setting aside 
action provided for by the Act. Unlike the SAR, which allow for internal arbitration 
appeal/review and indeed require that this option is exhausted before applying to the 
court,1026 article 49 of the SAL 2012 only permits appeals to the competent court.1027 
This approach, which precludes internal arbitration appeal/review is an unfortunate 
limitation on both party autonomy and the autonomy of the arbitration process. It 
would have been better had the SAL 2012 provided for such mechanisms, particularly 
given the establishment of the SCCA. Although the SCCA was established after the 
SAL 2012 had been passed, it was likely anticipated as a future development during 
the legislative process. 
 
Article 50(1) of the SAL 2012 follows the Model Law in providing an exhaustive list 
of grounds for vacating an award on the application of one of the parties.1028 These 
grounds, while set out and worded differently to the Model Law provisions, allow the 
award to be vacated for similar flaws in the arbitration proceedings. These are: (a) 
where an arbitration agreement is invalid; (b) where one of the parties lacked the 
requisite capacity at the relevant time; (c) where there has been a breach of natural 
justice denying the party the opportunity to present its case; (d) where the tribunal 
rendered the award without applying the legal rules agreed by the parties; (e) where 
the tribunal formation violated the SAL 2012’s provisions or the parties' agreement; 
(f) where the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, allowing the award or severable part 
                                                 
1026 SAR, r 71(2). 
1027 SAL 2012, articles 50, 51. 
1028 Yuksel v Arabian Pipes, Case no 4151/1/S (2015 (1436H)). 
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of the award to be vacated; and (g) where the contents of the award have been affected 
by a reliance on unauthorised proceedings or by a failure to comply with the 
prerequisite conditions for the award. 
 
Article 50(2) of the SAL 2012 follows the Model Law by allowing the court on its 
own initiative to vacate an award that is contrary to public policy or is not arbitrable. 
Consistent with the Islamic nature of the state, article 50(2) also allows the court to 
vacate an award that is inconsistent with Sharia. Furthermore, it also allows the court, 
on its own initiative, to vacate an award that contravenes the parties’ agreement. 
Crucially, and consistent with the Model Law, article 50(4) precludes the court from 
examining the substantive merits of the award. As the Riyadh Administrative Appeals 
Court emphasised: ‘Arbitration law bans the concerned court from inspecting the 
subject matter of the case’.1029 In a case for nullification of an award granting the 
defendant ownership rights to a percentage of the plaintiff’s land. The Mecca Court 
of Appeal rejected the claim and ordered the award to be implemented because it was 
not inconsistent with Sharia law and the plaintiff’s case, based on the subject matter 
of the award, fell outside the article 50 grounds for nullification.  Thus, in deciding 
whether to vacate an award, the court will rely restrictively on the grounds set out in 
article 50.1030   As such, and unlike the approach under the SAR, there is no scope for 
a legal error challenge. 
 
Any setting aside application must be made within sixty days,1031 which is shorter 
than the three months under the Model Law. This makes the process more efficient 
than under the Model Law. Furthermore, the right to make such an application cannot 
                                                 
1029 Yuksel v Arabian Pipes, Case no 4151/1/S (2015 (1436H)). See also: case no 2289/1434. Riyadh 
Administrative Appeal Court, February 2014 as cited in: Majed Alrasheed, Judge Mostafa Abdel-
Ghaffar, ‘Saudi Strides’ (11 April 2017) Global Arbitration Review 
<www.globalarbitrationreview.com> accessed 20 August 2018. 
1030 Case of nullification of arbitration award, (2015 (1436H)) case no 361279083. 
1031 SAL 2012, article 51(1). 
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be waived or excluded before the award has been issued.1032 The Model Law is silent 
on this issue, which makes this provision a useful clarification that prioritises justice 
over party autonomy. In this regard, the SAL 2012 is consistent with the approach 
under the SAR, which provides for inalienable rights to bring jurisdictional or serious 
irregularity challenges. Only legal error challenges may be disapplied,1033 but legal 
error challenges are unavailable under the SAL 2012. 
 
While both the Model Law and the SAR allow the court to remit the issue back to the 
arbitration tribunal, such an option is not available under the SAL 2012. Under the 
Model Law,1034 the court may suspend the setting aside proceedings to allow the 
tribunal the opportunity to resolve any issues that may eliminate the grounds for 
setting aside the award. For serious irregularity and legal error challenges,1035 the 
SAR allow the court to order the tribunal to reconsider the award. Although the scope 
of the authority afforded to the tribunal under the SAR is wider than that afforded by 
the Model Law, both approaches provide greater respect for the autonomy and 
integrity of arbitration. It is, therefore, unfortunate that a similar authority is not 
available under the SAL 2012. 
 
While the Model Law is silent on the issue of a legal appeal against a setting aside 
judgment, the SAL 2012 understandably fills that lacuna. Article 51(2) precludes any 
appeal against a decision that declines the setting aside application and confirms the 
award. Where, however, the award is set aside, then an appeal may be lodged within 
thirty days. This is different to the Scottish approach, which allows an appeal 
regardless of whether the award is confirmed or set aside. By refusing to allow an 
appeal against a court’s decision to confirm an award, the SAL 2012 prioritises the 
finality of the award. Furthermore, by freely allowing a time-limited appeal against 
                                                 
1032 SAL 2012, article 51(1). 
1033 SAR, r 69. 
1034 Article 33(4). 
1035 SAR, r 68(3), r 70(8). 
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the court's decision to set aside an award, the SAL 2012 further consolidates its 
supportive role, facilitating resolution of the dispute by arbitration.  
 
5.6.4 Challenging enforcement 
In providing for the recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award, the Model 
Law was drafted to ensure consistency with the NY Convention.1036 Beyond the 
option of allowing the state to make enforcement conditional on reciprocity,1037 and 
subject to article 36, recognition and enforcement are mandatory as reflected in the 
use of "shall" in article 35(1),1038 which provides: 
An arbitral award, irrespective of the country in which it is made, 
shall be recognized as binding and, upon application in writing to 
the competent court, shall be enforced subject to the provisions of 
this article and of article 36. 
Before considering the grounds allowing the courts to refuse recognition and 
enforcement, it should be noted that there are no time limits under article 35. This is 
for individual jurisdictions to determine, consistent with their obligation under the 
NY Convention.1039 
 
Consistent with article V of the NY Convention, article 36 sets out an exhaustive list 
of seven grounds that allow a national court to refuse to recognise or enforce an 
                                                 
1036 UNCITRAL, 'UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 With 
amendments as adopted in 2006' (UN 2008), 37. 
1037 See article I of the NY Convention, article 1 of the Model Law, and: UNCITRAL, Report of the 
UN Commission on International Trade Law (on the work of its eighteenth session), Official Records 
of the General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No 17, A/40/17 (UN 1985), para 309. 
1038 CLOUT case No 366, Europcar Italia SpA v Alba Tours International Inc, (1997) 23 OTC 376 
(Canada). 
1039 CLOUT case No 1009, Yugraneft Corp v Rexx Management Corp [2010] SCC 19; [2010] 1 SCR 
649, [14-24], relying on article III of the NY Convention. 
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award.1040. They are identical to the grounds allowing for setting aside, with the 
additional ground that a court may refuse to recognise or enforce an award that has: 
‘not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court 
of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made’. By allowing 
the same grounds for both setting aside and enforcement challenges: ‘the model law 
attempts to avoid the problem of "split validity" which enables an award to be found 
invalid in the state of origin but valid and enforceable abroad’.1041 This is an important 
goal, but is only capable of limited success since variations between states regarding 
public policy and arbitrability allow the courts of different jurisdictions to differently 
conclude whether an award should be set aside or recognised and enforced. 
 
Under article 36, the court is afforded discretion where one of the grounds that justify 
a refusal to recognise or enforce an award is satisfied.1042 When combined with the 
mandatory nature of the wording in article 35, and a supportive judicial approach that 
restrictively interprets the article 36 grounds,1043 this creates a presumption in favour 
of recognition and enforcement. Such a presumption defers to the tribunal and is 
consistent with a respect for arbitration as an alternative to litigation for resolving 
disputes.1044 It allows the courts to refuse recognition and enforcement where there is 
a significant issue of justice or public policy. At the same time, this discretion allows 
the court to enforce the award where there is evidence of a flaw, but the consequences 
did not amount to a material injustice.1045 
                                                 
1040 CLOUT case No 740, Aloe Vera of America, Inc v Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd [2006] 3 SLR 174 
(Singapore). 
1041 Mary E McNerny, Carlos A Esplugues, 'International Commercial Arbitration: The UNCITRAL 
Model Law' (1986) 9 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 47, 58. 
1042 CLOUT case No 366, Europcar Italia SpA v Alba Tours International Inc, (1997) 23 OTC 376. 
1043 CLOUT case No 391, Re Corporación Transnacional de Inversiones SA de CV v STET 
International SpA (1999) 45 OR (3d) 183 [1999] CanLII 14819 (Ontario SC). 
1044 CLOUT case No 351, Food Services of America v Pan Pacific Specialties Ltd (1997) 32 BCLR 
(3d) 225, [14-15]. 
1045 CLOUT case No 76, China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corporation, Shenzhen Branch v Gee Tai 
Holdings Co Ltd [1994] 3 HKC 375, 388. 
311 
 
Turning to the Scottish Act. Under s.11(1), the 'tribunal's award is final and binding 
on the parties', but this is conditional on the parties’ right to challenge the award as 
provided for by the SAR or 'by any available arbitral process of appeal or review'.1046 
Where the award is not subject to an appeal or correction, then s.12 allows the court 
to enforce the award on the application of any party, provided it is satisfied that the 
tribunal had jurisdiction. As with the Model Law, the wording suggests that the judge 
has discretion and is not obliged to order enforcement. Unlike the Model Law, there 
is no exception allowed for issues of natural or procedural justice, arbitrability, or 
public policy.  
 
For foreign 'Convention awards', as defined by s.18, the courts must recognise and 
enforce awards considered binding on the parties.1047 Discretionary exceptions to this 
are provided for by s.20, which effectively implements article V of the NY 
Convention. Section 20 also implements article VI of the NY Convention, allowing 
the court to suspend proceedings where an application has been made to set aside the 
award. Section 21 implements article IV of the NY Convention, requiring the 
applicant to provide suitable evidence of the arbitration agreement and award. These 
provisions fulfil Scotland's obligations under the NY Convention, as discussed 
previously. 
 
Like Scotland, Saudi Arabia is also bound by its obligations under the NY 
Convention. Unlike the Scottish Act, and the Model Law, the relevant provisions of 
the NY Convention are not incorporated into the SAL 2012. Nevertheless, reciprocal 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration award is anticipated by the 
Enforcement Law of 2012,1048 which allows applications to be considered by 
Enforcement Courts rather than the Board of Grievances. Crucially, under article 
11(a) the national courts are forbidden from scrutinising the merits of foreign 
                                                 
1046 Scottish Act, s 11(3). 
1047 Scottish Act, s 19. 
1048 Royal Decree No M/53 of 13 Sha'ban 1433H (2012). 
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arbitration awards and, under article 6, there is no appeal from a decision of the 
Enforcement Court. The former of these provisions limits the extent of the court's 
encroachment on the arbitration process and the latter will ensure that any application 
for enforcement will not be subject to a protracted process of appeals. Both features 
should encourage enforcement applications, but may be counteracted by the 
possibility of the losing party initiating an enforcement dispute.1049 This is defined 
under article 1 of the Enforcement Law as a dispute over the validity of the 
enforcement conditions. These actions, which are subject to an appeal process, allows 
enforcement to be stayed until the matter is resolved and may result in significant 
delays.1050  
 
Prior to the enactment of the 2012 Arbitration and Enforcement Laws, Saudi had a 
poor record of enforcement. This is reflected in Zeger's conclusion that: 
a party attempting to enforce a foreign arbitral award in Saudi 
Arabia will face considerable challenges … to the best of our 
knowledge, there is no precedent of a foreign arbitral award ever 
being successfully enforced in Saudi Arabia.1051 
How far the 2012 laws will counter the historical approach is dependent on the 
establishment of a more pro-arbitration attitude. It is worth noting, however, that a 
successful action for the enforcement of a foreign award was reported in May 
2016.1052 This case may be indicative of a change in culture, reflecting a greater 
                                                 
1049 Hosam ibn Ghaith, 'Saudi Enforcement Court confirms that it would enforce a London ICC 
Award' (Online, 13 July 2016) Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/07/13/saudi-enforcement-court-confirms-that-it-would-
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1050 Enforcement Law 2012, article 10. 
1051 Jean-Benoit Zegers, 'National Report for Saudi Arabia', in: Jan Paulsson (ed) (Kluwer Law 
International 1984, Supplement No 75 2013) International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration 1, 
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1052 Henry Quinlan, Amer Abdulaziz Al-Amr, 'Landmark enforcement decision in the Kingdom of 
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willingness to enforce foreign awards. However, as a single case, it is not definitive 
of such a change, which needs confirmation through future enforcement judgments. 
It should, however, be noted that the judgment is consistent with the trend in recent 
court judgments that suggest Saudi courts are taking a less interventionist approach 
consistent with the norms of modern ICA.1053 
 
The current enforcement regime engages both the SAL 2012 and the Enforcement 
Law. Under article 53 of the SAL 2012, the competent court must enforce a valid and 
enforceable award. However, an application may not be made until the time-limit for 
making a setting-aside application has expired.1054 Under article 55, the courts may 
order enforcement, of the whole award or severable part, only where: the award does 
not conflict with any existing court, committee or tribunal decision or order; the award 
is consistent with Sharia law and Saudi public policy; the other party was properly 
notified of the award. There is no appeal against an enforcement order, but an order 
refusing enforcement may be appealed within thirty days.1055 
 
The key provision under the Enforcement Law, is article 11, which applies to foreign 
judgments and imposes five conditions governing an enforcement order. These are: 
(a) the courts are not authorised to examine the merits of the award; (b) the natural 
justice rights of the other party were respected, affording that party the opportunity to 
present a defence; (c) the award is final and binding; (d) the award does not conflict 
with any judgment or order regarding the same matter and issued by a competent 
national judicial authority; and (e) the award is consistent with Saudi public law and 
policy, including Sharia. 
 
                                                 
1053 Majed Alrasheed, Judge Mostafa Abdel-Ghaffar, ‘Saudi Strides’ (11 April 2017) Global 
Arbitration Review <www.globalarbitrationreview.com> accessed 20 August 2018. 
1054 SAL 2012, article 55. 
1055 SAL, article 55(3). 
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Perhaps the key issue with the approach under Saudi law is the exception to 
enforcement where an award conflicts with Sharia.1056 The public policy exception 
generally is provided for by the NY Convention and is included as part of the Model 
Law. While Sharia is noted explicitly, alongside the public policy exception, in article 
55 of the SAL 2012, this simply clarifies and emphasises the importance of Sharia, 
which is integral to the state and its public policy.1057 This is evident in the Saudi 
Constitution, which is perfused by references to Islam and the Sharia, characterising 
the country as Islamic,1058 governed in accordance with the Sharia.1059 Most tellingly, 
the King is required to implement national policy, which must be 'legitimate policy 
in accordance with … Islam'.1060 Requiring compliance with Sharia is, therefore, 
simply one aspect of requiring compliance with Saudi public policy. As Harb and 
Leventhal note: ‘it is difficult to draw a clear delineation between public policy and 
Shari'a because religion and government are inextricably linked in the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia’.1061 As such, allowing an exception to enforcement based on a conflict 
between the award and Sharia, is consistent with Saudi's obligation under the NY 
Convention. As a final point, however, it should be noted that where possible, the 
courts are likely to distinguish those parts of the award that are inconsistent with 
Sharia and hence unenforceable, from those parts that are consistent with Sharia and 
hence enforceable.1062   
                                                 
1056 Ahmed A Altawyan, ‘The Legal System of the Saudi Judiciary and the Possible Effects on 
Reinforcement and Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration (2017) 10 Canadian International 
Journal for Social Science and Education 269, 270. See also, Mohammed I Aleisa, ‘A Critical 
Analysis of the Legal Problems associated with Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in 
Saudi Arabia: Will the New Saudi Arbitration Law (2012) Resolve the Main Legal Problems?’ (PhD 
thesis, University of Essex 2016), 181-199.   
1057 Nicholas Bremer, ‘Seeking Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Court Judgments and 
Arbitral Awards in the GCC Countries’ (2016-2017) 3 McGill Journal of Dispute Resolution 37, 56. 
1058 Basic Law of Governance 1992, article 1. 
1059 Basic Law of Governance 1992, article 8. 
1060 Basic Law of Governance 1992, articles 55. 
1061 Jean-Pierre Harb, Alexander G Leventhal, 'The New Saudi Arbitration Law: Modernization to 
the Tune of Shari'a’ (2013) 30 Journal of International Arbitration 113, 115. 
1062 Janoup Al Jazira v Assim Arab Centre for Environmental Consultations (2017 (1438H))) Case 
no 38249619, Riyadh Court of Appeal; Mohamed Khairi Al-Wakeel, Comments on the New Saudi 
Arbitration Law (King Fahd National Library, 2014/1435H), 117. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter focused on an examination of the arbitration award and the opportunities 
for challenging the award. The analysis was restricted to court-based applications, 
which included litigation to have the award set aside and enforcement actions that 
provide national courts with the opportunity to refuse to recognise and enforce an 
arbitration award. Other than briefly noting their availability, internal appeals 
mechanisms provided as part of the arbitration process itself were not addressed. For 
completeness, interim orders and provisional awards were briefly considered. 
 
The starting point was that, regardless of any other advantages that it provides, the 
goal of arbitration is to resolve the dispute. This resolution is achieved through the 
final award, which should be designed to settle the substantive issues of the dispute 
by adjusting the parties’ rights and obligations in a way that is acceptable to both the 
parties and the state supporting the arbitration process. As discussed here and in 
chapter two, the acceptability of the final award is dependent essentially on the 
fairness of the arbitration process. Where an award has resulted from a process 
perceived as unfair, which is more likely where a disgruntled party believes the award 
to be substantively unjust, that party may seek to challenge the award through the 
courts, either by an action to set aside the award or by resisting enforcement. This 
raises the questions of finality and enforceability. 
 
An arbitration award will not resolve the dispute unless it is both final and 
enforceable. While it would be possible for the law to support arbitration by treating 
all awards as final and enforceable, regardless of whether they were fair or acceptable, 
the state has an obligation to ensure that disputes are subject to at least minimal 
requirements of justice. This obligation is fulfilled through the legal framework that 
sets out the duties and powers of both the arbitration tribunal and the courts. 
Consequently, the arbitrators must exercise their power consistently with the legal 
duties imposed on them. These legal duties support the obligations arising from the 
contractual relationship between the arbitrators and the parties. Furthermore, the trust 
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invested in the relationship between the parties and the arbitrators creates a moral 
source of duty that reinforces and supplements the legal duties. 
 
In determining the moral duties, the analysis utilised Rawls' veil of ignorance to 
suggest that, in relation to the arbitration award, arbitrators have five basic duties: a 
duty to do what is reasonable to ensure enforceability; a duty to act within their 
jurisdictional authority; a duty to act fairly and impartially in rendering the award; a 
duty to render an accurate award through reasoned argument based on the evidence 
and the parties' cases; a duty to give reasons for the award. How far these moral duties 
are enforced depends on the framework of national legal rules. This framework 
establishes ex ante procedural rules that constrain the arbitrators’ power and ex post 
powers allowing the parties to challenge or enforce an award. As with the general 
rules of procedure, discussed in chapter three, this framework seeks to balance the 
values and interests of party autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness, which makes 
arbitration an attractive and viable alternative to litigation. In achieving this balance, 
the current trend in ICA is for the national legal system to play a supportive role, 
facilitating a cost-effective arbitration process by restricting the power of the courts 
to set aside, or to refuse recognition and enforcement, of an award.  
 
The pro-arbitration bias is reflected in the limited scope of judicial review, with the 
courts generally empowered to set aside an award where there are significant breaches 
of procedural justice or jurisdiction. In most jurisdictions, the courts are precluded 
from reviewing the substantive merits of the award. Some jurisdictions, however, 
allow an award to be set aside for legal, but not factual, error. Under English law, for 
example, legal error review is available, but is subject to the agreement of the parties, 
who may choose to exclude the option. This permits the parties to decide whether the 
award should be open to a legal error challenge, allowing them to vary the scope of 
judicial review, within limits established by the national law. This provides the parties 
with the power to fine tune the balance between accuracy, as an element of justice, 
and finality. This is more respectful of party autonomy than an approach that simply 
precludes the option of a legal error challenge, which prioritise finality and efficiency 
over justice and party autonomy. 
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While the setting aside action is a matter entirely for national law, the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign awards is subject to the NY Convention. As parties to the NY 
Convention, both Scotland and Saudi Arabia must reciprocally recognise and enforce 
foreign awards unless one of the article V grounds for refusing enforcement is 
satisfied. These include jurisdictional errors, procedural flaws and matters of public 
policy, but not substantive errors of fact or law. Of the permitted exceptions, it is 
public policy that provides the greatest scope for different approaches to enforcement. 
For Saudi Arabia, this exception crucially allows the national courts to refuse 
enforcement of awards that are inconsistent with Sharia. 
 
The point of discussing these issues is that they identify the interests, values and 
constraints that inform the framework established by the national legal systems. In 
comparing the legal frameworks of the Model Law, the Scottish Act, and the SAL 
2012, there are three relevant factors. First, the framework will be affected by 
differences in the degree of pro-arbitration bias. Second, the frameworks may vary 
because the balance between the relevant interests and values is set differently. Third, 
the framework, or its implementation, may vary because of different public policy 
concerns. 
 
As a general point, the approach under the Scottish Act, because of the SAR, provides 
the most detailed framework, while the Model Law is the least detailed. The SAL is 
generally more detailed, but closer to the Model Law than the Scottish framework. 
This distinction is not specific to the aspects of arbitration discussed in this chapter 
and, because of its general nature, it will be considered further in the concluding 
chapter. Here, it is sufficient to note that the SAR allow a more nuanced flexibility 
than is possible under either the Model Law or the SAL 2012. This allows the parties 
greater scope for fine tuning the balance between party autonomy, justice and cost-
effectiveness to better suit their needs.  
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The most notable feature of the ex ante requirements for a legally valid award under 
the SAL 2012 is that article 42(1) imposes a mandatory duty on the arbitrators to give 
reasons. Under both the Model Law and the SAR, this duty may be waived by the 
parties. Allowing a waiver respects party autonomy by enhancing the flexibility of 
the process. The approach under the SAL 2012, however, prioritises justice and 
enhances the legitimacy of arbitration as a rational mechanism for resolving disputes. 
Not requiring the reasons to be stated would perhaps be slightly more efficient, but 
the value of transparency to justice and the integrity of the process outweigh the 
minimal gains to autonomy and efficiency. It would however, be worth providing 
further detail regarding the extent of the reasoning required, particularly since the 
courts in other jurisdictions have not always agreed on what constitutes adequate 
reasons. 
 
The flexibility afforded by the SAR is most clearly evidenced in the default r.69, 
which allows a legal error challenge, but makes that power subject to the parties’ 
contrary agreement. Neither the Model Law nor the SAL 2012 allow a legal error 
challenge, which reflects a priority for finality and efficiency over accuracy, as an 
element of substantive justice, and party autonomy. All three frameworks, however, 
provide similar mandatory rules reflecting a baseline concern with ensuring a 
minimum standard of justice, allowing an award to be vacated for a breach of 
procedural or natural justice sufficient to undermine confidence in the substantive 
justice of the final award. All three frameworks also impose a similar constraint on 
the arbitrators’ jurisdictional power, allowing an award to be set aside where the 
tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. This approach, which is consistent with the 
main hypothesis, prioritises the integrity of arbitration, and the values of justice and 
autonomy, over finality and efficiency. Under the SAL 2012, however, that priority 
is itself constrained by limiting the challenge against the award to a first instance 
decision. That decision is only open to appeal where the court sets aside the award 
and not where the court declines to set aside the award. By contrast, the SAR, allow 
an appeal against the first instance decision regardless of whether the court confirms 
or sets aside the award. Under the Saudi approach, and consistent with the fourth 
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subsidiary hypothesis, a greater respect is given to the arbitration tribunal's decision, 
the integrity of the process and the finality of the award.  
 
This pro-arbitration approach, visible in the asymmetrical power to appeal against a 
setting aside order, is inconsistent under the SAL 2012. While both the Model Law 
and the SAR allow for an internal arbitration appeal process, that must be exhausted 
before an application is made to the courts, under the SAL 2012 the only recourse 
against an award is by an application to the court. Furthermore, under both the Model 
Law and the SAR, the issue may be remitted back to the arbitration tribunal. The 
approach under Scottish Law affords the tribunal greater power to reconsider its 
award than does the Model Law, but both frameworks are more pro-arbitration in this 
regard than the SAL 2012, which, inconsistently with the first and second subsidiary 
hypotheses, requires the court to decide the case without re-engaging the tribunal.  
 
In improving the framework for challenging an arbitration award established under 
the SAL 2012, it would be better to allow the additional flexibility provided for by 
the SAR. Particularly, the parties should be able to choose whether a legal error appeal 
should be available, which would improve consistency with the second subsidiary 
hypothesis. While the recent history of arbitration in Saudi Arabia may make the 
legislature cautious regarding legal error appeals, the additional respect it affords 
autonomy in allowing the parties to decide whether the arbitrators' duty of accuracy 
should be enforceable justifies putting aside that caution. In addition, the SAL 2012 
should allow for internal arbitration appeal mechanisms. Furthermore, allowing the 
court to remit the award back to the arbitration tribunal would enhance the pro-
arbitration approach. Finally, it should be made explicit, under article 50 of the SAL 
2012, that the grounds for setting aside must meet a threshold of causing a substantive 
injustice. This follows the approach under the SAR and is consistent with the way in 
which the grounds have been narrowly construed when implementing the Model Law 
in practice. It would also be consistent with the approach taken by the Mecca Court 
of Appeal, which rejected a claim for nullification because the complained of 
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procedural flaws had not substantively affected the award.1063 By requiring 
substantive injustice, the court's interference is restricted, respecting the autonomy 
and efficiency of arbitration, and respecting the finality of the award while still 
protecting against the more egregious procedural failings. 
 
Beyond the opportunity to challenge an award through a setting aside application, all 
three legal frameworks provide for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration 
awards. Since both Scotland and Saudi Arabia are parties to the NY Convention, their 
national courts have an obligation to recognise and enforce foreign awards unless one 
of the exceptions under article V applies. The approach under the Scottish Act is to 
implement the NY Convention directly through the Act. This is clearer than the 
approach under Saudi law, which engages both the SAL 2012 and the Enforcement 
Law of 2012. Although consistent with the obligations of the NY Convention, it 
would have been better had the terms of article V been explicitly implemented as part 
of the SAL 2012. This would not preclude the additional explicit reference to 
inconsistency with Sharia as a ground for non-enforcement since the Sharia is 
integral to Saudi’s public policy. 
 
In conclusion, the SAL 2012 broadly follows the Model Law and generally reflects a 
pro-arbitration approach. Consistent with the main hypothesis, it provides for a fair 
balance between the interests of justice, party autonomy, and cost-effectiveness, 
although it gives slightly less weight to autonomy than do either the Model Law or 
the SAR. It provides a reasonably detailed framework that can be justified by 
reference to the arbitrator's duties, which include: the duty to render an award 
consistent with the arbitrators’ jurisdictional authority; the duty to act fairly and 
impartially in rendering the award; and the duty to give reasons. Beyond requiring 
the tribunal to apply the rules of law agreed by the parties, the SAL 2012 does not, 
however, include any requirement for accuracy. In this regard, the law could be 
improved by allowing the parties the option of agreeing to a legal error appeal. The 
                                                 
1063 Implementation of arbitrators’ award, (2015 (1437H)) case no 3798925. 
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facility, under the SAR, to allow the tribunal to issue draft awards, would also 
improve the law by further enhancing the accuracy of the award. The law could 
further be improved by allowing for an internal arbitration appeals mechanism and 
by allowing the courts to remit the award back to the tribunal for rectification where 
this may prevent the need for the award to be set aside. Finally, the rules of 
enforcement could be clarified by directly implementing article V of the NY 
Convention as part of the SAL 2012.  
 
Over the course of this chapter and the previous three chapters, the legal framework 
provided for by the SAL 2012 has been subjected to a comparative and normative 
legal analysis. The SAL 2012 was compared to both the Model Law and the Scottish 
Act, with its associated SAR. That legal analysis was given a normative foundation 
by considering how well the legal frameworks balanced the three core principles of 
ICA. Over the course of chapters two to five, the analysis engaged with the regulation 
of jurisdiction, the arbitration agreement, the arbitration tribunal and proceedings, and 
the arbitration award. In chapter six, the concluding chapter, the analyses of those 
four aspects of the arbitration process will be drawn together and proposals will be 
made for how the SAL 2012 could be reformed to achieve a balance between the core 
principles that better reflects the values and needs of modern ICA. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Nine years before the enactment of the SAL 2012, Brower and Sharpe observed that: 
when one views the current strength and vibrancy of international 
dispute resolution in the Islamic world against arbitration's troubled 
history there during the past half-century, one cannot fail to see 
progress at every level.1064 
At that time, arbitration in Saudi was governed by the SAL 1983, which had 
established a comprehensive legal framework for arbitration. While certainly a sign 
of progress, the SAL 1983 nonetheless fell short of resolving all the criticisms levied 
at the regulation of arbitration in Saudi Arabia.1065 The SAL 1983 was replaced by 
the SAL 2012, which was enacted to further modernise arbitration in Saudi and make 
it more attractive to the international commercial community. It is the SAL 2012 that 
forms the focus of this research and the question is how far this legislation continues 
the earlier progress to meet the demands of ICA. 
 
To focus the research on the needs of ICA, and to avoid the limitations of a purely 
doctrinal analysis, the research question asked how far the SAL 2012 is consistent 
with the core principles of modern ICA. These three core principles, identified in 
chapter one as: party autonomy; justice; and cost-effectiveness,1066 were then used as 
normative tools to facilitate the critical comparative analysis of the legal framework 
                                                 
1064 Charles N Brower, Jeremy K Sharpe, 'International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The Third 
Phase' (2003) 97 The American Journal of International Law 643, 656. 
1065 See sections 1.5.3-1.5.4 
1066 See section 1.5.2. 
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provided for by the SAL 2012. That analysis, which compared the SAL 2012 with 
the Model Law and the Scottish Act, was directed at four key elements of arbitration: 
jurisdiction; the arbitration agreement; the arbitration tribunal and proceedings; and 
the arbitration award. These were considered in dedicated chapters that first examined 
the foundational theoretical issues before applying that initial analysis to the 
comparative examination of the SAL 2012.  
 
In this concluding chapter, the analyses carried out in chapters two to five, will be 
combined to highlight the areas where the SAL 2012 may be improved and generate 
proposals for the future development of the legal regulation of arbitration in Saudi 
Arabia. That process begins in the first section with a brief overview of the main 
issues. In the second section, that process will be continued by considering how well 
the SAL 2012 has implemented the three core principles. The process will be 
completed in the third section, which considers proposals for how the SAL 2012 could 
be reformed to further enhance the balance between party autonomy, procedural 
justice and cost-effectiveness This section will engage not just with the proposals in 
isolation but will also consider the possible issues that may arise when relying on 
legal transplantation as a mechanism for reform. The chapter, and thesis, ends with a 
final concluding statement. 
 
6.1 The Main Issues 
The first notable issue is that, although its approach to the court’s gateway jurisdiction 
is broadly similar to that under both the Model Law and Scottish Act, the SAL 2012 
unfortunately lacks a provision equivalent to article 5 of the Model Law. Second, the 
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SAL 2012 does not permit the parties to apply to court to determine a point of law or 
to challenge an award for legal error. Third, the SAL 2012 fails to fully define a valid 
arbitration agreement and requires the agreement to be completed in writing. 
Furthermore, the SAL 2012 imposes additional restrictions, such as requiring an odd 
number of arbitrators,1067 who must be of good character.1068 Fourth, while the SAL 
2012 provides for a reasonably accessible framework of mandatory and default rules, 
this is not as comprehensive, nor as clear, as the Scottish approach, which provides 
for a complete set of arbitration rules.1069 Fifth, while explicitly requiring arbitration 
to be Sharia compliant, the SAL 2012 lacks detail on the constraints imposed by 
Sharia. Sixth, where the selection of arbitrators fails, the SAL 2012 requires the 
parties to apply to court for assistance. This is less progressive than the approach 
under the Scottish Act, which allows for arbitration appointment referees. Seventh, 
there is no justice-based constraint on the court’s power to remove an arbitrator. 
Eighth, the SAL 2012 fails to explicitly deal with the requirement for confidentiality. 
Ninth, the SAL 2012 only allows an award to be challenged through the courts by a 
setting aside action, which restricts the parties’ freedom to utilise any available 
internal arbitration appeal mechanisms. Furthermore, in reviewing an award, the 
courts are not constrained by any requirement that the setting aside action should only 
succeed where it prevents a substantial injustice. Finally, the courts lack the power to 
refer the award back to the tribunal. 
 
                                                 
1067 SAL 2012, article 13. 
1068 SAL 2012, article 14. 
1069 Scottish Act, sch 1. 
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These issues arise from the attempt to balance the interests of party autonomy, justice 
and cost-effectiveness. How well the SAL 2012 achieves an appropriate overall 
balance between these three core principles will be addressed in the next section. 
However, one further issue with the SAL 2012 warrants mentioning here, particularly 
with regard to the need to encourage a pro-arbitration culture. This issue is the lack 
of any general statement of governing principles, such as that provided for by s.1 of 
the Scottish Act. The failure to include such a provision is a shortcoming that may be 
easily remedied by the proposal set out below. 
 
6.2 The Implementation of the Core Principles of Modern ICA by the SAL 2012 
Through the enactment of the SAL 2012, supported by the Enforcement Law of 2012, 
Saudi Arabia has, consistently with the main hypothesis, significantly liberalised the 
legal framework regulating ICA. Whatever its weaknesses, the SAL 2012 
significantly reforms the previous regime under the SAL 1983. This does not, 
however, mean that there is no room for improvement, and the next section of this 
chapter is dedicated to proposals for how the law might be further developed. It 
should, however, be acknowledged that the SAL 2012 provides a legal framework 
consistent with the needs of modern ICA and should foster a pro-arbitration culture. 
 
In this thesis, the SAL 2012 was assessed through comparison with the Model Law 
and the Scottish Act, using the three core principles of party autonomy, justice and 
cost-effectiveness as normative yardsticks. Because it is the source of the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, and because it is the basis for allowing parties to choose the arbitrators 
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and ‘control the details of their disputing process',1070 party autonomy was considered 
arbitration’s foundational principle. Through party autonomy, arbitration provides an 
attractive alternative to litigation. Arbitration, however, is a hybrid system enabled 
by the state and reliant on its support. This allows the state to maintain an interest in 
ensuring that arbitration is just, and that interest is reinforced by the parties’ need for 
the process to be just. Thus, while party autonomy is foundational, it must be 
tempered by justice. Beyond the importance of party autonomy and justice, for 
arbitration to provide a viable alternative to litigation, it must be capable of producing 
an effective award. Finally, it is in the interests of parties that the process is efficient, 
proceeding with minimal delays and costs. Thus, a suitable legal framework must 
achieve a rational balance between party autonomy, justice and cost-effectiveness. 
 
The overall impression, and affirming the main hypothesis driving the analysis, is that 
the SAL 2012 does establish an appropriate balance between these principles. When 
compared to the SAL 1983, it ensures greater respect for party autonomy, consistently 
facilitates the process, minimises delays and most significantly restricts the 
opportunity for court intervention. Under the SAL 2012: arbitration agreements no 
longer need court approval; awards no longer need confirmation by the courts, since 
the responsibility for ensuring Sharia and legal compliance rests solely with the 
tribunal;1071 and the scope of the court’s power has been restricted to prevent any 
review of an award’s merits. These restrictions are more consistent with the demands 
                                                 
1070 Edward Brunet, 'The Core Values of Arbitration' in Edward Brunet, Richard E Speidel, Jean R 
Sternlight, Stephen J Ware (eds) Arbitration Law in America: A Critical Assessment (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 3. 
1071 SAL 2012, article 38. 
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of modern ICA and provide much greater respect for party autonomy than the 
approach under the SAL 1983. 
 
The improvements introduced through the SAL 2012 flow from its reliance on the 
Model Law. Although the SAL 2012 does not implement the Model Law, its 
influence permeates the SAL 2012. Generally, the balance between the three core 
principles is similar, but under the SAL 2012 is shifted towards efficiency and justice. 
This emphasis is even more marked when compared to the Scottish Act and 
associated SAR. Despite this, the SAL 2012 still ensures a respect for party autonomy 
that significantly improves on the SAL 1983. Furthermore, the respect for party 
autonomy is consistent with the modern culture of ICA. As evidenced by the limited 
role for the courts, party autonomy more definitively provides the foundational 
principle for the current Saudi legal framework than under the previous regime. The 
flexibility required by party autonomy is, nevertheless, more limited than under either 
the Model Law or the Scottish Act and the SAR. 
 
It may be helpful to illustrate these conclusions with a few specific examples, such as 
the requirement under the SAL 2012 that arbitration agreements must be concluded 
in writing, rendering oral agreements invalid, even where they have subsequently 
been recorded in writing. Another example is the restrictions placed on arbitrator 
selection, which require the parties to appoint an odd number of arbitrators, who must 
be of good character, with one arbitrator possessing a degree in Sharia or legal 
sciences. A further example is the lack of facility for the parties to agree that a legal 
error appeal should be allowed. While there may be good reasons for the restrictions, 
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such as the controversial nature of legal error appeals and the criticisms levied at the 
previous law, they all limit party autonomy. It is submitted that the law could be 
further developed and reformed to increase the flexibility of the process, so enhancing 
respect for party autonomy, without unduly sacrificing the interests of justice and 
cost-effectiveness. 
 
Other aspects of the law that may be improved include both the role that the law plays 
in creating and maintaining a pro-arbitration culture, and the formal justice concerns 
of clarity and comprehensiveness. In the following section, several proposals will be 
suggested for further developing the legal framework to build on the significant 
improvements introduced by the SAL 2012, providing for the needs of international 
commerce while preserving the interests of the state.  
 
6.3 Proposals for Future Development  
The main constraint on making proposals for further development is the lack of 
information on how the SAL 2012 works in practice. Ideally, such information should 
be gathered through empirical studies looking at arbitration cases and using 
interviews and focus groups to gain a better understanding of how well the current 
legal framework meets the needs of the international arbitration community. In 
preparation for any such future empirical studies, the research presented in this thesis 
was an entirely text-based analysis, focusing on the doctrinal and normative aspects 
of the law. Despite the limitations of this focus, exacerbated by the lack of legal cases, 
it is nevertheless possible to suggest how the law might be improved. The following 
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proposals for amending the SAL 2012 are submitted. Before explaining those 
proposals, the issue of legal transplantation will first be considered. 
 
6.3.1 Legal transplantation and the reform of the SAL 2012 
Developing national law by ‘borrowing from a different jurisdiction has [long] been 
the principal way in which law has developed’.1072 It is, after all, sensible to use law 
that demonstrably works, and it may well offer the best solution provided there are 
good reasons for reforming the law and the transplanted law is not inconsistent with 
the socio-legal culture of the borrowing jurisdiction.1073 In Saudi Arabia, for example, 
the main socio-legal constraint on legal reform is the need for consistency with the 
Sharia,1074 and the risk that foreign legal transplants will be resisted by the institutions 
and jurists of the Sharia legal system. However, too much may be made of different 
cultural and political contexts. As Watson observes: ‘Very different social, political 
and economic circumstances may nonetheless be conducive to the creation of the 
same legal rule’, whether borrowed or developed independently.1075 The same, or 
very similar, legal rules can function in very different circumstances.1076 Indeed, as 
Ayad explains: ‘Contract law and ICA are well suited to harmonisation with the 
                                                 
1072 Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (2nd edn, Temple University Press 2001). 98.  
1073 Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (2nd edn, Temple University Press 2001). 98-99.  
1074 Mary B Ayad, ‘Harmonisation of International Commercial Arbitration Law and Sharia’ (2009) 
6 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 93, 94. 
1075 Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (2nd edn, Temple University Press 2001). 106.  
1076 Alan Watson, Society and Legal Change (2nd edn, Temple University Press 2001). 110.  
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Sharia’.1077 Pacta sunt servanda,1078 rebus sic stantibus and force majeure, for 
example, are principles applicable to both Western and Islamic legal systems.1079 
 
Since rules must be interpreted, and interpretation is culturally dependent, the 
transplanted legal rules may not operate identically in the donor and recipient 
jurisdictions.1080 Variations on the theme, however, are unimportant provided the 
theme itself is enhanced. The goal here is not to import legal rules that operate 
identically to the rules in their original cultural setting. Rather, and bearing in mind 
the Model Law harmonisation goals of ensuring supportive legal regulation and 
enabling party autonomy,1081 the aim is to enhance the interaction and balance 
between the three core principles, so facilitating a modern approach to arbitration 
under the Saudi Arabian legal framework. The three principles of party autonomy, 
justice and cost-effectiveness, which are the driving force behind the proposals, are 
not alien to Islamic countries. Indeed, as previously explained, Islam values free will 
and self-determination, albeit constrained by the obligation to follow the Sharia. 
Furthermore, justice, in both its substantive and procedural senses, is central to Islam. 
                                                 
1077 Mary B Ayad, ‘Harmonisation of International Commercial Arbitration Law and Sharia’ (2009) 
6 Macquarie Journal of Business Law 93, 94. 
1078 See the Holy Qu’ran, chapter 5, verse 1, which states ‘O you who believe, fulfil the obligations’ 
(the Arabic term is uqud, which encompasses covenants, contracts, agreements etc). 
1079 Saba Habachy, ‘Property, Right and Contract in Muslim Law’ (1962) 62 Columbia Law Review 
450, 459-460; Emilia Justyna Powell, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, ‘The International Court of Justice 
and the World’s Three Legal Systems’ (2007) 69 The Journal of Politics 397, 401; Mary B Ayad, 
‘Harmonisation of International Commercial Arbitration Law and Sharia’ (2009) 6 Macquarie 
Journal of Business Law 93, 101. 
1080  Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of 
European & Comparative Law 111, 115. 
1081 TT Arvind, ‘The “Transplant Effect” in Harmonization’ (2010) 59 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 65, 70. 
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And cost-effectiveness is a rational principle for any commercial environment, which 
applies as much to Islamic and Arabic countries as to any Western state. It is arguably 
even more important since Islam characterises Muslims as Allah’s vicegerents, as 
embodied in the concept of khilafa.1082 As the custodians of Earth’s wealth, it behoves 
all Muslims to avoid wastefulness, which in turn requires effectiveness and 
efficiency. Provided the imported rules function to enhance the balance between the 
three principles, then the transplantation may be considered a success. 
 
Provided the proposals are consistent with Sharia, then given the dual nature of Saudi 
Arabia’s legal system (see 1.3.5), changes to the secular system should not be a ‘legal 
irritant’ that ‘creates wild perturbations in the interplay of discourses’ within the 
Sharia legal system or even to Saudi law as a whole.1083 It is, as Siems notes, easy to 
exaggerate the risk that ‘foreign influences’ will act as ‘irritants’.1084  Furthermore, as 
Arvind observes: ‘[N]o legal system is entirely a prisoner of its own past 
traditions’.1085  Rather, the ongoing reform of the law, coupled with the development 
of the SCCA, should act as a positive influence on the arbitration culture in Saudi 
Arabia, reducing the risk that the proposals made in this thesis will act as ‘irritants’ 
or be met with undue resistance. As noted above, the proposed legal rules may not be 
                                                 
1082 The Holy Qu’ran, chapter 2, verse 30; chapter 6, verse 165; Sayd Farook, ‘On Corporate Social 
Responsibility of Islamic Financial Institutions’ (2007) 15 Islamic Economic Studies 31, 33; 
Muatasim Ismaeel, Katharina Blaim, ‘Toward applied Islamic business ethics: responsible halal 
business’ (2012) 31 Journal of Management Development 1090, 1091. 
1083 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11, 12. 
1084 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014), 197. 
1085 TT Arvind, ‘The “Transplant Effect” in Harmonization’ (2010) 59 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 65, 81 
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interpreted in quite the same way as in the donor jurisdiction, and this may impact on 
how the rules operate in practice. However, given the global nature of ICA and the 
three core principles, and given the changes to the arbitration institutions and 
framework already implemented in Saudi Arabia it would misrepresent the proposals 
to characterise them as ‘alien’ rules that are incapable of ‘domestication’ and ‘will 
unleash an evolutionary dynamic in which the external rule’s meaning will be 
reconstructed and the internal context will undergo fundamental change’.1086 In any 
case, the goal behind the proposals made here is to facilitate further evolution of the 
Saudi legal framework for arbitration. Provided that the change resulting from the 
proposals is beneficial and desired, then it seems inappropriate to consider the 
transplanted legal rules as ‘irritants’. 
 
In ensuring the success of the transplanted rules, and hence securing the intended 
benefits for Saudi Arabia, it is important to appreciate that this is likely to depend  at 
least as much, if not more, on ‘the process of legal reform and development … than 
the substance of transplanted rules’.1087 It is, therefore, crucial that Saudi Arabia 
intends to improve the commercial competitiveness of the country (see 1.3.5). This 
includes the goal of modernising arbitration as evidenced in the new legal framework, 
the SCCA, and the commercial courts. To further support an appropriate culture of 
arbitration, as Majeed al Rasheed, the CEO of the SCCA, explained: ‘the Ministry of 
Justice is developing judicial training programmes and the [SCCA] … is developing 
                                                 
1086 Gunther Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in 
New Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11, 12. 
1087 Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press 2014), 198. 
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research and professional development activities that will open a dialogue with 
judges’.1088 Indeed, it is recognised that arbitration institutions can help a country 
develop its approach to arbitration by ‘actively participat[ing] in developing 
arbitration laws and best practices … publishing decisions, hosting conferences and 
training events, and participating in public fora’.1089 Further to the crucial role of the 
SCCA, the ‘growing interest in arbitration in Saudi Arabia’ coupled with the trend 
for Saudi lawyers to further their education in ICA at Western universities, should 
also facilitate the diffusion of ICA norms.1090   
 
Together, these innovations should allow the culture of arbitration to develop 
alongside the changes in the legal framework and institutions. The reforms proposed 
in the subsequent sections of this chapter are aimed at fitting in to and complementing 
this already ongoing process of change. In so doing, the proposals should improve 
rather than ‘distort’ the existing legal framework.1091 Indeed, there are already cases 
that suggest the courts are taking a more supportive and less interventionist approach. 
In one case, for example, the court relied on the separability of the arbitration clause 
to hold that it should not be subject to other choice of law clauses within the main 
                                                 
1088 Alison Ross, ‘Introducing the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration’ (3 November 2016) 
Global Arbitration Review <www.globalarbitrationreview.com> accessed 20 August 2018. 
1089 Mohamed Abdel Raouf, ‘Emergence of New Arbitral Centres in Asia and Africa: Competition, 
Cooperation and Contribution to the Rule of Law’ in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian DM Lew and 
Loukas Mistelis (eds) The Evolution and Future of International Arbitration (Kluwer Law 
International 2016) 321, 325. 
1090 Alison Ross, ‘Introducing the Saudi Center for Commercial Arbitration’ (3 November 2016) 
Global Arbitration Review <www.globalarbitrationreview.com> accessed 20 August 2018. 
1091 Katharina Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Economies’ (2002) 
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contract.1092 Furthermore, in several cases, the courts have accepted that they have 
‘no jurisdiction to re-examine the substance of the case decided by the arbitral 
tribunal’.1093 
 
6.3.2 General proposals 
Based on the analysis carried out in this thesis, and following the Scottish approach, 
it is submitted that the SAL 2012 should be amended to include an additional article 
that sets out the founding principles underlying the legal framework. The aim behind 
this article would be to set the tone for the legal regulation of arbitration, which should 
foster a pro-arbitration culture, while also acknowledging the Islamic context. 
Because of this aim, the founding principles should be set down in article one, which 
emphasises their importance. As discussed previously, there are no cultural barriers 
that would prevent the three core principles from being understood and applied to 
enhance the legal regulation of arbitration in Saudi Arabia. The establishment of the 
commercial and enforcement courts and the SCCA should have a positive cultural 
impact on arbitration.1094 By emphasising the underlying principles, this proposed 
article should help to encourage a light touch approach and reduce the risk that the 
courts may be tempted to retain the interventionist approach that was one of the main 
                                                 
1092 Case no 32328746, Riyadh General Court, February 2012 as cited in: Majed Alrasheed, Judge 
Mostafa Abdel-Ghaffar, ‘Saudi Strides’ (11 April 2017) Global Arbitration Review 
<www.globalarbitrationreview.com> accessed 20 August 2018. 
1093 Majed Alrasheed, Judge Mostafa Abdel-Ghaffar, ‘Saudi Strides’ (11 April 2017) Global 
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1094 Mohamed Abdel Raouf, ‘Emergence of New Arbitral Centres in Asia and Africa: Competition, 
Cooperation and Contribution to the Rule of Law’ in Stavros Brekoulakis, Julian DM Lew and 
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issues with arbitration under the previous legal regime of the SAL 1983.1095 Under 
this article, and provided the implementation of these proposals is coupled with the 
provision of professional education for relevant lawyers and judges,1096 the courts 
should develop an expertise that appropriately respects party autonomy and serves to 
facilitate and support a just system of Sharia-compliant arbitration. Based on s.1 of 
the Scottish Act, the following is proposed: 
Article 1. The founding principles of these regulations are:  
(1) The object of arbitration is to provide the parties with a Sharia complaint 
alternative mechanism to litigation for resolving disputes. 
(2) The three foundational principles of arbitration, which provide the basis for 
the regulations and should be used to aid interpretation are: 
a. The principle of party autonomy 
b. The principle of justice 
c. The principle of cost-effectiveness 
(3) Based on its contractual origins, the principle of party autonomy means that 
the parties should be free to agree on the rules governing the arbitration of the 
dispute between them. This freedom is subject only to the mandatory rules of 
these regulations, which are necessary to ensure a procedurally just process, 
to ensure consistency with the Sharia and to safeguard the public interest. 
                                                 
1095 TT Arvind, ‘The “Transplant Effect” in Harmonization’ (2010) 59 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 65, 78. 
1096 TT Arvind, ‘The “Transplant Effect” in Harmonization’ (2010) 59 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 65, 81. 
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(4) Based on the principle of justice, the process of arbitration should be fair to 
all parties, should allow all parties the equal opportunity to present their case 
and should be resolved by impartial arbitrators. 
(5) Based on the principle of cost-effectiveness, arbitration must proceed without 
unnecessary delay or expense. The competent court should not intervene 
except as permitted under these regulations. 
 
The second general proposal, again following the Scottish approach, is for a 
comprehensive set of rules governing the arbitration process. These rules should 
include a limited number of mandatory rules, restricted to those strictly necessary to 
ensure: a fair, just and effective procedure; consistency with Sharia; and consistency 
with the public interest. To respect the principle of party autonomy, all other rules, 
including those aimed at ensuring efficiency, should be default. Rather than attempt 
to provide a full set of rules as part of this proposal, it would be better for them to be 
developed following an empirical analysis of arbitration in Saudi Arabia and could 
be based on the procedural rules already applied by the SCCA,1097 which are 
themselves based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules adapted to fit in with local 
cultural expectations. This could be used as the basis for a consultation process 
(shura) that would allow the development of a comprehensive set of rules that balance 
the needs of all stakeholders and clearly distinguish the mandatory from the default 
rules. This set of rules could be accommodated through a basic law of arbitration, 
                                                 
1097 SCCA, Arbitration Rules, Mediation Rules (SCCA 2016). 
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containing the mandatory rules and providing for the application of default rules, 
which would be contained in a supplementary law. 
 
6.3.3 Jurisdiction proposals 
The SAL 2012 already provides for both the principle of competence-competence 
and the doctrine of separability, which are usefully contained in two distinct articles. 
However, to further emphasise the autonomy of the arbitration process, and the 
court’s limited role, it would be helpful to follow the Model Law and include the two 
provisions under a dedicated chapter, entitled “Jurisdiction of the arbitration 
tribunal”. Furthermore, to serve both party autonomy and efficiency, article 20(3) 
should be labelled as a default, rather than mandatory, rule.  
 
Presently, article 20(3) provides that where the tribunal rejects a lack of jurisdiction 
plea, this may only be challenged through the courts by an annulment claim. While 
this reinforces the principle of competence-competence, it does so at the expense of 
party autonomy and may be less efficient than allowing an application to the court 
concurrent with ongoing arbitration proceedings. Simply changing the rule from 
mandatory to default will not affect the justice of the process, but will enhance party 
autonomy and may improve efficiency. It is proposed that article 20(3) should be 
amended as follows:  
20(3) - Subject to the parties’ agreement to the contrary, the arbitral 
tribunal may either rule on the pleas referred to in paragraph 1 of 
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this Article prior to ruling on the merits or rule on all of them at the 
same time.  
Where the tribunal dismisses the jurisdictional plea prior to ruling 
on the merits then, subject to the parties’ agreement to the contrary, 
the decision may be appealed to the competent court. The 
arbitration proceedings may continue while waiting for the appeal 
to be decided. 
Where the jurisdictional challenge is determined concurrently with 
the merits, and the tribunal dismisses the plea, then the decision 
cannot be challenged except through an application to set aside the 
final award in accordance with Article 54 of this Act.  
 
To support the emphasis on the autonomy of arbitration and the tribunal’s jurisdiction, 
it would also be helpful to follow article 5 of the Model Law and formally provide 
that the court may only intervene as permitted under the regulations, which would 
explicitly include both the proposed basic and supplementary laws of arbitration. 
Such a rule would be consistent with the current trend, which has seen the courts 
accept a less interventionist and more facilitatory approach than was the experience 
under previous legal regimes.1098 It would also be symbolically important and may 
help to further encourage a pro-arbitration culture. The rule should be mandatory and, 
although included as part of the proposed article 1 on the general principles, it should 
be provided for in more detail by including an additional article under chapter 1 
                                                 
1098 See 6.3.1. 
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(general provisions). This mandatory rule should also permit the court of 
enforcement’s role in enforcing arbitration awards, as provided for by the 
Enforcement Law of 2012. For clarity’s sake, the proposed new article is referred to 
here as article 8(A): 
For any matter governed by this Act, or by the Supplementary Law 
of Arbitration, no court is permitted to intervene except where so 
provided in this Act, the Supplementary Law of Arbitration or in 
the Enforcement Law of 2012. 
 
Finally, and following the approach under SAR r.41 and r.42, the proposed 
supplementary law of arbitration should include a default rule allowing the court to 
determine a referred point of law. The proposed article is: 
Subject to the contrary agreement of the parties, the competent 
court may, on the application of any party to the arbitration 
agreement, determine any point of Saudi law or Sharia law arising 
in the arbitration. 
For the application to be valid, all parties must have consented to 
the application, or the tribunal must have given its consent and the 
court is satisfied that allowing the application will be in the interests 
of justice and cost-effectiveness. 
Arbitration proceedings may be continued while awaiting the 
decision of the competent court. 
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The decision of the competent court is final and binding on the 
tribunal. 
By allowing the parties to determine the importance of legal accuracy to the fairness 
of the award, the rule would enhance party autonomy and justice, and may make an 
award more acceptable to the losing party. This proposal would be supported by the 
option of a legal error challenge (see section 6.3.5). 
 
Although this proposal may be considered controversial since it permits the court a 
more interventionist role than allowed under the Model Law, it is consistent with the 
approach taken both in Scotland and England, both of which are respected 
jurisdictions with London being one of the leading centres for ICA.1099 Given the 
importance to Sharia of making decisions based on truth,1100 allowing parties the 
option of applying to the court to determine a question of law, the rule is consistent 
with the legal culture in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, as the Holy Qu’ran states: ‘mix not up 
truth with falsehood’.1101 Thus, a rule allowing the parties to apply to the courts to 
ensure legal accuracy should at least be acceptable and may be a desirable choice for 
many parties. Finally, by making it a default rule, the choice is left to the parties 
                                                 
1099 School of International Arbitration Queen Mary University of London, 2018 International 
Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration (2018), 9 
<http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey---
The-Evolution-of-International-Arbitration.PDF> accessed 21 August 2018. 
1100 Sa'eed ibn Mut'ib Al-Qahtaanee, ‘A Study of the Legal Maxim "No Validity is Attached to 
Conjecture which is Obviously Tainted by Error (Laa Ibrata Bidh-Dhann-il Bayyani Khata'uhu)" and 
its Juristic Applications' (2014) Issue 62 Al-Adl 41, 84. See also:4.4.2. 
1101 Holy Qu’ran, chapter 2, verse 42. 
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themselves. As such, the rule is not a mandate for the court to intervene, but an option 
that respects party autonomy.  
 
6.3.4 Arbitration agreement proposals 
It should first be noted that the proposal that, following the Scottish approach, Saudi 
Arabia should provide a complete set of arbitration rules will ensure a complete and 
effective arbitration agreement. To support this, it would be helpful for the law to 
explicitly define a valid arbitration agreement. To respect the parties’ autonomy, the 
rule should specify that the agreement is only valid when made by competent natural 
or juridical persons and that it must made be made voluntarily by parties who have a 
reasonable understanding of their rights and obligations under the agreement. In the 
interests of justice this should be a mandatory rule but given the recognition of the 
need for competence (ahliyyah),1102 the requirement for adequate information,1103 and 
the importance of free will in Islam, such a rule would be consistent with the legal 
culture in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the whole faith of Islam is grounded in the ability of 
humans to exercise their free will and choose whether to believe in Allah.1104 This 
proposed article 9, would replace the current article 9(2) and article 10(1), with the 
                                                 
1102 Holy Qu’ran, chapter 2, verse 282; Md. Abdul Jalil, Muhammad Khalilur Rahman, ‘Islamic Law 
of Contract is Getting Momentum’ (2010) 1 International Journal of Business and Social Science 
175, 187. 
1103 Parviz Bagheri, Kamal Halili Hassan, Mehdi Shabannia Mansour, ‘Parties’ legal capacity in 
electronic commerce transactions’ (2017) 44 European Journal of Law and Economics 503, 505. 
1104 Holy Qu’ran, chapter 18, verses 29, 54-56; Abdur Rashid Bhat, ‘Free Will and Determinism: An 
Overview of Muslim Scholars’ Perspectives’ (2006) 2 Journal of Islamic Philosophy 7. 
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current article 9(1) and (3) and the current article 10(2) becoming a new article 10. 
The proposed article 9 is: 
An arbitration agreement will be valid and effective only of it has 
been concluded with the consent of the parties to the agreement. 
The parties giving consent, whether competent natural or juridical 
persons or their representatives: must have the legal capacity to 
dispose of their rights; must have a reasonable understanding that 
the agreement commits them to arbitrate the relevant dispute; and 
must have given their consent voluntarily. 
The arbitration agreement may be concluded orally or in writing. 
Where the agreement is concluded orally, the agreement will only 
be valid if it subsequently recorded in writing before the 
commencement of any arbitration proceedings. 
 
Because of the importance of the NY Convention, it would be unwise to completely 
remove the requirement for arbitration agreements to be in writing. A formal record 
of the agreement is also useful for evidentiary purposes. Furthermore, the Holy 
Qu’ran explicitly prescribes that a contract must be recorded in writing: ‘O you who 
believe, when you contract a debt for a fixed time, write it down’. Note that the 
context of this verse suggests that the requirement for writing is to provide evidence 
of the contract and so ‘to keep away from doubts’. Indeed, it goes on to state that a 
contract for a contemporaneous exchange of goods, under which both parties’ 
obligations are wholly fulfilled, is valid and acceptable even if not recorded in 
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writing.1105  This is consistent with the aim of the proposal here. Thus, given the 
demands of modern commercial activity, and as a respect for party autonomy, the 
formal requirement should be modified to allow for the agreement to be valid even if 
concluded orally, provided that the agreement is subsequently recorded in writing 
prior to the commencement of arbitration proceedings. This is consistent with the 
Qu’ranic requirement for writing and provides a reasonable balance between 
commercial practicalities, party autonomy and the formal justice requirement for 
evidential certainty. Requiring the agreement to be recorded should also reduce the 
risk of subsequent disagreements over its content and, furthermore, provides 
important evidence regarding the tribunal’s jurisdiction. 
 
Given the foundational importance of party autonomy, it is proposed that the issue of 
privity should be provided for in the SAL 2012, rather than the IRSAL 2017. It is also 
submitted that article 13 of the IRSAL 2017 should be amended to explicitly provide 
for a third party to be bound by the arbitration agreement through legal succession as 
well as consent. This would be consistent with both a previous Saudi judgment1106 
and the approach taken by the European Court of Justice in a case involving a choice 
of forum clause in a bill of lading.1107 Furthermore, the article should be amended to 
remove the discretion afforded the tribunal to refuse to agree to allow the third party 
                                                 
1105 Holy Qu’ran, chapter 2, verse 282. 
1106 Case no 269/3/J, (1988 (1409H)), Board of Grievances as cited in: Majed Alrasheed, Judge 
Mostafa Abdel-Ghaffar, ‘Saudi Strides’ (11 April 2017) Global Arbitration Review 
<www.globalarbitrationreview.com> accessed 20 August 2018. 
1107 Case C-387/98 Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV and Others [2000] ECR I-9362, 
9375, para 27. 
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to join the arbitration. This should be fully determined by the consent of all parties. 
Where the tribunal agrees to allow a third party to intervene, the tribunal should be 
required to take into consideration the parties’ wishes and whether the decision would 
substantially prejudice one of the parties. It should be required to give reasons for any 
decision, and there should be the right to challenge the decision before the competent 
court. Such an approach would adequately balance the principles of autonomy and 
justice.1108 
 
Furthermore, and specifically for the benefit of non-Muslim parties, the law should 
be amended to clarify the Sharia prohibitions of riba (interest) and gharar 
(speculation) and their implications for the arbitration agreement. It should be made 
explicit that an agreement to arbitrate a dispute involving riba or gharar (eg 
speculative contracts, or disputes over speculative damages) would not be a valid 
arbitration agreement. However, to respect party autonomy as far as possible, the 
validity of the agreement should be preserved where it is possible to remove the 
offending part without undermining the agreement. The proposed article 10(A) is: 
Any arbitration agreement, or part thereof, that is prohibited by 
Sharia will be deemed null and void. This includes: agreements 
concerning speculative contracts or speculative damages; 
agreements that allow for award to include the payment of interest; 
and agreements to arbitrate disputes regarding services or 
                                                 
1108 SI Strong, ‘Intervention and Joinder as of Right in International Arbitration: An Infringement of 
Individual Contract Rights or a Proper Equitable Measure?’ (1998) 31 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 915, 978-987. 
345 
 
commodities prohibited by Sharia, such as interest-based financial 
services, gambling, adult entertainment, alcohol, and pork.  
An arbitration agreement will still be considered valid if the 
affected part can be separated from the remainder of the agreement 
without destroying the purpose or function of the agreement.  
 
6.3.5 The arbitration tribunal and proceedings proposals 
As suggested above, legislating for a comprehensive set of arbitration rules, with a 
clear distinction between mandatory and default rules, would provide a flexible 
framework that both respects party autonomy and ensures a just process. While it has 
been argued that the rules should be drafted following an empirical study and a period 
of consultation with the relevant stakeholders, some specific proposals will be 
explained here. 
 
First, the parties should have greater control over the composition of the arbitration 
tribunal. It would be more respectful of party autonomy to make article 13 a default 
provision, allowing the parties to agree on the number of arbitrators without requiring 
an odd number. While an odd number avoids problems with majority decision 
making, the option of appointing an arbitration ‘umpire’ under article 39(2) provides 
an equally effective mechanism for resolving a split decision. Article 13 should also 
be amended to provide for a default number of arbitrators. The proposed amended 
article 13 is: 
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The arbitral tribunal shall be composed of one or more arbitrators. 
The parties are free to decide on the number of arbitrators that will 
constitute the tribunal. Where the parties fail to decide, then by 
default the tribunal shall be composed of one arbitrator.   
Providing for a default of one arbitrator serves the interests of cost-effectiveness by 
ensuring that the arbitration may proceed with the minimum cost expended on the 
tribunal. Out of respect for party autonomy, where the parties are happy to meet the 
expense of a larger panel then they are free to agree on a tribunal comprised of two 
or more arbitrators.  
 
Further to the number of arbitrators, the requirement, under article 14, for the 
appointed arbitrators to be of good conduct, is vague and leaves an appointment open 
to challenge. While it is appreciated that the good conduct requirement is based on 
the Sharia prescription that judges should be worthy of the authority granted them,1109 
it would be better for this to be replaced by an objectively verifiable requirement. 
Thus, article 14 should be amended to read: 
The arbitrator is required: 
1. To have full capacity; 
2. To certify that he or she has never been convicted of a 
serious criminal offence or struck off a professional 
register; 
                                                 
1109 Holy Qu’ran, chapter 4, verse 58. 
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3. To hold at the least, a degree in legal or Sharia Sciences; if 
the arbitral tribunal is composed of more than one arbitrator 
then it is sufficient if the chairperson fulfils the 
abovementioned requirement. 
It should be noted that the SCCA has produced a Code of Ethics and it may be feasible 
to also require arbitrators to abide by that Code,1110 which would further ensure that 
the arbitrator is worthy of the parties’ trust to resolve the dispute fairly. 
 
Second, although there is nothing in the SAL 2012 precluding the appointment of 
female arbitrators, it would be better if the law explicitly states that arbitrators may 
be male or female. This may be achieved by further amending article 14, specifically, 
by changing the first sentence to provide: ‘The arbitrator, who may be male or female, 
is required …’. Despite the recent case in which an administrative court of appeal 
accepted the appointment of a female arbitrator,1111 women have traditionally been 
excluded as arbitrators in Saudi Arabia. Making it explicit that women may be 
appointed as arbitrators would be consistent with developments in Saudi Arabia.1112 
It would also be consistent with the cultural expectations of the international 
arbitration community and it would eliminate any doubt regarding the validity of their 
appointment. 
                                                 
1110 SCCA, Code of Ethics: Arbitrators; Mediators; Parties (2016). 
1111 Mulhim Hamad Almulhim, ‘The First Female Arbitrator in Saudi Arabia’ (Online, 29 August 
2016) Kluwer Arbitration Blog <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2016/08/29/the-first-female-
arbitrator-in-saudi-arabia/> accessed 30 November 2017. 
1112 Section 3.3.3 
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Third, Saudi Arabia should follow the Scottish approach and create the role of 
arbitration appointment referees that may be appointed to resolve problems arising 
where the arbitrator selection process breaks down. To facilitate this, the SCCA could 
administer the process and maintain a register of arbitration appointment referees, 
who should be sufficiently qualified and experienced in the arbitration process to 
enable them to fulfil the role. The SCCA could also amend their Arbitration Rules 
and Code of Ethics to govern the conduct of the referees. 
 
The use of arbitration appointment referees would further limit the court’s role, which 
should minimise delays, making the process more efficient. Furthermore, avoiding 
the courts’ involvement in the appointment of arbitrators respects the autonomy of 
the arbitration process and should help to foster the development of a pro-arbitration 
culture. To respect party autonomy, the use of a referee should be a default option, 
allowing the parties to refer the matter to the referee, but also preserving the option 
of referring the matter to the court where the parties cannot agree on the use of an 
appointment referee. While this is based on SAR r.7, the proposal varies that approach 
by requiring the parties’ agreement, rather than relying on a lack of objection. This is 
because an agreement provides stronger evidence of the party’s wishes than does the 
process of notification and lack of objection. This may be achieved by amending the 
current article 15(1) to read as follows: 
1. The parties to arbitration shall agree on the procedure for the appointment of 
the arbitrators. Where the parties fail to reach an agreement, the parties may 
agree to refer the matter to the arbitration appointment referee and request that 
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the arbitration appointment referee either: a) determines the appointment 
procedure; or b) appoints the arbitrators. 
Where the parties do not agree to refer the matter to an arbitration appointment 
referee, or where the arbitration appointment referee fails to determine the 
appointment procedure or make an appointment within 15 days of the referral, 
the following default appointment procedure will apply: … 
Here the default procedure, and the option to request the court’s intervention, would 
be available as already provided for by the current article 15.  
 
Fourth, article 18 of the SAL 2012 should be amended. Article 18 provides that, 
where the parties are unable to agree on the dismissal of an arbitrator who has caused 
an ‘undue delay’ in the proceedings, the court is empowered, on application, to 
dismiss the arbitrator. A similar power is available under the SAR, but the court’s 
power is limited, with dismissal only permitted where the delay has resulted in a 
substantive injustice. This restriction provides a greater respect for party autonomy, 
while still allowing the court to act where justice is threatened, which would be 
consistent with the Sharia’s requirement for justice: ‘Surely Allah commands … that 
when you judge between people you judge with justice’.1113 Thus, article 18(1) should 
be amended to similarly restrict the court’s power. The proposed amended article 
18(1) is: 
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The competent court may remove an arbitrator and terminate his or 
her mandate on the request of either party where the following 
conditions are met: 
a. The arbitrator is unable to fulfil the required duties, or fails 
to fulfil those duties, or causes an undue delay to the 
arbitration proceedings by interrupting performance of 
those duties; and 
b. The arbitrator does not voluntarily withdraw from office, 
and the parties do not agree on removing the arbitrator from 
office; and 
c. The delay has caused, or is likely to cause, a substantial 
injustice to the party requesting the court’s intervention. 
 
Finally, the issue of confidentiality should be dealt with explicitly through a default 
rule as follows. 
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, all matters relating to the 
dispute, the arbitration proceedings and the award, that are not 
already in the public domain, are to be treated as confidential. 
Disclosure of such confidential information may give rise to a legal 
action for breach of confidentiality unless: 
The parties have consented to the disclosure; 
Disclosure is necessary to allow the tribunal to fulfil its duties; 
or 
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Disclosure is required by law, the public interest or the interests 
of justice. 
The tribunal must ensure that all parties and any expert witnesses 
involved in the arbitration are aware of the obligation to maintain 
confidentiality. 
This would ensure confidentiality, which reflects both local and international 
expectations,1114 unless the rule was specifically dis-applied by the parties. Explicitly 
providing for confidentiality would be consistent with the Holy Qu’ran which 
recognises the value of ‘secret counsels’ when attempting to secure ‘reconciliation 
between people’.1115 Allowing the waiver respects party autonomy, while the default 
rule avoids the problem of the parties’ failure to explicitly consider the issue as part 
of their arbitration agreement. It also provides certainty and clarity regarding the 
confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings. 
 
6.3.6 Arbitration award proposals 
First, as with the issue of arbitrability, the SAL 2012 should be more explicit 
regarding the constraints imposed by Sharia. Thus, there should be a mandatory rule 
prohibiting the tribunal from a making an award that includes the payment of interest 
                                                 
1114 The Holy Qu’ran, chapter 49, verse 12; chapter 24, verse 19; Lawrence Rosen, The Justice of 
Islam: Comparative Perspectives on Islamic Law and Society (Oxford University Press 2000), 187-
199; Roszaini Haniffa, Mohammad Hudaib, ‘Locating audit expectations gap within a cultural 
context: The case of Saudi Arabia’ (2007) 16 Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation 179, 186; Vidushi Marda, Bhairav Acharya, Identifying Aspects of Privacy in Islamic Law 
(2014) < https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/identifying-aspects-of-privacy-in-islamic-
law> accessed 22 August 2018; L Ali Khan, ‘Arbitral Autonomy’ (2013) 74 Louisiana Law Review 
1, 49-50. 
1115 The Holy Qu’ran, chapter 4, verse 114. 
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(contrary to the prohibition of riba) or speculative damages (contrary to the 
prohibition of gharar). The proposed article 42(A) is: 
Without prejudice to the tribunal’s duty to ensure a just award, and 
considering the obligation on the tribunal to make an award that is 
not contrary to Sharia, the tribunal shall not issue an award that 
includes the payment of interest or the payment of damages for any 
possible future losses arising out of the dispute. 
 
Second, when making an award, the SAL 2012 requires, under article 42(1), the 
reasons for the award to be stated. This mandatory rule provides no further details 
regarding the scope of the obligation.1116 Providing reasons serves two main 
purposes: first, it allows the parties to understand the award, making it easier for the 
losing party to decide whether to accept the justice of the award or to appeal against 
it; and second, where an application is brought to vacate the award, it makes it easier 
for the appellate forum to decide whether the award should be upheld or vacated. To 
fulfil these purposes, the rule should at least state the minimum scope and extent of 
the requirement to state the reasons behind the award.1117 Thus, article 42(1) should 
be amended to require the reasons to include: a summary statement of the dispute 
between the parties; the issues raised by the dispute; ‘the factual findings and legal or 
                                                 
1116 Sections 5.6.2, 5.7. 
1117 SI Strong, 'Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Embracing and 
Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy' (2015) 37 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 1, 33. 
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other reasons' for the award.1118 To respect party autonomy, there should be a default 
rule allowing the parties to agree on whether the statement of reasons should include 
detail of any dissenting opinions.1119  
 
Third, the SAL 2012 appears to preclude the option of appealing an arbitration 
decision through an internal arbitration appeal process. Thus, article 49 only permits 
the award to be challenged before the competent court. In the interests of both 
substantive justice and party autonomy, that provision should be amended to allow 
the parties the power to utilise any suitable internal appeal mechanism. To respect 
both the autonomy of the arbitration process as well as party autonomy, the right to 
utilise an arbitration appeal or review mechanism is a default provision that may be 
disapplied by the parties in their arbitration agreement. The amended article 49 should 
read as follows: 
Arbitral awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of this 
Act cannot be challenged by any means of recourse, except for: 
1. Subject to the contrary agreement of the parties, any 
available arbitration process of appeal or review; and 
2. The action for setting aside the arbitral award as per the 
provisions of this Act. 
                                                 
1118 Gordon Runoff Ltd v Westport Insurance Corporation [2010] NSWCA 57, [218-220]. See also: 
Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Westzucker GmbH (No 2) [1981] 2 Lloyd's Reports 130, 132-
133; Bay Hotel and Resort Ltd v Cavalier Construction Ltd [2001] UKPC 34, [25]. 
1119 See, SI Strong, 'Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Embracing and 
Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy' (2015) 37 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 1, 23-24. 
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Furthermore, to enhance the arbitration culture, an appellate arbitration tribunal 
should be made available under the auspices of the SCCA.1120 By utilising the SCCA 
for this purpose, the internal appeal mechanism could be both efficient and sensitive 
to the need to ensure that the award is Sharia compliant. 
 
Fourth, unlike the Model Law and the SAR, the current law does not allow the courts 
to remit an issue back to the tribunal. To respect the process of arbitration, and the 
parties’ autonomous decision to resolve their dispute through arbitration, the law 
should be amended to allow the courts, when considering a legal challenge to the 
award, to remit the matter back to the arbitration tribunal. This would, for example, 
allow the court to refer the award for reconsideration where the award, or part of the 
award, contravenes Sharia. Such an approach would mitigate the impact of article 
50(2) while preserving the cultural and legal expectation that the final enforceable 
award will be Sharia compliant.  As explained in chapter five, the Scottish approach 
provides the greatest respect for the integrity and autonomy of the arbitration process 
by allowing the court, where appropriate, to remit the award back to the tribunal for 
reconsideration. The SAL 2012 should be amended accordingly. However, while the 
SAR leave remittance to the court’s discretion, it is submitted that the court’s power 
should be subject to the parties’ agreement, which would provide a greater respect for 
party autonomy without prejudicing justice. This could be achieved by the following 
proposed article 50(A): 
                                                 
1120 Council of Saudi Chambers, ‘Council Announces Board of Saudi Arbitration Centre’ (Online, 15 
July 2014) Council of Saudi Chambers <http://www.csc.org.sa/English/News/Pages/14ye12.aspx> 
accessed 30 November 2017. 
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In deciding on the action for setting aside the award, the competent 
court may: 
1. Confirm the award; or 
2. Refer the award, or part of the award, back to the tribunal 
for reconsideration, provided that the court considers that 
reconsideration is appropriate in the interests of justice. 
This power is subject to the contrary agreement of the 
parties; or 
3. Set aside the arbitration award. 
 
Fifth, consistently with the Model Law and most jurisdictions, the SAL 2012 does 
not allow the award to be challenged for legal error.1121 The main reason for the 
reluctance to allow such an appeal is that it emphasises the autonomy of arbitration 
as a dispute resolution mechanism. Precluding a legal error appeal limits judicial 
intervention, emphasises the distinctive nature of arbitration and respects the finality 
of the award. It prioritises the nature of arbitration as an autonomous system over the 
justice-based goal of ensuring a legally accurate award and a respect for party 
autonomy. It should be noted, however, that arbitration is founded on the 
jurisdictional authority that flows from the contractual agreement between the parties 
to submit their dispute to arbitration. Out of respect for the parties’ autonomy, they 
should be allowed the discretion to agree on the availability of a legal error appeal. 
Under the SAR, a default rule allows the parties to raise a legal error challenge. Given 
                                                 
1121 Section 5.6.3. 
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the history of arbitration in Saudi, and the past criticism that the law allowed the court 
too much scope to intervene, it would be better to adopt an opt-in rather than an opt-
out approach.1122 Thus, while challenges for errors of law should be excluded by 
default, the law should allow legal error as a ground for vacating the award where 
that option has been explicitly agreed by the parties. Allowing the parties to select a 
rule that facilitates legal accuracy would serve both party autonomy and justice while 
also being consistent with the Sharia (see 6.3.3). It allows the parties to determine 
whether the benefit of legal accuracy justifies the costs of making a legal error appeal. 
The threat to the integrity of the arbitration process and the finality of the arbitration 
award is minimised by making the rule a default opt-in choice and by coupling the 
rule with the proposed option of allowing the court to refer the matter back to the 
tribunal. 
 
The option of a legal error appeal may be achieved by inserting two new paragraphs 
into article 50.1123 First, article 50(1)(h) should be added to establish the option for 
the parties to expand the grounds for a setting aside action to include legal error. The 
proposed paragraph states: ‘Subject to the conditions set out in paragraph (5), where 
the parties have agreed to an appeal on a question of law’. The following article 50(5) 
is proposed: 
A party may appeal to the competent court to determine whether 
the tribunal erred on a point of law. Any such application must 
                                                 
1122 See, eg, Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) 2011, Schedule 2, s 5. 
1123 Based on: SAR, rr 69 and 70; English Act, s 69; Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Cap 609) 
2011, Schedule 2, ss 5 and 6. 
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identify the relevant point of law and the alleged error of law. In 
deciding the case, the court must rely on the tribunal’s findings of 
fact in the award to determine whether the tribunal erred on a point 
of law. Where the reasons for the award are insufficient, the court 
may require the tribunal to set out its reasons for the award in 
sufficient detail to allow the court to determine the appeal. The 
court’s decision may only be appealed with the court’s permission.  
 
Sixth, article 50 of the SAL 2012 should be reformed to make it explicit that the 
grounds for setting aside an arbitration award meet a threshold of a substantive 
injustice, which would be entirely consistent with the Sharia’s concern with 
justice.1124 Such a condition should not apply to article 50(a) and (b), which are 
concerned with the very validity of the arbitration agreement, and hence the tribunal’s 
jurisdictional authority to resolve the dispute and render the award. Because the 
option for a legal error appeal has been proposed on the basis that the availability of 
the appeal is entirely a matter of party autonomy, the requirement for a substantive 
injustice would also not apply to the proposed article 50(1)(h). Thus, article 50(1) 
should be amended by adding the relevant provision at the end of the list of cases 
where an award may be set aside. This should state: 
The action for setting aside the arbitral award under cases (c), (d), 
(e), (f), and (g) is only admissible where the irregularity in the 
proceedings has caused, or will cause, a substantive injustice. 
                                                 
1124 Holy Qu’ran, chapter 4, verse 58. 
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This follows the SAR and is consistent with Model Law jurisprudence. Such a 
condition would limit the court’s power to intervene, which would respect both the 
autonomy of arbitration and the finality of the arbitration award, while providing a 
safety net that protects against substantively significant procedural failings. 
 
Finally, article V of the NY Convention should be directly implemented through the 
SAL 2012. Although currently provided for by the Enforcement Law of 2012, it 
would improve the accessibility of the law, and reinforce Saudi Arabia’s commitment 
to ICA, if the provisions of article V of the NY Convention were included as part of 
the arbitration law. 
 
6.4 Final Concluding Statement 
Redfern recently claimed that: ‘If parties are looking for a binding and enforceable 
decision on an international dispute, to be given by a neutral and independent tribunal, 
then international arbitration is "the only game in town"'.1125 It is crucial, then, that in 
this commercially globalised world, progressive nations provide a legal framework 
that enables and facilitates an arbitration service that meets the needs of international 
commerce. The SAL 2012 goes a long way towards fulfilling that requirement, and it 
is certainly a huge improvement over the previous legal framework centred around 
the SAL 1983. While the SAL 2012 provides for a legal framework that is not out of 
                                                 
1125 Alan Redfern, 'The Changing World of International Arbitration' in David D Caron, Stephan W 
Schill, Abby Cohen Smutny, Epaminontas E Triantafilou (eds) Practising Virtue: Inside 
International Arbitration (Oxford University Press 2015) 45, 47. 
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place in the world of ICA and largely consistent with the main hypothesis, there is 
still much room for improvement as this research has demonstrated. 
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